Confusing reports to the contrary, it turns out all 55 members of the House committee on justice voted to approve the articles of impeachment for submission to the House of Representatives in plenary. The whole House will get to decide whether or not to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte. If she is impeached, the charges, or articles of impeachment, will be sent to the Senate, which will then constitute itself into an impeachment court to decide whether the Vice President should be convicted or acquitted.

When the Vice President was first impeached, there was no need for a vote in the committee on justice, because the representatives resorted to the faster means of impeaching an official, which is to have at least one-third of the House’s membership endorse an impeachment complaint.

Back then, 215 out of 306 members endorsed the impeachment complaint, far exceeding the minimum requirement of 102; having impeached her, the House then transmitted its articles of impeachment to the Senate on the same day. Then the dillydallying began as then Senate President Francis Escudero proceeded to murder the English language in excruciating but convenient slow motion.

Because of the Supreme Court’s declaration of that impeachment as null and void, the House this time around did things methodically. From March 2 to 4, the committee on justice tackled sufficiency in form and substance, and sent formal notice to the Veep to give her the opportunity to rebut the allegations made (which she did on March 16). On March 18, the committee tackled the sufficiency of the grounds established; on March 25, it issued subpoenas for witnesses and documents. Three clarificatory hearings followed: on alleged confidential funds misuse on April 14; on allegations of unexplained wealth and nondisclosure of assets on April 22; and on her alleged threats against officials on April 29. That same day, the committee unanimously decided there was probable cause to impeach. Last Monday, the committee approved its report containing the articles of impeachment, which the plenary could tackle after the committee on rules schedules it for debate.

If the first impeachment was a stampede, this one has all the spontaneity of a steamroller. The plenary vote is already being described as a foregone conclusion. Senate President Vicente Sotto III repeatedly says he understands English better than Escudero and more strictly than the Supremes.

In the Senate, the majority is composed of 15, with nine in the minority: on a strict coalition (and not party) line vote, one vote is lacking to convict. But then again, this assumes coalition loyalty or at least solidarity in both groups when every senator will be trying to detect the public pulse to determine their vote.

This trumps every other consideration, including allegations of inducements to encourage voting one way or another. We forget that in the Estrada impeachment, for example, the career-killing vote to suppress the so-called “second envelope” in 2001 was as much based on the besieged president’s continuing popularity as anything else, and that public opinion had swung heavily toward accepting the guilt of impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona in 2011.

This is why describing an impeachment trial as a “political numbers game” is a lazy shorthand. To be sure, it is entirely possible for senators, being political animals, to approach impeachment strictly based on party, coalition, or some other affiliation. It is also possible to consider it the greatest auction of votes in our transactional system. It is also entirely possible to consider it a combination of the two, but to limit it to that is not enough.

Three principles, I think, have been well absorbed by the public. The first is Benjamin Franklin’s comment that impeachment is preferable to assassination to solve the problem of intolerable officials. The second is Alexander Hamilton’s definition of the process of impeachment as an inquest into the conduct of public men. The third is that for the highest officials in a democracy, only representatives of the people and not unelected judges are fit to remove those who have electoral mandates or fixed terms: the removal being limited to holding office and seeking it in the future, and nothing more.

Because what is the proper preserve of the judiciary is the determination of whether you can retain, or should lose, God-given rights: life, liberty, and property. In these, only the strictest procedure can apply; for public office, a looser procedure can suffice. This is why even if convicted in an impeachment, that official will only end up in jail if charges are filed in court and successfully prosecuted to achieve a judicial conviction.

It’s best to understand an impeachment trial as being conducted on two levels: as a kind of court of law in the Senate itself and before the court of public opinion. There, not just the official impeached, but all those participating in the trial—the senators, who are asked to render a judgment, the House managers who act as prosecuting attorneys, even the defense panel, are being judged. No one will forget Estelito Mendoza proving he was fit for wheeling and dealing behind the scenes, but not for the legal theater of a jury trial, or the political disgrace that ended or handicapped the political careers of so many senators.