In that legal phrase popularized by former President Rodrigo Duterte, “He, who is the cause of the cause, is the cause of them all.” The cause of the cause–the “he” who was the cause of them all—was, according to Sen. Panfilo Lacson, an unnamed media relations officer of a senator. What was leaked was the draft Senate blue ribbon committee report, which would have recommended the filing of plunder and other criminal and administrative charges against former Sen. Ramon “Bong” Revilla, former House appropriations committee chair Zaldy Co, former Caloocan 2nd District Rep. Mitch Cajayon Uy, former Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary Manuel Bonoan, former Department of Education Undersecretary Trygve Olaivar, Sen. Francis “Chiz” Escudero’s “alleged bagman” and tech entrepreneur Maynard Ngu, members of an alleged DPWH syndicate, and three sitting senators: Jinggoy Estrada, Joel Villanueva, and Escudero.

The leak caused hesitation, which caused a coup attempt: Senate Majority Leader Juan Miguel Zubiri, Sen. Sherwin Gatchalian, and Sen. JV Ejercito withdrew their signatures from the circulating draft, triggering, in turn, the effort to oust Sen. Vicente “Tito” Sotto III from the Senate presidency—and with it, Lacson from both being Senate President Pro Tempore and chair of the blue ribbon committee. The dynamic trio in the coup attempt were Estrada, Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano, and Sen. Imee Marcos, who trooped to Sen. Loren Legarda’s office to tempt her with visions of being the first female Senate President in our history.

By all accounts, two in charge of whipping—or gathering—the votes were Cayetano and Villanueva; what they hoped to achieve was to combine the minority bloc (Escudero, Villanueva, Estrada, Cayetano, Marcos, Sen. Rodante Marcoleta, Sen. Christopher “Bong” Go, Sen. Robinhood Padilla, and domestic man of mystery Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa) with Sen. Pia Cayetano, Sen. Mark Villar, Sen. Camille Villar, and defectors from the majority: Legarda, Ejercito, Zubiri, and Gatchalian. Whipping votes, it seems, to maintain Sotto’s leadership were Lacson, Zubiri, and Sen. Risa Hontiveros, and it isn’t beyond the realm of possibility that powerful allies elsewhere were called in to back the Senate President.

The Senate President, who all the while was presiding over the session with a champion poker face, saw how ridiculous the situation could end up. When it was proposed that the portion of the draft blue ribbon committee report recommending the filing of charges against sitting senators be taken out, he opposed it. Perhaps he heard that charges were expected to be filed against one of the senators anyway (you’d have a Senate removing names even as charges were actually filed).

In any case, the deal-breaker was said to have been the prospect of restoring Marcoleta as chair of the blue ribbon committee. The coup failing was signaled by Estrada walking out of the Senate session hall.

The optics were terrible even for the thick-faced. The energy and enthusiasm of Estrada and Villanueva were obviously motivated by self-preservation, an incentive shared by Escudero, Ejercito, Zubiri, and Gatchalian. If they’d joined the coup, they would obviously have been tagged, as their loyalty to good government ends where their loyalty to their friends and their jobs begins. The enthusiasm of Marcos was obviously out of spite, since she’d been unceremoniously removed from the chairmanship of the committee on foreign affairs. The participation in a coup by the two Villars would obviously have fostered the impression that they did so to somehow help their father’s chances to wriggle out of ongoing investigations, and Legarda was already being tagged as motivated less by history and more by maternal concern over her son’s unraveling political fortunes; as for the Cayetanos, they were being the Cayetanos, helpful to the Dutertes above all.

To save Legarda’s face, Sotto, after the coup failed, briefly talked about term-sharing, the kind of pie-in-the-sky, easily forgettable, after-the-emergency-passes soothing noises politicians make to take away the sting of defeat for a colleague. Things will only remain precarious until—or unless—the blue ribbon committee report is released. If the names remain, it underscores the gravity of the charges when they are actually filed against some, or all, of those mentioned (just as it builds expectation hard to defuse: for example, even if scuttlebutt says that the first lady would prefer Escudero not be charged, a blue ribbon committee report would give the Ombudsman cover to charge Escudero anyway).

Whatever happens, it makes the Senate presidency a poisoned chalice for anyone still wanting to take it away from Sotto, now, or later (for example, if the Veep is impeached). It also diminishes the Senate’s standing just when public opposition to dynasties is reaching critical mass: jealous and exasperated because defensive congressmen can seriously ask, ahead of a constitutional convention, since the Senate has exchanged a national perspective for a self-protecting one, do we even need an upper House at all?