

Quezon's Role in Philippine Independence

by

Joseph F. Hutchinson, Jr.

On February 10, 1933, a tired, tubercular man delivered to a meeting of Philippine Provincial Governors and Treasurers a succinct denunciation of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, an act for Philippine Independence which had recently been passed by the United States Congress over President Hoover's veto. The speaker's once jet-black sideburns were now a hoary white, but his elegant style still radiated charm and force. He attacked the trade provisions of the act as unfair to the Philippines; he claimed that the proposed Commonwealth did not give the Filipinos "the opportunity, the means, the power to legislate for themselves"; he denounced the proponents of the act for "behaving as though we are engaged in an electoral campaign, accusing those who do not agree with [them] as traitors to the country."¹ What was remarkable was not the substance of the speech, but the fact that it was made by Manuel Quezon, leader of the Nacionalista Party and symbol of the Philippine demand for independence. Now he stood as an apparent opponent of the independence that had for so long been his publicly avowed goal, stood in opposition not only to the United States Congress but also to his close friends and long-time colleagues in the leadership of the Nacionalista Party.

This paper is not a biography of Manuel Quezon or a chronicle of Philippine independence; it is, rather, a study of how a remarkable man used political power. At one of the most crucial points in Philippine history--when the reality of independence was at hand in 1932-33--Quezon, the leader of that nation, was seemingly willing to block the decades-old dream of attaining independence in order to ensure his continued hegemony in

domestic politics. This is a study of how Quezon used this opportunity to strengthen his political position, and how the Filipino socio-political system allowed such an action to occur.

Quezon's most dominant characteristic was his ability to manipulate people; he had a proud, volatile, and charismatic personality which he used skillfully to mobilize Filipinos behind him. His personal flair and political force quickly made him a prominent national figure, and his keen understanding of the intricacies of Philippine politics enabled him to build up a permanently loyal following. By publicly advocating immediate, complete, and absolute independence for the Philippines, he became a national symbol to his people. Filipinos were mobilized into a more viable polity by their admiration for Quezon's dynamic personality. He made himself the embodiment of national unity, will, dignity, and desire for independence, and Filipinos responded by praising his ability to mingle with other world leaders and by reveling vicariously in his political pomp and grandeur.

Quezon's personality was also mercurial, however, and to understand him it is necessary to study the sly, ambivalent, and sometimes ruthless side of his personality. Quezon's private correspondence² shows how he manipulated the Filipino people so that he could continue his rule over them. He also deceived his own friends and lied to politicians in order to further his political ambitions. But he was extremely careful in his chicanery--he seldom allowed his lies to catch up with him publicly and undermine his position.

This study will focus on Quezon's opposition to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, and the explanations he advanced for thus rejecting the very issue he had been publicly advocating for so long. It may lead us closer to an understanding of Quezon's own motivation, his rationalization of his action--was it pure political ambition, or a sincere belief that the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was inferior to an independence bill he himself might be able to obtain from Congress?

Manuel Quezon was born on August 19, 1878 in the small town of Baler in the province of Tayabas (now Quezon Province). He had a good education, culminating in study at the College of San Juan de Letran in 1894. After fighting the Americans as an

insurrecto, Quezon passed his bar exams and was appointed Fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of Mindoro in 1903; in 1904 he was transferred to Tayabas. Later that year he resigned from the bureaucracy and set up a private law practice. At this time, Quezon began his illustrious political career.

There were then in the Philippines several underground pro-independence parties; three of these³ were to merge to form the Partido Nacionalista (Nacionalistas) not long after the ban on such parties was lifted in 1906. Quezon plunged into action in this formative period of Filipino politics and became a close friend of Sergio Osmeña,⁴ who would emerge as leader of the Nacionalistas. In the 1907 elections for the Philippine Assembly, the Nacionalistas rolled up a decisive plurality over all other parties;⁵ Osmeña was elected Speaker, with Quezon's backing. Osmeña asserted his claim to leadership in Philippine politics by his fiery invective against American rule, claiming the Filipinos' right to immediate, complete, and absolute independence.⁶

In 1909 Osmeña sent Quezon to Washington as the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States. Quezon disseminated the Filipino desire for immediate independence to both Congress and the American people at large. He created a newspaper, The Filipino People, with the support of the American Anti-Imperialist League and "many important figures in the Democratic Party."⁷ When he addressed Congress in 1910, instead of chiding the United States with a frontal attack on colonialism, he praised American conduct in the Philippines, while noting that the Filipinos were capable of controlling their own destiny. In response to a question about the desire of the Filipinos for independence, the young Commissioner replied, "Ask the bird, Sir, who is enclosed in a golden cage if he would prefer the cage and the care of his owner to the freedom of the skies and the allure of the forest."⁸

A swing in American politics toward the Democratic Party produced both the "Filipinization" of the Philippine bureaucracy under Governor-General Francis B. Harrison and a growing Congressional sentiment in favor of Philippine independence. In 1912 Democratic Congressman William Atkinson Jones introduced a bill providing for Philippine Independence, but it failed to get out of committee. In 1914 another "Jones Bill" passed the House but was rejected by the Senate. In 1916 it was reintroduced once more, this time with the Clarke Amendment attached,

which guaranteed that independence would be granted within five years. Quezon had lobbied for the Jones Bill since 1912 but did not support the Clarke Amendment. In this he was backed by Osmeña; neither politician seemed over-anxious for a definite early date for Philippine independence.⁹

The private memoranda of General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, show Quezon's growing concern that immediate independence might be detrimental to the Philippines and to *ilustrado* control. Despite his public espousals of immediate independence since his rise to national prominence in 1907, Quezon now privately proposed a new organic act which would give the Islands their independence in twenty-five years. McIntyre wrote that Quezon "said that there would perhaps be a little more difficulty in getting an agreement to this now than there would have been a few years ago, in that independence now had acquired an attractive sound to the ears of the Filipinos." When Quezon had expressed his fear to Congressman Jones that the Jones proposal for independence in three years would give the Philippines independence too early, McIntyre recorded that Quezon "was afraid that he had impressed Mr. Jones unfavorably in standing out against that."¹⁰

Nevertheless, Quezon returned to Manila claiming sole credit for the Jones Act (which had passed without the Clarke Amendment)¹¹ and was greeted as a national hero. The Filipino people believed that Quezon had done his best to obtain immediate independence, but had been limited to the Jones Act by the United States Congress. The credit awarded Quezon for this achievement made him a threat to Osmeña's power, but Osmeña skillfully managed to obtain the leading position in the newly created Council of State, thus reaffirming his control of the party and temporarily thwarting Quezon's advance in domestic politics. In 1919 Quezon returned to Washington as head of the first Philippine Independence Mission, hoping to obtain further concessions from the Democrats which might enable him to supplant Osmeña. He took with him the "Declaration of Purposes" passed on March 17, 1919 by the Philippine Legislature, which reiterated the demand for independence.¹² Quezon pleaded the Filipino case to Secretary of War Newton Baker with the help of Governor-General Harrison, then vacationing in the United States. Baker gave the Mission a sympathetic hearing and said that Wilson would work for Philippine independence

when he returned from Versailles.¹³ In December 1920 Wilson told the Congress (after a Republican electoral landslide) that a "stable" government existed in the Islands, and that it was the duty of the Congress to keep its "promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet."¹⁴ But Wilson's efforts were fruitless, and Quezon found he could do little else to promote the independence issue, so he decided to return to the Philippines to challenge Osmeña directly.

The tactless rule of newly-appointed Governor-General Leonard Wood gave Quezon the opportunity he sought. Wood's constant pressure on the Filipino elite caused dissension within the Nacionalista party. Quezon publicly blamed Osmeña for the disintegration of the party, which, he asserted, stemmed from Osmeña's pretentious assumption of a dictatorial role in both the party and the Legislature. These attacks upon Osmeña's "unipersonalistic" rule were ultimately successful, and Quezon was elected President of the Senate. He thereupon turned around and obtained a rapprochement with Osmeña which lasted for a decade.

Quezon, now the most powerful Filipino politician, sent several independence missions to Washington, but Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were impervious to any such pleas. Late in 1927 Quezon was incapacitated by tuberculosis and he was forced to convalesce at a sanatorium in Monrovia, California. For three years he tried to maintain his power by corresponding from his sick bed to Manila and Washington. His enforced isolation allowed him to take an overview of the Philippine-American situation. During his illness his views on the possible problems of a premature independence began to solidify. A new set of variables complicated the independence issue even more. Quezon watched the growing militarism of Japan and the worsening Depression; he was one of the first Filipinos to recognize that these phenomena had profoundly altered American policy toward the Philippine Islands. Independence was becoming a real possibility, no longer just a political and rhetorical issue.

Before 1929, despite the increasing trade between the United States and the Philippines, Americans tended to overlook the economic realities of imperialism and to see the Philippines primarily in political and administrative terms. But with the coming of the Depression, every sector of the American economy began to suffer. Many Americans began to see the Philippines as a liability; the Islands became a scapegoat for American fears and hostilities. The Western states had begun lobbying to restrict Filipino immigration because their unemployed labor pool already exceeded the critical limits. The large labor organizations not only wanted Filipino immigration halted, but they also proposed that the free entry of Philippine goods be curtailed. Labor felt that any foreign goods successfully competing with the goods produced by the American worker would only add momentum to the snowballing Depression. Certain Congressmen, mainly from the agricultural states, also began to propose tariff and import quotas on Philippine goods. Groups such as dairy farmers, cottonseed oil producers, cane and beet sugar growers, cordage manufacturers, and sundry "patriotic" societies began to lobby for Philippine independence so that the Islands would lose their special status and become a foreign country susceptible to import quotas.

In January, 1930, Senator William King of Utah presented the Senate with a bill for immediate independence. In March, Senator Harry Hawes of Missouri and Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico introduced a bill which provided for the popular election of a Philippine constituent assembly to construct a constitution. By the provisions of the Hawes-Cutting Bill the Philippines would remain under lenient American control for five more years, during which time the free trade between the United States and the Philippines would gradually be abrogated by the introduction of steadily increasing tariff walls. A similar bill was introduced in the House by Congressman Butler B. Hare of South Carolina.

Quezon increasingly realized that the Philippine economy would be periled if there was no trade protection by the United States in an independence bill.¹⁵ In a letter to Osmeña, Quezon wrote that Philippine free trade with the United States was not resting on a solid foundation, because it "depends not at all

upon our will but exclusively on the will of Congress."¹⁶ Although both politicians believed that immediate independence would be a mistake, they dared not abandon their "immediate, complete, and absolute" independence platform at this time, professing instead to educate the Filipino people gradually about the dangers of a premature independence.

Quezon, who had only partially recovered from his illness, had returned to the Philippines late in 1929. Although the political battle wounds of 1922 were not entirely healed, Osmeña and Quezon became extremely close political comrades. Quezon's will was by far the stronger of the two and Quezon could usually get Osmeña to follow his lead. Osmeña and Quezon were intimate enough to trust each other and to exchange private political thoughts. It was not until later that their divergent views on the independence issue drove them to ruthless political slander against each other.

Early in 1930, Osmeña and Manuel Roxas¹⁷ had been sent by the Philippine Legislature to Washington to lobby for independence. Osmeña returned to Manila after a brief stay in Washington to confer with Quezon. After discussing the economic issue, Osmeña proposed that he return to Washington to support the Hawes-Cutting Bill and the Hare Bill. Quezon agreed to this plan.

Roxas had remained in Washington to continue the fight for independence and to espouse the Filipino position at the Senate hearings on the Hawes-Cutting Bill. Roxas cabled Osmeña, who was on his way to meet him, a statement made by Henry Stimson which concerned the Senate's possible approval of an independence bill, but Roxas assured Osmeña that no action seemed likely to be taken in Congress in that session. Roxas also met with Secretary of War Hurley and Senator Bingham, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, and discovered that while both men were apprehensive toward the Hawes-Cutting Bill, the sentiment of Congress was leaning toward independence. Osmeña relayed Roxas' observations to Quezon, who gave Roxas carte blanche in the pending Senate hearings.¹⁸

Roxas was the first witness called to testify. He explained that sovereignty over the Philippines was an unnecessary financial burden for the United States. Roxas then claimed that

independence was owed to the Filipino people since they had fulfilled the "stable" government provision of the Jones Law. He went on to say that "under the present circumstances, aside from any duty to free the Philippine Islands in accordance with the desire of their people, the United States could be more helpful to them if she were to withdraw her sovereignty, rather than to permit their progress to lurk in stagnation." But Roxas realized that "with the granting of tariff autonomy serious difficulties may arise."¹⁹ To Roxas, as to Osmeña and Quezon, political independence was desired but economic independence was not. They realized that not only would the Filipino people as a whole be hurt by discontinuing the special trade agreement with the United States, but also that they would personally lose money and status if this relationship with the United States was severed.

American farm and labor leaders were the next to appear before the Committee. Although some of the witnesses demonstrated that their support of Philippine independence was purely on economic grounds, most of the farm and labor witnesses claimed that the group they represented had, in fact, always supported Philippine independence. But the Committee soon realized that many of the farm and labor witnesses only testified because of the worsening economic conditions.²⁰

The Philippines Chamber of Commerce, the American Asiatic Association, and various American exporters to the Philippines spoke out against independence.²¹ These groups based their arguments on idealistic and moral persuasion, but the Committee continually directed its questions to the economic problem. The Committee had discovered that American concern with independence rested very heavily on the economic issues involved, even though the moral argument had some prominent proponents: A New York Times reporter, Nicholas Roosevelt, argued that the duty of the United States was to watch over and guide the Filipinos to a stable society, and therefore, the United States should not modify the status quo, other than to set a date for eventual independence. A different argument came from Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who claimed that independence would "inevitably create a general unsettlement of affairs in the Far East."²²

Stricken again with illness in the Philippines, Quezon followed the Committee's proceedings by cablegrams from Roxas and

Resident Commissioners Guevara and Osias. Early in January, 1930, Quezon decided that a Philippine convention for independence in Manila could be useful in assisting the efforts of the Filipinos in Washington. He wrote Maximo Kalaw, Dean of the University of the Philippines, and Osmeña, suggesting that Kalaw organize an Independence Congress to meet on February 22, Washington's Birthday. Due to Quezon's illness, Osmeña was to take his place.²³

The Independence Congress lasted for two days, and was attended by a well-chosen group of two thousand from "all sectors of the Philippine population."²⁴ The First Independence Congress had two plenary sessions with speeches from various delegates. The Congress authored a unanimous Manifesto, which was subsequently disseminated throughout the Islands. It declared that "no matter how lightly an alien control may rest on a people, it cannot, it will not, make the people happy."²⁵ The Independence Congress, while discussing the pending difficulties facing the Philippines if independence should be granted, still decided to support an "immediate, complete, and absolute" independence platform. Quezon had submitted a letter to the Independence Congress upon the request of Maximo Kalaw stating that Filipinos should fight heartily for independence, but with "self-control" and "patience."²⁶ Although this might have seemed like political blasphemy to the delegates of the Congress and a breach of the "immediate" independence proposal which Quezon had publicly professed for so long, the letter seemingly generated no objections, probably because the remainder of the letter was rather vague and Quezon had not really expressed a specific platform.

While the financial crises of the Depression relentlessly intensified, the Senate Committee hearings were drawing to a close. Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, the spokesman of the White House, submitted a report to the Committee on May 19, 1930. He strongly urged that independence not be "tampered with" at this time and that the status quo should prevail.²⁷ He believed that the Filipinos were not ready to govern themselves and said that "it would be inexpedient and hazardous to attempt to anticipate future developments by fixing any future date for ultimate independence."²⁸

Meanwhile, Senator Hawes, whose bill was under consideration in the Senate Committee, wrote Quezon in disgust

concerning an article in the St. Louis Dispatch which quoted Quezon as proclaiming that a protectorate with a thirty-year transition period would be necessary before Philippine independence could be conceivable. Quezon cabled back a denunciation to the accusation and stated that he earnestly hoped Congress would "now enact the laws granting the Islands their independence." Quezon did not qualify the terms for independence in this correspondence, and Senator Hawes was consequently unaware of Quezon's growing apprehension toward the termination of free trade.²⁹ When the Hawes-Cutting Bill was favorably reported by the Senate Committee, Roxas cabled Quezon that Stimson and Hurley made such damaging reports at this time, that Quezon should cable Hawes and Cutting reassuring them that the Filipino people coveted immediate, complete, and absolute independence. Quezon did this on May 24, saying that Filipinos "crave their national freedom."³⁰

The Senate Committee, which consisted primarily of farm-state Republicans and Democrats, favorably reported the Hawes-Cutting Bill on June 2.³¹ The Committee resolved that since "the interests of Americans are concerned in Philippine trade, it will be more simple to grant independence at an early date than when their investments have a deeper and more far-reaching contact with the Philippines."³² The Bill provided for the drafting of a democratic constitution. Upon ratification of the constitution a Commonwealth government, run exclusively by Filipinos, would function under the ultimate control of the President of the United States. This commonwealth status would exist for nineteen years with gradually increasing tariffs.³³ The United States would give independence to the Philippines if a plebiscite, to be taken after the transition period, was affirmative. The Hawes-Cutting Bill was not considered again until December, 1931, due to the more urgent domestic problems that confronted Congress.

In the eighteen-month interim, the severe Depression generated financial chaos and with this development farm and labor lobbying intensified. The Republican setback in the 1930 elections produced a nearly evenly-balanced Congress, the first stage of a political reversal which would reach its peak in the 1936 election.³⁴ During this interim, while the befuddled economists tried to solve the financial dilemma, a portentous incident occurred--Japanese armies attacked Manchuria in September of 1931. United States opinion became emphatically

and fervently anti-imperialistic, and many more Americans proposed divestment of the Philippines. Although Japanese aggression did not frighten the mass of the Filipinos, Quezon saw the imminent danger of Japan and accordingly became more overtly against "immediate, complete, and absolute" independence. But throughout 1930 and 1931 (as at other times) Quezon was far from consistent in his public proclamations.

When Congress had adjourned in the summer of 1930, Roxas returned to Manila with a scheme he had devised to strengthen the Philippine argument for independence. Roxas founded an allegedly non-partisan elite group to carry the independence issue directly to the people. The group, called Ang Bagong Katipunan (The New Association), stressed economic progress, racial equality, the unification of a national culture, and the disbanding of political parties so that a unified polity could approach Washington with the plea for independence.³⁵ There was great debate in the Philippine press as to whether this solution should be considered by the Philippine Legislature, but Roxas' faction was not strong enough to sway Osmeña's and Quezon's comrades.³⁶ The Nacionalistas had no intention of disbanding, and Ang Bagong Katipunan died a natural death very shortly after its inception. Roxas was not hurt politically, because the Filipino politicians assumed that he was trying to bolster the Filipino cause rather than attempting a political power play. They automatically assumed that Roxas was too intelligent to attempt a coup of both Osmeña's and Quezon's factions at once.

Although the 71st Congress met in late 1930, Resident Commissioners Osias and Guevara cabled Quezon, who had returned to Monrovia, that there was no chance for any Congressional action on Philippine independence in that short session.³⁷ At this point Quezon wrote the Commissioners that the Hawes-Cutting Bill was "most like" the kind of independence he desired, and that the fight for independence should be vigorously continued by the Commissioners. Quezon also solicited the support of Senator Wheeler. Although Quezon knew there would be no action this session, he asked the Senator to use his influence to bring the Hawes-Cutting Bill up for debate and possible vote.³⁸ It is unclear whether Quezon actually approved of the economic provisions in the Bill, or whether his support of it was a politically expedient move, but

it is clear that Quezon came more and more to favor the kind of limited independence that the Hawes-Cutting Bill provided.

As independence increasingly had seemed a tangible reality, uncertainties over what kind of independence bill Quezon wanted became more pronounced. Quezon privately supported the Hawes-Cutting Bill with its transition period and economic provisions but still espoused "immediate" independence in his public political pronouncements.³⁹ He also publicly denied the Philippine press allegations, which had accused him of abandoning "immediate" independence; the opposition press even dared to accuse Quezon of being anti-independence.⁴⁰ Quezon was not anti-independence, but was merely unsure of the optimum solution to his problem--should he publicly support the relatively conservative economic provisions of the Hawes-Cutting Bill and thus sacrifice his political program by discarding the "immediate" independence issue?⁴¹ Should he support the limited independence of the Hawes-Cutting Bill even if this might mean a decline in his political power? It would be several months before he formulated an answer to his dilemma.

In the early summer of 1931, Secretary Hurley and Senator Hawes decided to journey separately to the Philippines to examine the political context upon which successful independence would rely. Quezon and Hurley met several times in Monrovia before Hurley sailed for Manila. Hurley and Quezon came to an agreement which was to be submitted to Congress by Secretary Hurley; both had compromised their seemingly irreconcilable positions. Quezon stood firm as to what kind of independence he considered necessary for the Philippines; he publicly discarded his "immediate" independence platform, and instead offered a plan which had very similar provisions to the Hawes-Cutting Bill. Quezon's plan had political liabilities because it called for a ten-year transition period under a Governor-General. Quezon also agreed to a plebiscite after ten years, a raw sugar quota of 800,000 to 1,000,000 long tons, and the continuation of the present coconut oil quota.⁴² Since these were high quotas and would essentially constitute free trade, Quezon had clearly sacrificed his political independence platform for more satisfactory economic provisions. Osmeña and Roxas had also agreed to this threefold plan for commonwealth status before Quezon had offered it to Secretary Hurley.⁴³

Quezon, Roxas, and Osmeña had made a negotiation shift; they had publicly become the conservative element in the fight

for Philippine independence. Independence was no longer vague political claptrap, but was a concrete proposal with definite economic and political provisions qualifying it. Roxas had said that Filipino leaders were compelled to use "radical statements" for "immediate, complete, and absolute" independence to "maintain hold of the people."⁴⁴ Quezon brought the new proposals to the people by reasserting his proposal to the First Independence Congress of a year earlier in more explicit terms; he said that "haste and unreasoning passion will sweep us into danger" and that for this reason the Filipinos must "go slow."⁴⁵

Quezon's revised ideas generated sharp criticism from Filipino politicians. General Aguinaldo and Senator Juan Sumulong of the Democratras considered the proposal a breach of the debt of gratitude which the Nacionalistas owed the Filipino people for electing them. The Philippine papers that were not controlled by the Nacionalistas also lashed out against the plan. The Democratras labeled Quezon a "reactionary" and a "traitor to his pristine ideals of complete and immediate independence."⁴⁶ But these accusations did not affect the popularity of the Nacionalistas, who were re-elected en masse on July 13, 1931. The entrenched party structure, based on personal loyalties, remained more influential than any issues yet raised in Philippine politics. Quezon was re-elected Senate President, Roxas speaker of the House, and Osmeña Majority Floor Leader.⁴⁷ The Filipino people had apparently felt that the Nacionalista leaders had not reneged on their commitment.

With Quezon's commonwealth plan as the accepted proposal of the Filipino people, the Philippine Legislature presented the visiting Secretary Hurley with a resolution asking for the "immediate political separation" from the United States.⁴⁸ The support of Quezon's dominion plan was implicit in this resolution which called specifically for political independence, but no longer called for "absolute" independence. Hurley reported to the President that even though Filipinos wanted independence, it would not be feasible either politically or economically. President Hoover agreed with the report, and on October 26, 1931, Hoover emphasized this attitude in a speech. Hurley's War Department was undoubtedly influenced by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September, and he believed that the abandonment of vital military and naval installations in the Pacific would be an incalculable mistake.⁴⁹

Quezon sent a belated confirmation of the commonwealth proposal to Commissioners Osias and Guevara, who reacted favorably.⁵⁰ Osmeña and Roxas enjoined the Legislature to finance a trip to Washington to permit them to work with Osias and Guevara for "political independence."⁵¹ Quezon, now back in Manila but still ill, remained at home and rendered no specific instructions to the Mission. While the Mission was in Washington occupying itself with "winning friends for the Filipino cause, in solidifying friendships already won, and in mapping out a thorough campaign for independence,"⁵² Quezon again changed his mind on the kind of independence he thought the Filipinos needed.

Quezon saw that his people were becoming more "active and radical" and that they really did seem to want absolute independence. He sensed that the increasing number of independence parades and rallies proved the Filipino people's desire for complete and absolute independence.⁵³ As a result, he may have overreacted to this situation, believing that to keep his power and position he needed to maintain a hard-line independence stand. Aside from being influenced by the changing Filipino mood, Quezon was also influenced by the fact that he was sitting on the sidelines watching Roxas and Osmeña sail for Washington and for the resulting glory of success.

Quezon knew that the new American Congress which would take up the Hawes-Cutting Bill in December was very sympathetic to Philippine independence because of the Democratic victories, the worsening Depression, and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Quezon saw that there was a good chance that his potential political rivals would receive credit for achieving Philippine independence. When Hurley asked Quezon in December if any solution to the Philippine problem had to include guaranteed independence, Quezon answered affirmatively.⁵⁴ Quezon had reneged on his commonwealth status agreement of the previous summer with Secretary Hurley.

Quezon's ambition not only prompted him to go back on his agreement with Hurley, but also to turn against the OsRox (the press and cable abbreviation for Osmeña-Roxas) Mission in Washington. Quezon wrote Resident Commissioner Osias that he still favored immediate independence but said he realized the termination of free trade would be disastrous to the Philippine economy. He added, however, that if immediate independence

could not be achieved with a proposal for economic protection, then the Philippines would accept independence regardless of the circumstances.⁵⁵ Quezon said that he would "take independence under the most burdensome conditions if necessary" and if independence were impossible he would take "anything" he could get "that means an advance in our fight for freedom."⁵⁶ Quezon assured John Switzer and Senator King that the Philippines would accept independence even if there were no trade agreement at all.⁵⁷ From the beginning, Quezon had attempted to undermine the position and authority of the OsRox Mission in Washington, but the Mission relentlessly fought for the approval of the Hawes-Cutting Bill in the Senate and the Hare Bill in the House of Representatives.⁵⁸

When the Hare and the Hawes-Cutting Bills had become the basis for discussion for an independence bill in the American Congress, Quezon had formed two definite concepts about Philippine independence. First, Quezon wanted to be the leader of a politically autonomous Philippine Legislature but wanted the Philippine economy to have United States protection. Second, Quezon was willing to undermine his political comrades' efforts to attain independence because he felt that he alone should liberate his people. Quezon continued undermining the OsRox Mission for the next two years until the political battle between Quezon and the OsRox Mission, called the pro- anti- fight, ensued in 1933.

The pro- anti- fight was waged to determine two things: on the superficial level it was to decide what course Philippine independence would take, and on the more profound level it was to decide who would become the leader of the Filipino people. Whoever brought independence to the people would be able to control the Legislature; for this reason Quezon did not want Osmeña to return to Manila with an independence bill. When this did happen he attacked the bill, claiming that the clause allowing the United States to retain its naval and military bases on the Islands was deleterious to the neutrality of the Filipinos. Quezon contended that a much better bill could be obtained easily from the American Congress which was only beginning to grapple with the consequences of the Depression.

Even before the bill was reintroduced in the American Congress in December, 1932, "Quezon's imagination seized on means not of improving but of defeating the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill."⁵⁹ After the Hare Bill had been reported favorably by the House Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs and passed by the House in April,⁶⁰ Quezon asked the OsRox Mission to return to Manila to explain the issues to the people and to help Quezon in the financial trouble that plagued the Legislature. The OsRox Mission refused to return and said that the independence issue was more important and that they would agree with whatever Quezon decided. Quezon, not wishing to force the issue and cause a public rift with the OsRox Mission at this time, replied, "if you still believe that it is your duty to remain there rather than take part in the discussion of all these matters, I shall defer to your judgment and advise the Legislature accordingly."⁶¹ Encouraged by Quezon's acquiescence, the OsRox Mission and the two Resident Commissioners to the United States asked Quezon to come to Washington to help lobby for the Hare and the Hawes-Cutting Bills, but Quezon did not go.⁶²

Expecting a Democratic victory in the American Congress in November of 1932, Quezon believed that if the Senate did not pass the Hawes-Cutting Bill the new Democratic Senate would pass some kind of independence bill. Quezon realized that OsRox would eventually be successful and that he could not alter this by traveling to Washington. Preparing for a political battle at home, Quezon tried to purge the civil service and judicial systems of Osmeña's followers. The Quezon faction claimed that this was done to increase efficiency, but Osmeña and Roxas correctly saw it as an offensive move to weaken their forces in Manila.⁶³

Both the Hare and the Hawes-Cutting Bills specified that during the Commonwealth the American President would have the right to intervene in case of an emergency, and that American naval and military bases would remain on the Islands. Quezon had never made this a real issue to the OsRox Mission, but early in November, 1932, Quezon publicly denounced the Hare and Hawes-Cutting Bills because they did "not grant independence." Quezon then noted that he objected chiefly to the intervention and military clauses and the low tariff quotas, but that he would be willing to postpone independence for ten years "provided in the meantime

there is established in the Philippine Islands a government autonomous in name as well as in fact."⁶⁴ Quezon had set the stage for the political battle. The military and intervention clauses and the low trade quotas were, in fact, somewhat objectionable to Quezon, but he magnified their importance so that he could publicly fight the OsRox Mission and begin to mobilize his political forces.

In the meantime the OsRox Mission said it agreed with Quezon's objections and would "seek further expert opinion and [would] favor wording which most limits power intervention [by the President of the United States]." But later the OsRox Mission noted that for independence to be at all possible in the near future, the naval and military bases would have to remain on the Islands because many members of the House and Senate whose support was "indispensable" believed that these military reservations were "necessary."⁶⁵

In late November, Quezon informed the OsRox Mission he was sending Senator Benigno Aquino to Washington "with special instructions." Although Quezon publicly spoke out against the military provisions of the two bills, he enjoined Aquino to inform Osmeña and Roxas not to accept a bill unless Presidential intervention was restricted and a higher sugar quota was provided (1.2 million tons).⁶⁶ Since Quezon clearly knew that the American Congress would not accept these terms, he was trying to force the OsRox Mission to get the bills tabled. He wrote to a Mr. Ansberry that Aquino was sent with these instructions because Quezon wanted to wait until the Democratic 73rd Congress convened and an independence bill more favorable than the Hawes-Cutting or Hare Bills could be passed.⁶⁷ With his health slowly returning, Quezon knew he would be well enough by that time to go to Washington and fight for a new independence bill that he could give to his people.⁶⁸

The Hare and the Hawes-Cutting Bills were both reintroduced into Congress in early December, 1932. There were two amendments to the Hawes-Cutting Bill which genuinely angered Quezon. Senator Hiram Johnson introduced an immigration exclusion amendment and Senator Huey Long proposed an amendment cutting the free trade quota on raw sugar to half of what the Filipinos desired (585,000 tons). Quezon wrote to Osmeña and Roxas that he was sure he was voicing "the unanimous sentiment of our people in urging you to press for immediate

independence and if this is impossible let there be no bill" because a better bill would be possible in the new Congress.⁶⁹ In a press release dated December 16, Quezon said that "the last dispatches from America clearly show that the fight in the Senate is not to give independence and freedom to the Philippines but to close American doors to Filipino labor and Philippine products. . . . America should grant independence to the Philippines at once."⁷⁰ But Osmeña and Roxas ignored Quezon and decided to continue lobbying for the acceptance of the Hawes-Cutting Bill.

The lobbying of farm and labor groups pleading for relief from the Depression was a powerful ally for Osmeña and Roxas. The Hawes-Cutting Bill was passed on December 17, 1932, in the Senate without a record vote. In the conference between the House and the Senate on the Hare and Hawes-Cutting Bills the Senate yielded quickly to the Hare Bill provision for a one million ton per year sugar quota, and a token Filipino immigration quota of fifty persons per year. The two Houses also settled on a ten-year transition period.⁷¹

After the conference the two bills became known collectively as the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill (abbreviated H-H-C by the press), although many Filipinos continued to refer to it as the Hawes-Cutting Bill. This bill had to be signed by Hoover and accepted by the Philippine Legislature to become law. It stipulated that the Legislature must convene a Constitutional Convention to write a constitution which would be republican in form and would assure American rights and principles of government. The constitution would have to be approved by the President of the United States and, if acceptable to him, would then have to be approved by the Filipino people in a national plebiscite. All American property, except naval and military bases, was to go to the Philippine government. The H-H-C Bill also provided for a ten-year transition period during which time the Philippines would be run under an autonomous Commonwealth government. The President of the United States would have the final say on all foreign policy and would appoint a High Commissioner to the Islands with limited powers. The tariff rates would remain the same for the first five years of the Commonwealth but would increase 5% annually for the second five years. Independence would come on July 4 ten years after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

Osmeña and Roxas immediately cabled Quezon announcing that they "would not commit ourselves a priori in favor" of the bill so that the Legislature may have an "absolutely free hand to accept or reject" the measure. Quezon cabled back that the H-H-C Bill was not satisfactory to the Filipino people. Quezon wrote that there were no "signs that our people will be discouraged if there is [a] deadlock among [the] conferences or [a] presidential veto because they are ready to force the immediate independence issue upon the next Administration."⁷² After Hoover had been handed the H-H-C Bill by Congress, Quezon continued to malign the bill, calling it "the work of the National City Bank" and a "joke that is unfair and harmful to us, but profitable to American manufacturers and exporters, [and] to Cuban sugar and beet sugar interests." Quezon also said that he would "oppose" the H-H-C Bill if it was "signed by the President."⁷³

The OsRox Mission tried to persuade Hoover to sign the bill but on January 13 he vetoed it because he considered the bill inconsistent with Republican policy.⁷⁴ Both houses of Congress passed the H-H-C Bill over the veto on the same day, and the bill became law.⁷⁵ Osmeña and Roxas had achieved independence for the Filipino people but it was far from the immediate, complete, and absolute independence which Filipino leaders had publicly espoused for the last thirty years and which Quezon now publicly professed.

Even though Osmeña and Roxas knew that Quezon's forces in Manila had been trying to purge Osmeña's followers out of the civil service and courts in November and were aware that Quezon had previously accepted the provisions of the H-H-C Act and then came out against them, Osmeña and Roxas were either too slow to act or were naïvely unaware of Quezon's motives for rejecting the measure. Since the OsRox Mission felt that Quezon's objections to the act's provisions for Presidential intervention, the retention of military and naval bases, the relatively low tariff quota on sugar, and the limited Filipino immigration clause, were the real reasons Quezon castigated the act, the OsRox Mission challenged Quezon to come to Washington and see if he could obtain any further concessions.⁷⁶ On January 28 Quezon agreed to come to Washington via Europe and arrive in late March.⁷⁷ It would be several weeks before Osmeña and Roxas realized that Quezon was waging a battle for the leadership of Philippine politics.

In the two-month interim Quezon prepared for the ensuing political battle with Osmeña and Roxas by campaigning against the H-H-C Act. In a radio broadcast transmitted from overseas to the United States, Quezon declared that the H-H-C Act was not really an independence bill but a tariff quota and an immigration exclusion act to help the American citizen. He also broadcast a message on KZRM radio to his own people claiming that "the Philippines would remain a conquered province of the United States, just as we are now, but she [the United States] would be under no moral or legal obligation to look after our interest and to protect us from foreign invasion."⁷⁸

Having heard the public attacks Quezon was making against the achievements of the OsRox Mission, Osmeña and Roxas decided to launch a counteroffensive against Quezon. Osmeña entreated his followers in Manila to create a League for the Acceptance of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law. The League disseminated pamphlets and had Osmeña-controlled newspapers campaign, not only for the acceptance of the H-H-C Act but also against the leadership of Quezon. As a reaction to this Quezon made more and more public appearances denouncing the act and Osmeña's attacks on Quezon's leadership. For the next month there was little correspondence between the Independence Mission and Quezon. In a "heat of temper"⁷⁹ Quezon wrote a letter to Secretary of War Parker claiming that since the Philippines had a "deficit in legislative appropriation" the OsRox Mission must "return as soon as possible." He added that Parker should "inform them that their per diems will not be paid after fifteen days of notification."⁸⁰

Quezon chose a handpicked mission that was supposedly "mixed" in sentiment over the H-H-C Act to journey to Washington. Quezon suggested that Osmeña and Roxas meet him in Paris and they agreed.⁸¹ Quezon and Osmeña and Roxas came to an agreement on board the Ile de France which was taking them to Washington. On April 25 Quezon, fearing that he could not defeat Osmeña, agreed to accept the H-H-C Act provided that the military and naval bases near Manila be evacuated, and that either the transition period be reduced from ten to five years or the tariff clauses be modified.⁸² But Quezon reneged and the agreement was dissolved. Quezon did this apparently because the cables sent to him showed that his followers in Manila believed they could easily defeat Osmeña and thus became disenchanted with him for accepting the "common program."⁸³

José Clarin and Quintin Paredes headed Quezon's faction in Manila and Benigno Aquino and Maximo Kalaw headed Osmeña's. Following the typical pattern of Philippine politics the factions were split according to family and geographic affiliations. José de Jesus, Quezon's personal secretary, wrote that "we can readily see that it is in the Visayas Group [home of Osmeña and Roxas] where the supporters of the bill are centered." De Jesus also reassured Quezon by telling him that the pros (the name that Osmeña's forces were called because they wanted the H-H-C Act accepted) were waging an "intensive" but "unfruitful" campaign against the H-H-C Act. De Jesus mentioned that Aquino led the most vicious attack by "mercilessly bombasting the opponents of the bill," and that the battle in the Philippine press between Clarin and Aquino reached a "low level." He also told Quezon that the National Information Committee on the Hawes-Cutting Bill had been established by one of Quezon's men, Representative Diokno, and that it was working "full blast" and making pamphlets for distribution throughout the Islands.⁸⁴

The antis (or Quezonistas as Quezon's followers were sometimes referred to by the Philippine press) formed the Anti Hawes-Cutting League which was "to send orators and debators to all parts of the province around Manila at their own expense to counteract the propaganda launched by the agents of the proponents of the Law." The League considered the H-H-C Act "an assassination to the hope of Philippine freedom."⁸⁵ Paredes cabled Quezon that due to this kind of strenuous campaigning a "majority" of the Legislature was "anxious" to reject the measure but was "awaiting your advice."⁸⁶ But Quezon's position was not this strong--his followers had overestimated the effects of their efforts and, in fact, the pro and anti forces at this time were about equal in strength.⁸⁷ After several public debates between the pros and the antis, the Filipino leaders returned.

The OsRox Mission and the "Mixed Mission" had decided not to go back to the Islands by the same route; but they met in Hong Kong and, refusing to accept the separate receptions prepared by the two camps, returned to Manila together. They did not publicly attack each other until a few days after their arrival.⁸⁸

The pro- anti- fight was intensified by the return of the leaders of both factions. Before leaving for Europe Quezon had been the first to express publicly an opinion about the H-H-C Act; but Osmeña was the first to use personal slander. Knowing that he had ground to make up after a one-and-a-half-year absence, Osmeña aggressively attacked Quezon's patriotism. To many Filipinos this was seen as an act of walang hiya (base ingratitude); this allowed Quezon "to adopt a stance he loved well: injured innocence defending slandered patriotism."⁸⁹

Osmeña obtained the support of a powerful newspaper chain (Tribune-Vanguardia-Taliba), but Quezon had only a few isolated papers supporting him. To remedy this Quezon bought the other major newspaper chain on the Islands (El Debate-Mabuhay-Herald-Monday Mail) for ₱ 300,000. The chain had been neutral but Quezon placed Carlos Romulo, an anti, to run it.

Since the University of the Philippines endorsed Osmeña and Roxas, Quezon charged the President of the University, Rafael Palma, with "abusing what should be a neutral office" and cut back the budget of the University by one third. Both Palma and Maximo Kalaw, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, quickly resigned, and Quezon appointed an anti, Jorge Bocobo, to head the University. Although the newly-appointed American Governor-General, Frank Murphy, did not enter the pro- anti- fight, Quezon had previously persuaded the former Governor-General, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., to allow the pros to be replaced by antis. Quezon was able to do this because he proposed a re-organization of the courts if the H-H-C were rejected, which Roosevelt believed would save money.⁹⁰

Quezon not only had the power of his office and of his long-standing political prestige to fight Osmeña, but also the power of his personality and the knowledge of the intricacies of Filipino politics. At this time Quezon solicited the support of a proud independent, Vicente Vera, who was thinking of joining Osmeña. Quezon said, "Look here, chico, your leading opponent for leadership in this region is José Surbito--and he's an Osmeña man. If you go over to Osmeña, I'll take Surbito who, after all, is closely related to my former secretary, Felipe Buencamino. So you might as well join me." Not only did Vera join the antis, but Surbito did also. When Quezon was campaigning against the H-H-C Act in Tanawan, Batangas (country dominated by José P. Laurel, of the OsRox faction), he was greeted coolly. Quezon

spotted a cross-eyed man and said, "Hey, putang ina mong duling . . . What are you doing here?" People gathered around Quezon, thinking that he knew one of their neighbors. When Quezon was asked later who the cross-eyed man was he said, "I'll be damned if I know his name. . . . This is the first time I've ever seen him in my life!"⁹¹ In July, Quezon wrote to ex-Governor-General Harrison asking if Quezon publicly could "refer to Osmeña's visit to you [Harrison] trembling with fear when the Clarke Amendment [1916] was discussed in Congress as something you have told me in a private conversation."⁹² Thus, Quezon had not only betrayed his friendship with Osmeña and Roxas when he made public a private conversation over a dead issue, but he also transcended the traditional trust supposedly sacred to ilustrado politicians. Neither Osmeña nor Roxas could compete with Quezon's political skill and they were confounded "by the intricate steps he took in his political dances."⁹³

In carrying out his political maneuvers, Quezon was able to raise more money from his supporters than was Osmeña. Quezon was successful in raising substantial funds to fight the H-H-C Act. He received over ₱100,000 from his long-time friends, the Elizaldes and Sorianos. Since Quezon publicly claimed that the H-H-C Act did not sufficiently protect Philippine sugar trade he won strong support from "the majority of sugar centralistas." Senator Claro Recto said later that the antis were able to raise a million pesos in all "to get a new independence bill." Recto revealed that the largest contributor was the Elizalde family because, he said, "They had to save Quezon's face. They were very close friends of his."⁹⁴

Quezon used an entirely different tactic to gain further support. In addition to saying that the H-H-C Act did not do enough to protect the Philippine economy (and in this way winning over the conservative business elements), he also continued to attack the act for failing to grant immediate independence, thus winning the radicals over to his camp. In this way he convinced Judge Sumulong, General Aguinaldo, and Bishop Aglipay, who had all fought for immediate independence throughout the American occupation and who were, unlike Quezon, consistent about its implementation. Since Quezon also strongly influenced a majority of the upper middle-class ilustrados, by the middle of the summer of 1933, he had won out over Osmeña in all sectors of the society. All that Quezon

had to do now was to use his power to purge Osmeña and Roxas from the Government, have the Legislature reject the H-H-C Act, and then head his own independence mission to Washington to achieve an independence bill more to his liking and with his name associated with it.

With Quezon holding most of the cards, Osmeña made a final effort to uproot Quezon from the leadership of the Filipinos. He challenged Quezon by suggesting that both combatants resign from the Senate and take the issue to the people. Knowing that he controlled the Senate, on July 20, 1933, Quezon offered his resignation in a speech to the Philippine Senate. He said, "I can not submit my judgment to them nor should they submit theirs to mine," and added that it was up to the Legislature "which has the authority to determine who should be at the head of our national leadership."⁹⁵ Quezon made it clear that he really did not want to take the issue to the people, but was offering his resignation as a political power play so that the Quezon-controlled Senate would make the obvious choice as to who it would keep as head of the Legislature. Osmeña delivered a speech to the Senate demanding that it accept Quezon's resignation. Osmeña used the same line of attack that Quezon had used eleven years earlier to dethrone him--he castigated the autocratic character of Quezon and his presumptuous rejection of the H-H-C Act; he protested against "a personal leadership gained through intrigue and machinations."⁹⁶

Osmeña's diatribe did not succeed. The Senate voted 16 to 5 to reject Quezon's resignation and then accepted Osmeña's resignation, 15 to 2. One of Quezon's most ardent followers, Representative Buencamino, led the fight against Roxas in the House. After a frenzied scuffle in the House caused by Roxas' student followers, Roxas was voted out of office by the Quezon-controlled House, 50 to 29. Quezon replaced Osmeña and Roxas with antis--Paredes and Clarin.⁹⁷ He said that these changes in the leadership of the Legislature were "unpleasant" but that "changes in the national leadership are nothing abnormal in democracies. . . ."⁹⁸ But Osmeña saw Quezon's actions as both abnormal and undemocratic; he said that Quezon was "insistent in the support of his pernicious, anti-democratic and subversive principles of the stability of our institutions."⁹⁹

Quezon was genuinely offended by Osmeña's continuous attacks and asked him to leave the Nacionalista party ranks.

Quezon said that "as a matter of political honesty I would not have as my associates in the leadership of the Legislature and the Party men who have denounced me in private and in public as conniving with imperialists to deprive my own people of their liberty." Quezon then challenged Osmeña to form a new party: "Let us have two parties and then the Senator [Osmeña] and I will prove to the country that we mean what we say when we affirm that we believe in the need of two political parties."¹⁰⁰ The pros formed a party called the Partido Pro-Independencia Nacionalista with the same ideology as the Nacionalistas except that the Pros wanted the H-H-C Act accepted. The Pros elected Osmeña as President and Roxas as Vice-President of the Party, which was joined by former members of the recently disbanded Democratas.¹⁰¹

Osmeña directed his minority group against Quezon, who was waiting for the American Congress to settle its pressing domestic problems which were consuming its time,¹⁰² before he would direct the Legislature to formally reject the H-H-C Act and head his own independence mission to Washington. Osmeña pressed Quezon to honor his previous agreement to hold a plebiscite so that the Filipino people could decide on the H-H-C Act. Quezon was afraid that the people might accept the H-H-C Act and therefore fomented a fight with Osmeña over the form the plebiscite would take. Osmeña wanted a straight "yes or no" question and Quezon proposed a purposely ambiguous set of questions, both to render the plebiscite useless and to frustrate Osmeña. In effect, Quezon proposed that the plebiscite ask: "Do you want the H-H-C Act or do you want a better independence act?" Osmeña finally conceded and no plebiscite was held. In later years, Osmeña said he did not push the issue because a bitter campaign would have ensued and it would have divided the people.¹⁰³

After Quezon and Osmeña had signed an agreement that a plebiscite would not be held because they could not agree on the form, the Philippine Senate decided to vote on whether to accept or reject the H-H-C Act. On the morning of October 17, 1933, the Philippine Legislature in a concurrent resolution declined to accept the independence offered by the United States.

Quezon sailed for Washington in November to try to attain the better independence bill he had promised his people. Quezon had written Governor-General Frank Murphy seeking his support

for either a change in the H-H-C Act or "new legislation." Quezon now desired political independence in three years with economic protection. He wanted a yearly quota of not less than one million long tons of sugar, 200,000 tons of oil, and not less than the maximum amount of cordage ever exported to the United States. He also specified that there should be no American "military reservations" in the Philippines but "if the United States should feel that it must have and maintain naval reservations, it should be in common accord with the Philippine Republic and the bay and port of Manila." Quezon also naïvely desired a treaty between the United States, France, Great Britain, and Japan guaranteeing the neutrality of the Philippines after independence.¹⁰⁴

Quezon's aims were not revolutionary; indeed, they were very similar to the provisions of the H-H-C Act. Quezon had apparently suspected all along that Congress might be reluctant to change its mood toward the Islands in less than two years. As a result of this, Quezon still desired a continued economic protection by the United States but political autonomy in the Far East without the interference of Japan. The American Congress proved even more reluctant than Quezon had prognosticated and he, therefore, had to utilize all his skill in political maneuvering and manipulating.

The new Filipino delegation was not greeted enthusiastically in Washington. Since the first New Deal legislation was sputtering, Congress had more urgent measures to consider than Philippine independence. Henry Stimson and Harry Hawes were disillusioned by the rejection of the H-H-C Act and cautioned Quezon not to ask too much of Congress--there might be no independence bill rendered at all.

When Quezon arrived in Washington he discovered that the pros had sent Camilo Osias to talk with President Roosevelt. Osias told Roosevelt that the Filipino people were in favor of the H-H-C Act, but that it was blocked due to Quezon's political maneuvers. Roosevelt gave his support to Quezon, however, and decided to allow Quezon to lobby Congress for the modification of the H-H-C Act.¹⁰⁵ Osias was dismissed as Resident Commissioner by Quezon's followers and the antis took complete control of the independence bill negotiations.

Quezon presented a proposal to Senator Millard Tyding

Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. The proposal was very similar to the one he had earlier submitted to Governor-General Murphy. Tydings, having been influenced by Osias, rejected the proposal and stated that the acceptance date for the H-H-C Act would be extended another nine months. Quezon used his dignified charm to win a concession from Tydings. Knowing that better economic provisions were impossible, Quezon emphasized his objection to the military reservations. Tydings soon agreed that the army bases would be expunged and the naval bases would be subject to negotiation at a later date.¹⁰⁶

But during this time, Quezon was trying to find a more advantageous avenue to a better independence bill. He told Senator King he would accept King's immediate independence bill. He entreated the support of Joseph Tumulty, Senator Robinson, and former Senator Hawes, who all believed Quezon was in favor of a bill similar to the H-H-C Act. Quezon implored ex-Governor-General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who was now in Washington, to support a dominion plan for the Islands. Quezon had not openly reneged on his agreement with Tydings which he later signed. He realized that Tydings held the real power over the fate of Philippine independence and that these other avenues to a better independence would most probably prove to be dead ends.¹⁰⁷ The President agreed to the Quezon-Tydings plan and sent a message to Congress asking for a new Philippine independence bill.

The King bill for immediate independence and full tariff, Dickenson's bill with a five year transition period, and Vandenberg's bill with a two-year transition period and eight years of economic protection were all quickly defeated. Congress had failed to change its mood and passed the Tydings bill in the Senate and a similar measure, the McDuffie bill, in the House. President Roosevelt signed the bill on March 24, 1934. The Tydings-McDuffie Act was, despite Quezon's efforts, almost a carbon copy of the rejected Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. The economic provisions remained the same; the only political change was the abolition of American army installations and the promise of a later review of the naval bases.

Quezon was greeted as a national hero when he returned to Manila. His homecoming was enhanced by a throng of Filipinos shouting "Viva Quezon!" Quezon spoke to the

Philippine Legislature shortly after his arrival claiming sole credit for the independence of the Philippines. He said, "There is no other colored people in the Far East that has the same benefits or anything like them that the Filipino people have to-day and this victory of ours will be a stimulus to them. . . . Seven years in the United States have proven to me that America is the best friend that the Filipino people ever had or could ever have."¹⁰⁸ But Osmeña rightly claimed that the Tydings-McDuffie Act was "his" H-H-C Act with Quezon's name associated with it.

Six weeks later the elections determined who the people wanted to rule the Legislature. The antis won a landslide victory over Osmeña's forces. This election was the last political event in the system created by the Jones Law of 1916. Both the antis and pros were now faced with constructing a commonwealth government. Quezon saw that it would be to his and to the country's advantage if a union between the two camps was implemented. At first Osmeña was reluctant, but finally acquiesced for three reasons. He realized that he and Quezon held identical views on almost all political issues and that the pro- anti- fight was really a test to see who would become the political leader. His group loyalties were such that he saw that only harm would come to the ilustrado ruling elite by being bitterly divided at the time of independence. Osmeña also realized that his personal power would be stronger as second in command in a one-party system than head of a relatively weaker opposition party. Many members in the lower tiers of government felt that this was a breach of utang na loob; they had strenuously fought each other at the local level and knew a union would be extremely difficult. Senator Juan Sumulong also vehemently protested the union. But Osmeña was won over, as he had been in 1922, and the Nacionalistas were reunited on June 16, 1935, under the direction of Quezon and Osmeña. The union assured that the existing ilustrado elite would continue to rule unchallenged during the Commonwealth and the future Republic. A formidable ticket of Quezon for President and Osmeña for Vice-President won an overwhelming victory at the polls in the election for the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines in 1935.

This study has attempted to show that Quezon was successful in the pro- anti- fight primarily because he both understood the traditional personalism of Philippine politics and how to manipulate modern political institutions by his charisma and by his astute political judgment. He saw himself as a living bridge for his people between a new, somewhat alien, modern world and a traditional social system based on factions, kinship, and family alliances of his peasant-based society. His success lay in his ability to blend these relationships into a strong and unified leadership. Quezon's mercurial personality and his keen understanding of key issues enabled him to put off independence until a later date, to defeat Osmeña and Roxas, to regain independence, and to continue in power over the Filipino people.

Part of Quezon's success lay in his ability to become the leader of the Filipino politicians. Often resorting to ruthless political trickery or to overt lies, Quezon built up the most powerful political machine in the Islands. Quezon's ability to detect and thwart any threats guaranteed his position as leader. Perhaps even more important than his political maneuvers was his forceful personality which won much respect and many followers among the ruling elite. Quezon's personality and his use of patronage made most of the other politicians feel they owed him utang na loob.

However, Quezon's role in Philippine independence cannot be seen solely as an ambitious use of power. While it is true that Quezon's ego thrived on ceremonies and the praise political power awarded him, he also loved his people. Quezon delayed independence because he believed, like Louis XIV, that he was the state and that, therefore, he, and only he, should present independence to the people. Quezon realized that his charismatic leadership was the crucial unifying force for his people at the difficult time of formulating a Commonwealth government. Quezon knew how to give the peasant something tangible to believe in and to follow. Since Quezon could mobilize the peasants and unite the politicians, he gave the Philippines the kind of leadership necessary to make a successful transition from a traditional society to a modern political system.

In 1932 and 1933, Quezon was truly a harbinger of how other national leaders might attempt to mobilize their people

on a mass basis. Like Quezon, Nkrumah and Sukarno, for example, clamored for independence and, after it was achieved, were able to keep their people united and interested in politics. They did this in part by filling a political void and by projecting their personalities as symbols of their nations. Some leaders were more successful and lasted longer than others; Quezon was one of the first and one of the most successful.

Quezon's achievement in winning independence has not been forgotten in the Philippines. Indeed today, Quezon is more than just a historical hero who brought independence to the Islands; Filipinos now see Quezon as the great emancipator of the Filipino people from the yoke of Western imperialism. Thus, Quezon's proudly dynamic personality has made it possible for him to be remembered and loved for the ends he produced, while the means he used have been largely overlooked by most Filipinos. As one Filipino historian noted: "No Filipino has equalled his oratorical prowess, and his intuitive knowledge of Filipino mass psychology led him from one political triumph to another without meeting a single defeat."¹⁰⁹ Quezon, who was concerned for his historical image, can be said to have fought and won what he called "the good fight."

Notes

1. Manuel L. Quezon, "Our Peaceful Struggle for Independence," The Philippine Social Science Review, V-1 (1933), 71-86.
2. The Quezon Papers, which consist of Quezon's cablegrams, telegrams, radiograms, letters, and speeches, are at the Philippine National Library and are available on microfilm at the Michigan Historical Collections, The University of Michigan. (Hereinafter referred to as QP.)
3. The Partido Urgentista, the Comité de la Union Nacionalista, and the Partido Independista Inmediatista. Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule:1901-1913 ([Hamden, Conn.] 1968), p. 160.
4. Sergio Osmeña was born in Cebu City on the island of Cebu in the Visayas on September 9, 1878. He received his A.B. degree from the College of San Juan de Letrán, and his Bachelor of Laws in 1903. He was elected Governor of Cebu in 1904 and in 1907 was elected the first Speaker in the Philippine Assembly.
5. The election results were: 32 Nacionalistas, 16 Progresistas, 7 Independistas, 4 Inmediatistas, 20 non-partisan, 1 Catholic. See Gregorio F. Zaide and Sonia M. Zaide, Government and Politics of the Government of the Philippines (Quezon City, 1969), p. 46.
6. Ibid., p. 53.
7. Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence (New York, 1936), p. 42. From 1898 on, the Democrats had been the party more inclined to oppose (Republican) imperialism; this had been a major campaign issue in the elections of 1900 and 1902.
8. Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York, 1946), p. 117.
9. This seeming anomaly was mentioned in only one important Philippine newspaper, La Nacion. Isabelo Caballero and M. de Garcia Concepcion, Quezon (Manila, 1935), p. 173.

10. Salamanca, pp. 172-73.
11. As it was passed, the Jones Act promised independence but set no specific date. The preamble said that independence would be granted when the Filipinos had formed a "stable" government. The ambiguity of this term proved explosive when the Republicans returned to power in 1921.
12. H. R. Rep. No. 511, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1920.
13. Quezon, The Good Fight, p. 36.
14. Kirk, p. 48.
15. QP, Quezon to Mr. Pond, undated letter [1930?].
16. QP, Quezon to Osmeña, undated letter [early 1930?].
17. Manuel Roxas, born in 1894, was, like Osmeña, from the Visayan Islands. The youthful Roxas came to national prominence when he was elected Speaker of the House in 1922.
18. QP, Roxas to Osmeña, cables, Jan. 5, 7, 1930; Osmeña to Roxas, cable, Jan. 12, 1930.
19. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., 1930, pp. 10-17.
20. Ibid., statements of Chester H. Gray, p. 69; W. C. Hushings, p. 113; C. W. Holman, p. 453; Frederic Brenckman, p. 110; J. S. McDaniel, pp. 293-313.
21. Ibid., statements of Charles P. Perrin, pp. 540-67; Charles D. Orth, p. 179; John M. Switzer, pp. 377-437; D. F. Webster, p. 251; John H. Pardeo, p. 251; A. G. Kempf, p. 216; J. F. Comins, p. 209.
22. Ibid., statements of Nicholas Roosevelt, pp. 341-77; Henry Stimson, pp. 658-82.
23. QP, Quezon to Maximo Kalaw, letter, Jan. 4, 1930, and Quezon to Osmeña, letter, Jan. 4, 1930.

24. Gregorio F. Zaide, The Republic of the Philippines (Manila, 1963), p. 261.
25. Proceedings of the First Independence Congress (Manila, n. d.).
26. Ibid.
27. Hayden Papers, "Secretary Hurley's report to the Chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs." (Typewritten.) (Hereinafter collection referred to as HP.)
28. Dapen Liang, The Development of Philippine Political Parties (Hong Kong, 1939), p. 209.
29. QP, Quezon to Hawes, letter, Mar. 17, 1930.
30. QP, Roxas to Quezon, letter, May 23, 1930; Quezon to Hawes, letter, May 24, 1930.
31. Sen. Rep. No. 751, 71st Congress, 2nd session, 1932, Part 1.
32. Kirk, p. 107.
33. The transition period was later changed to ten years.
34. Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York, 1964), p. 277.
35. Maximo Manguiat Kalaw, Introduction to Philippine Social Science (Manila, 1933), pp. 499-500.
36. Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, 1942), p. 349.
37. QP, Osias and Guevara to Quezon, letter, Nov. 28, 1930.
38. QP, Quezon to Osias and Guevara, letter, Nov. 21, 1930, and Quezon to Senator Wheeler, letter, Dec. 3, 1930.
39. QP, Quezon to Guevara, letter (not sent), Mar. 23, 1931.
40. QP, Quezon to Osmeña and Roxas, cable, Mar. 19, 1931.

41. When Senator Bingham asked Quezon if he would accept a "dominion status," Quezon declined. QP, June 6, 1931; Quezon to Senator Bingham, letter, June 11, 1931.
42. QP, Quezon to Osmeña and Roxas, cable, Aug. 26, 1931.
43. Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires (New Haven, Conn., 1965), p. 65.
44. Carlos Quirino, Quezon: Man of Destiny (Manila, 1935), p. 56.
45. Ibid., p. 69; QP, draft of an interview of Quezon for the Philippine press, Nov. 13, 1931.
46. Friend, p. 60; Quirino, Quezon, p. 65.
47. QP, Osmeña to Quezon, cable, July 13, 1931.
48. New York Times, Sept. 18-20, 1931.
49. Friend, p. 77.
50. QP, Quezon to Guevara, and Quezon to Osias, both letters dated Sept. 18, 1931.
51. QP, joint resolution in both Houses of the Philippine Legislature, Sept. 24, 1931.
52. Caballero and Concepcion, p. 300.
53. QP, M. Kalaw to Quezon, letter, Oct. 5, 1931; Quezon to Osias and Guevara, letter, Nov. 6, 1931.
54. QP, Hurley to Quezon, and Quezon's reply, both letters dated December, 1931.
55. QP, Quezon to Osias, letter, Sept. 17, 1931.
56. QP, Quezon to Guevara, letter (not sent), Dec. 14, 1931.
57. QP, Quezon to John Switzer, letter, Oct. 2, 1931.

58. The major difference between the bills was that the Senate bill provided for a nineteen-year transition period and the House bill called for a five-year transition period.
59. Friend, p. 103.
60. The Hare Bill provided for a five-year transition period under an autonomous commonwealth status with no plebiscite after the five years; it also called for liberal trade relations. See QP, OsRox to Quezon, cable, Mar. 6, 1932. The Senate did not vote on the Hawes-Cutting Bill until December, 1932.
61. QP, Quezon to OsRox, cables, July 6, 9, 11, 13, 1932; OsRox to Quezon, cables, July 6, 13, 18, 1932.
62. QP, OsRox to Quezon, cable, Sept. 10, 1932; Osias to Quezon, cable, Sept. 19, 1932.
63. Hayden, p. 356; Liang, pp. 211-12.
64. QP, Quezon to the Independence Commission, letters, Nov. 3, 5, 1932. The Independence Commission consisted of several Philippine legislators who desired the right to vote on any independence bill offered by the United States.
65. QP, OsRox to Quezon, cable, Nov. 7, 1932.
66. QP, Quezon to Aquino, radiogram, Nov. 14, 1932.
67. QP, Quezon to Mr. Ansberry, letter, Nov. 16, 1932.
68. Quezon had chosen Aquino to inform the OsRox Mission of Quezon's instructions because he was an "Osmeña man" and Quezon thought Osmeña and Roxas would listen to him. But Osmeña convinced Aquino that the Hawes-Cutting and Hare Bills were the best possible arrangements for independence. From that time on, Aquino fought with the OsRox Mission versus Quezon. QP, Aquino to Quezon, cable, Dec. 13, 1932.
69. QP, Quezon to OsRox, letter, Dec. 10, 1932.

70. QP, Quezon, press release dated Dec. 16, 1932.
71. Kirk, p. 119.
72. QP, OsRox to Quezon, cable, Dec. 19, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, cables, Dec. 19, 21, 1932.
73. QP, OsRox to Quezon, cable, Dec. 31, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, letter, Jan. 2, 1933.
74. Hoover was also influenced by the report by the War Department which called the H-H-C Bill "fundamentally unsound." HP, "Report to the President by the Secretary of War on the Hawes-Cutting Bill Granting Philippine Independence," dated Jan. 11, 1933.
75. Quezon was so much against the H-H-C Bill that he asked Senator King and General Wheeler to vote against the overriding of the veto. QP, Quezon to Senator King, cable, Jan. 16, 1933; Quezon to General Wheeler, cable, Jan. 16, 1933.
76. QP, OsRox to Quezon, cables, Jan. 20, 28, 1933.
77. QP, Quezon to Osias, cable, Jan. 28, 1933. Quezon to Osmeña, letter, Feb. 9, 1933.
78. QP, "A Message to the American People: Speech Delivered by Senate President Quezon over the Columbia Broadcasting Station, transmitted from Station KZRM, Jan. 30, 1933"; "Address of Senate President Manuel L. Quezon over Station KZRM at 9:00 P.M., Mar. 16, 1933."
79. Liang, p. 213.
80. QP, Quezon to Secretary Parker, letter, undated [Mar. 20, 1933?]; Quezon to Paredes, letter, Mar. 18, 1933. This applied to everyone under Osmeña and Roxas but not to the leaders themselves.
81. QP, OsRox to Quezon, radiogram, Mar. 28, 1933.
82. QP, untitled document on Willard Hotel stationery, April 25, 1933; Quezon to Clarin, cables, April 27, 28, 1933.

83. Quezon later consented to the April 25 agreement but again reneged. See QP, Quezon to de Jesus, letter, May 22, 1933.
84. Quezon would often refer in speeches to Osmeña as the Senator or gentleman from Cebu instead of by name. QP, de Jesus to Quezon, letter, April 1, 1933.
85. QP, Hilarion Dugenio to Clarin, letter, April 20, 1933.
86. QP, Paredes to Quezon, cable, April 25, 1933.
87. QP, Clarin to Dugenio, letter, April 29, 1933.
88. Liang, p. 215; Friend, p. 113.
89. Friend, p. 122.
90. Ibid., pp. 114-16.
91. Carlos Quirino, "Anecdotes about Quezon," Historical Bulletin (Manila), VI-3 (1962), 239-43.
92. QP, Quezon to Harrison, letter, July 2, 1933.
93. Caballero and Concepcion, p. 326.
94. Friend, pp. 117-19.
95. QP, "Speech of Senate President Quezon to the Philippine Senate," July 20, 1933.
96. Sergio Osmeña, Diario de Sesiones, quoted in Friend, p. 127.
97. QP, Quezon to Governor-General Murphy, letter, Aug. 2, 1933.
98. QP, "Speech by Senate President Quezon to the Philippine Senate," July 21, 1933.
99. Caballero and Concepcion, pp. 322-23.

100. QP, "Speech by Senate President Quezon to the Philippine Senate," Aug. 1, 1933.
101. Liang, p. 226. The leader of the Democratas, Juan Sumulong, had disbanded the party in order to join with Osmeña and form a viable opposition party.
102. Congress at this time was swamped with Roosevelt's first New Deal legislation.
103. Friend, pp. 129-31.
104. QP, Quezon to Governor-General Murphy, letter, Nov. 3, 1933.
105. Liang, p. 225.
106. Friend, p. 140.
107. Quirino, Quezon, p. 77; Friend, p. 140; New York Times, Jan. 18, 1934.
108. Caballero and Concepcion, p. 160.
109. Quirino, "Anecdotes about Quezon," p. 239.