WHY FERDINAND E. MARCOS
SHOULD NOT BE BURIED
AT THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI

12 JULY 2016
WHY FERDINAND E. MARCOS SHOULD NOT BE BURIED AT THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI
President Rodrigo R. Duterte proposes to bury Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) because he “was a Filipino soldier, period.” The NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NHCP) objects to the burial of Mr. Marcos at the LNMB based on his record as a soldier. The NHCP study demonstrates that:

1. Mr. Marcos lied about receiving the U.S. Medal of Honor, Silver Star, and Order of the Purple Heart, which he claimed as early as about 1945.

2. His guerrilla unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika, was never officially recognized and neither was his leadership of it.


4. Some of Mr. Marcos’s actions as a soldier were officially called into question by upper echelons of the U.S. military, such as his command over the Allas Intelligence Unit (described as “usurpation”), his commissioning of officers (without authority), his abandonment of USAFIP-NL presumably to build an airfield for Gen. Roxas, his collection of money for the airfield (described as “illegal”), and his listing of his name on the roster of different units (called a “malicious criminal act”).

Mr. Marcos’s military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies. The rule in history is that when a claim is disproven—such as Mr. Marcos’s claims about his medals, rank, and guerrilla unit—it is simply dismissed. When, moreover, a historical matter is under question or grave doubt, as expressed in the military records about Mr. Marcos’s actions and character as a soldier, the matter may not be established or taken as fact. A doubtful record also does not serve as sound, unassailable basis of historical recognition of any sort, let alone burial in a site intended, as its name suggests, for heroes.

For these reasons, the NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES opposes the plan to bury Mr. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

The COMMISSION undertook this study as part of its mandate to conduct and disseminate historical research and resolve historical controversies. (Section 5 and 7, R.A. 10086).
I. RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

During his campaign, then presidential candidate Mr. Rodrigo R. Duterte announced his desire to bury Mr. Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) because “he was a great president and he was a hero ... he had the idealism, the vision for this country...” and would have been “the best president” had he not become a dictator. After the election, President-elect Duterte backtracked and stated: “I will allow the burial of President Marcos ... not because he is a hero, kung ayaw ng iba (if others don’t like it), but because he was a Filipino soldier, period.”

The NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NHCP) differs with President Duterte’s assessment of Mr. Marcos as a ‘great president’ and ‘hero’ and stands on enormous, solid factual evidence to support its position. (The COMMISSION is prepared to present such evidence if so asked.) The rules of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which determine who may be buried at the site, proscribe military “personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service” and “authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgement of an offense involving moral turpitude” from being interred at the LNMB. Mr. Marcos was certainly not ‘dishonorably separated’ from military service but he suffered a worse and more dishonorable fate: he was removed by the collective action of the Filipino people in 1986. He then fled to Hawaii with his family, where he died three years later, isolated from the people who had removed him.

The mere fact of the presidency, too, does not automatically mean burial at the LNMB. Of the eleven deceased Philippine presidents, seven are not buried there (Presidents Emilio Aguinaldo, Manuel L. Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, Jose P. Laurel, Manuel Roxas, Ramon Magsaysay, and Corazon C. Aquino).

In any case, since President Duterte withdrew his initial reason for burying Mr. Marcos at the LNMB and now settles on the simple justification that the fallen leader “was a Filipino soldier, period,” the COMMISSION grounds its objection to the burial of Mr. Marcos at the LNMB on his status, and especially his record, as a soldier. As this paper will demonstrate, Mr. Marcos’s military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies. The rule in history is that when a claim is disproven—such as Mr. Marcos’s claims about his medals, rank, and guerrilla unit (Ang Mga Maharlika)—it is simply dismissed. When, moreover, a historical matter is under question, it may neither be established nor taken as fact and therefore cannot serve as the basis of historical recognition of any sort, let alone burial in a site intended, as its name suggests, for heroes.

NHCP MANDATE

The COMMISSION undertakes this study in keeping with its mandate. By law the COMMISSION is tasked to “conduct and support all kinds of research relating to Philippine national and local history” and “actively engage in the settlement or resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages, places, dates and events.” Its Board’s powers and functions are, among others, to:

(a) Conduct and encourage all manner of research pertaining to Philippine national and local history; ...

(e) Approve the declaration of historic structures and edifices such as national shrines, monuments and landmarks or heritage houses;

(f) Prescribe the manner of celebration or commemoration of significant events pertaining to Philippine history; ...

(h) Discuss and resolve, with finality, issues or conflicts on Philippine history; ...


5 Sec. 5(a), (e) of R.A. 10086, “An Act Strengthening Peoples’ Nationalism through Philippine History by Changing the Nomenclature of the National Historical Institute into the National Historical Commission of the Philippines, Strengthening its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes,” approved on 12 May 2010.
(p) Conduct public hearings and ocular inspections or initiate factual investigations with respect to disputed historical issues for the purpose of declaring official historical dates, places, personages and events....

As head of the COMMISSION, moreover, the Chair’s function (among others) is to “advise the President and Congress on matters relating to Philippine history.”

The Board of the NHCP thus agreed to study the historical record of Mr. Marcos as a soldier to resolve questions about Mr. Marcos’s claims as a soldier during the war, which are the basis of the President’s plan for his burial at the LNMB. By exercising its mandate, the NHCP also hopes to address the public concern about Mr. Marcos’s possible burial at the LNMB as well as advise the President of the Republic.

NOTE ON SOURCES

Historians rely heavily on primary sources or documents, photographs and other materials created during the period under study by eyewitnesses, participants or actors in the event. Sources pass through the historian’s test of authenticity (provenance of the document) and credibility (the source author’s ability and willingness to tell the truth, accuracy and consistency of content, corroboration) before they are used. In this study, the most important primary evidence comes from declassified documents in the Philippine Archives Collection of the U.S. National Archives/National Archives and Records Administration that are available online at the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office website.

Many of these documents were produced in the course of processing requests from war veterans, including guerrilla unit members, for back pay and benefits from the U.S. government. Hence narratives of guerrilla units were produced, membership rosters, accounts of ‘liberation activities’ intended to justify requests for official U.S. recognition, requests for the revision of dates of recognition, various correspondence, and official memoranda at different levels of the military structure issued during and in the few years after the war.

Two sets of archival document files are used in this study:

- Ang Mga Maharlika Grla Unit (Independent), File No. 60, Box 298, Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files, 1942-1948, Philippine Archives Collection (<http://collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-0000281>); and


The Ang Mga Maharlika file (#60) contains letters, memoranda, reports, and accounts relating to the guerrilla unit Maj. Marcos claimed to have founded and led. Mr. Marcos was one of those who had sought (and failed to obtain) recognition of his guerrilla unit by the U.S. government. The Allas Intelligence Unit file (#140), on the other hand, pertains to the organization led by Cipriano Allas, which claimed to be the intelligence unit of the Ang Mga Maharlika. This latter file concerns, among others, the unit’s request for the revision of its recognition date by the U.S. government (to obtain larger back pay and benefits). In the process numerous references to Maj. Marcos and his unit are made.

Official websites of pertinent U.S. government agencies were also consulted (see references). Other official documents referred to in this study were obtained from secondary sources and are so cited; such official records are not available in the Philippines or online.

6 Sec. 7, ibid.
7 Sec. 13(b), ibid.
8 See <http://collections.pvao.mil.ph>.
Aside from the secondary sources that contain excerpts of primary records, the most important secondary sources are the officially sanctioned biographies of Mr. Marcos for these present the claims advanced by him about his exploits during the war:

- Hartzell Spence, *For Every Tear a Victory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964);
- Benjamin A. Gray, *Rendezvous with Destiny* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1968);
- Hartzell Spence, *Marcos of the Philippines* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1969); and

## II. OF MEDALS AND RANK

The authorized biographies of Mr. Marcos portray him as a soldier of immense courage; according to one, he was “the most decorated and valor-cited warrior in his nation’s history.”9 The official biographies abound with stories of his heroic achievements, such as how he spent the first day of 1942 “by ambushing a company of Japanese cyclists,”10 killing 40 and turning back the rest. In the process, the story continues, Mr. Marcos was able to get a samurai sword that Gen. Douglas MacArthur later presented to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944, “the first captured Japanese saber to reach the American mainland!”11 The video recording of this event in British Pathé, a newsreel archive founded in 1910 containing 85,000 films from 1896 to 1976, however, makes no mention of the origin of the sword.12

Another wartime feat of Mr. Marcos is described below:

> ... Marcos carried out reconnaissance missions almost of his own choosing, or on direct orders from General [Mateo] Capinpin. In southern Pampanga, near the Bataan border, he spent three days behind enemy lines, surveying troops and material which the Japanese were bringing up. In all that time he had no food. Spying a casuy tree, he climbed into (sic) it to gather some fruit, only to be met by a Japanese sniper with the same intent. Only one of them ate breakfast.13

Another passage highlights Major Marcos’s role in Kiangan (in Ifugao province today) as part of the defense of Bessang Pass, where Marcos single-handedly routed 50 enemy soldiers, for which he was awarded another medal.

> On April 5 [1945] Ferdinand won his second Silver Star. He was at a command post ... in Kiangan ... still defending Bessang Pass.... What he discovered was a well-camouflaged infiltration by fifty Japanese....

Sending his man back to alarm headquarters, Marcos stood alone between the attack force and its goal, a Thompson sub-machine gun under his arm. But now the element of surprise was with him.... the enemy ... did not see Ferdinand at all. At a point-blank fifty yards, he began to shoot, killing the commanding officer with the first burst. Disorganized, the detachment regrouped and attacked, but Marcos repulsed it. For half an hour the skirmish continued, with grenades and automatic-rifle fire.... Still unsupported, Major Marcos counterattacked. He had pursued the Japanese nearly two kilometers down the trail before reinforcements reached him.14

Thus, his official biography concludes,
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Before he was twenty-five he had won more medals for bravery than anyone else in the Philippine history, had suffered the heroic Battle of Bataan and its aftermath, the infamous Death March, and the medieval tortures of the Japanese secret police.15

MEDALS OF COURAGE

A wartime history of the Ang Mga Maharlika, Mr. Marcos’s guerrilla unit, which is believed to have been written in 1945 or thereabout by Mr. Marcos himself,16 claims that Maj. Marcos, then a Combat Intelligence officer of the 21st Division of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFE), received the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC)

for having attacked with three men, an infiltrating column of not less than a battalion of Japanese which had attacked the Divisions in Reserve (the 21st, 31st and elements of the 51st Divisions) in the town of Balanga [Bataan], personally blowing up an enemy artillery ammunition dump, destroying four battalion guns and killing in combat no less than six officers and more than twenty enlisted men; the Silver Star for outstanding gallantry in action for having led a counter-attack on a much more superior enemy force driving away such enemy force from the Outpost Line of Resistance of the 21st Division; the Order of the Purple Heart for having been wounded by enemy mortar fire while leading a patrol to save the life of the 21st Division Commanding General, Brigadier General Mateo Capinpin.17

Thus as early as 1945 or so, Maj. Marcos claimed to have received three major U.S. medals: the DSC, the Silver Star, and the Order of the Purple Heart. This story continues in the Marcos-sanctioned biographies. One says that by war’s end, Mr. Marcos had received 27 medals.18 Two biographies claim that the DSC, in particular, was pinned on him by Gen. MacArthur, while in a foxhole according to one,19 and according to another:

General Douglas MacArthur, pinning on Ferdinand Marcos the Distinguished Service Cross for valor in battle far beyond the call of duty, commented publicly that without Ferdinand’s exploits, Bataan would have fallen three months sooner than it did. Military historians concede that the heroic stand at Bataan upset the Japanese timetable of conquest, gave the allies time to defend the South Pacific, and thus saved Australia and New Zealand. In a very real sense, therefore, the refusal of Ferdinand Marcos to admit he was beaten made a contribution to the war that was of enormous consequence to the world.20

MEDALS QUESTIONED

Filipino war historian and University of the Philippines Prof. Ricardo T. Jose argues, however, that it was simply not possible for one man to have caused the delay of the fall of Bataan by three months. If true, then Mr. Marcos would have received not the second highest medal, the DSC (as Mr. Marcos claimed), but the top recognition, the Medal of Honor. Consider, for instance, that mess cook Sgt. Jose Calugas (Battery B, 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts), who was able to set back the Japanese advance by two days,21 received the U.S. Medal of Honor. Sgt. Calugas’s citation reads:

Sgt. Calugas’s action for which the award was made took place near Culis, Bataan Province, Philippine Islands, on 16 January 1942. A battery gun position was bombed and shelled by the enemy until 1 gun was put out of commission and all the cannoneers were killed or wounded. Sgt. Calugas, a mess sergeant of another battery, voluntarily and without orders ran 1,000 yards across the shell-swept area to the gun position. There he organized a volunteer squad which placed the gun back in commission

15 Ibid., p. 4.
16 “’Ang Mga Maharlika’ — Its History in Brief,” in Ang Mga Maharlika Grla Unit (Independent), File No. 60, Box No. 298, Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files (AMM-GURF) <http://collections.pvaomil.ph/Guerilla/GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-0000281> Accessed 9 June 2016. Although for the most part, the narrative refers to Maj. Marcos in the third person, on p. 27 (first paragraph) the narrative shifts to the first person ‘I’.
17 Ibid., p. 3.
18 Marcos of the Philippines, 1975, p. 50.
and fired effectively against the enemy, although the position remained under constant and heavy Japanese artillery fire.\textsuperscript{22}

As for the biographical claim that Gen. MacArthur himself pinned the DSC on Mr. Marcos, which, according to the wartime narrative, Maj. Marcos received about 1945, it is simply not possible. Then commander of the U.S. Army forces in Asia when the war broke out, MacArthur and his men had retreated to the Bataan peninsula. In March 1942, on orders of President Franklin Roosevelt, MacArthur escaped to Australia. He returned to the Philippines (Leyte) only in October 1944. He officially accepted Japan’s surrender on 2 September 1945 aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Thereafter and until 1951, he was occupied with the military demobilization of Japan, its economic development and the framing of its new constitution.\textsuperscript{23}

Dr. Jose pored over the archives of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, which made no reference at all to Gen. MacArthur pinning the DSC on Mr. Marcos. Neither is there any mention in John Toland’s *The Rising Sun* (1970), nor in any of the published works on Bataan, adds Dr. Jose. In contrast, nearly everyone in Bataan knew about Sgt. Calugas, who received his award in 1945.\textsuperscript{24}

Furthermore, writing in 1982, retired Army officer Bonifacio Gillego examined primary wartime sources in the General Archives Division in Washington D.C. and found “[n]o mention, no hint whatsoever … of the exploits of Marcos that delayed the fall of Bataan considerably.”\textsuperscript{25} The official records Maj. Gillego examined are enumerated below:

- Report of Operations of USAFFE [United States Armed Forces in the Far East] and USAFIP [United States Army Forces in the Philippines] in the Philippine Islands, 1941-42, dated 10 August 1946; and
- Maj. Gen. George N. Parker, Jr., Report of Operations of North Luzon Force and II Philippine Corps in the Defense of North Luzon and Bataan from 8 December 1941 to 9 April 1942.\textsuperscript{26}

Gillego added:

The scale of Marcos’ war exploits would hardly escape notice if they were indeed true. The first man that should have trumpeted such heroism to the world was the man who claimed he was “the last man to come out of Bataan” — Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo. Yet in his book *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines* [1943], he was altogether oblivious of even the presence of Marcos in Bataan. Neither in General Douglas MacArthur’s *Reminiscences* [1964] nor in William Manchester’s *The American Caesar* [1978] is there a mention of Marcos.\textsuperscript{27}

**REBUTTAL**

It must be mentioned that two American war veterans, Capt. Donald V. Jamison (ret.) and Lt. Larry O. Guzman (ret.) rebutted Gillego’s assertions in sworn affidavits they executed in 1982.\textsuperscript{28} Both debunked the sworn statement of Col. Romulo A. Manriquez (ret.), which Gillego also used in his investigation into Mr. Marcos’s war record. Guzman stated that he felt

proud and privileged to have fought side-by-side with such a gallant Filipino officer as Major Marcos and I feel doubly proud that today, this same man who joined Capt. Jamison and myself and the other gallant Filipinos in risking our lives for the Allied cause, is the leader of his country and nation.\textsuperscript{29}
For his part, wrote Jamison,

it saddens me to read in leftist-dominated opposition groups, as well as some of our own people in the U.S., comments and reports purportedly made by Col. Manriquez that Mr. Marcos is a “fake hero and an impostor” and that he supposedly said that the Marcos medals were “typewriter decorations” based on affidavits, which lies and distortions of history some liberal newspapers are wont to publish.30

Both affidavits were evidently executed as a direct response to Gillego’s article, which was published as a six-part series in the triweekly newspaper in Manila, the We Forum.31 Months later the dictatorship affirmed Jamison’s perception of ‘leftist-dominated’ comments; the We Forum office was raided and the newspaper, shut down on 7 December 1982 and its staff, arrested on subversion charges.32 The subsequent publication of Gillego’s article in American media prompted John Sharkey, Assistant Foreign Editor of the Washington Post, to undertake his own investigation. In 1983 Sharkey wrote:

... an 18-month effort to verify Marcos’ claims to high American decorations raises serious doubts about whether he actually was awarded them. This effort included a search of U.S. military archives, a detailed examination of official military histories, personal memoirs and portions of Marcos’ personal file at the U.S. military records centre in St. Louis, and conversations with Philippine and American survivors of the war.

Nor could any independent, outside corroboration be found to buttress a claim made in Philippine government brochures that he was recommended for the U.S. Medal of Honor because of his bravery on Bataan, as a document in his US military file suggests.33

30 Ibid.
31 We Forum, 3-4, 5-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-14, and 19-21 November 1982.
THE FACTS

The fact is that U.S. officials knew that Mr. Marcos had never received the DSC and the Silver Star. Among the U.S. State Department documents, reports historian and Ateneo de Manila University Prof. Ambeth Ocampo, is a confidential telegram (dated 6 September 1966) from U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair, Jr. in Manila about President Marcos’s upcoming state visit to Washington. In the telegram Ambassador Blair recommended that Mr. Marcos be awarded two medals for his “wartime heroism under US flag” because the latter “had never received the Distinguished Service Cross.” The response from the State Department two days later affirmed that Mr. Marcos had indeed never received the medals:

We have determined that Army ready and willing go ahead with presentation Distinguished Service Cross and Silver medals on basis that Marcos' US Army records do not, repeat, not show he ever received them...

Ocampo surmises that the U.S. kept the myth of the Marcos medals afloat because it needed Philippine support for America’s war in Vietnam.

Finally, the official websites of the U.S. Medal of Honor, Silver Star, and Order of the Purple Heart do not list Maj. Marcos as a recipient of these awards.

As for Mr. Marcos’s military rank, while in earlier communications Mr. Marcos referred to himself as ‘Major’, by the end of 1947 he signed with the rank of Lt. Col. Higher officials, however, did not recognize his rank promotion. As Capt. E.R. Curtis noted on 24 March 1948:

During the liberation period Marcos was serving with the 14th Infantry USAFIP, NL, i.e., December 1944 to May 1945 and is recognized as a major in the roster of the 14th Infantry USAFIP, NL as of 12 December 1944 to his date of discharge.

III. ANG MGA MAHARLIKA

Another part of Mr. Marcos’s claim to heroic fame rests on his leadership of the Ang Mga Maharlika, a guerrilla unit that operated in Pangasinan and other parts of northern Luzon. U.S. military records present a vastly different picture from the sanctioned biographical accounts of Mr. Marcos. For one, American military officials entertained serious doubts about the status of the Ang Mga Maharlika as a guerrilla organization. Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer’s “Report on the Allas Intelligence Unit” (21 July 1947), for example, described the Ang Mga Maharlika as “a purported guerrilla unit” and questioned the practice of “collusion by many guerrilla leaders in listing as members of their units men who were already members of other purported guerrilla organizations,” which he found to be the case among supposed members of the Ang Mga Maharlika and the Allas Intelligence Unit (the latter, led by Cipriano Allas, claimed to be the intelligence unit of the former). U.S. officials believed that this practice was done to gain eligibility for back pay and war benefits.

NO RECOGNITION OF UNIT

In fact, military records repeatedly stated that the U.S. government never recognized the Ang Mga Maharlika led by Maj. Marcos because of grave doubts about its authenticity. For example, Maj. Marcos’s request on 1 May 1945 for release from the 14th Infantry (to which he had been assigned on 20 January 1945) so that he could return to his unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika, was precisely...
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1. ... disapproved [on 6 May 1945] by reason of the fact that his organization "Ang Mga Maharlika" is not among the guerrilla units recognized by Higher headquarters.

2. It is therefore believed that his trip to Manila at this time to report to an unrecognized guerrilla organization would be futile, and that if he continues to render service to USAFIP, NL [Northern Luzon], in whatever capacity he may be assigned it will be for the best interest of the service. [underscoring supplied]

By Order of Colonel [Russell William] VOLCKMANN

The non-recognition of the Ang Mga Maharlika was reiterated a few weeks later by Maj. R.G. Langham, signing on behalf of the Regimental Commander of the 5th Cavalry. In his memorandum dated 31 May 1945, Langham wrote that the Ang Mga Maharlika, with a strength of six officers and 18 enlisted men, was deployed “to guard the Regimental Supply Dump and perform warehousing details.” Langham added: “They are not recommended for recognition because of the limited military value of their duties” (underscoring supplied). The Commanding General accepted Langham’s recommendation.

APPEAL FOR RECOGNITION

Thus began Maj. Marcos’s appeal for the recognition of his guerrilla unit. On 18 August 1945 he sent the Adjutant General of the Philippine Army the complete membership roster of the Ang Mga Maharlika. Among others, Maj. Marcos asserted:

5. A grave injustice has been committed against many officers and men of the Maharlika because while the men listed down in the roster of the East Pangasinan Unit have been granted their guerrilla ranks, those members of the Maharlika who had served this organization since its start of operations in 1942 and who were not included in the approved roster of the East Pangasinan Unit have not been credited with recognition of their proper ranks.

A month later, Maj. Harry McKenzie (Infantry, Army of the U.S., Commanding) refuted Maj. Marcos’s claims. With regard to Marcos’s statement that “Landings at Lingayen Gulf cut off my return to my organization,” McKenzie remarked:

b. Par 3 b. is contradictory in itself. “Landings at Lingayen Gulf cut off my return to my organization”. However, he [Marcos] attached (sic) himself to USAFIP NL 12 December 1944, only a few days after he arrived in that area. Landings a month later could not have influenced his abandoning his outfit and attaching himself to another guerrilla organization.

McKenzie, too, did not accept Maj. Marcos’s assertion that his unit began at the end of 1942; neither did McKenzie accept Marcos’s authority to set up his unit and commission officers. Instead, McKenzie questioned the liberation activities Maj. Marcos claimed to have undertaken.

c. Suggest inquiry into veracity of par 4 a. [where Marcos claimed Ang Mga Maharlika had been in operation since 1 December 1942] and authority of Ferdinand E. Marcos to organize guerrillas and commission his own officers; also check-up of papers in support of subpars 4 c. & 4 d [where Marcos detailed how his unit was crucial to the recovery of Manila from enemy hands].

d. Further suggest case be referred to Maj Narciso Ramos, now Congressman, for his comment and explanation re par 3 d. basic communication [where Marcos claimed that then Maj. Ramos, acting

44 Lt. Col. Parker Calvert, Memorandum to the Adjutant General, Camp Spencer, General Headquarters USAFIP North Luzon, 6 May 1945, in AMM-GURF.
46 Capt. James H. Alley, “Recognition of Guerrilla Unit,” 7 June 1945, in AMM-GURF.
47 Marcos, “Complete Roster, Submission of” to the Adjutant General, Philippine Army, 18 August 1945, in AMM-GURF.
The Commanding General
Headquarters, PHILRYCOM
APU 707
ATTENTION: CHIEF, CAB G-3

Dear Sir:

In answer to the letter from that Headquarters dated 7 June 1947 signed by Thomas J. Brown CWO, USA, Asst Adjutant General, denying recognition to "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA", I wish to submit this petition for reconsideration outlined on the grounds of the refusal of recognition given in the letter.

A. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence:

Guerrilla service, as we understand it is composed of intelligence activity, sabotage, actual clash of arms and propaganda. "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" was active in all these lines of guerrilla work.

1. Intelligence Activity:

a. "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" is included in the Report of General Willoughby to the Commanding General of the SWPA as to guerrilla groups operating in the Philippines.

4. In the City of Manila, the undersigned, at one time, kept his headquarters at his home with his family --- a strategy which may have been ill-advised but surely not inconvenient.

5. In the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA", the members did not support their families. The families supported the members.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully requested that the order denying recognition to the MANILA and ILOCOS NORTE Units of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" be reconsidered and reversed, and recognition be granted to the MANILA unit as of 1 December 1942 and to the ILOCOS NORTE REGIMENT as of 1 April 1943.

Respectfully,

Ferdinand E. Marcos
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding Officer

Incls: Appendices "A" to "P".
Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer, report on the Allas Intelligence Unit, 21 July 1947, in AIU-GURF

commanding officer of the Ang Mga Maharlika, a purported guerrilla unit. The commanding officer of the Ang Mga Maharlika, Ferdinand Marcos, assigned Allas as an intelligence officer in Pangasinan. Allas claims to have been a member of this unit until the 28th August 1945, (Incl 2, page 1). In other words Allas was now a member of another unit since his Allas Intelligence Unit no longer existed. Allas states that some of the members of his former unit joined him as intelligence operatives. This may be true, but these men were now members of the Ang Mga Maharlika unit, not the Allas Intelligence Unit (Incl 3). Checking the rosters of the Ang Mga Maharlika unit it was found that many members were also on the roster of the Allas Intelligence Unit. The following are examples of duplications in rosters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allas Intelligence Unit</th>
<th>Ang Mga Maharlika</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donato, Ancheta</td>
<td>Donato, Ancheta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>1st Lt, CO Co &quot;C&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guloy, Constantiano</td>
<td>Guloy, Constantiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>1st Lt Co &quot;C&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olavidez, Felipe</td>
<td>Olavidez, Felipe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Lt</td>
<td>2nd Lt Co &quot;C&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodriguez, Victoriano</td>
<td>Rodriguez, Victoriano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Sgt</td>
<td>2nd Lt Co &quot;C&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these facts it is apparent that many members are listed as "guerrillas" by both units. It seems very improbable that these listed members could have actively engaged in guerrilla activities with two organizations at the same time. This information would substantiate the fact that the Allas Intelligence Unit was not an active unit if it at all existed during the occupation. It further substantiates the fact of collusion by many guerrilla leaders in listing as members of their units' men who were already members of other purported guerrilla organizations.

With the arrival of the liberating forces Allas had himself and twenty nine other men attached to the 25th Division and were subsequently recognized. He submitted a roster to the Judge Advocate of the 25th Division, and called his unit the "Allas Intelligence Unit." In other words Allas now revived his long dead unit (May 1943) and had them recognized as such. Certainly a unit which had not existed for two years deserves no revision of dates. In its short existence, from late August 1942, to May 1943, the unit did not exist as a well organized unit. This is borne out by the fact that the unit disintegrated.
MEMO:

TO: Adjutant General

1. Inform Major Marcos that request of this basic communication is disapproved by reason of the fact that his organization "Ang Mga Maharlika" is not among the guerrilla units recognized by higher headquarters.

2. It is therefore believed that his trip to Manila at this time to report to an unrecognized guerrilla organization would be futile, and that if he continues to render service to USAFIP, NL, in whatever capacity he may be assigned it will be for the best interest of the service.

By Order of Colonel VOLCKMANN:

Acting on Maj. McKenzie’s endorsement, Lt. Col. James W. Davis (Guerrilla Coordinator) wrote the Commanding General of the Philippine Army on 20 September 1945:

1. No basis for recognition can be established this command [Ang Mga Maharlika].

2. Present location and attachment of subject unit unknown.

DENIAL OF APPEAL

On 7 June 1947, the PHILRYCOM Headquarters denied Maj. Marcos’s appeal, citing the following reasons:

- “Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence.”

- “The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy.”

- “Activities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy.”

49 Ibid.

50 Lt. Col. J. W. Davis, 2nd Ind to the Commanding General, Philippine Army, 20 September 1945, in AMM-GURF.

51 These reasons were cited in and are taken from Mr. Marcos’s letter to the Commanding General of PHILRYCOM, 2 December 1947.
SECR

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CAVALRY
APO 201

31 May 1945

SECRET

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Unit.

TO: CG, 1st Cav Div, APO 201.

1. In compliance with letter 3 May subject "Procurement, recognition, use, Units", the following information is supplied:

a. Designation of Unit:
ANG MANGA MAHARLIKA GUERRILLA
MANILA RATT. Manila

b. Name of overall cmdr:
Ferdinand Marcos, Major (Regimental C.O.)
Narciso Rances, Major FA Reserve (Acting C.O.)

c. Strength of the Unit:
6 Officers and 18 EM. Total 24.

2. Date of attachment:
11 Feb 1945.

3. Unit has been employed by this organization to guard the Regimental Supply Dump and perform warehousing details.

4. They are not recommended for recognition because of the limited military value of their duties.

For the Regimental Commander:

R. G. LANGHAM
Major, Cavalry

DECLASSIFIED

DOD Directive No. 5200.9 S - 2
27 Sept 1958
Special Roster, Ang Mga Maharlika, 1 August 1945, in AMM-GURF

Marcos’s appeal, denied by PHILRYCOM Headquarters, 7 June 1947, in AMM-GURF
• “A definite organization was not established.”

• “Adequate records were not maintained (names, ranks, dates of enlistment or joining, dates of promotions, and necessary related information).”

• “Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its leaders because of the desertion of its commanding officer to join another unit.”

• “Sphere of operations and unit strength claimed by the unit were not commensurate with the nature of the terrain, limitation of communication facilities, and the degree of anti-resistance activities of the Japanese in the area during the period concerned.”

• “Unit did not show any satisfactory continuity of activity and organization.”

• “Frequent change of geographic location was not justified.”

• “Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in the field to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation and family obligations.”

• “Many members apparently lived at home, supporting their families by means of farming or other civilian pursuits, and assisted the guerrilla unit on a part time basis only.”

PROTEST VIA RADIOGRAM

Maj. Marcos, then representing the Philippine Veterans Mission to the U.S. Congress, protested this decision by radiogram. Capt. Elbert R. Curtis responded with a ‘check sheet’ addressed to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes on the subject, “Radiogram Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika Guerrilla Unit.” Curtis pointed out that:

4. Maj R [Robert] B Lapham is familiar with the activities of the commanding officer of the Maharlika unit and attests to the following:

Ferdinand Marcos was in San Quintin, Pangasinan two or three months prior to the landing of the American forces, soliciting funds and guerrilla help to construct a landing field in the vicinity. The purpose of the landing field was to allow a plane to come in and evacuate General Roxas. Capt Ray C Hunt, commanding officer of PMD [Philippine Military District], LGAF [Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces] placed Marcos under arrest for collecting money under false pretense. Gen Roxas intervened on Marcos’ behalf and had him released to his custody. It is quite obvious that Marcos did not exercise any control over a guerrilla organization prior to liberation.

5. The [Maharlika] unit claims a vast amount of intelligence coverage by submitting reports to Col [Wendell W.] Fertig, Col [Macario] Peralta, Col Andrews, Col [Augustin] Marking and Maj [Ismael] Ingeniero. One letter from Col Fertig is the only supporting evidence to substantiate these claims. There is no mention in the Green book of the Maharlika Unit being a source of intelligence information.

Capt. Curtis concluded that:

1. It is evident that Ferdinand Marcos and S [Simeon] M Valdez combined their forces in order to gain recognition, and by so doing have created a very confused picture of the unit. It is also known that Marcos has


HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINES-RYUKYUS COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Do not remove from attached sheets.

FILE NO.

SUBJECT: Radiogram Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika Guerrilla Unit

(1) FROM: Capt E R Curtis TO: Lt Col W M Hanes

1. The ANG MANGA MAHARLIKAS Guerrilla Unit is composed of the following:
   
   a. Ilocos Norte Regt  1,032
   b. Ang Manga Maharlika Hq  178
   c. Prov Bn 2nd Co  112
   d. 3rd Pangasinan Regt  508
      Total Strength  1,830
   e. Maharlika Unit Eastern Pangasinan Combat Co  111
      Total Recognized  111

2. The Ilocos Norte Regt under the command of S M Valdez was organized or contacted by Maj Ferdinand Marcos until after Nov 1944. There is a letter in the unit file to Capt S M Valdez from Col R W Volckmann, in which Col Volckmann thanks Valdez for his offer to place the Ilocos Norte Regt under his command. The letter also gives Valdez initial orders and instructions to accomplish this merger.

3. The Maharlika Hq, Prov Bn 2nd Co, and the 3rd Pangasinan Regt all possess conflicting histories and supporting evidence. The valid supporting evidence they have produced is as follows:
   
   a. One true copy of an attachment paper from the 544th FA Bn dated 6 Sept 1945 containing the names of 16 men.
   
   b. A photostatic copy of a letter to Maj Ferdinand E Marcos from Col Fertig regarding an intelligence report.
   
   c. A true copy of non-attachment order dated 31 May 1945 from Headquarters, Fifth Cavalry stating in substance, the Ang Manga Maharlika Guerrilla Unit is placed under the control of Fifth Cavalry Regiment.
   
   d. The fact that 111 men were recognized by attachment to the 128th Inf Regt, 32nd Division.
2. Maj R B Lapham is familiar with the activities of the commanding officer of the Maharlika unit and attests to the following:

Ferdinand Marcos was in San Quintin, Pangasinan, two or three months prior to the landing of the American forces, soliciting funds and guerrilla help to construct a landing field in the vicinity. The purpose of the landing field was to allow a plane to come in and evacuate General Roxas. Capt Ray C Hunt, commanding officer of PMD, LCAP placed Marcos under arrest for collecting money under false pretense. Gen Roxas intervened on Marcos' behalf and had him released to his custody. It is quite obvious that Marcos did not exercise any control over a guerrilla organization prior to liberation.

5. The unit claims a vast amount of intelligence coverage by submitting reports to Col Fertig, Col Peralta, Col Andrews, Col Marking and Maj Ingeniero. One letter from Col Fertig is the only supporting evidence to substantiate these claims. There is no mention in the Green book of the Maharlika Unit being a source of intelligence information.

Conclusion:

1. It is evident that Ferdinand Marcos and S M Valdez combined their forces in order to gain recognition, and by doing have created a very confused picture of the unit. It is also known that Marcos has enough political prestige to bring pressure to bear where it is needed for his own personal benefit.

2. All the available evidence on the case indicates that the decision of this headquarters, not favorably considering the unit, should be sustained. The only possible exception might be on the decision rendered the 16 men pending receipt of an attachment paper to the 544th FA Bn.

Recommendation:

That no action be taken on the case until the letter mentioned in the radiogram reaches this Division.

ELBERT R CURTIS
Capt, FA
Lt Col W M Hanes:

1. Basic, ltr fr Cipriano S Alías to CG PHILRCOM, dtd 16 August 1947, subj: "Reconsideration of Alías Intelligence Unit", requesting reconsideration of dates of recognition for the Alías Intelligence Unit.

2. Recommend Tab A be approved for the signature of the Adjutant General and returned to this section for dispatch.

3. The recommendation to not favorably reconsider the unit for revision of dates of recognition is made because of the following reasons:
   a. Unit did not exist during the occupation
   b. Activities of the Alías Intelligence Unit are based on an organization which has not been favorably considered for recognition. (Ang Nga Maharlika)
   c. Recently submitted evidence is not of a nature to substantiate a claim for revision of dates of recognition.

1st Lt Kenneth H Neubauer
enough political prestige to bring pressure to bear where it is needed for his own personal benefit.

2. All the available evidence on the case indicates that the decision of this headquarters, not favorably considering the unit, should be sustained....

The decision not to recognize the Ang Mga Maharlika also appears in the memorandum of Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer to Capt. J. O. Keider, Chief of the Revision Section, on 18 September 1947, regarding the appeal of the Allas Intelligence Unit for a revision of its recognition date (to obtain larger benefits for its members). Lt. Neubauer wrote:

4. ... The Ang Mga Maharlika was not favorably considered for recognition by Headquarters PHILRYCOM.... The activities of the Ang Mga Maharlika were not of such a nature to warrant recognition...

5.b. ... The Ang Mga Maharlika does not exist as a guerrilla organization; therefore intelligence activities of the unit were not of such a nature to warrant recognition...

5.e. ... the Ang Mga Maharlika ... was NFC'd [not favorably considered].

Lt. Neubauer reiterated his position on the Ang Mga Maharlika in a subsequent memorandum to Lt. Col. Wallace M. Hanes (9 October 1947): “Activities of the Allas Intelligence Unit are based on an organization which has not been favorably considered for recognition. (Ang Mga Maharlika).” This memorandum had the concurrence of Capt. Keider as head of the Revision Section and Capt. Elbert R. Curtis, head of the Unit Branch.

APPEAL FOR RECONSIDERATION, DENIED

On 2 December 1947, Maj. Marcos appealed once again to the PHILRYCOM headquarters, refuting each of the reasons cited by Asst. Adjutant Gen. Thomas J. Brown. For example, Marcos enumerated his unit's guerrilla activities (intelligence gathering, sabotage, propaganda, offensive lines, actual battle). He explained that the unit’s records were destroyed in mid-1944 upon his orders because his men were being hunted by the enemy. He reiterated that he did not abandon his unit to join another but left East Pangasinan on 8 December 1944 on a mission by President Manuel Roxas to put up air-reception bases and airfields. He stressed that even as some of his unit members kept up normal civilian lives, they remained devoted to the military effort against the Japanese. Finally, he pointed out that his unit’s funds were limited and that the members were supported by their families.

Maj. Marcos failed to persuade his superiors. Capt. Curtis noted in March 1948 that “Marcos took the liberty of usurping the command” of the Allas Intelligence Unit—recognized by the U.S. as an independent organization—which Cipriano S. Allas had organized in August 1942 and that disbanded two years later. Curtis further described Maj. Marcos’s arrest by Capt. Ray Hunt for illegally collecting money to construct an air field near Baguio for the purpose of rescuing General Roxas. Had General Roxas not appealed to Maj Lapham for the release of Marcos, Capt Hunt would have held him prisoner until the liberation.

Indeed, Capt. Curtis observed, “[t]he liberation activities of the Ang Mga Maharlika are of very little value as is shown on recommendation against the unit by the 5th Cav.” Too:

54 Ibid.
55 Neubauer, Memorandum to Capt. J. O. Keider, 18 September 1947, in AIU-GURF.
56 Neubauer, Memorandum to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, 9 October 1947, in AIU-GURF.
57 Marcos, Letter to PHILRYCOM, 2 December 1947.
58 Curtis, Check Sheet on Ferdinand E. Marcos sent to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, 24 March 1948, in AMM-GURF.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
The Ilocos Norte Regiment under the command of Valdez was not contacted by Marcos until November 1944. Marcos claims that this unit is a part of his organization. The facts are that the Ilocos Norte Regiment became a part of the 15th Infantry USAFIP, NL. 61

Unable to obtain recognition of his unit, Marcos redesignated the Alles (sic) Intelligence Unit to be the Ang Mga Maharlica (The Freemen) Intelligence section and listed his name as the commanding officer. The recognition of this unit specifically did not afford recognition to Marcos.

The recognition of the Maharlica Unit, East Pangasinan, under the command of Donato C. Ancheta, redesignated Ang Mga Maharlica (The Freemen) Co C, by Marcos specifically did not include him for recognition.

Marcos has listed himself in two separate rosters for recognition that was denied both in the field by this headquarters on 7 June 1947...62

Capt. Curtis thus concluded that:

1. The Ang Mga Maharlica Unit under the alleged command of Ferdinand Marcos is fraudulent.

2. The insertion of his name on a roster other than the USAFIP, NL roster was a malicious criminal act.63 (underscoring supplied)

Capt. Curtis then recommended no further consideration of the recognition of the Ang Mga Maharlika. On 31 March 1948, PHILRYCOM Headquarters replied to Maj. Marcos's letter of 2 December 1947, denying his appeal with finality:

after extensive investigation and full consideration of all substantiating evidence submitted by this unit and a careful analysis of all other available information of the military activities of the unit from its inception, scrutinized in relation to the overall resistance movement, it was determined that the unit failed to fulfill the requirements of our constant guerrilla recognition criterion used in the consideration of all claimant guerrilla units.64

FORGERY AND ‘PAPER GUERRILLAS’

Ray C. Hunt, Jr., a retired Army captain who had led the command in Pangasinan, stated in an interview cited in 1986 that “Marcos was never the leader of a large guerrilla organization, no way. Nothing like that could have happened without my knowledge.”65 Although Hunt subsequently retracted this statement in his memoir, Behind Japanese Lines, An American Guerrilla in the Philippines (1986), because “my memory of the precise details is inexact,”66 he clarified that “I know he did not command an armed guerrilla organization in Pangasinan province, but it is possible that he did organize guerrillas elsewhere” (emphasis in the original).67 Note that even this retraction contradicts Marcos’s claims in U.S. military archives and in his own biographies that his unit operated in Pangasinan and other parts of northern Luzon.

Hunt also clarified that:

I do not recall ever ordering his arrest, and I believe the document purporting to show this is a forgery. Of course, it is conceivable that some of my subordinates might have arrested him for a brief time without telling me about it, or that I might have been so informed but forgot about it merely because I attached little importance to it and had other matters on my mind.68

There are actually three documents in the U.S. Archives that speak of Hunt’s arrest order. The first, which Hunt refers to above, is a letter signed by him to
WHY FERDINAND E. MARCOS SHOULD NOT BE BURIED AT THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI

“I. C.,” 69 believed to be Capt. Crispulo Ilumin, 70 dated 9 October 1944. Hunt asserted that he had never heard of Ilumin and that he never signed with just his first name as it appears on the letter. He believes that the letter was “most likely invented after the war to bolster claims for back pay by supposed followers of Allas and Marcos.” 71

The second document is a general arrest order from Hunt, dated the same day as the letter above, issued to all sector commanders:

1. You are hereby ordered to apprehend any and all organizations within your territory who are working under any command other than the LGF [Luzon Guerrilla Force]-USAFFE. This office will then be notified immediately upon apprehension of every organizer.

2. For your information there is only one authorized command in Pangasinan and any organization operating in P.M.A. [Pangasinan Military Area] will do so only after receiving authority from the Commanding Officer, P.M.A. or the Commanding Officer, 2nd Military District, P.A. [Philippine Army], Maj. Robert B. Lapham.

3. Major [Edwin Price] Ramsey has no authority within Pangasinan; Major Lapham having assumed command as per orders from S.W.P. [Southwest Pacific], G.H.Q. [General Headquarters] on the 6th of April, 1944. 72

Hunt accepts the veracity of the foregoing document. 73 Given the official refusal to recognize the Ang Mga Maharlika and its leadership, the order above can be presumed to have covered units like Marcos’s, which were seen as fraudulent.

The third document, mentioned earlier (p. 14), is the ‘check sheet’ prepared by Capt. Curtis on the ‘radiogram protest’ of Maj. Marcos against the non-recognition of the Ang Mga Maharlika. 74 Here Curtis referred to the arrest of Maj. Marcos by Hunt. In his memoir Hunt maintained that “forty-one years later, I have no recollection of this.” 75

As for the size and membership of guerrilla outfits, Hunt explained that:

it was and is always difficult to say with any precision how many people there are in any irregular outfit or resistance movement. If one counts only those who are actively engaged on a full-time basis, the number is almost always small.... With “paper guerrillas” estimates are the merest guesses; and my own surmise (not unimpeachable knowledge) is that most of Marcos’s followers were “paper guerrillas,” particularly in Pangasinan. In 1944-45 a “paper guerrilla” was a person who possessed a piece of paper identifying him as a member of a guerrilla organization, even though he did not have a gun. Some such people really wanted to be guerrillas. Others were former collaborators with the Japanese who wanted to cover their tracks. Others were fence-sitters who now judged that the Allies were going to win the war. Still others were out for personal gain of some kind.... Whatever their intentions, and whatever the risks involved, “paper guerrillas” did little good and much harm. 76

SUMMARY

What clearly emerges from the war records are the following:

1. The Ang Mga Maharlika was never recognized by the U.S. government based on the letter of PHILRYCOM on 7 June 1947 and reiterated (with finality) on 31 March 1948, the latter after rejecting Mr. Marcos’s appeal on 2 December 1947. The unit was, in official eyes, non-existent.

69 Capt. Ray Hunt, Letter to I.C., 9 October 1944, in AIU-GURF.
70 See letter of Cipriano S. Allas, Letter to the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukus Command, 16 August 1947, in AIU-GURF.
71 Hunt, Behind Japanese Lines, p. 239.
72 Hunt, Jr., “Arrest of Organizers, P.M.A.,” 9 October 1944, in AIU-GURF.
73 Hunt, Behind Japanese Lines, p. 239.
74 There is actually a fourth document, the “Check Sheet on Ferdinand E. Marcos” dated 24 March 1948. But since it is also authored by Capt. Curtis and was likely based on his previous check sheet, it is not included in the list above.
75 Ibid., p. 240.
76 Ibid., p. 155.
Check Sheet sent by Capt. E.R. Curtis to Lt. Col. W.M. Hanes, 24 March 1948, in AMM-GURF

DISCUSSION:

1. On 25 July 1947 a check note concerning Ferdinand E. Marcos was written in response to a cablegram received remonstrating over the non-favorable decision rendered regarding the recognition of the supplementary roster of the Ang Mga Maharlika unit. At this time it was determined that Marcos was recognized as a Major inasmuch as his name appeared as the commanding officer of the Ang Mga Maharlika (The Freemens) Intelligence section. This designation of the unit as it appears in the roster is fabrication inasmuch as the letter of recognition for the unit designates it as "Capt Alle Intelligence Unit." Further the memorandum dated 15 August 1945, ordaining the organization as the Civil Guard,mortified to have the name of the organization changed from its own individual independent organization even though it claims affiliation with the Ang Mga Maharlika unit to enhance its preposterous claim for revision of dates.

2. During the liberation period Marcos was serving with the 14th Infantry USAFIP, NL, i.e., December 1944 to May 1945 and is recognized as a major in the roster of the 14th Infantry USAFIP, NL as of 12 December 1944 to his date of discharge.

CONCLUSION:

It is concluded that:

1. The Ang Mga Maharlika Unit under the alleged command of Ferdinand Marcos is fraudulent.

2. The insertion of his name on a roster other than the USAFIP, NL roster was a malicious criminal act.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That no further consideration be given the Ang Mga Maharlika Unit for revision or recognition as per the request of Marcos dated 2 December 1947.

2. That no further consideration be given the Alle Intelligence Unit as per request of Alle dated 7 February 1948.

Capt E.R. Curtis
PA
Dear Major Marcos:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated 2 December 1947, requesting reconsideration of the unfavorable decision rendered by this headquarters on 7 June 1947 on the request for recognition of a claimant guerrilla unit under the name of Ang Nga Maharlika and forwarding additional papers in support of your request.

It is desired to emphasize that after extensive investigation and full consideration of all substantiating evidence submitted by this unit and a careful analysis of all other available information of the military activities of the unit from its inception, scrutinized in relation to the overall resistance movement, it was determined that the unit failed to fulfill the requirements of our constant guerrilla recognition criterion used in the consideration of all claimant guerrilla units. As a result, the unit was not favorably considered for recognition by this headquarters on 7 June 1947. A letter to this effect was dispatched to you, care of TAG, Headquarters Army of the Philippines, Camp Murphy, Quezon City.

In view of your request for reconsideration of this unfavorable decision, a thorough review has been made of all the information upon which the original decision of non-recognition was based. This study definitely substantiated the original decision of non-recognition and failed conclusively to reveal any material which would justify further consideration of this unit. Your request for reconsideration therefore cannot be accepted.

The records of this headquarters indicate that the Maharlika Unit, East Pangasinan, recognized by letter, Headquarters, Sixth Army, dated 26 March 1945, was not favorably considered for revision of its recognition date by this headquarters on 7 August 1947. The additional evidence forwarded with your letter of 2 December 1947 fails to warrant any modification of this unfavorable decision.

Inasmuch as it is considered that your unit under the name of Ang Nga Maharlika and the Maharlika Unit, East Pangasinan, have received all the consideration that is warranted, no further consideration being justified, the unfavorable decision rendered by this headquarters on 7 June 1947 on the request for recognition of Ang Nga Maharlika and the unfavorable decision rendered by this headquarters on 7 August 1947 on the revision of the recognition dates of the Maharlika Unit, East Pangasinan, remain final.
2. Even Hunt’s concession that “I know he [Mr. Marcos] did not command an armed guerrilla organization in Pangasinan province, but it is possible that he did organize guerrillas elsewhere” runs counter to Mr. Marcos’s claim that his unit operated in Pangasinan (among other parts of northern Luzon). Hunt also contradicts himself when he writes on another page of his memoir that “most of Marcos’s followers were ‘paper guerrillas,’ particularly in Pangasinan”77 (emphasis supplied).

3. Mr. Marcos’s leadership of the unit was seriously doubted at official levels and described variously as questionable, non-existent, and even fraudulent. His practice of double listing his name on different units was called a “malicious criminal act.” U.S. military officials, in fact, decried the practice of collusion among guerrilla leaders in allowing multiple memberships across units (presumably to obtain larger back pay and benefits), as was the case between the Ang Mga Maharlika, Alias Intelligence Unit, and other units operating in northern Luzon.

4. Other acts of Mr. Marcos were officially called into question, such as his command over the Alias Intelligence Unit (described as “usurpation”), his commissioning of officers (without authority), his abandonment of USAFIP-NL presumably to build an airfield for Gen. Roxas, and his “illegal collection” of money for the airfield.

5. As early as the war period, U.S. military officials were aware, in Capt. Curtis’s words, “that Marcos … [had] enough political prestige to bring pressure to bear where it is needed for his own personal benefit.”78

IV. CONCLUSION

With regard to Mr. Marcos’s war medals, we have established that Mr. Marcos did not receive, as the wartime history of the Ang Mga Maharlika and Marcos’s authorized biographies claim, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Medal, and the Order of the Purple Heart. In the hierarchy of primary sources, official biographies and memoirs do not rank at the top and are never taken at face value because of their self-serving orientation, as is abundantly palpable in Mr. Marcos’s sanctioned biographies. In a leader’s earnestness to project himself to present and succeeding generations as strong and heroic, personally authorized accounts tend to suffer from a shortage of facts and a bounty of embellishment.

With respect to Mr. Marcos’s guerrilla unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika was never recognized during the war and neither was Mr. Marcos’s leadership of it. Note that other guerrilla units in northern Luzon were recognized, such as:

- 103rd Regiment, East Central Luzon Area, LGAF,79
- Pangasinan Anti-Crime Service, Pangasinan Military Area, LGAF,80
- 100TH Bn/100th Inf. Regiment LGAF,81
- Southern Pangasinan Guerrilla Forces (Gonzalo C. Mendoza Commander).82

Furthermore, grave doubts expressed in the military records about Mr. Marcos’s actions and character as a soldier do not provide sound, unassailable basis for the recognition of a soldier who deserves to be buried at the LNMB.

On these grounds, coupled with Mr. Marcos’s lies about his medals, the NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES opposes the plan to bury Mr. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

78 Capt. Curtis, “Check Sheet” on “Radiogram Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika Guerrilla Unit.”
79 GURF File No. 102-27.
80 GURF File No. 102-18.
81 GURF File No. 102-10.
82 GURF File No. 199.
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