Why Should Ministers Do What They Say? 'Full' and 'Partial' Cabinet Decision-making Structures in Government

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Introduction

UNRELIABILITY IN policy-making is a serious problem facing government. The media are full of stories of national executives undertaking 'U-turns' or more routinely not implementing policies which they claimed they had approved. Unreliability in policy-making has two distinct aspects, although these are naturally somewhat related. On the one hand, there is collective unreliability: proposals made in electoral programs or even announced by governments may not be turned into policies or come to be so modified that they no longer correspond to the original vision. On the other hand, there is individual ministerial unreliability which can take two forms: in its 'milder' or 'negative' form, policies which the government has approved are not followed up by the ministers concerned or are followed up with such delays or in such a manner that here too, the original idea does not become reality; in the 'stronger' or 'positive' form of unreliability, ministers embark on their own on policies which have not been approved by the government or are even in contradiction with the government's stated aims.

Individual ministerial unreliability has been much less discussed than collective governmental unreliability. This is perhaps because collective unreliability seems to go directly against the idea of accountability: governments which do not fulfil their promises appear to flout basic principles of honesty in political life. Yet individual ministerial unreliability is equally dangerous; it, too, endangers accountability: what the government should be accountable for becomes unclear. At the limit, it even makes a mockery of the concept of governmental policy: if ministers repeatedly do not do what they are expected to do or what they said they would be doing, the notion of 'a' government becomes so diluted that not only is the government not the 'compact' body which it is typically expected to be but that one might even wonder whether it exists at all.

It is therefore surprising that the dangers of individual ministerial unreliability should not have been more carefully monitored. Perhaps it is that this form of unreliability is felt to be rare: it is known that ministers sometimes delay taking decisions which are in line with

governmental policy, for instance under pressure from officials in their department or from lobbies operating around that department; it may even be that what begins as delaying ends up in not implementing. It seems none the less to be felt that occurrences of these 'milder' or 'negative' forms of unreliability are marginal and that cases of 'stronger' or 'positive' types of unreliability where ministers undertake policies on their own independently from or even against governmental views are utterly exceptional. Otherwise, it is felt that the unity of the government would be in question.

Admittedly, especially with respect to the United States, there has been a substantial literature on the fact that the various departments and even the agencies and bureaus within the departments may well be excessively autonomous. This phenomenon has been continuously deplored and the efforts to reduce it through the setting up of a number of bodies close to the president have been shown not to have solved the problem (Neustadt, 1962; Heclo, 1977, 1983); but unreliability goes beyond mere autonomy. It is a sub-set of autonomy, so to speak, or a disease of autonomous governmental agencies: it is unlikely to take place on a vast scale unless the departments and their heads, the ministers, are autonomous. What unreliability adds is concealment and deliberate activity against what the center – in this case the president and the president's aides – wish to see happening.

On the whole, on unreliability as distinct from autonomy, little, if anything is said, as if it was assumed that the head of the government is highly likely to intervene swiftly if cases of individual ministerial unreliability were to affect central issues of government policy. Although similar mechanisms may not be felt able to prevent autonomous behavior from developing, at least in the American context, it seems to be believed that governments have self-steering mechanisms preventing individual ministerial unreliability from getting out of hand.

This rather optimistic view about reliability may be correct in the context of those governments which have been analyzed with some care – developed country governments – although it would be worth knowing even here to what extent ministers follow reliably governmental policies and far autonomy leads to unreliability. Yet a growing amount of evidence indicates that the assumption that individual ministerial unreliability is rare is not correct with respect to a substantial number of governments of developing countries: for instance, analyses made of the fate of governmental decisions in some developing countries have shown that upwards of two-thirds of these decisions have been left in abeyance. In two countries in Africa in which monitoring of implementation has recently been initiated for the first time: 75 percent and 67 percent of cabinet decisions were discovered to have never been implemented. Individual ministerial unreliability is therefore a grave and almost endemic characteristic of many governments: whether such governments can be regarded as being truly governments is manifestly debatable.

Two questions arise as a result. First, why is there apparently more individual ministerial unreliability among developing country governments than developed? Second, can the amount of unreliability be reduced where it exists? Maybe the continuity of tradition in many developed country governments has made it possible for institutional or psycho-sociological mechanisms to prevent ministerail 'faux pas' even when there is a large dose of ministerial

autonomy; these mechanisms have probably grown apace with government activities. Many post-colonial developing country governments, on the other hand, have been set up in the second half of the twentieth century without having much or even any previous experience of public policy-making.

If this answer is correct, the recipe would be 'patience;' but this is not an appealing proposition, to say the least. Hence the second question, namely how far ministerial unreliability can be reduced, presumably by institutional means: this question is obviously of great practical importance, but the answer does entail knowing more about what occurred in developed countries and not merely that reliable (or at least more reliable) systems of governments have been those which have lasted longer. There are probably characteristic aspects of these governments which could, if introduced or strengthened elsewhere, ensure that ministerial unreliability is reduced and governments become more united or one might say more 'compact' on the understanding that the views and approaches of the members of these governments are close to each other.

At this point it seems valuable to consider the possible impact of the major distinction between the two broad types of governments (and specifically the two broad types of *democratic* governments) which exist in the contemporary world, namely those which are based on a cabinet and those which are presidential: at first sight, the distinction appears to have a close relationship with the extent to which governments are 'compact' or united. Cabinets are organized on the basis of a collective structure in which the ministers are involved in the decision-making process, while presidential systems are in essence 'hierarchical,' as policies are the responsibility of the president alone and ministers are 'aides' rather than 'co-deciders.'

Yet the answer may not be as clear cut. Cabinets may appear in theory 'better' equipped to achieve unity because decisions are expected to be taken collectively; but, in practice, decision-making is often not truly collective in cabinets. On the other hand, at least some presidents can be expected to have enough authority to impose a common line to their ministers and thus achieve governmental 'compactness' and, through 'compactness,' reliability, even if this is occasionally arrived at somewhat artificially.

The aim of this paper is therefore to examine the distinctive features of both cabinet and presidential systems which ensure ministerial reliability. Under either system, why should ministers do what they say they are going to do? To look at both systems, we must first define them, as there is considerable vagueness and ambiguity in the matter. Second, we need to examine how they attempt to enforce ministerial reliability and see whether, at least in their 'pure' form, presidential governments are less likely to foster ministerial reliability than cabinet governments, also in their 'pure' form. Finally, we need to consider 'intermediate' cases and assess whether these are primarily constituted by presidential governments having adopted features of cabinets in order to streamline the executive and to ensure in the process greater reliability among the ministers.

An Operational Definition of Cabinet and Presidential Government

No Precise Definition of the Activities of Governments in
Both Cabinet and Presidential Systems

There is no precise definition, either of what constitutes a cabinet or of the exact characteristics of the government in presidential systems. Cabinets are typically described as bodies whose members (the ministers) are collectively involved in decision-making, but what this means is not clear. At most it seems that the expression refers to the fact that the cabinet is concerned in a general fashion with the 'most important matters of state.'

As a matter of fact, writers about the cabinet and in particular about the key example, that of the British cabinet, suggest that there is an element of 'mystery' surrounding the whole arrangement. The first and most famous among these writers, Bagehot, made this point at some length. Having referred to the special 'merits' of the English constitution, with its 'dignified' and its 'efficient' parts, he describes the cabinet in terms of "the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers" (Fontana, 1963: 65). He then says that "the Cabinet, in a word, is a board of control chosen by the legislature out of persons whom it trusts and knows, to rule the nation" (Fontana, 1963: 67). In reality, this definition is no longer accurate, as the legislature (i.e., the House of Commons) does not 'choose' the government—the most it can do is to throw it out; but this description is also unsatisfactory as what the cabinet does is not stated at all.

Over a century later, in a standard work on *The British Cabinet*, J.P. Mackintosh was not markedly more precise, although his account of what the cabinet does was more realistic. He states (1962: 11): "…all that can be said is that the Cabinet is bound to be concerned with most major decisions during the lifetime of a government.   It is the cabinet that is the final court of appeal in interdepartmental disputes…" A generation afterwards, Burch's presentation comes much closer to grappling with the problem when he asserts: "Where the difficulty arises is in assessing whether cabinet effectively oversees and controls decision-taking in the cabinet system, as most conventional theories would suggest" (Burch, 1997: 33). Meanwhile, in other countries, the cabinet (typically referred to as 'council of ministers') is often, though not always, mentioned in constitutions and in such cases it is stated, as in the case of the French Constitution (Art. 20) that "the government shall determine and conduct the policy of the nation:" such a wording may be practically useful as it means that the cabinet can in effect do what it wants and, like an accordion, expand its real involvement more or less depending on the issue; but these and similar expressions do not provide guidelines enabling observers to decide in what ways cabinets differ from other forms of executive arrangements.

The problem is indeed complicated by the fact that other forms of executive arrangements exist at least in the context of democratic politics one of these, pesidential government, has so to speak equal status within cabinets, a third model, that of the 'council,' having been in use in Switzerland only, although some features of the decision making structure of the European Union come close to it. However, despite the fact that presidentialism has spread

throughout the Americas, the exact role of the government in this model has not been truly define either. One of the most important works on the subject, indeed by far the most sophisticated text so far, Shugart and Carey's President and Assemblies, does not provide much light on the subject: it bases its distinction between the two models of executive arrangements, not on what ministers do or do not do, collectively or singly, but on two other aspects, namely whether the head of state is elected by universal suffrage or not and whether the legislature has or does not have the power to dismiss the government (1992: 1-2). These aspects are of crucial importance in understanding the threats that the executive faces to its survival and it is very plausible that the nature of the threats then has a bearing on how the executive arranges itself to respond to them. However, an understanding of the security or otherwise of government between elections does not tell us anything about what the government does. As a matter of fact, the book is not concerned with the character of governmental decision-making but with a different problem, which has agitated political scientists for the last two decades of the twentieth century, the controversy about whether presidentialism is 'better' or 'worse' than the parliamentary system in terms of its effect on the stability of regimes. While Shugart and Carey come to sophisticated conclusions on this point, they say very little about the government itself, except to note that "some systems give the president so little power relative to the assembly that they are effectively parliamentary" (1992: 2): but this point remains at the level of government-assembly relations. Interestingly enough, the word 'cabinet' does not appear in the index except indirectly in the context of cabinet responsibility, while the word government is not listed at all. It is therefore permissible to continue to conclude with Heclo that, despite many volumes on the American presidency, the government as much remains one of 'strangers': "Despite a host of management and organization studies…, very little information is available about the working world and everyday conduct of the top people in government" (1977: 1).

If we are to assess whether ministers are likely to be more or less reliable in a presidential government than in a cabinet, a definition of presidentialism based on the relative powers of president and assembly is clearly not sufficient. We have to be able to state with precision what it is that the executive does in the framework of a cabinet and in the framework of presidentialism. The distinctions identified by Shugart and Carey are of value in that they demonstrate that presidential systems vary appreciably: some presidential governments may therefore be close to having and indeed may even have characteristics of cabinets. Conversely, one cannot rule out altogether the possibility that what is formally a cabinet may be close to being analogous to a presidential executive. The first task must thus be to come to operational definitions of these two types of executive arrangements. The confusion that may arise from the use of the term 'cabinet' in the United States, for example, will be resolved below where this term is defined with precision.

Role of Ministers in Cabinet Systems

To do so, let us begin by examining cabinets, as it is to cabinets that most work has been devoted despite the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that the precise role of the cabinet appears difficult to determine. The starting point of such an analysis must be the recognition that cabinet government is in principle collective and collegial, but that, in practice, as

analyses of contemporary cabinets have repeatedly shown, for instance all over Western Europe, discussions at cabinet meetings are rarely of sufficient focus or duration to determine policies in the strong sense of the word. Almost everywhere, committees have been of increasing significance and have tended to be the place where decisions are prepared, 'pre-cooked,' and subsequently presented to the cabinet meeting. To this extent, the cabinet is not (or has ceased to be) a truly decision-making organ.

This situation suggests a degree of fuzziness and indeed obscurity as to what exactly the cabinet as an institution achieves. On the one hand, it is in charge of decision-making; on the other, it is not. From a practical point of view, this makes for considerable flexibility, a flexibility which has often been praised. Thus, if an issue is very 'hot,' the cabinet may be involved and the decision may truly be taken collectively; if, as in most cases, the issue is of limited significance and at most concerns some ministers only and at the limit only one of them, the cabinet nods gently and goes to the next business. The uncertainty about the real role of the cabinet is reinforced by the fact that the prime minister is often very influential and can effectively control the decision process, in part because, on the other hand, many ministers, especially those who are specialists, have little interest in participating in most of the issues which are outside the remit of their department. It is therefore very valuable that the decision-making process in cabinet should be flexible; but, if there is such a flexibility, what does the cabinet really do? Can it be said to be really involved in decision-making and can one given an accurate and tight definition of its role?

To say that an operational—and therefore tight—definition of cabinet government can be obtained means that one must discover, despite the flexibility of the arrangement and indeed below it, a minimum set of characteristics which all cabinet governments possess. This minimum set cannot include decision-making as such, since this is precisely what cabinets are flexible about; but, if cabinets are not decision-making bodies in the strong sense of the word, what then is their role, formally or informally, with respect to governmental decisions?

While the 'debunking' of the role of the cabinet as a decision-making body has been justified in order to provide a more realistic picture of this role, such a 'debunking' has tended to obscure the fact that the cabinet remains essential in one respect—namely that, whatever may have taken place earlier, it is involved in the final and crucial part of the process. The decisions may have been 'prepared' or 'pre-cooked:' they have to go eventually to the cabinet meeting to be ratified. This is overwhelmingly the case in Continental European cabinets, which have typically to approve of very large number of decisions; in the case of the British cabinet, the number of formal decisions to approve is smaller, but the cabinet has nonetheless to 'pass' all the main policies which the government subsequently puts forward. During that ratification phase, all the members of the cabinet—the ministers—are involved in every aspect of governmental life, whether they have truly contributed to the preparation of the decisions or not. This has a direct effect on the part which these ministers can subsequently be expected to play.

The power of ratification must be viewed as the crucial element of an operational definition of cabinets. However, it is clear that not all decisions are ratified by the cabinet as a whole,

since individual ministers must have some discretion, a 'competence' of their own. What goes to the cabinet meeting are the 'important' matters which come within the province of a single minister, for instance a new bill to be sent to parliament, as well as those matters which do not fall clearly within the province of an individual minister. As a matter of fact, ministers are expected to use their 'competence' with care and to refer at least to the prime minister if they have reason to worry about the effect which a measure which they wish to take may have.

Given that ministers have to ratify all important decisions of the cabinet, it is natural that this power should be central to the determination of the operational definition of cabinets. One last proviso has to be made, however, which brings back to the distinction between the formal role of the meeting of the government on the Continent and its more informal character in Britain. In a strict sense, the British cabinet does not formally ratify the key decisions of the executive: it gives its stamp of approval to what ministers will do: its function is then to 'allow' for that ratification of decisions rather than to ratify formally. In practice, however, except for the fact that large numbers of routine matters simply do not come to the meetings of the British cabinet, the effective role of these meetings is the same in Britain as it is on the Continent.

The question of ratification is truly the key element in the definition of what constitutes a cabinet as two other characteristics which have to be taken into account are consequential on the part which cabinets play in the ratification process. One of these characteristics is that cabinets both are relatively small bodies and form groups in the strong sense of the word. They are not 'assemblies,' neither in terms of their size nor in terms of the role of their members. Cabinets are expected to be small enough to be able to work together. There could not be communion of interests if that body was a collection of persons having nothing or even little in common. The ministers have a common goal, which is to determine strategic policy for the nation. The other characteristic of cabinets is the fact that ministers are jointly involved in approving the decisions of the cabinet: they are in effect co-responsible, whether they did or did not participate in the elaboration of these decisions and indeed whether they liked them or not. If a minister really dislikes a decision so much that he or she cannot be associated with it, he or she must resign. To fail to resign means to accept. There may not be collective decision-making in the cabinet in the strong sense of the word, but there is collective responsibility so long as one remains a member of that cabinet.

On this basis, one can therefore state that an executive is a cabinet if the following three conditions obtain:

1.   it is composed of a group senior policy makers—between, say 5 and 40— widely perceived to be at the highest decision-making level in government;

2.   all major government policy matters go to this group for final approval;

3.   the members of the group are accountable for the decisions which have been approved.

The Role of Ministers in Presidential Systems

The above definition should clarify that the use of the term 'cabinet' in presidential systems does not necessarily mean that the government meets the criteria to be regarded as a cabinet government. It does not rule out either—but it makes the determination an empirical question of how the executive is structured. The role of ministers in presidential systems is naturally expected to be different, but the exact nature of the difference has also to be clarified. The main point of the structure of presidential executives is that presidents alone have the formal authority to take decisions. There are obviously also ministers (typically referred to as 'secretaries') and these form together a 'government' in the sense that they constitute the universe of the top decision-makers in the country; but they act by delegation or on behalf of the president.

It follows that they key problem which had to be explored in connection with cabinets—whether these bodies were or not taking collectively the key decisions in the state—does not have its counterpart in presidential systems. There is no collective decision taking in formal terms. The 'governments' in presidential systems do meet. In the United States for instance, the word 'cabinet' is used extensively to refer to the meetings which the 'government' does hold. However, these meetings do not have to take place for governmental decisions to be taken, as the literature on the subject amply shows; one classic work on the subject is indeed pointedly entitled "The President's Cabinet" (Fenno, 1959). It may be that the president decides to consult the ministers and subsequently takes the result of this consultation into account when taking the decision. But the president is in no way obliged to do so and he or she may well decide against the view expressed in the consultation. As Truman is held to have said: "Eleven against, one for (his own), the ayes have it." If this consultation process becomes a habit in a particular presidential system or under a particular president, the result may be, as we shall see in the final section, that the government in that system or under that president slides towards becoming in effect a cabinet; in the normal way, however, ministers or 'secretaries' do what they are formally appointed to do in presidential systems. They run the department on behalf of the president.

The central characteristics of cabinet systems thus does not obtain in presidential systems. Nor do—indeed consequently—the other two features of cabinet systems either. First, presidential governments are not 'groups' in the strong sense of the word: they are collections of individuals who are appointed independently from each other by the president to fill the posts which the president wants them to fill. If, in practice, the situation is somewhat different, this, too, suggests that a given presidential government is sliding towards becoming a cabinet. Second, not being even indirectly involved in the decisions taken by other ministers or by the president, ministers or 'secretaries' are not accountable for these decisions: their accountability is limited to their own actions.

On this basis, an executive can be said to be presidential if the three following conditions obtain:

1.   no distinct boundary exists around senior policy-makers—defined differently in different sectors/decision-making areas;

2.   matters may frequently be determined by the president alone;

3.   senior policy makers are held accountable for the performance of their agencies only.

Figure 1. Empirical Distinctions between Cabinet and Presidential Executives

Criterion	Cabinet	Presidential
Identification of the executive	1. it is composed of a group senior policymakers between say, 5 and 40—widely perceived to be at the highest decisionmaking level in government;	1. no distinct boundary around senior policymakers—defined differently in different sectors/decisionmaking areas
Routing of decisions	2. all major government policy matters go to this group for final approval;	2. matters may frequently be determined by the president alone
Collective accountability	3. the members of the group are collectively accountable for the decisions which have been approved.	3. ministers are held accountable for the performance of their own agencies only

Although the key distinguishing criterion of cabinet and presidential governments is not that cabinets are collectively involved in decision-making as such (since they are only expected to ratify) while presidential governments are hierarchical, substantial differences remain in the relationship which ministers have with the government in the two sets of arrangements. A cabinet is a group; one is tempted to say a "club." Its members have to act together in many circumstances and, in particular, in order to ratify the major decisions taken by these governments, they are also subsequently jointly accountable for these decisions and cannot, so to speak, shrug them away as having been made without their knowledge. In presidential governments, on the contrary, the relationship is based on a person-to-person link between the president and each minister, not on participation in a group. The president is ultimately responsible and the 'secretaries', deep down, are merely the aides of the president. Given that there are such differences in the overall character of the two arrangements, it would be surprising if at least some effect of these differences did not emerge in the way ministers conduct their business in the government and in particular in the extent to which they are reliable.

Admittedly, the differences are most marked in those governments in which the characteristics of either the cabinet or presidential systems exist to the full. This is not always the case. There are example in which a major 'personal' influence on the part of the government leader is combined with substantial 'group' cohesion among government members. Thus, in cabinet governments, some ministers may be appointed primarily because they are personally close to the prime minister, though this is relatively rare, at least in Western

countries and in the contemporary period. Conversely and seemingly more frequently, ministers in presidential governments may be appointed because they are (prominent) members of a party: that party plays as a result a substantial part in counterbalancing the role of the president. As a matter of fact, where practices of this kind occur regularly and almost continuously, the government ceases to be truly a 'cabinet' or to be truly 'presidential' to become a hybrid in which a person-to-person relationships are associated with group relationships. At the limit, a government could even be a cabinet only in name, if its leader were so powerful and the group basis so weak that person-to-person relationships were to prevail; conversely, a government could be presidential in name only, if what counted primarily were the group relationships among the members and the party basis of these members. We must therefore first examine the effect of what might be described as the 'pure' cabinet system and the 'pure' presidential system on ministerial reliability. We should then turn to intermediate cases and see what might be the effect on ministerial reliability of cabinets which have become 'quasi-presidential' and of presidential governments which have become 'quasi-cabinets.'

Where do we find cabinets?

The definition offered above enables us to identify where executives can be considered to be cabinets on an empirical basis.

Recent research suggests that out of 182 countries, 124 are 'collective cabinet-like.' Of these 44 are weakly cabinet-like and 80 strongly so. Globally, using the criteria above, we could say that 32 percent of countries are not cabinet at all, 24 percent are weakly cabinet-like and 44 percent are strongly collective cabinet-like. The full details of the survey are attached in Appendix 1. There are two interesting issues which emerge from this empirical research.

First, a line of argument suggests that cabinet government is associated with a combination of three particular threats to the executive. Work is continuing on the matter, but it appears that the 124 countries with weak or strong forms of cabinet government are largely constituted of countries in which the executive faces significant elements of one or more of those threats. The first threat is that of dismissal between elections. In many cabinet governments, including by definition strong parliamentary systems, the executive can be dismissed relatively easily between elections following a collapse of the coalition or the loss of confidence of the parliament. The second threat is that the legislature is relatively unconstrained in its ability to amend the government's program as expressed in the budget proposals made by the executive. If carried out, this threat means that the executive will be seen by the public to have departed from a previous tradition of cabinet government and judged poorly in consequence. In other words, in the public mind, the institution of cabinet really is sticky and when a tradition of cabinet government has been established it is politically costly to break with that.

Second, the significance of the survey for our purposes here is that having adopted an empirical definition of cabinet government based on behavior and not on the constitution, it

is then clear that presidential systems can be 'cabinet governments' although they tend to be weak versions: for example, Bolivia, Chile and Panama emerge as cabinet-like.

Are Ministers Likely to be More Reliable in Cabinet Governments?

Ministerial reliability, as any form of obedience, depends on socio-political and administrative characteristics. The socio-political characteristics have to do with the extent to which the persons involved are socialized into the norms of the group and with the credibility of the sanctions which can be applied against those who transgress these norms. The administrative characteristics have to do with the capacity of the system to trace the cases of transgression and to cope with these cases. By and large, in the context of ministerial reliability, the effect of cabinet or presidential arrangements is most likely to be felt, if at all, on the socio-political characteristics under which ministers operate. The capacity to monitor transgression and to cope with these transgressions is more likely to be dependent, on the contrary, on the level of development of the administrative system in the country than on the overall nature of the governmental arrangements, though some effect of the governmental arrangements may also occur.

The Key Role of Government Secretariats, Presidential Offices and of Treasuries in Assessing and Even Fostering the Reliability of Ministers

The capacity of the governmental system to detect cases of transgression has manifestly a crucial impact on the reliability of ministers. To begin with, the extent of reliability or unreliability of ministers is not, as it were, self-evident: it depends on the contrary on being discovered. Unless mechanisms exist as a result of which the actions of ministers are reported to other members of the government collectively or to the president singly, the question as to whether ministers follow the governmental line does not truly arise since it cannot be clarified. Thus, if the reliability of their members is to be monitored, governments must have at their disposal organs which tell them what takes place in each department. This means that there must be what is typically known as 'government secretariats' or 'presidential offices' but to create effective units of this kind is not a trivial matter, as skilled personnel has to be appointed and this personnel has to have access to the departments. Not surprisingly, these units are not equally well-developed everywhere; as a result, one may well find in this respect more differences among cabinet systems and among presidential systems than between cabinet and presidential systems.

Moreover, the role of these secretaries and offices is not confined to the monitoring of ministerial actions. Indeed, these bodies can determine whether ministers are reliable or not only if they possess a record of the decisions of the cabinet or of the president. As a matter of fact, such a record is also useful to the ministers themselves as these are very likely otherwise to forget some of what had been decided or even whether anything had been decided at all on a particular problem. The numbers of decisions which have to be taken by governments being very large, ministers can be 'unreliable' involuntarily. A key role of government secretariats and of presidential offices is thus to list all the decisions which have been taken and to communicate this list to ministers. The involvement of these secretariats

and offices in the life of the governments has to be deep and extensive, not surprisingly the extent of this involvement varies from country to country.

Government secretariats and presidential offices are not the only administrative bodies likely to have a substantial effect on the reliability of ministers. Treasuries or bureaus of the budget have a key part to play given that most policies have a substantial price tag. If these monitor carefully the proposals of ministers and if they are truly in a position to prevent ministers from being able to spend money without authorization, their effect on ministerial reliability is crucial. If ministers can make promises and even start to incur expenditure before the treasury or the bureau of the budget becomes involved and thus place these bodies in front of a *fait accompli*, the potential for ministerial unreliability is obviously much greater.

The extent to which ministers are reliable is thus in part dependent on the existence of an efficient 'support system' and on strict financial control in both cabinet government and presidential government. It is of course this aspect which partially explains ministerial unreliability in developing countries which are heavily dependent on donor funding. The undermining of central control by ministerial relationships with powerful outside funders equally undermines collective accountability. However, the difference may not all be between developed and developing countries. There are probably also some differences between cabinet systems and presidential systems in this respect. A government secretariat and even a treasury may well be closer to the ministers whose activities it monitors in a cabinet system than a presidential office or a bureau of the budget in a presidential system. Such 'coordinating' bodies might thus be able to find out better what goes on in the departments in the first case than in the second.

The Dynamics of the Relationship between Presidents and Ministers in
Presidential Government and the Reliability of Ministers

Let us begin by examining how far, in presidential governments, ministers are likely to have to be reliable. The starting point of the analysis is the point that ministers are in a subordinate position. Presidents being 'in command', ministers depend wholly on the whims of presidents for the power which they hold while in office and for their maintenance in office. There is a basic inequality between the two sides—benefits seem to accrue exclusively to presidents while costs seem to fall entirely on the ministers. From an efficiency standpoint, such an arrangement may be regarded as ideal. Presidents take the decisions and they use the 'secretaries' (the ministers) to implement these decisions. From a point of view of human relations, on the other hand, such an arrangement may seem to have major flaws.

As a matter of fact, the calculus of costs and benefits is obviously not as straightforward. Despite the obvious advantages under which they operate, presidents are subjected to three types of constraints when appointing their ministers. First, they may have to reward some friends for the help which these gave them. In such cases, the personal ties between president and minister are probably such that the relevant ministers can enjoy, at least for a while, the 'ear' of the leader. Second, president occasionally have to appoint some ministers because of

their recognized skills or competence. This is often the case with finance or economic ministers, in particular when the country is in crisis. Third, presidents cannot dismiss ministers too frequently as this would mean administrative chaos and would reflect adversely on their judgment. New ministers thus have at least some time on their hands to develop their policies.

The constraints under which presidents operate when appointing ministers are thus not negligible but ministers also enjoy some benefits even though their tenure is fundamentally precarious. These ministers (the secretaries) are chosen by the president to undertake a job, not because these persons had followed previously a political career. This obviously gives presidents considerable freedom, a freedom which, as we shall point out and is indeed well-known, even the strongest prime ministers do not have in cabinet government. There is another side of the coin, however, ministers chosen in that manner are not likely to partake in an ethos in which being a minister means doing the kind of things which other ministers and other politicians would expect them to do. They are 'strangers' to each other and to the whole structure, as Heclo does put it (1977). 'Secretaries' in presidential governments are not internalizing any norms about 'governmental behavior.' They are concerned about what the job which is offered to them is likely to give to them. What they can see is, first, that they will have a direct impact on policy in fields in which they are presumably keenly interested. Second, they note that there are non-insignificant prerequisites attached to the job, from prestige to daily material luxuries associated with the status of a member of government. Few are those likely to be wholly impervious to such advantages. Third, they find that there are opportunities to reward those who helped in the past, from invitations to events to temporary or even longer-term appointments. These favors fuel the reputation of ministers while in office and they are valuable investments for the future, when ministers have to leave office.

The balance of costs and benefits for presidents and ministers at the time of appointment is thus not as strongly tilted in favor of presidents as it may seem at first sight. Moreover, as time passes, despite the fact that presidents are in principle able to dismiss their 'secretaries' at any point, the position of ministers comes paradoxically to be strengthened. It is also then that the question of unreliability begins to arise. When appointments are made, one can assume that ministers are in agreement with the policies of their president. Presumably presidents choose ministers, in part at least, because they see eye to eye with them. Yet his understanding may not last. If the president disagrees with some of the positions of a minister, that minister has to decide whether to remain in office or resign. Some ministers may decide both to remain in office and abide by the president's wishes; others may also decide to remain in office but choose to do what they want 'under cover.' After all, they would cease to have any part in policy development if they left the government. For a while at least the president may not even be aware of such cases of unreliability, an unreliability which can take many forms, as we noted, and can range from being wholly negative (not implementing or delaying the implementation) to being strongly positive (undertaking actions against stated governmental, i.e. in this case presidential, policy).

Two further complications intervene at this point, both of which increase the bargaining position of ministers vis-à-vis president. First, in democratic presidential systems at least—and these are the only ones which are considered here, the game of politics being very different in authoritarian systems—there are other sources of political power beyond the presidency and the executive; such sources of power tend indeed to be more autonomous from the executive in presidential systems than in cabinet systems, this being a well-documented consequence of the separation of powers arrangements on which presidentialism is based. In particular, legislatures in (democratic) presidential systems are typically appreciably freer from executive control than legislatures in parliamentary cabinet systems, a point which has been made extensively in the American context (King, 1983). As a result of this autonomy as well as because of the autonomy of many other organizations, both public and private, ministers are not only inclined, but indeed obliged to bargain with these bodies if their policies are to be adopted. This is so even when their policies are entirely consistent with those which the president favors. In this process, ministers are likely to be constrained to make compromises and a degree of 'unreliability' will inevitably take place, as the slide from 'autonomy' to 'unreliability' is easy and can go almost unnoticed. Gradually, unreliability will become more serious and is likely to cover important matters. Thus the nature of the presidential system leads to ministerial autonomy and, as a result, to ministerial unreliability.

Second, ministers may have a clientele of their own which they would want to keep happy. Given the precarious character of their appointment, they are likely to wish to secure their future by creating or strengthening personal ties with 'friends' of various kinds who may in turn help them later. This may mean being 'unreliable' in one way or another vis-à-vis the president; but, the more time passes—and the more therefore the date of the end of tenure approaches—the more the minister may find occasions to be unreliable. Indeed, as the dismissal or resignation point becomes close and as the prospects of a new life approaches, there is obviously more to gain than to lose by being unreliable. Thus the point is not only that unreliability may be rampant in the context of the autonomy of the various 'secretaries' of presidential governments. It is more likely to increase than to decrease during the tenure of these 'secretaries.' Not only are ministers likely to be 'unreliable' but their unreliability is likely to increase.

Such a negative scenario is of course far from being universal in presidential governments. Some ministers may remain loyal to their president to the end; some presidents may maintain their 'secretaries' in office both because hey feel that they are efficient and highly competent and because of personal feelings they have towards them. All presidential governments may thus not be characterized by a spiral of ever increasing mistrust. But if there is mistrust between the president and some ministers, the dynamics of the presidential system do not provide a way out. Presidents have no other means at their disposal apart from the 'nuclear' option of dismissal. Indeed, they may not even know the extent to which ministerial unreliability takes place since presidential offices, when there is mistrust, are unlikely to be able to monitor with great accuracy what goes on in each department. Meanwhile, being aware that their dismissal may well occur soon, ministers attempt to limit the consequences by using all the opportunities they have to enhance their career. It becomes therefore highly rational for them to act unreliably and to act increasingly unreliably as time passes. When

mistrust has come to develop on a large scale, presidential government does not have internal mechanisms to reduce it. As a by-product, the system is likely to foster unreliability since this mode of behavior may be a protective device. Presidential government may thus generate major internal problems which undermine, not just its efficiency but its credibility.

Cabinet Government and the Reliability of Ministers

While presidential government fosters ministerial unreliability, cabinet government, on the contrary, tends to reduce its impact. This is in large part because, as we need, the relationship between ministers and government in a cabinet is mediated by groups, the cabinet itself, to begin with, as well as the party or parties to which the ministers belong.

As was suggested earlier, the cabinet is a kind of club, a club which has rules of entry and rules of behavior. One of the rules of entry is that one does not normally become a member unless one has successively gone through a series of steps, a development which is not expected to occur in presidential government. The cabinet is the apex of a career which tends to start in a local party organization and to continue as a backbencher in parliament. There is then a period of 'apprenticeship' of the ministerial job: this may mean having had a seat in a 'shadow cabinet,' as in Britain, belonging to the leadership of a party, primarily a parliamentary party, as in many continental countries and above all having been for a substantial period a second rank minister. This curse us is not universal, admittedly, in some countries, especially in Austria, the Netherlands or France, a substantial number of political 'outsides,' as their colleagues in presidential systems, come directly from the public or (but less so) the private sector into the cabinet. Yet not only are these in a minority but the rules of the cabinet 'club' are produced by the 'regulars.'   Furthermore, the career is regulated 'automatically' so to speak, and the part played by the leader of the government, the prime minister, takes place within this context. Indeed, only in some countries, principally those of the Westminster-type, do prime ministers truly crucially influence more than a minority of ministerial appointments and, even in these countries, they are typically not in a position to choose ministers outside the relatively narrow confines of the pre-defined political elite.

Two consequences follow. First, although the job of cabinet minister is in principle as precarious as its counterpart in presidential government, dismissals of ministers are less routine affairs. On the one hand, they are very rare in most Continental countries as dismissing ministers would mean upsetting the complex architecture of coalitions, they simply do not occur in these countries, save in highly exceptional situations. The end of the ministers' jobs tends therefore to coincide in these countries with the end of the government. On the other hand, reshuffles are frequent in Britain and other countries based on the Westminster model, but even there they tend to have to be 'justified' in terms of the failure of ministers as departmental heads or of major policy disagreements with the rest of the cabinet. Moreover, those prime ministers who can reshuffle have to show restraint as they, too, could be toppled. Too many dismissals of ministers may lead to rebellions and result in the prime minister's downfall, as has occurred more than once in Britain, for instance with Lady Thatcher.

Second, in a context in which ministers have 'grown together,' so to speak, and in which they know each other well, especially within their own party but even across parties—for

instance because of the time spent in parliament—the bond goes beyond the links which are formally established. It is therefore relatively more difficult for cabinet ministers, not just to be autonomous but even to conceal what they are trying to do and what they like or do not like. An atmosphere of trust comes to develop even among colleagues of different parties and reliability is a by-product as well as a necessary component of this atmosphere.

Ministerial reliability is thus part of the 'code' which is expected to be followed by the members of the cabinet 'club.' There can be peccadilloes, such as instances of delayed implementation when there are disagreements with colleagues over minor issues or when favors are being distributed to friends in need. Large-scale clientelistic behavior, on the other hand, is frowned upon; to be allowed it has to be regulated by explicit agreements among the coalition parties and even occasionally with the opposition as well. This is no longer a case of unreliability, although it may be a source of conflict between public service morality and party loyalty. There is also less scope than in presidential government for unreliability over policy matters as cabinet members can air problems in a multitude of meetings, formal and informal. Not all ministers win, of course, especially if there is a crisis and above all over budgetary questions, but the discussions make it possible to reach compromises which are likely to leave intact the 'vital interests' of departments. The coordination mechanisms of the cabinet system are thus a protection against unreliability as they include ministers to act openly rather than to conceal what they aim at doing.

Moreover, the activities of government secretaries and of treasuries are likely to be both better accepted and more effective than those of their equivalents in presidential government, as these tend to operate from outside and are less likely to find allies within the departments. Government secretaries are the eyes and arms, not merely of prime ministers, but of cabinets as a whole. They ease the progress of government policies while subsequently supervising the way in which these policies are implemented. It is therefore not in the interest of ministers to refuse to collaborate or to conceal their moves from them.

Cabinet government is thus better equipped than presidential government to cope with idiosyncrasies of ministers and with the consequences of these idiosyncrasies which might result in unreliable actions. But these favorable developments occur if two conditions obtain. First, there has to have been enough time for the 'club-like' modes of behavior to grow in and around the cabinet, since, as we noted, the cabinet is a 'club' because its members have had a previous political career which has often extended over one or two decades. Second and even more serious, the club-like atmosphere in the cabinet is predicated on the existence of strong parties. These are the background groups on which the system is based; they are the 'columns of the temple,' so to speak. It is not crucial that there be only very few significant parties, for instance two or three; there can be more, though not too many more. What is crucial is that these parties should be well-organized and disciplined so that they can exercise a strong influence on the behavior of potential cabinet ministers both before they reach office and when they are in the government.

There are thus likely to be variations in cabinet development, both because of the way in which ministers are related to and in effect dependent on parties and because the prime

ministers are more or less powerful. Cabinets can thus be very loose organizations if the influence of parties is very limited; they seem to have the potential to become 'quasi-presidential' when prime ministers are very strong. On the other hand, some presidential governments may well be obliged by political circumstances to adopt forms of collective behavior which bring them fairly close to the cabinet model. Having looked so far at what can be regarded as the 'pure' types of the two sets of arrangements, we now need to examine the variations from these 'pure' types and assess how far these variations have an effect on ministerial unreliability in the contemporary world.

Intermediate Cases

Why cabinets may rarely come close to being presidential but may be ineffective and why some presidential governments move towards the cabinet model

It has sometimes been said that the British government had become 'prime ministerial:' if it is meant by this expression that the British prime minister can be and usually is more powerful than prime ministers in most other cabinet systems, the statement is probably correct; if what is suggested is that the cabinet model has been abandoned and the presidential model effectively introduced in Britain, as Crossman implied in his Preface to Bagehot's English Constitution (1963: 51-53), this is a distortion in a number of respects and in particular in terms of the relationship between ministers and the rest of the cabinet. As a matter of fact, the problem faced by cabinets is often the converse one, namely that they are weak because they are ill-led and lack the backbone which strong parties can provide. Meanwhile, presidential governments sometimes adopt many characteristics of cabinets, with ministers working together as a group, although the formal presidential framework is retained: such developments had tended to remain unnoticed until the 1990s, because little work had been devoted to presidentialism outside the United States up to then and as Latin American presidential governments had been those most likely to adopt some features of the cabinet system.

Strong cabinet prime ministers and the question of ministerial reliability

It is in Westminster-type governments that the prime minister has been alleged to have sometimes become so powerful that the cabinet has been reduced to impotence. That some prime ministers are very powerful in these systems is undeniable, even if the strongest prime ministers may eventually come to be toppled by 'conspiracies' of ministers, ex-ministers and their friends. Meanwhile, strong prime ministers no doubt contribute to reducing the decisionmaking power of the cabinet; but decision-making in the cabinet is not what is under discussion here: the definition of cabinet governments refers only to ratification. So long as ratification takes place in the cabinet—and this does remain the case even when the prime minister is strong—the government remains a cabinet. Strong prime ministers intervene before ratification occurs to ensure that they obtain the policies they wish to see adopted. The role of the cabinet as such is therefore not modified.

One crucial variable is constituted by the nature of the party system, however. Cabinet government creates a broad framework whereby collective decision-making and thereby ministerial reliability is likely to be fostered, but the party system can strengthen or weaken markedly this collective character. If parties are well-structured and disciplined, the ministers of those parties which are in the executive are likely to act as a team. This is first because they will have known each other for some time, both in opposition or in government. They are therefore likely to know each other's typical modes of behavior; second, 'individualistic' behavior on the part of a minister is likely to be frowned upon and indeed sanctioned. There is pressure on all the members of the executive to conform and be reliable. If, on the other hand, parties are not tightly structured, if they are composed of a number of clientelistic networks of which ministers are likely to be the heads, the probability is much higher that these ministers will find it convenient to act independently from time to time and perhaps even regularly. No party sanction can be against them as they have their own power base. Group trust will therefore not prevail.

The build-up of strong party structures tends to take time, as clientelistic ties, typically based on local patterns of leadership, also tend to die hard. This is why one may well find less well-structured party systems in countries which are 'democratizing' or are in 'transition', as several examples in East and Southeast Asia show. In such cases, parties are unable to oblige ministers to adopt collective norms of behavior and to prevent ministers from acting in an idiosyncratic manner. This idiosyncrasy will lead, in many cases at least, to undue autonomy and to unreliability. Overtime, these characteristics may change; but, for a period, perhaps a long period, cabinet government may not be streamlined enough to ensure coherence and stop under cover action by many ministers. Cabinet government needs strong parties and strong group norms to function effectively. If these exist, the government will be 'compact' and ministers will find it difficult to behave in an idiosyncratic, erratic and unreliable manner. The existence of such norms and of such parties cannot be decreed, however, and so long as parties are not strong and group norms are weak, cabinets will also be weak and ministers are likely to be autonomous, erratic and unreliable. This may have the effect of moving the country towards authoritarian rule, a move which is sometimes fuelled by prime ministers anxious to dominate their polity. A well-entrenched and efficiently working cabinet government may be difficult to implant in newly created polities. Should one conclude that the only practical alternative is presidential rule or can alternative arrangements be devised whereby some of the characteristics of cabinet are introduced in the midst of a presidential framework?

Presidential Governments and the Partial Move Towards a Cabinet System

As a matter of fact, forms of 'quasi-cabinets' within presidential systems have existed for some time, precisely where parties have been sufficiently strong to be able to structure to an extent governmental behavior. Presidents can be truly in control of ministerial appointments in two kinds of situations only, at one extreme when parties are weakly structured, or at the other extreme, when there is a dominant party which they fully control. This has been the case for decades in Mexico. In a more pluralistic context, this was the case in Venezuela from the 1960s to the early 1990s. On the contrary, where parties are numerous but they are also strong and disciplined, presidents have less autonomy in relation to appointments and

even policies and have to enter into discussions with these parties. Indeed, negotiations with the parties may even begin at the time of the nomination of the presidential candidates and at least after the first ballot and before the second, this typically takes place in a multi-party system context. During that bargaining phase, presidential candidates may not merely have to make policy promises. They have also to offer ministerial positions to some of the parties in the hope that their leaders will be bound to support the government as a result. This kind of development has taken place regularly in Bolivia and have occurred also in Brazil, Chile or Colombia. As a result, such governments cease to be truly presidential. They are party coalitions which resemble fairly closely the cabinet coalitions of Continental Europe and constitute genuine groups and not mere collection of ministers. Occasionally, presidents are able to dispense with the constraints which such a quasi-cabinet model introduces: this was the case in Venezuela when the parties declined in the 1990s. But this may also mean, somewhat more ominously, as in Peru under President Fujimori, that the president is moving away from the strict liberal democratic model. So long as the regimes remain liberal democratic, however, if presidents are not in control of a dominant party or are not faced with ill-disciplined parties which they can manipulate, they have no alternative but to come to agreements with some parties and thus to run in effect a collegial government as a prime minister has to do.

Presidential systems may become 'quasi-cabinets' in another way, namely during transition periods in which major social, economic and political reforms have to be introduced. These situations can in some ways be compared to the earlier transitions during which European monarchs moved away from bureaucratic governments—in effect of a presidential kind as ministers were individually appointed—and began to set up collective cabinets. These cabinets emerged, in a first stage at least, not because parliaments insisted on taking over or controlling the government, but because the monarchs themselves wanted to retain as much influence as possible over these parliaments and over society. A broader based and more compact cabinet seemed better suited for that task than a collection of managers concerned exclusively with their department. Cabinet government thus came into being as a mechanism designed to enable chief executives to keep much of their authority at a time when it was challenged.

Some contemporary presidents are experiencing a similar challenge. They respond by introducing reforms designed to reduce the opposition—often a somewhat ill-defined but diffused opposition—against the existing regime in general and themselves in particular. To ensure that these reforms will not get out of hand, presidents need to enlist the support of at least part of that opposition. Yet, because of its hierarchical and almost command character, pure presidential government makes it more difficult than cabinet government to associate substantial segments of the political elite to the enterprise. Hence, the move towards a partial form of cabinet government, a move which has occurred for instance in some East and Southeast Asian countries and which may be taking place, though in a more limited manner, in African countries, as the analysis referred to earlier suggests.

Given that, since the end of the cold war, democracy has tended to spread more widely across the world, but given that the countries which are undergoing such a change had typically been run for many years by authoritarian presidents, it is perhaps more realistic for

these polities to move partially towards a cabinet rather than adopt a full-fledged cabinet model. Such a partial moves has the advantage of not necessitating, in the first stages at least, formal changes in the constitutional power structure. Meanwhile, the government becomes more compact, members of the government are likely to become less idiosyncratic in their behavior, they are likely to be more reliable as a result. For, despite the fact that previous regimes may have been authoritarian, their governments were often not at all compact and united. Ministers were often able to fully exploit the advantages of their positions, presidents being unwilling or unable to stop them for fear of weakening the bases of their own support. It is therefore sensible to encourage presidents and their entourage to consider adopting intermediate arrangements and to sep up governments which are quasi-cabinets. Political progress might then be achieved without the country having to undergo the traumas and the hazards of major constitutional change.

The contrast between cabinet and presidential government is usually felt at the level of the relationship between executive and legislature. Cabinets appear to be better able to streamline decision-making between these two powers in the state by squarely placing the responsibility for the initiative and development of policies in the executive branch; this move is sensible, as the executive has greater technical competence and a greater capacity to examine the detailed implications of policies than the legislature.

Yet the contrast between cabinet government and presidential government is also important at another level, although the point is not as frequently made, except to an extent in the American specialized literature. For cabinet government is more likely than presidential government to ensure that ministers speak with one voice and form a compact group. Admittedly, presidential government has the advantage of providing stability to the executive where parties are weak and ill-structured but a price has to be paid for this stability. Governments are not of one piece, the secretaries (the ministers) are semi-autonomous agents who often pursue personal policies which lead them to being unreliable both to the president and their governmental colleagues. Thus the hierarchical character of the presidential executive has the paradoxical effect of inducing ministers to pay more attention to their personal well-being. By giving the executive a more egalitarian outlook, cabinet government, on the contrary, induces ministers to have a greater desire to act as a group even if the cabinet as such is not or is no longer the main effective decision-making body.

Pure cabinet government can thus provide a more reliable executive and more reliable ministers than pure presidential government. The former is therefore in principle to be preferred to the latter, but cabinet government is not likely to function well when parties are numerous and weak, a state of affairs which tends to prevail in countries in transition from long periods of authoritarian rule. This is why an intermediate solution, based on the partial introduction of cabinet arrangements within the presidential model is perhaps the best way of giving compactness to the government. This may also be the best way of ensuring greater ministerial reliability. The advantages of cabinet government might thus be gradually achieved within the formal context of the presidential system.

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Appendix I

Searching for Cabinet Government

The Survey[*]

A survey of experts was undertaken by the World Bank in late 1998 to measure the empirical degree of "cabinet-like" government around the world. Expert academics were asked to evaluate whether each country met the following criteria:

1. Are there between 5 and 40 senior policy-makers who are widely perceived to be at the highest decision-making level in government?
2. Do all major government policy matters go to this group for final approval?
3. Do members of this group have to take decisions together and, as a consequence, are they together accountable for these decisions?

The possible answers are: "No," "Yes, probably," "Yes, certainly"

Each individual respondent's input was aggregated for each country for which they responded to all three questions:

1. If the answer to any one of the three criteria was "No," then the country received a score of 1 from the respondent.
2. If the answers to all three questions were either "Yes, probably" or "Yes, certainly," then the country received a score of 1 for each "Yes, probably" and 2 for each "Yes, certainly"
3. Scores from individual respondents for individual countries thus range from 1-6.

Not all respondents evaluated all countries; most respondents evaluated only some countries from one or two of the regions in the survey. The scores from individuals who responded with answers for only one country were removed from the aggregate calculations to ensure some comparative consistency.

Scores were then averaged for each country to represent the collective knowledge of the respondents, and scaled down to yield a single score for each country on a scale of 0-5 of the degree to which government in that country is considered cabinet-like. However, to ensure that the strict criteria for evaluating the degree to which a government is cabinet-like hold, a country received a score of 0 if:

1. the country received one to six individual scores, two or more of which were 1 scores
2. the country received seven to nine individual scores, three or more of which were 1 scores

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3.   the country received ten to twelve individual scores, four or more of which were 1 scores

Using this scoring method, any country that scores above 0 is thus considered by more than two-thirds of the respondents concerning that country to fulfill all three criteria of evaluation of the degree to which a government is cabinet-like.

OECD countries not covered in the survey were evaluated by World Bank staff as to the degree to which their governments are cabinet-like.

Any country receiving a score of 0 is considered "not cabinet-like"; any country receiving a score greater than 0 but below 3 is considered "weakly cabinet-like;" and any country scoring 3 to 5 is considered "strongly cabinet-like".

Responses

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Results

	Cabinet-like	*Weakly Cabinet-like*	*Strongly Cabinet-like*	*Not Cabinet-like*	*Total*
Africa	38	31	7	10	48
East Asia and Pacific	14	2	12	6	20
Europe and Central Asia	19	2	17	8	27
Latin America and Caribbean	15	4	11	16	31
Middle East and North Africa	4	2	2	15	19
South Asia	8	3	5	0	8
OECD	26	0	26	3	29
Total	124	44	80	58	182
Proportion	68%	24%	44%	32%	100%