The Philippines: An Experiment in Democracy
ON October 15, 1921, Major-General Leonard Wood took the oath of office as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and a new period in the history of America’s great Oriental possession began. From the crowding events of the ensuing four years it is now possible to form some conception of the outstanding constitutional and political developments of this period. These developments cannot, as yet, be fully appraised, but their trend can be clearly perceived. Already they constitute an important chapter in the story of American colonial policy and in the epic of Philippine national development. They are of vital concern to Americans because they are essential incidents in the great rôle which the United States is playing as the Occident and the Orient are being forced into close contact in the area of the Pacific; and because they witness the travail by which a new nation whose destiny is linked with ours is being brought to birth.
In the Philippines the East and the West meet under conditions most favorable for mutual understanding and coöperation. In these beautiful tropical islands representative democracy has been accepted by almost 12,000,000 Malays and has been made the corner stone of the state which they are attempting to build. This is the cardinal fact in the political development of the Philippines, and in the relationship between the United States and the Filipino people. From the inception of this relationship the aspirations of the Filipino people have been for a self-governing, democratic commonwealth. Democracy, as well as independence, has been their goal. The political education they have received since 1898, whether through participation in actual government or in the national public-school system, has been designed to prepare them not only for self-government but for democratic self-government. The building of a Philippine nation under American auspices possesses significance to the world chiefly because it is the most promising attempt which has yet been made to adapt the institutions of representative democracy to the needs and desires of a subject Oriental people. It is, then, in their relation to the great project of building a democratic, self-governing state in the Philippines that the several periods through which the government of the Islands has passed since 1898, and especially the most recent one, should be understood by the people of the United States.
I
The Philippine policy of the United States may be divided into three periods with reference to the development of self-government in the Islands. The first began in 1899 with the cession of the Archipelago to the United States, and ended in 1913 when the control of the American government passed from the Republican to the Democratic Party. The second coincided with the Democratic tenure of power from 1913 to 1921. The third was inaugurated when President Harding appointed Major-General Leonard Wood as Governor-General. It may be regrettable that colonial policy should be dependent upon the vicissitudes of domestic party politics; but in a certain sense and within certain limits it has always been so determined in every country governed under the party system. It is quite true that partisanship should ‘end at the water’s edge’ whether in colonial or in foreign policy. Party responsibility, however, cannot do so. Inasmuch as the two major American parties have always held widely divergent views as to the proper course for this country to follow in the Philippines, the Philippine policy of the United States has been party policy, and has undergone radical changes as one party has succeeded the other in power. Recognition of this fact will go a long way toward enabling Americans to understand what has happened in the Philippines since 1921.
During the first of the three periods a definite policy as to Philippine selfgovernment was set forth and consistently carried out. There is no clearer authoritative statement of this policy than that made in 1908 by Mr. William Howard Taft, then Secretary of War, in a report to President Roosevelt. Secretary Taft declared: —
Shortly stated, the national policy is to govern the Philippine Islands for the benefit and welfare and uplifting of the people of the Islands and gradually to extend to them, as they shall show themselves fit to exercise it, a greater and greater measure of popular self-government. What should be emphasized in the statement of our national policy is that we wish to prepare the Filipinos for popular self-government. This is plain from Mr. McKinley’s letter of instructions and all of his utterances. It was not at all within his purpose or that of the Congress which made his letter a part of the law of the land that we were merely to await the organization of a Philippine oligarchy or aristocracy competent to administer the government and then turn the Islands over to it. . . . Another logical deduction from the main proposition is that when the Filipino people as a whole show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self-government, maintaining law and order and offering equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence of the United States, they shall be given it.
It is generally recognized in the United States and throughout the world that the administrative achievements of the first fourteen years of American sovereignty in the Philippines are unparalleled in the history of colonies. These accomplishments need not be recounted here. It should be recalled, however, that American administrators of this period had two definite objects in view: to discharge American responsibility to the Filipino people by giving them as good a government as possible; and to educate them for democratic self-government by allowing them to participate in government with Americans who would throw all possible responsibility upon them but at the same time hold them up to high standards of honesty and efficiency, accustom them to the methods of Western administration, and indoctrinate them with American political ideals. Throughout the period, despite a steady development of local autonomy, powers commensurate with this dual responsibility were retained in the hands of the American officials, Insular and provincial, of the government of the Philippines.
The policy which has been described was based upon the convictions that the Filipino people were, as yet, incapable of self-government, and that the United States was under obligation to give them a genuine opportunity to establish a stable, democratic state. From these propositions the controlling Filipino political leaders dissented. When defeated in the field they accepted as much self-government as they could obtain and coöperated with Americans in the modernization of their national life. At the same time they utilized the political powers which they were granted to obtain an ever greater control over their own affairs. Many of their measures bear a striking resemblance to those by which AngloSaxons have always resisted political authority imposed upon them without their consent. After the establishment of the elective Philippine Assembly in 1907 this body became the centre of Filipino opposition to American domination. The Americanistas who had been given places on the Philippine Commission were, perhaps, the most distinguished Filipinos of their day, but they did not control this intensely nationalistic chamber. Its outstanding leaders were men who used it to increase Philippine autonomy and as a forum from which to demand independence. For the last three years of the Republican régime in the Islands the Assembly refused to pass any appropriation bill that the Commission would accept, thereby placing the American and the Filipino elements in the Insular government in serious deadlock.
Whether any concessions that a Republican American government might have been willing to make to the Filipino demands for an immediate increase in power would then have allayed the rising tide of anti-American feeling and ensured the continued success of the general policy thus far followed is a matter of speculation. The Democratic victory in the elections of 1912 took the Philippine proble m out of Republican hands and put it in those of men who from the beginning had proposed a different solution.
II
The Democratic platform of 1900 declared that the party favored ‘an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; third, protection from outside interference, such as has been given for nearly a century to the Republics of Central and South America.’ Nothing was said about the establishment in the Philippines of good government, of democratic institutions, of what President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission, had called ‘ certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom.’ The Philippines were to be given ‘a stable form of government,’ then independence and protection;and, as it was postulated that ‘the Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization,’ the implication was that this form of government would not be democratic. Certainly it would not necessarily be democratic.
Mr. Bryan sought to make ‘imperialism’ the paramount issue in the campaign of 1900, and in the only national election which has ever in any sense turned upon Philippine policy his party was decisively defeated. The Republicans called their policy in the Philippines, thus accepted by the American electorate, a national policy, reaffirmed it in subsequent platforms, and put it into effect. The Democrats denounced this policy and restated their initial position, without substantial change, in their platforms of 1904, 1908, and 1912, and in 1916 they wrote it, without the guaranty of independence, into the preamble to the Jones Act, a new organic law for the Philippine Islands. This famous preamble declared that ‘it is, as it always has been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein.’ As an historical statement of the national purpose as to the Philippines this declaration was erroneous in two particulars. During fourteen out of the seventeen years of American sovereignty over the Islands the Government of the United States had consistently declared that the ultimate granting of their independence would depend upon the establishment of a government which should be not only stable but also democratic, and upon the desire of the Filipino people for independence when such a government should have been established. Two of these prerequisites to independence were ignored in the preamble to the Jones Act. The statement made therein simply represents Democratic, as contrasted with Republican, policy. Between the two are differences which may be fateful both for the Philippines and for the United States. The preamble further declared that ‘it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without in the meantime impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States,’ and the bill proper provided for a government in which Filipinos should exercise greatly increased legislative powers.
The historical antecedents of the Jones Act, as well as all of the circumstances of its passage, warrant two conclusions concerning its character: its preamble was narrowly partisan; the act itself, although some of its provisions were considered by Republicans as ‘unwise and dangerous,’ was in general harmony with the accepted national policy of progressively extending to the Filipinos the largest measure of self-government which they are able to use to their own advantage. The vitally significant fact in the subsequent history of the Philippines, however, is that the measure was actually applied wholly in the spirit of the preamble and not in accordance with the letter or the spirit of the law itself.
There can be little doubt that in enacting the Jones Act Congress intended to provide for the Philippines a government essentially similar in form to that with which Americans are familiar in their states, their nation, and, historically, in their Continental territories. Certainly the terms of the law describe a government preëminently of the American type, one based upon the doctrine of separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The legislative branch of this government was given almost completely into Filipino hands, and the legislature was authorized to organize the executive departments as it saw fit. On the other hand, final American control over the executive branch was retained by investing the governor-general with all of the usual American executive powers, together with additional authority not given to any other chief executive in the American system. The new organic act not only greatly increased the powers of the governor-general, but it explicitly provided that the heads of executive departments should be appointed and removed by him, and that‘all executive functions of the government must be directly under the governor-general or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the governor-general.’ Neither the Jones Act itself nor the Congressional debates and hearings which preceded its passage afford the slightest warrant for the assumption that the powers thus granted to the chief executive were not to be exercised to the full and maintained in their entirety in the face of possible legislative encroachment. On the contrary, when Secretary of War Newton D. Baker forwarded the new law to Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison he informed the latter that the governor-general had been entrusted with unusually wide powers for the express purpose of preventing the Filipinos from obtaining more self-government than Congress had given them in the law itself, and urged him to permit no legislative encroachment upon those powers.
Between 1913 and 1916, however, Governor-General Harrison and President Wilson had proceeded in action much faster and farther than their party colleagues in Congress had progressed in thought. Construed and enforced in accordance with the ordinary rules of constitutional interpretation, the much heralded ‘autonomy act’ would have diminished rather than increased the amount of self-government actually enjoyed by the Filipinos when it was finally passed. From the outset the Wilson-Harrison policy was based upon the belief that the best and quickest, perhaps the only, way to teach the Filipinos self-government was to allow them to govern. In the execution of this policy the Filipinos were at once given a majority on the Philippine Commission, and hence complete control of the legislature; practically all of the Americans who had been the instruments of supervision and control over the Philippine government were replaced with Filipinos; and the Governor-General habitually — not always, but habitually — exercised the powers of his office in accordance with the advice of the dominant Filipino leaders. Through this policy Mr. Harrison, long before the passage of the Jones Bill, had shifted the emphasis from good government to self-government; had transferred the responsibility for good government from American to Filipino shoulders; had discarded the means which his predecessors had considered indispensable for guaranteeing that the people of the Philippines should enjoy a reasonably good government of the American type while they were preparing for self-government. He had, in short, almost completely turned the government of the Philippines over to the Filipinos.
In these circumstances it is not altogether surprising that the government established under the Jones Law differed materially from that contemplated by the act. In it the principle of the separation of powers was discarded and the governor-general was reduced to the position of a figurehead, or of the titular chief of a parliamentary state. More than eighty statutes were passed by the Philippine legislature which curtailed or made impossible of exercise the powers vested in the governor-general by the organic act. Many of the acts in question placed final authority in administrative matters in the heads of departments, and the theory was advanced, and tacitly accepted, that these officials were responsible to the legislature and not to the governor-general.
The creation and development of the Council of State completed the establishment of this parliamentary system of government. For some time Mr. Harrison had regularly acted in governmental affairs upon the advice of Mr. Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Senate. These two men completely controlled the dominant political party of the Islands and unquestionably were the popular leaders of their people. Neither of them held executive office, however, or was under any legal or official responsibility for political advice which he might give to the governor-general. Upon the suggestion of Mr. Osmeña their position was regularized by the creation of the Council of State, comprising the governor-general, the heads of the six executive departments, and the presiding officers of the two legislative chambers. Thus were brought to the council board officially and openly the two men who actually controlled the government, Messrs. Osmeña and Quezon. Theoretically the arrangement provided for the expression of the will of the Filipino people regarding the administration of their government through officials who, in their capacity of councilors to the American governor-general, were responsible to the legislature. Actually it put the executive power in the hands of the two men who were the absolute masters of the legislative branch of the government.
Thus, with the coöperation of an American governor-general and the approbation of an American president, the Philippines obtained practically complete autonomy under a system of government which had never been authorized or even dreamed of by the American Congress. The feat compels admiration for the political sagacity of the Filipinos who accomplished it. It made easily workable an organic act that contemplated a form of colonial government in which friction and ultimate deadlock have almost invariably developed. The powerful chief executive provided by the Jones Act is responsible to the American Government. The legislature is elected by and responsible to the Filipino people. Such a complete separation of powers does not exist even in the United States, where a common responsibility to the American electorate and, ordinarily, a common political party bridge the constitutional gap between the president and Congress. In the Philippines there is no historical precedent for the doctrine of the separation of powers. Even during the previous years of the American régime, executive and legislative functions had been united in the hands of the Commission, upon which Filipinos had served. In an unwilling dependency in which a tremendous spirit of nationalism had been deliberately developed the abrupt establishment of such a juxtaposition of powers as that provided by the Jones Act could hardly have failed to produce trouble. The system of government built up between 1916 and 1921 solved the dual problem of executive-legislative and FilipinoAmerican coöperation to the satisfaction of the Filipino leaders and of the American Government of that day.
In 1921 the report of the WoodForbes mission gave to the American public a fair estimate of the quality of the government thus established from the standpoint of honesty, efficiency, and probable stability. It remained for one of the two outstanding Filipino leaders to describe it from the standpoint of democracy. During 1921 Senator Quezon broke with Speaker Osmeña and established a new political party, chiefly to avoid the anticipated displeasure of the people in the approaching elections. In the political struggle which followed Mr. Quezon wrote to the Speaker as follows: —
Since the government of the Philippines was established by the provisions of the Jones Law . . . it may be said that practically all measures which received your approval were transformed into laws, and no law could be approved without your consent. The department secretaries. individually and collectively, guided their course of action under your inspiration, and nothing against your opinion was ever performed by them. Recommendations on appointments made by the secretaries to the Governor-General were made upon your initiative, at least with your consent. Your veto in these cases was final and definite.
Such practices put the executive and legislative powers of the government of the Philippines in the hands of two men. I say two because all this was allowed to go on with my knowledge and consent, or at least with my tolerance. Thus there was created without provision that would authorize it, and merely with our consent, not as legislators, but as members of the same party, a truly supreme authority over the Cabinet and the legislature.
And possession of the government carried with it means of perpetuating the power of the possessors. Of patronage, the Nacionalista party controlled the appointments, not only of executive and administrative officials in the central government, but of the judges of the courts of first instance and of all the justices of the peace throughout the Archipelago. It likewise named the provincial fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, who long have been key men in Filipino politics. It dominated the government of every province and of every municipality. In one district this meant that the humble followers of a local rival of the organization senator repeatedly lost their carabaos, only to be laughed at when they appealed to the authorities for aid in recovering their indispensable work-animals. When they saw the light politically the depredations ceased and their stolen property was returned to them. The election machinery itself was almost everywhere in the hands of the Nacionalista organization, so that the president of the Democrata party declared, ‘In the provinces election frauds were the rule rather than the exception.’
To these quite usual means of political control were added, during the last few years of the Harrison regime, the disposition of vast sums of money voted by the legislature for the development of the national bank, and the nationally owned railway, sugar centrals, cement plants, coal mines, and coconut-oil refineries. These public enterprises were put in the hands of a board of control upon which the governor-general could be outvoted by the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives—Messrs. Quezon and Osmena. In one year the Manila railroad, comprising some six hundred and fifty miles of track, issued eighty thousand annual family-passes to the political supporters of its president, Senator Quezon. The story of the Philippine National Bank is familiar to most Americans. Finally, in 1920, the legislature made an annually recurring appropriation of one million pesos to defray the expenses of the ‘Independence Commission,’composed of all the members of the legislature. The expenditure of this fund was entrusted to the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House without the requirement of publicity as to the purposes for which the money was used.
In a tropical country of 11,500,000 population, in which the daily newspaper circulation was not more than 150,000, and in which the people had been accustomed from time immemorial to the absolute dominance of a small ruling class, the situation which has been described could hardly have been expected to result in democratic self-government. The plain facts are that between 1913 and 1921 ‘an oligarchy or aristocracy’ was thoroughly entrenched in control of the government of the Philippines. For this result it would be exceedingly unjust to blame either the Filipino people or their leaders. No matter how much they may have desired a democracy, they did not possess the materials from which one could be created in less than a decade. Despite the great powers given over to them, they did not have final authority or final responsibility. In the actual conduct of the government Mr. Harrison occasionally asserted himself as Governor-General, usually at some unexpected moment, and upon such occasions was apt to have his way. The situation was artificial and abnormal, and both the Filipinos and their critics have attempted to prove entirely too much from it. Assuming, however, that the government of the Philippines was ‘stable’ in 1920, President Wilson’s recommendation to Congress that the Islands be granted immediate independence was in perfect harmony with the traditional Philippine policy of the Democratic Party.
III
The appointment of Major-General Leonard Wood as Governor-General of the Philippines and his acceptance of the office were generally considered as evidence that the findings and the recommendations of the Wood-Forbes mission were approved, at least by the executive branch of the American government. Within less than a year, however, President Harding officially declared to the Filipino people: ‘No backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is to be sought.’ Whatever Mr. Harding may have meant by this statement, his words were accepted at their face value by the Filipinos. The phrase gained a currency equal to that of ‘the Philippines for the Filipinos, ‘ of twenty years ago. Americans and Filipinos thoroughly acquainted with local conditions and residing in widely separated parts of the Islands have informed the writer that this promise perceptibly eased the tension in Filipino-American relations which developed in their localities immediately after the appointment of Mr. Harrison’s successor. As the policies of the Wood administration developed, accompanied by startling repercussions in Filipino politics, President Harding’s declaration became one of the outstanding factors of the situation in the Islands.
Filipino opposition to the Wood administration, culminating in the resignation of the native members of the Council of State in July 1923, was based chiefly upon two grounds. It was asserted, first, that General Wood’s policy violated President Harding’s promise and resulted in a curtailment of the autonomy enjoyed under Governor-General Harrison; second, that the Governor-General’s policy and many of his specific acts were tyrannical, arbitrary, illegal, subversive of the best interests of the country, or all four of these things. For real understanding of what has happened in the Philippines during the past four years it is absolutely necessary to differentiate between these two categories of criticism.
As to the first category, there cannot be the slightest doubt that ‘backward steps’ were taken, and that diminution of the ‘domestic control’ exercised by Filipinos in 1921 was sought and achieved. General Wood took the position that the organic act, which is, in effect, the constitution of the Islands, cannot be modified except by action of Congress itself in express language; that no act of commission or omission on the part of the governor-general or the president, working in conjunction with the Philippine legislature, can operate to change this fundamental law. In his inaugural address he declared that it was his purpose, so far as lay within his power, to conduct ‘a government of the people by their representatives, to the extent provided in the Jones Bill‘ [author’s italics]. In pursuance of this policy he consistently exercised the powers of his office after the manner of an American chief executive, and not in accordance with the previously accepted European theory of parliamentary government. In so doing he did reduce the autonomy which had been enjoyed by the Filipinos during the term of his predecessor in office. Prior to the break of July 1923, however, General Wood had not ignored or overridden any of the Philippine statutes limiting his authority as Governor-General. He considered them unconstitutional, and had recommended that if the Philippine legislature did not repeal them Congress should annul them. Meanwhile, he did the best that he could under the limitations which they imposed.
With reference to the second category an exactly opposite answer must be given. General Wood’s attitude and acts were neither illegal, arbitrary, nor tyrannical. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the government of the Philippines between the inauguration of General Wood and the resignation of the Council of State was the coöperation between the Filipino members of the government and the chief executive. This coöperation resulted from two main causes. The first was the eagerness of General Wood to coöperate with the Filipino leaders in the manner contemplated by the law. Far from being overbearing or high-handed in his dealings with them, his course of action was so conciliatory that it was criticized as hopelessly weak by many local Americans, by most of the foreign colony in Manila, and by the Filipino opposition party. In so far as administration was concerned, it was the policy of the Governor-General never to enter any department for the purpose of inspection or to intervene in its affairs. As chief executive he secured agreement in the Council of State upon the broad general policy of government and then called upon the department heads to carry it out, leaving to each complete autonomy, subject only to the broadest supervision in order to secure adherence to the general plan. During the entire period he did not appoint a single employee or official in any department or bureau without reference to the unit involved, and in practically all cases appointments were made upon the recommendation of the department secretary or bureau chief.
General Wood did not, of course, blindly approve all departmental recommendations. Where there was doubt in his mind he conferred with the secretary concerned and succeeded in getting the matter put into proper shape, or received an explanation which enabled him to carry out the recommendation. Needless to say, his influence was often decisive. It rested, however, upon a perfectly legitimate basis: that of the legal authority of his position, plus incessant industry, an intimate knowledge of the problems to be solved, wide administrative experience, sound, independent judgment, and strong character. Instead of sitting in Malacañang, the executive residence in Manila, or in the Mansion House at Baguio and receiving reports, the Governor-General went in person wherever the work of the government was being done. Shortly before the Filipino leaders broke with him Speaker Manuel Roxas declared to the writer: —
The inspections which he has made all over the Islands have produced remarkable results in the improvement of the government service. The people and the officials feel that he knows what they are doing and that he has a personal interest in it. His approval is eagerly sought and his disapproval is a thing to be avoided.
Granting that the governor-general was to exercise any powders of supervision and control whatever, General Wood exercised them in an absolutely unexceptionable manner. In point of fact, the chief executive and the department heads worked together harmoniously to the end. The break which finally came was engineered by the legislative leaders, whose unconstitutional control over the executive branch of the government had been greatly reduced by the Wood policy. After the resignation of the Council of State the records of every branch of the government were combed for something that would indicate a lack of consideration or courtesy, or an infringement upon the rights and privileges of some Filipino official or body. No letter or endorsement was found which the Governor-General’s opponents cared to publish.
The second explanation of the two years of coöperation which preceded the break between General Wood and the majority leaders is, perhaps, of greater practical significance. From the Filipino standpoint there was no immediate necessity for coming to grips with the new chief executive, because, in those larger matters of policy concerning which he and the Filipino leaders differed, they and not he were in control. General Wood sought to ‘get the government out of business’ by transferring the operation of the Manila Railroad to an American corporation expert in such enterprises; by closing up or changing the character of the Philippine National Bank; by selling or leasing the government sugar centrals on the best terms possible; and by terminating the other business enterprises undertaken by the State prior to 1921. He failed, in whole or in part, at every point of this programme. His hands were almost as effectually tied in other directions. After the election of 1922 he announced his intention of giving the strengthened minority party some representation among the department secretaries and hence on the Council of State. The majority leaders objected on the ground that the heads of all departments should be selected from and responsible to the party enjoying a legislative majority. After a prolonged struggle their objection prevailed. It was well known that the Governor-General wished to replace the Filipino governor of the Mountain Province with an American, and to place either Americans or strong Filipinos in certain other key offices. It was also understood that the Senate would not confirm such appointments, and they were not made. In short, in 1923 the powers of the chief representative of American sovereignty in the Philippines were largely negative in character. He could prevent many abuses, but he could not put through any programme requiring the appointment of important officials, the appropriation of money, the control of the business enterprises of the government, or the passage of legislation, without the consent of the Philippine legislature, over which he had neither legal nor political control.
An examination of the actual relations between the Governor-General and the Filipino leaders between his inauguration and the resignation of the Council of State leads, then, to the conclusion that the real grievance of the men who dominated that body was not that General Wood used the powers of his office arbitrarily, or harshly, or even unwisely, but that he exercised them at all. The two parties held absolutely different conceptions of that office. If General Wood’s conception were to prevail, the system of parliamentary government under which the Filipinos had gained virtual autonomy between 1913 and 1921 would disappear. If, on the other hand, the governor-generalship were to remain permanently what Mr. Harrison and the Filipinos had made it, the actual control of the American Government over the government of the Philippines would be reduced to something closely approaching zero; and, without the sanction of Congressional act, there would be permanently ‘established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.’ This fundamental conflict was recognized by Secretary Weeks when he declared: ‘The controversy with the legislative leaders and certain executive officers is at bottom a legal one.’
IV
More than once has the unexpected demise of a ruler altered the course of history and affected the fate of a people. When, within a month of the dramatic resignation of the Council of State in July 1923, death abruptly ended the presidency of Warren G. Harding, the Filipino leaders knew that they had lost their appeal from Malacañang to the White House. To President Harding they had appealed by cable on the day following their break with General Wood. They had been informed that the President could not be consulted until after his return from Alaska, and Fate had decreed that he could never be consulted upon the issue which they had raised.
The first official pronouncement of the Coolidge Government upon the situation in Manila came on October 11 in the form of ‘an authoritative statement of the views of the administration’ cabled to General Wood by Secretary Weeks, ‘after personal conference with the President.’ General Wood was declared not to have exceeded or misused the powers of his office, and it was stated that ‘if the legislature has enacted legislation violative of the provisions of the organic law, such legislation is to that extent null and void, and, in so far as it provides for encroachment on the authority of the Governor-General, is in no way binding on that official.’ The delegation of legislative power by the Philippine legislature in violation of the principles of constitutional government was said not to effect a modification of the organic act, even though Congress had not annulled the statutes involved. The veto power of the governor-general was declared to be applicable to all legislation, whether local or otherwise.
Secretary Weeks’s cablegram definitely stated the position of the American Government on the legal aspects of the controversy between General Wood and the Filipino majority leaders. On March 5, 1925, in reply to representations made to President Coolidge by the Philippine legislature and Filipino Commissioners in Washington, the President set forth at length the Philippine policy of his administration. This statement is, perhaps, the most important executive document with reference to the Philippines since the instructions issued by President McKinley to the Taft Commission in 1900. The communication undoubtedly sets forth principles of action which will not be deviated from lightly so long as the Republican Party remains in power.
Practically every sentence of President Coolidge’s carefully prepared letter is an expression of the Philippine policy established by McKinley, Root, Roosevelt, and Taft, written into Republican platforms for a quarter of a century, and translated into deeds when the Republican Party has controlled the government. Every phase of that policy is there: a frank determination to brook no unlawful challenge of American sovereignty over the Islands; a recognition that a large and substantial element of the Filipino people regard the indefinite continuance of the American tie as a blessing; the intention not to leave the Philippines without having fully discharged America’s obligations to the Filipino people and to civilization by giving to them an opportunity to establish themselves as a nation; the establishment in the Philippines of a permanently stable government based upon the fundamental ideas of the democraticrepublican state; the support of worthy American officials in the Philippines, and the encouragement of Filipinos to coöperate with them; the extension of self-government to the Filipino people as rapidly as they are able to exercise it for their own good; the grant of independence if the Filipino people desire it when, in the opinion of the American Government, the Philippines are able to meet the responsibilities of an independent nation.
The President’s statement as to independence was a direct quotation from the Philippine plank in the Republican platform of 1920. ‘ If the time ever comes,’ the platform declared, ‘when it is apparent that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines, from the point of view of their own domestic concerns and their status in the world, and if when that time comes the Filipino people desire complete independence, it is not possible to doubt that the American Government and people will gladly accord it.’ To these words Mr. Coolidge added the sentence: ‘Frankly, it is not felt that that time has come.’
Since the publication of President Coolidge’s letter to Speaker Roxas, Governor-General Wood’s legal and political position has been further strengthened by the disallowance of the million-peso independence fund as unconstitutional, and by strong presidential support of the governor-general’s authority to veto acts of the Philippine legislature of purely domestic concern. Thus the Harding and Coolidge administrations have done practically everything that the executive branch of the American government can do to substitute the sort of government provided for in the body of the Jones Act for that which was established in the Philippines during the preceding eight years, and to reapply the traditional Philippine policy of the Republican Party.
V
For the past four years, as during every other period of Philippine history, the unusual, the sensational, and the more obviously significant political events of the day have constituted nine tenths of the news received in the United States from its most distant possession. The continuous, fundamental processes of government and of the life of the people in the Philippines have been, as always, quite beyond the ken of the American public. Hence it is easy for Americans to miss the outstanding fact of the period: the steady development among the Filipino people of the capacity for democratic self-government. If Governor-General Wood has talked little of independence, he has labored ceaselessly and effectively to aid the Filipinos in laying the social, economic, and political foundations without which national independence can never become a reality. And if the protests of a few Filipinos against a restriction of Philippine autonomy have made discord and strife seem to be the outstanding characteristics of the period, the vast majority of the people, official and unofficial, have gone quietly about their business, confidently and steadily growing in those habits of thought and action which form the indispensable basis of the democratic state.
One notable result of the combined efforts of Americans and Filipinos during the past four years is a very great improvement in the administration of the government. Every year of good government has made the people of the Islands, especially those who are just coming into political power, a little more intolerant of bad government, a little less inclined to accept a government ‘ run like hell,’ even though so run by Filipinos. Furthermore, administration, like most other human activities, is largely a matter of technique. Under the inspiration and guidance of General Wood, who is both a master technician and a great leader of men, the thousands of Filipinos who are actually carrying on the government of the Philippines are acquiring a technique in administration that eventually may compensate, in a measure, for the political inexperience of the masses of the people.
The efficiency and momentum of the governmental machine which has been built up in the Philippines and the political stability of the Filipino people have never been better shown than during the two and a half years since the crisis of 1923. Despite the withdrawal of the political heads of the several executive departments, and the repeated declarations of Senator Quezon that the Filipinos had ceased to coöperate with the Governor-General, the government proceeded harmoniously and efficiently. The undersecretaries of the departments, ‘the real technical men of the government,’ as acting-secretaries, automatically took the places of their resigning political chiefs. No administrative official resigned his office. There was no spontaneous popular outburst of resentment against the United States, although observers familiar with the Islands noted that in the less advanced communities more anti-Wood feeling was stirred up than in the more educated and sophisticated centres. Local government, which is almost entirely in the hands of Filipinos, proceeded practically unaffected by the political storm at the apex of the official hierarchy.
Even more significant than the failure of Senator Quezon and his associates seriously to embarrass the Government were the developments that followed the support which Washington gave to the Governor-General. Upon the return of the all-party mission which had borne the protests of the Philippine legislature to the United States, the Democrata members of that body accused the Nacionalista leaders, Senator Quezon and Speaker Roxas, of having betrayed the cause of immediate independence at Washington, and of having misled the Filipino people as to the course which they had pursued at the American capital. The mission was also boldly criticized for having recklessly squandered the people’s money, much of which had been raised by popular subscription, during their journey. Eventually it became evident to the general public that the attack of Messrs. Quezon and Roxas upon the Governor General not only had failed to change his course or effect his removal, but had actually resulted in regularizing his position and confirming his powers.
The results of the immediately preceding events and of the developments of the entire Wood period were fairly reflected in the general election of June 1925. This appeal to the people confirmed the outstanding tendencies shown by the momentous election of 1922. In this latter year the Filipino people destroyed the fifteen-year political monopoly of the Nacionalista party and gave the formerly insignificant Democratas sufficient strength to make them an important factor in Philippine politics. In so doing they revealed the existence of an unsuspected amount of political independence and of a real public opinion in the Philippines. They also returned a significant proportion of liberal candidates to the lower house of the legislature and unmistakably approved the parties which stood for liberal and democratic principles of government. In both elections a large proportion of the qualified electors actually voted, and in many districts they cast their ballots with little regard for the instructions of their ancient economic and political bosses. As to the precise degree in which this happy result may be attributed to the presence in the background of a determined, impartial chief executive who everyone knew was ready to use the whole force of the government of the Philippines, and of the United States if necessary, to prevent or to punish serious infractions of the election law, opinions differ.
The most important result of the voting in 1925 was the continuance of the Democrata party as a strong, and probably permanent, party of opposition. In 1922 a number of Democratas won seats because the majority vote was temporarily split between the Quezon and the Osmeña wings of the party. In 1925, however, the old party was again united as the Partido Nacionalista Consolidado, and the election was a straight two-party battle. In this fight the Democratas lost some ten seats in the House of Representatives and gained three in the Senate. In a number of provinces the Democratas lost only by very narrow margins, the closeness of the votes indicating that in those districts their strength was almost equal to that of their victorious opponents.
The figures, moreover, do not tell the whole story of the Democrata rise in influence. In both 1922 and 1925 this party carried the metropolitan districts of Manila and Cebu, the two largest cities in the Philippines, by safe majorities for both its local and its Insular tickets. In a number of other notable cases it was victorious in more advanced and better-educated districts where the common people are relatively free from coercion and other improper influence. There thus seem to be good grounds for believing that the Democratas are in the field to stay and that they are strong enough to perform the indispensable functions of an opposition party, or to take over the government should the majority group lose the confidence of the people.
Another important result of the elections was the rise in political power of new and vigorous national leaders, men whose success already gives hope for the termination of the monopoly of power so long held by Messrs. Quezon and Osmeña. Outstanding among these growing figures are Camilio Osias, Dr. José P. Laurel, and Speaker Manuel Roxas. In addition to these three outstanding figures, some thirty-five graduates of the University of the Philippines were returned to the House of Representatives, as well as numerous other young men whose formative years were passed under the influence of American institutions. It is interesting to observe that the adherence of the ‘younger generation,’which is much talked of in the Philippines, has not been given to any one party or leader.
Since the elections, politics have pursued a comparatively placid course. But although there is now little open friction between the Governor-General and the legislature, neither Filipinos nor Americans are satisfied with the present situation. There is a gulf between the executive and the legislative departments which is not conducive to good government or to good feeling. Public statements made by President Coolidge and Governor-General Wood have indicated that the American Government has definitely decided upon a course of action intended to bridge that gulf. General Wood has declared that with Filipino coöperation, or with ‘certain amendments,’ the present organic act is adequate to carry out the administration’s policy in the Islands. President Coolidge, in his letter to Speaker Roxas, earnestly appealed to the Filipinos to ‘coöperate fully and effectively with the American Government and authorities,’ in the manner contemplated by the law. At the same time he intimated that such coöperation would result in further concessions of self-government, and that its absence might cause the withdrawal of powers previously granted. In his annual message of December 8, 1925, the President declared: ‘From such reports as reach me there are indications that more authority should be given to the governor-general, so that he will not be so dependent upon the local legislative body to render effective our efforts to set an example of the sound administration and good government which is so necessary for the preparation of the Philippine people for self-government under ultimate independence.’ The Filipino leaders, therefore, are presented with the alternatives of genuinely coöperating to make the present organic law work as it was intended to, with the prospect of a future extension of local autonomy, or of having that law made workable by a decided increase in the power of the governor-general. Meanwhile the Filipinos are steadily growing to political maturity, and at no period of Philippine history has that growth among the people at large been more rapid or substantial than during the past four years.
