Back in March 2025, Pulse Asia asked a representative sample of Filipinos where they got their news, to which they could give multiple answers. Unsurprisingly, TV remained the top source, at 83 percent (72 percent national, 16 percent local). Internet came next at 72 percent (Facebook at 67 percent, YouTube at 34 percent, “online news sites” at 4 percent, and “other social media sites” at 3 percent with X [formerly Twitter] at 1 percent). Radio came next, 36 percent (local 21 percent, national 16 percent) followed by family/relatives 34 percent and friends/acquaintances 22 percent. Miserably (because, of these sources, the only one capable of sustainably providing depth) last came newspapers at 1 percent.

While dating to last year, the 2025 snapshot of news sources helps put the latest Pulse Asia survey on 2028 voters’ preferences in context. That is, if what the survey provides is a snapshot of how the respondents think they will vote in 2028 based on opinions they held at the time they were polled, then the 2025 survey gives us an insight into how they decided on their choices (assuming news plays an important role in choices). But since we do not know, specifically, what their basis for deciding was, we can only theorize.

Except for the politically obsessed (like journalists, columnists, politicians and their hangers-on, etc.), no normal person has really put much thought into an election two years from now, much less a campaign that only becomes official a year from now. However, the timing of the Pulse Asia survey is significant because it provides a benchmark of public opinion a year before the filing of candidacies. And this is where we should begin.

The survey, I think, puts the question in a peculiar way: “Of the people on this list, whom would you vote for as President of the Philippines if the May 2028 elections were held today and they were candidates?” Peculiarly because including “2028” makes them fast-forward but what they’re being asked is their opinion, now. See the difference? You might as well have asked, “If presidential elections were held today, who would you vote for from this list…”

The survey took place from Sept. 17 to 24, and has Vice President Sara Duterte at 50 percent, former Vice President Leni Robredo at 26 percent, Sen. Raffy Tulfo at 12 percent and Sen. Risa Hontiveros at 3 percent, with Defense Secretary Gilberto ”Gibo” Teodoro Jr. and Public Works and Highways Secretary Vince Dizon at 1 percent (with a margin of error of plus/minus 2 percent, the results are basically unchanged from the previous, for the top two).

No overt campaign has started. In fact, the whole question of the electoral landscape is unclear until—and unless—the impeachment of the Vice President is resolved: but the survey, in projecting a scenario where the Vice President is a presidential candidate in 2028, immediately assumes she has overcome the impeachment: and it would be true to assume that the saying “what does not kill you makes you stronger” would apply. No one can doubt that if the Veep were acquitted, her not merely surviving but being seen to win would boost her chances and candidacy. So in that sense the Pulse number—50 percent—is a possibly fair projection of the political payoff from an acquittal.

The other figure, for the former Veep, is interesting because Robredo has repeatedly said she’s not interested in seeking the presidency; her numbers are not a projection of future success but the continuing afterglow of her supporters’ support and her past national stature. This is a very different lens from the one a prospective Duterte voter would be looking through, thinking of her still being a candidate in 2028. As for the rest, they simply show they aren’t top of mind when the whole exercise, anyway, isn’t top of mind for most sane people, anyway.

You could read things another way, of course, which is simple as can be: if an election had been held between Sept. 17 and 24, the Vice President would have become president basically with a majority, trouncing any other rival. Without having to project to 2028, the underlying strength of her appeal would have been the same: surviving, winning.

I’ve long believed we don’t really root for the underdog but prefer to stampede to the winner. There’s that remarkable story of a pollster who recounted asking people whom they had voted for after an election, only to find more people remembered voting for the winner than actually did. Similarly, we are for the underdog so long as the underdog wins—but to lose is worse than a disgrace; it is an embarrassment because it is a sign of weakness.

Consider that other survey-related phenomenon, which is a bump in the ratings enjoyed by individuals who transition from being possible to actual candidates. The person who hasn’t thrown their hat in the ring is judged less seriously than the one who has placed a bet—and is thus worth betting on. The real proof, then, of a candidate’s chances is becoming a candidate. All the rest is hedging and trial balloons. Without parties conducting intramurals that use party members to gauge the chances of a candidate by voting for them in conventions, the replacement for parties—the impresarios who put together candidacies based on survey results with which to entice investments by funders who manage risk by means of the surveys—have to look at these numbers to see who has what it takes to be a winner.