From MacArthur in Asia: The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, ands Korea, by Hiroshi Masuda, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2015
CHAPTER 5
CORREGIDOR, EARLY FEBRUARY TO LATE FEBRUARY 1942
Quezon’s Anti-Americanism and Demand for Neutrality
Manuel L. Quezon, president of the Philippines, originally declined MacArthur’s request that he withdraw from the capital. Caught off guard by MacArthur’s message, he protested: “My own first duty is to take care of the civilian population and to maintain public order while you are fighting the enemy?” MacArthur’s real intention was to make sure that Quezon was not captured and, thus, to prevent the Japanese from using the head of the Philippine government as a symbol of their glorious triumph. In this sense, Quezon was an important American political hostage who should not be handed over to the Japanese. Looking at Hito Koryaku Sakusen (Operation to capture the Philippines) the documentary collection prepared by Japan’s National Institute of Defense Studies, however, one finds no reference to any operation targeting Quezon. However, since Prime Minister Tojo Hideki was to propose independence for the Philippines soon thereafter, one can assume that finding a way to get Quezon on their side was a major concern for the Japanese. Accepting MacArthur’s request, however, Quezon evacuated from Manila to Corregidor with his wife, two daughters, and a son. The movement of the head of state meant that the capital of the Philippines had moved from Manila to a small island, about one-third the size of Manhattan Island.
On December 27, 1941, the Asahi Shimbun covered Quezon’s message with the headlines “Imperial Army Advances to Manila, “U.S. Headquarter Starts Withdrawal” and “Philippine Government Announces Removal of Government Facilities.” Ouezon’s announcement confirmed that the Philippine government had moved from Manila on MacArthur’s recommendation, and that Quezon himself would continue to lead the government from Corregidor in cooperation with the U.S. commander of the Far East. Moreover, the paper noted that, using his emergency powers, the president would reduce the number of cabinet members from nine to four in order to strengthen presidential authority. Even at this stage, the Japanese side was not aware that MacArthur’s party had removed to Corregidor.
However, the health of Quezon, who suffered from tuberculosis, steadily deteriorated, affected by air raids and bombardments, insufficient food rations and hunger, and, above all, frustration and disappointment that the hoped-for relief was not arriving from the United States. In the daytime he needed a wheelchair, and at night morphine was indispensable to ease his coughing. Quezon’s illness was more serious than that of anyone on Corregidor, with the exception of wounded soldiers.
Under these distressing circumstances, Quezon made some political decisions. The first concerned the disposal of the national treasure brought from Manila. On January 11, 1942, John K. Davis, the treasury advisor to High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre, asked Washington whether Philippine cash and certificates of credit transferred from the Manila Bank to Corregidor should be destroyed or sent to the United States so as not to fall into Japanese hands. On January 16, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall conveyed to Quezon through MacArthur that he had reached an agreement with the Department of the Treasury not to allow Philippine treasure to fall into enemy hands. With the permission of the Department of the Treasury, Sidney L. Huff, MacArthur’s aide, put millions of dollars into a barrel, poured gasoline in, and set the money on fire. The numbers on each dollar bill were recorded. Seeing the smoke, the Japanese on Cavite turned their guns in that direction. On the night of February 4,
ten million dollars’ worth of gold and silver bullion brought from Manila were transferred out of the island by the submarine Trout.
Quezon’s second political decision concerned the payment of a special award to MacArthur and some of his immediate aides. On January 3, Quezon issued his Secret Executive Order No. 1, by which $640,000 was withdrawn from Commonwealth funds on deposit in the United States for payment to MacArthur ($500,000), Chief of Staff Richard K. Sutherland ($75,000), Deputy Chief of Staff Richard J. Marshall ($45,000), and Huff ($20,000). Six weeks later MacArthur accepted the money. The special payment was for services rendered by MacArthur as military advisor during the period from July 1941, when he was recalled to active duty as major general (later general), through December 1941. As such it was in violation of army rules. Why did Quezon make this payment at this particular time? Historian Michael Schaller makes the following interpretation:
“As soon as they took Manila, Japanese military authorities called upon Filipino officials to remain in their jobs. The conquerors promised early independence as a reward for collaboration… Shocked by the collaboration of so many of their friends, Quezon and MacArthur both sought a way to reaffirm their allegiance to each other.” However, the reason for the payment was probably not so simple. Sergeant Paul P. Rogers, Sutherland’s secretary and stenographer, left a detailed record on the background to the payment, which will be explained later in this chapter.
Quezon’s third political decision resulted in his sudden and anti-American demand for neutrality and early independence. At least three factors formed the background to this decision. First, on January 7, Japan established a puppet administrative regime with Jorge B. Vargas, Quezon’s former secretary, as its head. Second, on January 21, Prime Minister Tojo Hideki made a policy speech to both houses of the Japanese Diet in which he announced the possibility of conditional Philippine independence: “With regard to the Philippines, in the future, so long as the Philippine people understand the true intentions of our Imperial Government and cooperate with the Japanese project of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, the Imperial Government of Japan will gladly grant the honor of independence to them.” Third, responding to the Japanese announcement, on February 6 General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon’s political antagonist, made an impassioned plea to MacArthur through a radio broadcast from Manila. He urged MacArthur to end the resistance and to surrender in order to avoid further deaths among the Filipino people and further destruction of the Philippine Islands.
Quezon was particularly irritated by Aguinaldo’s anti-American and anti-MacArthur radio broadcast, because he realized that its pro-Japanese stance would have a big influence on non-elite Filipinos. More serious was the negative attitude of Washington. Sitting in a wheelchair as he listened to American radio broadcasts, Quezon was enraged to learn that a large consignment of relief material as well as military forces was being sent to Europe. Worried about Quezon, MacArthur sent Chief of Intelligence Section (CIS) Charles A. Willoughby, a fluent speaker of Spanish, to soothe him. But Quezon’s resentment toward the United States could not be softened. He told MacArthur that he was seriously considering turning himself over to the Japanese. MacArthur explained that the Japanese would never allow him to be the master of Malacanan Palace. Quezon ignored that argument and expressed his strong desire that the Philippine people should cooperate with Japan and that Filipino soldiers at the front should abandon the U.S. forces and surrender to the Japanese. After thorough consideration, however, Quezon gave up his original idea of placing himself at the mercy of the Japanese and settled instead on a second proposal: to end the war in the Philippines and call for the acknowledgment of Philippine neutrality by both the
United States and Japan. Calling a meeting of his skeleton cabinet, Quezon read a message addressed to President Roosevelt in which he severely criticized U.S. war policy. Vice President Sergio Osmena and MacArthur’s adjutant Manuel A. Roxas questioned Quezon’s stance, but as Quezon threatened to demand their resignations, they reluctantly assented.
In Washington on the afternoon of February 8, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, reading Quezon’s letter via MacArthur, was at a loss. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall was also shocked. Quezon wrote that from a military point of view, unless there was immediate support from the United States, he
could not save the soldiers now fighting gallantly. All soldiers in the field had been animated by the belief that U.S. help would be forthcoming. But that help had not been realized, and the Philippine people had suffered death, misery, and devastation. On the following morning, Quezon’s second plea via MacArthur
reached Stimson:
“I feel that the elements of the situation here can be composed into a solution that will not reduce the delaying effect of our resistance here but which will save my country from further devastation as the battle ground of two great powers…. The government of the United States under the McDuffie-Tydings Law is committed to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946, and the same law authorized the president to open negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Japanese government has publicly announced its willingness to grant the Philippines her independence. In view of the foregoing I propose the following: that the United States immediately grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence; that the Philippines be at once neutralized; that all occupying troops, both American and Japanese, be withdrawn by mutual agreement with the Philippine government within a reasonable length of time; that neither country maintain bases in the Philippines; that the Philippine Army be immediately disbanded, the only armed forces being maintained here to be a constabulary of modest size; that immediately upon granting independence the trade relations of the Philippines with foreign countries be a matter to be determined entirely by the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned; that American and Japanese civilians who so desire be withdrawn with their respective troops under mutual and proper safeguards. It is my proposal to make this suggestion publicly to you and to the Japanese authorities without delay and upon its acceptance in general principle by those two countries that an immediate armistice be entered into here pending the withdrawal of their respective garrisons.”
Sayre echoed MacArthur in his support for Quezon: “If the premise of President Quezon is correct that American help cannot or will not arrive here in time to be availing, I believe his proposal for immediate independence and neutralization of the Philippines is the sound course to follow.” MacArthur, further,
emphasized the dire situation of the troops in his report on the military situation:
“The troops have sustained practically 50% casualties from their original strength. Divisions are reduced to the size of regiments, regiments to battalions, battalions to companies. Some units have entirely disappeared. The men have been in constant action and are badly battleworn. They are desperately in need of rest and refitting. Their spirit is good but they are capable now of nothing but fighting in place on a fixed position. All our supplies are scant and the command has been on half rations for the past month.”
MacArthur thus reported that the military situation had reached a desperate stage. Hinting at eventual surrender, MacArthur implicitly communicated that Quezon’s legitimate consideration of the possibility of neutrality was inevitable. In his Reminiscences, MacArthur criticized the absence of a broad policy perspective in Washington:
“Those that had dictated the policies of the United States could not have failed to see that this is the weakest point in American territory. From the beginning they should have tried to build up our defenses. As soon as the prospects looked bad to me, I telegraphed President Roosevelt requesting him to include the Philippines in the American defense program. I was given no satisfactory answer.
“How long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippines front is of no importance and that therefore, no help can be expected here in the immediate future, or at
least before our power of resistance is exhausted?”
While criticizing Washington policy makers, MacArthur also defended Quezon for having to write Roosevelt demanding that the United States should grant immediate independence to the Philippines and that Philippine neutrality should be recognized by a protocol between the United States and Japan. On the other hand, MacArthur justified his own position in words pitched carefully enough that they could easily be used to support either side: “I remonstrated with Quezon as best I could against the proposals involved, and said bluntly I would not endorse them, that there was not the slightest chance of approval by either the United States or Japan.” There is no evidence to indicate whether MacArthur
had actually attempted to persuade Quezon.
Washington recognized that the situation was serious. Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, and other top leaders were shocked by Quezon’s series of demands fot the early independence and neutrality of the Philippines, and they were clearly offended. They labeled Quezon as no different from a traitor, and they were annoyed at MacArthur’s implicit support for him. Stimson, especially, thought Quezon’s demand was impractical and that MacArthur’s report on the military situation was much worse than it was portrayed in Quezon’s message.
Eisenhower’s diary entries recorded the Washington atmosphere. On January 29 he wrote: “He [MacArthur] has forwarded (probably inspired) letter from Mr. Quezon; statement (Quisling) from Aguinaldo; he complains about lack of unity of command, about lack of information. He’s jittery!” On February 3: “Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I’m hoping that his yelps are just his way of
spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain factor.” On February 8: “Another long message on ‘strategy to MacArthur. He sent in one extolling the virtues of the flank offensive. Wonder what he thinks we’ve been studying for all these years. His lecture would have been good for plebes. Today another long wail from Quezon. I’ll have to wait though, because it is badly garbled. I think he wants to give up.” On February 9: “Spent the entire day preparing drafts of president’s messages to MacArthur and Quezon. Long, difficult, and irritating. Both are babies. But now we’ll see what happens. Tonight at 6:45 I saw the president and got his approval to sending (sic) the messages.”
In the White House, Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall, together with Admiral Ernest J. King, newly appointed to head the War Plans Division, and Harold R. Stark, former head of the War Plans Division, met to discuss the U.S. government response. Late in the afternoon of February 9, two top-secret messages were sent to MacArthur. The first, entitled “The Far East Situation,” was sent from Roosevelt to MacArthur through Stimson. Clearly rejecting Quezon’s proposal of February 8, it communicated the president’s firm intention to keep American forces in the Philippines while at the same time mentioning the evacuation not only of Quezon and his cabinet but also of Sayre and MacArthur with their families. The second message, from Marshall to MacArthur, contained Marshall’s comments on Roosevelt’s response to Quezon. In particular, with regard to Quezon’s request that his proposal should be made publicly to the authorities of both the United States and Japan, he explained to MacArthur that Roosevelt would make no public statement directly or indirectly on the matter. He also urged MacArthur to finalize an evacuation plan by submarine for Quezon without delay. It is not certain whether MacArthur confirmed the correspondence, but the next day he dispatched another radiogram to Washington to discuss Philippine independence.
Quezon was disappointed at Roosevelt’s flat refusal. He dictated his resignation as president of the Commonwealth to his secretary, and said he would sign it in the morning. It was Osmeña who persuaded Quezon to reconsider, arguing that if he persisted in resigning, history might judge him as a coward and a traitor, and that if he took his family to Manila, his daughters might be raped by Japanese soldiers. Quezon reconsidered, and then wrote to Roosevelt through MacArthur that he comprehended the basic reason for Roosevelt’s decision and would accept it. The issue was not raised again.
As a result of this confusion, Washington condemned Quezon as a traitor and strongly urged MacArthur to get Quezon to evacuate from Corregidor.
The Evacuation of Ouezon and Sayre
According to the U.S. official record, a proposal to evacuate Quezon from Corregidor had already been raised in the radiogram sent from Marshall to MacArthur and dated December 31, 1941. In it Marshall reported that Roosevelt, Stimson, and the resident commissioner of the Philippines in Washington had
discussed Ouezon’s evacuation to the United States. If MacArthur and Quezon agreed, he proposed asking the U.S. Navy for help.
Marshall’s coded radiogram reached MacArthur late in the afternoon of January 1, 1942. Before consulting Quezon himself, MacArthur held a conference with Sutherland, Marshall, Huff, and Willoughby. All agreed that the best course of action was for Quezon to remain on Corregidor. MacArthur then met with Quezon. Sayre followed Quezon into the meeting room. MacArthur read aloud Marshall’s radiogram to Quezon, and then his draft reply to Marshall in which he recommended that Quezon stay on Corregidor. After a long silence, Quezon asked for time to discuss the matter with Vice President Osmeña and other staff. He then sent a reply to Washington through MacArthur that fell within the
parameters of MacArthur’s draft response: “The evacuation of President Quezon is deemed by me to be too hazardous to attempt. This garrison is now beleaguered in Bataan and Corregidor. The only means of egress is by air or submarine, both fraught with great danger in view of complete control of sea and air by the enemy.” Marshall’s offer had been turned down.
On January 11, the State Department instructed that “steps be taken to prevent President Quezon and, presumably, High Commissioner Sayre, from being captured by the Japanese.” On January 18, a message came from Roosevelt’s staff, urging MacArthur to reconsider seriously the question of Quezon’s evacuation from Corregidor. There is no evidence that MacArthur replied. From his point of view, even if Quezon was in poor health and had limited actual authority, evacuation of the president from his own country would not only affect the morale of the soldiers but strike an immeasurable blow at the entire Philippine people. There was a possibility that the severely strained battlefront would simply
weary of the war. Recognizing this situation, the Washington leadership maintained close communication with Sayre while at the same time being forced to pay careful and respectful attention to MacArthur’s opinion and dignity. On January 27, Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent the following message directly to Roosevelt:
It is the consensus of opinion among the officers of the three Departments who have been giving this matter special consideration that all concerned should keep in mind the question of the desirability that
President Quezon and his family and Mr. Osmena not fall into the hands of the Japanese; and that, as the military situation develops, consideration be given to the question of possible need for and possible nature of further messages to Mr. Sayre, General MacArthur, and Admiral Hart on that subject. It is my understanding that General Marshall and Admiral King will keep in close touch with each other regarding the situation and this problem.
It was not until February 2 that MacArthur’s response on this matter reached Marshall. The Bataan military situation was about to worsen, causing MacArthur to hint at surrender. He wrote to Marshall: “In case of ultimate loss of Bataan and consequent siege of Corregidor, the question arises as to the ultimate preservation of President Quezon and his family Vice President Osmeña and the immediate members of the commonwealth cabinet.” For the evacuation of Quezon’s group, MacArthur urged the use of submarine rather than air transportation, and asked that the specific plans be arranged from Washington. MacArthur also communicated Ouezon’s wish that he be evacuated to the United States. At this point MacArthur finally moved away from his originally negative attitude toward evacuation. Marshall replied on the same day as follows:
The President and his advisers feel that if and when military considerations no longer call for continued presence of President Quezon and other Philippine officials, the evacuation of Quezon and family, of
Osmeña and of other such officials will become desirable. The question whether any of those persons and whether any other persons including Mr. Sayre and family, Mrs. MacArthur and son, and other Americans, shall at any time be evacuated will be for your decision in the light of the military situation, the feasibility and hazard of the operation of evacuation and wishes of individuals concerned.
The message reflected Washington’s delicate effort not to damage MacArthur’s fragile self-esteem.
On February 9, Roosevelt replied through Stimson to MacArthur:
If the evacuation of President Quezon and his cabinet appears reasonably safe they would be honored and greatly welcomed in the United States. They should come here via Australia. This applies also to the
High Commissioner. Mrs. Sayre and your family should be given this opportunity if you consider it advisable. You yourself, however, must determine action to be taken in view of circumstances. Please inform Sayre of this message to you and to Quezon.
On the same day Marshall again contacted MacArthur, seeking his help in settling the details of the submarine evacuation plan for Quezon: “I should like to be advised so as to arrange so far as possible for a safe and speedy trip to the United States.” Taking advantage of Quezon’s neutrality declaration, MacArthur tried to extract from Washington the reinforcements and concessions that he had long desired, but Roosevelt flatly refused. MacArthur may have felt as frustrated as Quezon did.
MacArthur sent a response to Washington on February 11. Noting that he had communicated Roosevelt’s message to Quezon and Sayre, he wrote: “If opportunity presents and can be done with reasonable safety and of course with their own consent I will evacuate the members of the Commonwealth Government the High Commissioner and Mrs. Sayre and their son. I am deeply appreciative of the inclusion of my own family in this list, but they and I have decided that they will share the fate of the garrison.” MacArthur thus agreed to the evacuation of Quezon and Sayre with their families, but conveyed a firm refusal to evacuate himself and his family. His stubborn resolve may be interpreted in part as revenge against Roosevelt for his flat refusal of Quezon’s and MacArthur’s appeals. One can detect here a clash over face, or a clash of wills, between Roosevelt and MacArthur.
On February 16, MacArthur informed Marshall that Quezon and his cabinet desired to establish the seat of the Commonwealth not in the United States, but in unoccupied portions of the Visayan Islands, located between Luzon and Mindanao islands in the central Philippines. He also noted that, in accordance with Roosevelt’s wishes, they intended to put up a fierce resistance against the Japanese. With regard to the evacuation, they would travel by water and at night. But in the case of a Japanese attack, it was possible they would remain in the safety of Mindanao. MacArthur emphasized that, even if Washington opposed the plan, he intended to carry it out, and he requested authority to utilize a submarine within the next three or four days. Since it seemed difficult to evacuate Ouezon’s and Sayre’s party at the same time, he had scheduled Quezon’s evacuation first, followed by Sayre’s. Marshall agreed immediately to these proposals.
The evacuation of Quezon and Sayre from Corregidor was thus decided. Quezon and MacArthur moved quickly to make the final arrangements. On February 13, MacArthur learned in a secret communication from Quezon that there were silver currency and other assets left in the vault at Corregidor. (According to Rogers, MacArthur knew the location of the vault, so he probably already knew the secret.) Reporting this information to Washington, MacArthur noted that he would take measures to prevent the silver currency from falling into the hands of the enemy. After receiving acknowledgment from Roosevelt the following day, MacArthur reported to Washington on February 17: “The Philippine Government has delivered to the United States Navy the following: 1 small case marked G-11 containing 5 small bars of gold bullion, 1 bar of silver bullion, and various other pieces of gold and/or silver bullion; 264 small bars of gold bullion; 630 bags containing 1,000 pesos each.” However, Roosevelt promised MacArthur and Quezon that he would never announce this fact publicly, and what actually happened to these assets remains unclear.
On February 15, just before the transfer of the assets, MacArthur restarted procedures, held pending since January 3, to receive his $500,000 special payment from Quezon. He requested that Chase National Bank and Trust Company, New York, withdraw $500,000 from the general assets it held for the Commonwealth of the Philippines and transfer it to the account of Douglas MacArthur at the Chemical National Bank and Trust Company, New York. In addition, he requested the following transfers: $75,000 to the credit of Richard K. Sutherland; $45,000 to the credit of Richard J. Marshall; and $20,000 to the credit of Sidney L. Huff. The transfer documents bore the signatures of Quezon and Secretary of Finance Jos eAbad Santos. At this point, MacArthur had not yet agreed to his own evacuation and that of his family from Corregidor, and in Washington there was a sense of urgency, focusing on how to persuade him to evacuate after Quezon and Sayre. A matter of precise timing linked the two delicate problems of
MacArthur’s own evacuation and the transfer of Philippine assets.
Two questions arise in this regard. Why did MacArthur receive such a large special payment from Quezon at this time? Why did Quezon decide to hand over the remaining Philippine assets to the United States via MacArthur at this time? The key point is the relationship between Marshall’s December 31 recommendation for Ouezon’s evacuation and MacArthur’s January 1 refusal. As a result of the conference held with his aides before meeting Quezon, MacArthur had prepared the draft of a response in which he noted that it was too dangerous for Quezon to evacuate from Corregidor. He then asked for Quezon’s agreement. Following a long silence, Quezon conferred with other government officials before deciding to follow MacArthur’s recommendation. Nevertheless, Quezon’s long silence indicated that his agreement did not come from the heart; his agreement was reluctant at best. Quezon had opposed leaving the capital, Manila. He was battling serious illness on Corregidor. As a virtual political prisoner, however, he had no alternative but to rely on MacArthur. The objective situation meant that he could not reject MacArthur’s plan. In this situation, Quezon’s offer of a large sum of money to MacArthur several days later may be interpreted as coming from the recognition that he and MacArthur were bound together by fate; the payment was an insurance premium to secure the safety of Quezon’s top officials. An alternative interpretation might suggest that the payment was a political maneuver to help Quezon
negotiate a more advantageous outcome for himself. Paul P. Rogers, Sutherland’s secretary and stenographer, concluded that Quezon’s offer was a defensive action against the anti-Quezon powers who had opposed his military plans.
Washington subsequently finalized the plans for Quezon’s evacuation. In the process, three points became crucial: first, the timing of the evacuation; second, the method of evacuation; and third, the destination. As far as the timing was concerned, January was considered to be too early and April too late because of expected battles. From the viewpoint of the campaign schedule, the period from late February to early March, when the enemy’s offensive power would be temporarily weakened, was judged to be the most appropriate time for Quezon’s withdrawal. However, Quezon’s sudden demand to the United States for neutrality moved the planning forward, and the evacuation was set for the middle of February. With regard to the method of evacuation, Quezon’s illness had a complicating influence. His personal doctor disapproved of submarine travel, but travel on a surface vessel carried the danger of capture or death at the hands of the Japanese military. In the end, Quezon chose the submarine option, and the date of the U.S. submarine’s arrival at Corregidor was set as the departure date.
Regarding the destination, a final decision proved elusive. Although Washington originally welcomed Quezon to the United States and Quezon favored the idea, the destination was later changed to the Visayan Islands or Mindanao Island. It is unclear what discussions were conducted between Quezon and his officials, or between Quezon and MacArthur. MacArthur may have thought that if Quezon remained in the United States, he might be politically constrained by Roosevelt. Therefore, using the pretext of directing the guerrilla campaign against Japan, MacArthur may have decided it was better to keep Quezon in the middle of the southern part of the Philippines, where he could control him more effectively.
Quezon’s last and most dependable resources were Philippine government assets that were transferred to the U.S. Navy at this time,. They formed an indispensable fund that he would need during his life in exile and he wanted to leave the details vague. Roosevelt understood and, in accordance with MacArthur’s request, canceled any obligation to make the transfers public.
The evacuation plans for Quezon and Save were finalized by February 17.
On February 19, the U.S. Navy submarine Swordfish broke through the Japanese blockade to reach Corregidor. On February 20, Quezon left the island, accompanied by four family members and several of his cabinet members. Roxas, who had gained MacArthur’s trust, remained. (Later, he was arrested by Japanese forces, and was forced to cooperate with the puppet government of José P. Laurel, but he
did not abandon his hope for liberation by the United States.) Three days later, on February 23, eleven people, including three members of Sayre’s family, left Corregidor and headed for Australia. Jean MacArthur and Ah Cheu were the only women who remained on the island.
MacArthur’s Authorization to Evacuate
On January 27, 1942, MacArthur’s evacuation from Corregidor was discussed at a conference in Washington. After consulting with Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, Hull recommended to Roosevelt that in addition to Quezon and Sayre, consideration should be given to evacuating MacArthur as well. Roosevelt, however, did not shift from his position that the decision should be left to MacArthur.
As noted, it was on February 2 that MacArthur’s attitude regarding Quezon’s evacuation changed from negative to positive. Marshall did not miss this opportunity to press MacArthur: “The question whether any of those persons including Mr. Sayre and family, Mrs. MacArthur and son, and other Americans, shall at any time be evacuated will be for your decision in the light of the military situation.” Marshall’s message posed a new problem for MacArthur.
MacArthur remarked in his Reminiscences:
General Marshall had suggested that Mrs. MacArthur and Arthur be evacuated by submarine. The tactical picture was worsening almost minute by minute; this might be the last opportunity for sure deliverance of the two human beings dearest to me. The Quezons implored me to agree; they and the Sayres planned to leave at once. It was one of the desperate moments of my life, but even before I spoke to Jean I knew the answer…. I answered Marshall’s sympathetic suggestion; “I and my
family will share the fate of the garrison.”
Jean recalled that MacArthur called her to his office and showed her Marshall’s message. Her response was firm: “I’m just not going. I said, just thank whoever it was–I think it was the President. Thank him and tell him I appreciate it, but that Arthur and I stay with you. I made the decision.” The recollections of both
MacArthur and Jean were both inaccurate. In fact, it was not at this time, but a week later, that MacArthur made the statement that he and his family would share the fate of the garrison when he responded to a similar suggestion from Roosevelt.
On February 4, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, assistant chief of staff of the War Plans Division (WPD), raised the possibility of evacuation again in a secret radiogram and suggested new responsibilities for MacArthur:
Your possible movements should your forces be unable [sic] longer to sustain themselves in Bataan and there should remain nothing but the fortress defense of Corregidor. Under these conditions the need for your services there might be less pressing than at other points in the Far East. There seem to be but two possible courses of action: the first is that you, at least initially, proceed to Mindanao. How long you would remain there would depend on the good you might do toward stimulating guerrilla operations in the Visayas and Mindanao, especially if our blockade running operations now under way meet with fair success and the Japanese threats at the Malay barrier are checked. From there you could later proceed south to resume command of the United States forces in the Far East. The alternative would be for you to proceed south direct without pause in Mindanao.
Measures now progressing should soon provide, unless seriously interrupted, comprehensive service of supply in Australia and an active U.S. air force of five bomber and four pursuit groups in the NEI [Netherlands East Indies] …. No record is being made of this message within the War Department and I have arranged that your reply labeled personal to General Marshall for his eye [sic] only will come directly from the decoding clerk to me with no copy retained and no other individual involved.
It was clear that Washington was showing sensitive consideration toward MacArthur.
MacArthur, however, had no intention of accepting such proposals. On February 8, the same day Homma ordered a temporary halt to the Bataan offensive, MacArthur attempted an enormous challenge to Washington. His aim was to obtain the long-sought assistance and military reinforcements from the United States by pushing forward discussion of Philippine neutrality and early independence. Roosevelt’s response of February 9 shattered MacArthur’s expectations. MacArthur, along with Quezon, had lost the political game. Moreover, Roosevelt suggested that a means of evacuation should be offered not simply to Quezon and his family but also to Sayre and MacArthur and their families. Roosevelt’s formal suggestion was as follows:
I authorize you to arrange for the capitulation of the Filipino elements of the defending forces, when and if in your opinion that course appears necessary and always having in mind that the Filipino troops are in the service of the United States. Details of all necessary arrangements will be left in your hands, including plans for segregation of forces and the withdrawal, if your judgment so dictates, of American elements to Fort Mills [on Corregidor]. The timing also will be left to you…. I therefore give you this most difficult mission in full understanding of the desperate situation to which you may shortly be reduced.
Now it was MacArthur’s turn to turn down the offer. Although he had agreed with the evacuation of Quezon and Sayre, on February 11 he wrote that “I am deeply appreciative of the inclusion of my own family in this list but they and I have decided that they will share the fate of the garrison.” Rejecting the recommendation to surrender and boldly proclaiming his choice of a loyal death, he added: “My plans have already been outlined in previous radios (radiograms); they consist in fighting my present battle position in Bataan to destruction and then holding Corregidor in a similar manner. I have not the slightest intention in the world of surrendering or capitulating the Philippine elements of my command.” Rather than bravery, MacArthur’s stance probably reflected his sense of dignity and pride toward Roosevelt.
Subsequently, however, MacArthur was forced to accept the difference in status between himself and those in Washington. On February 14, Marshall wrote: “Regarding decision that your family will not be evacuated, I think it very important that you have in mind the possibility that some later situation might require duty from you that would compel separation from them under circumstances of greatly increased peril” He added: “I am anxious that you do not overlook this particular possibility of poignant embarrassment to you personally.” Marshall’s words pointed to the logical weakness in MacArthur’s position, and probably had the effect of altering his thinking. It was on February 13 that Quezon had secretly raised the matter of treasury assets to MacArthur, and MacArthur had passed the information on to Washington. Both MacArthur and Quezon had requested that Roosevelt keep the matter completely secret and, understanding the implications, Roosevelt agreed to their request the following day. Rogers kept a record of a meeting held between MacArthur and Sutherland at Malinta Tunnel on February 13. His interpretation was that Quezon and MacArthur had reached an agreement and Sutherland had put it in writing: “Quezon raised the matter with MacArthur and asked that MacArthur put the document in final form. Or, it may be believed that MacArthur and Sutherland prepared a document and presented
it to Quezon for signature.”
On February 15, MacArthur conveyed to Roosevelt his gratitude for the president’s consent to secrecy regarding the Philippine assets and, at the same time, requested that Chase National Bank and Trust Company, New York, transfer the $500,000 cash payment offered by Quezon on January 3 through the War Department. Stimson authorized payment on the same day and instructed the bank to initiate procedures for payment. What was the meaning of this smooth flow of agreements?
Schaller comments that MacArthur’s change of attitude was closely related to Roosevelt’s blunt refusal of Quezon’s demand for Philippine independence. He notes that while the $500,000 was being processed for payment into his account, MacArthur requested from Roxas a loan for more than that amount:
Pending confirmation of the transfer, MacArthur asked Manuel Roxas, Quezon’s aide, to loan him 1.2 million pesos worth over a half million dollars. (He returned this after the transfer was confirmed.) Of all the honors and awards he received, this was the only one the general kept secret. Besides implying that he knew about the legal complications, MacArthur’s convoluted behavior suggested he did not intend to “share the fate of the garrison.”
Schaller’s analysis contains both correct and incorrect elements. He is correct in noting that there was a close connection between MacArthur’s acceptance of the cash and Roosevelt’s rejection of Philippine independence. He is also correct in the conclusion that MacArthur had no intention of sharing the fate of the garrison and that, in fact, evacuating from Corregidor was already in his mind. On the other hand, Schaller’s analysis does not clarify how the tacit agreements between MacArthur and Quezon, and between MacArthur and Roosevelt (or Stimson), were made.
Rogers explained why MacArthur postponed the implementation of Quezon’s January 3 Executive Order No. 1 (the payment to MacArthur and others) until February 15: “MacArthur had served as Chief of Staff under the Roosevelt administration, knew Stimson and Roosevelt, and was acquainted with the probable course of events which must follow receipt of such a dispatch from Corregidor at a time when both these men were still quivering from the shock of Quezon’s proposal to neutralize the Philippines.”* Since MacArthur’s strong sense of caution made him alert to the possibility of being brought to account before a court-martial or other legal authority, he avoided immediate acceptance of the money and calculated a more advantageous timing. Regarding that timing, Rogers speculated that MacArthur seized the moment when shock at Quezon’s demand for neutrality had caused both Stimson and Roosevelt to waver, but this explanation does not sit right. Although it is no more than speculation, one might guess that, since a person facing death would not require a large sum of money, Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall regarded MacArthur’s request for $500,000 as a clear indication that he had chosen not honorable death with his family on Corregidor but, rather, survival on the island of Mindanao or in Australia. Along with the handling of the Philippine assets, the large payment to MacArthur could be seen as an exchange for MacArthur’s acceptance of evacuation from Corregidor. For this reason, even though Roosevelt and Stimson could have prevented this legally questionable action, they gave it their tacit approval.
Still, questions remain. First, although there is clear documentation concerning the procedures for transferring the funds, there is no record of their actual deposit into MacArthur’s accounts. Probably Roxas, who remained in Corregidor and was a liaison officer between MacArthur and Quezon, played some kind of role. Rogers revealed the following interesting exchange:
Late in January Diller had given me several pages to copy. They were lists of MacArthur’s security holdings with names and amounts. Diller warned me several times that this was a matter of MacArthur’s personal finances and made me state that I would make just one copy and no more. When I finished the task, Diller was waiting by my side to take the copy and asked again whether I had made more than one copy. I was irritated because Diller seemed to challenge my integrity.
Again, Rogers wrote in his diary entry for February 13: “Executive Act #1 of the Philippine Commonwealth grants General MacArthur fifty [sic] thousand dollars US currency, and three officers sums forty-five thousand, forty thousand, and twenty thousand each. God! I would like to be a general” Eventually, the
issue of the payment, like that of the disposal of Philippine assets, was consigned to a gray zone from which the details have never been recovered.
Second, why, among MacArthur’s aides (those who would become the Bataan Boys), were Sutherland, Marshall, and Huff selected to receive payments, but Willoughby, for example, was not? According to Rogers, “Willoughby was never a member of the Military Mission. He joined MacArthur’s Headquarters USAFFE in November 1941 long after the Military Mission had been dissolved.” Therefore, he was not entitled to receive the cash award.? But Willoughby had played an important role as Spanish-English translator between Quezon and MacArthur, which might have qualified him for an award. His eccentric personality may have been an obstacle.
Given these considerations, one might say that the ensuing communications between Corregidor and Washington assumed a ritualistic character. On or around February 15, Marshall informed MacArthur that “the President directs that you make arrangements to leave Fort Mills and proceed to Mindanao. … From
Mindanao you will proceed to Australia where you will assume command of all United States Troops….You are authorized to take with you your Chief of Staff, General Sutherland.” On February 21, the day after Quezon left Corregidor, Marshall informed MacArthur that “the President is considering advisability of ordering you to Mindanao to continue your command of the Philippines from that locality” and “the Secretary of War and I desire your views on the above.” Regarding this communication, MacArthur wrote in his Reminiscences:
On February 21st–Arthur’s fourth birthday Marshall notified me that the President was considering ordering me to Mindanao to set up a new base of operations for the defense of the southern part of the
Philippines. The same day the cabinet in Canberra had requested my immediate assignment to Australia as commander of the newly formed Southwest Pacific Area. When [Australian] Prime Minister John] Curtin’s recommendation reached the White House, President Roosevelt personally sent me a message to proceed as soon as possible to Mind- nao. There I was to do what I could to buttress defenses, then go on to Australia.
MacArthur, however, had no intention of giving up his poker game with Washington. He described his own thinking and the situation within his camp and the Philippines as follows:
My first reaction was to try and avoid the latter part of the order, even to the extent of resigning my commission and joining the Bataan force as a simple volunteer. But Dick Sutherland and my entire staff would have none of it. They felt that the concentration of men, arms, and transport which they believed was being massed in Australia would enable me almost at once to return at the head of an effective rescue operation. They also suggested that I might seek to delay my departure. For two days I delayed a final decision. Finally, I answered the President in a message that warned of the results that might follow the failure to adequately sustain the Philippines. Because of the very special confidence the Filipino people and army had in me, my sudden departure might set off a collapse at the Filipino defenses. I therefore requested authorization to delay my departure.
“Please be guided by me in this matter,” I concluded. “I know the situation here in the Philippines and unless the right moment is chosen for so delicate an operation a sudden collapse might result. These people are depending upon me now, any idea that might develop in their minds that I was being withdrawn for any other reason than to bring them immediate relief could not be explained.”
MacArthur’s personality is well reflected in his conviction that he had the full trust of all Filipinos and in his unhesitating declaration that without him the Philippines would collapse.
On February 24, MacArthur sent a reply to Marshall in which he expressed his gratitude for Marshall’s suggestion. MacArthur’s message was immediately communicated to Roosevelt:
I am deeply appreciative of the confidence in me…. It is my studied opinion however the immediate movement directed is too sudden and abrupt in that it may result at this time in collapse in the Philippine area with ensuing adverse effect on the entire theatre before the means are available for counter offensive action from Australia.. ..I am of the opinion that during the initial stages of that organizational effort I can better accomplish the aims of the president as set forth in your radio by temporary delay in my departure. This would not prevent any immediate reorganization that you may have in mind nor my reassumption of command of the troops in the Far East at this time; … I earnestly hope that you accept my advice as to the timing of this movement. I know the situation here in the Philippines and unless the right moment is chosen for this delicate operation, a sudden collapse might occur which would carry with it not only the people but the government. Rightly or wrongly these people are depending upon me now not only militarily but civically and any idea that might develop in their minds that I was being withdrawn for any other purpose than to bring them immediate relief could not be explained to their simple intelligence…. Please be guided by me in this matter.
That one man on the small island of Corregidor, located in a corner of the Philippines, should hold such grand illusions about holding the fate of the land and people of the entire Philippines in his hands suggests something of MacArthur’s sense of self.
One who predicted MacArthur’s arrogant response was Brigadier General Eisenhower, assistant chief of staff, who wrote in his diary as follows:
February 22
ABDA [American, British, Dutch and Australian] area is disintegrating. We have concocted a message to MacArthur directing him to start south to take command of Australian area, etc. I’ve always been fearful
of this plan. I think he’s doing a better job in Bataan than he will anywhere else. (Draft of message went to FDR.)
February 23
Message to MacArthur was approved by president and dispatched. I’m dubious about the thing. I cannot help believing that we are disturbed by editorials and reacting to “public opinion” rather than to military logic. [Edwin] “Pa” Watson [U.S. Army general and military advisor to Roosevelt] is certain we must get MacArthur out, as being worth “five army corps.” He is doing a good job where he is, but I’m doubtful that he’d do so well in more complicated situations. Bataan is made to order for him. It’s in the public eye; it has made him a public hero; it has all the essentials of drama; and he is the acknowledged king on the spot. If brought out, public opinion will force him into a position where his love of the limelight may ruin him.
February 24
MacArthur says, in effect, “not now.” I think he is right. This psychological warfare business is going to fall right into the lap of WPD, principally for the reason that no one else will lead with his chin. We’ll probably take it on.
Eisenhower’s predictions proved to be correct. On February 25, Marshall wrote to MacArthur that the president had carefully considered MacArthur’s views and had ordered that the time and method of departure would be left entirely in the general’s hands. Moreover, the Department of the Army (Marshall) had directed Major General George H. Brett in the Melbourne, Australia, headquarters to dispatch bombers to Mindanao at a time to be ordered by MacArthur. MacArthur, of course, had no quarrel with these arrangements and on February 26 informed Marshall that he was satisfied with them.54 In this last tactical maneuver, MacArthur had defeated Roosevelt, and had secured himself a free hand in deciding the time and method of his evacuation.
