A realignment is going on, and where it is headed is interesting. The public mood remains depressed because the world remains uneasy due to the disruption caused by the war in the Middle East. While the world is waiting to see if the current pause is merely temporary or will last, and whether its continuing effects will intensify or dissipate, for now, governments around the world have a breather, including ours. At the time the crisis was at its height, I’d observed that President Marcos had demonstrated a fairly disciplined antidrama approach; the question is, did it succeed or fail?

From March 10 to 17, as the crisis was unfolding, WR Numero conducted a survey in which they asked people what their factional partisanship was. The results would seem to be our first snapshot of public opinion on the handling of the crisis, not just by the President, but by other groups. Chances are, satisfaction with how the leadership was handling the crisis, whether in or out of government, would have a significant effect on partisanship.

The survey boils it down as follows, as of the dates the survey was held: 33 percent of Filipinos identify as pro-Duterte, 22 percent say they’re pro-Marcos, 17 percent are pro-opposition, with 25 percent being independent. With this latest snapshot, one then has to look at the most immediate snapshot to make a comparison.

Since November, the last time these questions were asked, who, if anyone, has reaped any political gains? Marcos grew 8 points, the opposition, which is defined as the center-left, exemplified by former Vice President Leni Robredo, and Sen. Bam Aquino and Sen. Risa Hontiveros, went up 5 points since the previous survey. Independents (the “none of the above” crowd) fell from 39 percent in November to 25 percent in March, which means more people are taking sides.

But year-on-year, it’s interesting, too: the independents are basically back where they started: 21 percent in March 2025 and 25 percent in March 2026. Pro-Duterte was 38 percent in March 2025, pro-opposition was 26 percent, and pro-Marcos was 15 percent, also last March. By March 2026, pro-Marcos gained 7 points, and the pro-opposition lost 9 points.

What about the strength of their affiliations? The Duterte loyalists are not only the biggest, but the most cohesive of the factions (65.9 percent of them are “solid Duterte,” 11 percent lean toward the opposition, 7.9 percent refused to answer); the pro-opposition may come in third, but they’re the second-most cohesive (52.6 percent “solid opposition,” 23.2 percent “soft opposition,” 11.9 percent “lean Duterte”), while despite being the second-biggest, Marcos loyalists are the weakest in terms of solid support. (32.8 percent “solid Marcos,” 23.2 percent “soft opposition,” 11.9 percent “lean Duterte”).

Since, overall, it’s mainly Marcos who has managed a very slow inching upward, it’s possible to theorize that the plunge in the opposition has meant some of its constituency shifted to becoming independents or giving cautious support to Marcos (while those who shifted away from Duterte have likely shifted to, and remain, independent status). Much as the administration has been relentlessly criticized for not doing what its enemies want, it can claim it’s done enough and without the recklessness involved in other proposals, such as lavish across-the-board subsidies.

A sign of where the administration is, politically, is the growth of the President’s party, the Partido Federal ng Pilipinas. According to the party’s president, South Cotabato Gov. Reynaldo Tamayo Jr., its membership in the House had been growing even ahead of the second impeachment effort against Vice President Sara Duterte–except the party didn’t announce it.

From 38 representatives when the current 20th Congress began on June 30, 2025, its members now comprise 50 representatives. It’s now the second-biggest party in the House. Since patronage is the milk of representative government, nothing beats Abraham Lincoln’s explanation to a friend, who was kept waiting while Lincoln kept attending to one political caller after another. Pointing to the line of political supplicants, Honest Abe shrugged and remarked, “Too many piglets, too few teats.”

Then again, however many piglets there may be, only the administration owns the trough. Duterte didn’t do, as Arroyo did, which was to bog down her successor by stacking the bureaucracy with midnight appointees; Marcos and company are old hands at it. If the crisis hasn’t altogether gone away, the lack of drama on top means it can quietly go ahead and mount an impeachment.

What this suggests is the resilience of the system, much as no one, anywhere, seems to have any particular attachment or fondness for it. The thing is that the system itself is not conducive to proposing alternatives capable of mustering a consensus: it is far easier to simply knock down any proposal. We all know what we hate, but we hardly seem capable of coming together in support of something, anything, everyone likes—except the most basic, such as elections, first of all, and direct election of the head of state and government (the president), second of all.