The Long View: Out of sight, out of mind

The Long View
Out of sight, out of mind
By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:49:00 04/30/2009


It’s probable that as far as the governments of Brunei and the Netherlands are concerned, they won’t object to Generals Alexander Yano and Cardozo Luna being made Philippine ambassadors to those countries. And while feathers have been ruffled in the Department of Foreign Affairs – the appointments will affect the chances of careerists reaching retirement age achieving plum ambassadorial posts – the DFA is also used to career diplomats rudely being shoved aside to accommodate political appointees.

It’s significant that Yano is being compared to the late Rafael Ileto, as far as the chief executive’s motives for sending him abroad. Nearly all the press reports on the Yano appointment bring up Ileto, who was Armed Forces deputy chief of staff, being made an ambassador to get him out the way because he registered objections to martial law.

President Marcos himself, in his diary, makes no mention of any such objections in entries such as this one, dated May 8, 1972: ” After the meeting I directed Sec. Ponce Enrile, the Chief of Staff, Gen. Espino, Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Ileto, PC Chief, Gen. Ramos, PA Chief, Gen. Zagala, Air Force Chief, Gen. Rancudo, 1st PC Zone Commander, Gen. Tomas Diaz, IV PC Zone Commander, Gen. Encarnacion, Asst. Chief of Staff, J-2, Col. Paz, to update the contingency plans and the list of target personalities in the event of the use of emergency powers.”

Ileto remained deputy chief of staff up to 1973 and was even promoted to vice chief of staff in 1974. It wasn’t until 1975 that he was sent overseas as ambassador, although he remained a commissioned officer until he retired from the military in 1978. If you recall my two-column series on Marcos, some observers like Lew Gleeck point to 1975 as a turning point in Marcos’ New Society, when the removal of Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor marked the end of the period of reform.

Besides Ileto, another general-turned-ambassador is often mentioned in reports: Manuel Yan, who was sent overseas as an ambassador after he retired and was replaced by Romeo Espino, the chief of staff until 1981. Both Yan and Ileto have been described as belonging to the strict, constitutionalist tradition of our early officer corps, and who were viewed as not pliable enough by Marcos, who preferred to rely on officers from the UP Vanguard, for example.

Whatever reservations or objections Yan and Ileto may have had concerning either martial law or Marcos’ handling of the military didn’t prevent them from accepting diplomatic postings. And this, to my mind, is where the comparisons being made between Ileto and Yano truly gets interesting.

Let’s assume that after 1975, Marcos decided that Ileto was too much of a stickler for propriety to retain at home, and that it would be more politically advantageous to send him abroad to join Yan in representing the country overseas. Let’s assume, further, that the traditional notions of soldierly conduct in which both Yan and Ileto were drilled demanded of them acceptance of their respective ambassadorships, on the principle that if the President of the Philippines gives you an order, your duty is to obey.

Then it’s possible to conclude that on the one hand, what presidents like Marcos feared was that respected officers might become a focus for unfavorable comparisons with the officers he (Marcos) preferred, while the prestige and sense of duty of those inconvenient, old-fashioned soldiers made them useful in obtaining goodwill elsewhere. So, on the whole, it was a perfectly reasonable political solution all around: and one made delicious because it relied on the officers obeying orders to exile them abroad.
The same thing seems to be at work in the cases of Yano and Luna. But what makes both men so inconvenient to the administration at the present time? It’s the respect in which both men are said to be held by most of the officer corps, and the approach both men have taken towards the AFP and its relationship with the commander in chief. On one hand, both men have tried to insulate the military from political interference, while on the other hand trying to dampen down any unrest arising from grievances among enlisted men and the officer corps.

Both, it seem, have been fairly successful at this, and one reason may be that both embarked on a policy of  ”strict constructionism,” concerning the military. That is, they wouldn’t tolerate lost commands and rogue liquidation squads targeting the government’s civilian enemies, they would resist using the military for patently partisan political purposes, but also demand of civilian leaders that they stop pushing the envelope as far as the constitutional framework is concerned (meaning: plots to declare a state of emergency or some sort of martial law).

One version of this policy I heard was basically that “there will be no coups so long as the civilian leadership refrains from efforts to unconstitutionally extend its stay in power.” This implies a consensus within the officer corps that it would be better, institutionally, for the military to avoid rocking the boat, and await, instead, a less controversial administration to enter office in 2010.

Yano’s early retirement and his assignment, along with his reportedly more hot-headed (or politically expressive) deputy, Luna, may therefore be more a case of their being willing to fall on their swords, in order to permit at least one more non-controversial chief of staff to sit before the truly controversial Delfin Bangit takes command in time for the elections. It remains to be seen whether in following orders, they will provide any institutional benefits at all or are merely postponing an inevitable resumption of unrest within the ranks.

Pondering a pandemic

healthmap
(above, screen cap of Heathmap: Global disease alert map)

“Containment is not a feasible operation,” the World Health Organization said, as it raised the pandemic level from 3 to 4 (see WHO warns: No region safe). In Mexico City, the Catholic Church brought out the heavy ammunition:

Later in the day, an image of Christ on the cross — known as the “Lord of Health” — was removed from its spot in the cathedral for the first time since 1850 and carried in a procession around central Mexico City. The “Cristo,” as the image is known, has been credited with past miracles, including intervention in an 1850 cholera outbreak.

For updates and for local color on the goings-on in Mexico City, check out Intersections, the blog of Daniel Hernandez:

On Monday authorities here canceled school across the country and elevated the number of suspected swine flu fatalities to 149. The ‘suspected’ there is important. Keep in mind Mexico is not yet equipped to test for and identify the virus. The number could rise, or just as well, it could fall. Also, more than 1,600 people have been treated for swine flu, but the majority of those have been released and sent home. So even if you do catch swine flu, it’s more likely you’d recover and live than it is that you’d die from it.

Also, in case you were wondering, it is still perfectly OK to eat pork. (I mean if that’s your thing.)
Yes, the swine flu could mutate and become more dangerous. It could spread farther and further. Things could change at any moment. But again, as I argue today, what’s more worrisome is the corrosive and contagious quality of the fear, not the flu. And frankly the economic impact of this outbreak has the potential to be even more painful and long-lasting for all of us.

The progression of the swine flu doesn’t seem to have reached exponential levels, but developments are enough to make things trackable day-by-day. Last night, if you consult H1N1 Swine Flu Google Maps, the result would have been this (purple balloons are confirmed cases; pink are probable cases; yellow, disproven cases):

swineflue google map

Today, as I’m writing this, here’s the map, showing the newly-confirmed cases in Europe:

swineflu google map

The World Health Organization lists three pandemics during the 20th Century: “Spanish influenza” in 1918, “Asian influenza” in 1957, and “Hong Kong influenza” in 1968 (see also History of pandemics). Recent articles (see Flu in Mexico City May Be Next Pandemic: Firsthand Account of 1918 and 1957 for example; more can be found in the PanFlu Storybook) haven taken to putting the present, and past, outbreaks in the context of the Mother of All Outbreaks: the 1918 pandemic.

Influenza 1918: The American Experience has this animated graphic of the spread of the flu in the United States, where the pandemic seems to have begun (it ended up being called the “Spanish flu” because Spain was the first and most open to report about the pandemic):

map

The flu then traveled the world, in waves.

Concerning the Philippines, here’s the relevant passage in America’s forgotten pandemic by Alfred W. Crosby:

The flu morbidity and mortality statistics of the Philippine Islands, which had a population of 9 to 10.5 million, depending on which authority you consult, are undependable. Something like 40 percent of Filipinos contracted the disease, and 70,000-90,000 died. By even the most conservative estimate, the pandemic killed 2 percent of those it made ill. In many villages in the worst days there weren’t enough well people to bury the dead. The pandemic seems to have wreaked the worst damage in the remote areas, such as in Cotobato province in Mindanao, where 95 percent fell ill.

Back in 2006, the Harvard School of Public Health warned Recurrence of a Flu Pandemic Similar to Infamous 1918 Flu Could Kill 62 Million. The article adds an additional insight into the Philippine fatalities in 1918:

For many decades, published epidemiological literature assumed that mortality rates from the 1918-20 pandemic were distributed fairly equally. A simple population count from that period would lead to the conclusion that about 20 percent of all fatalities occurred in the developed world. “But when you look at the data,” said Murray, “that number shrinks to about three or four percent.”

The disparities between the developed and developing worlds during this period are striking. For example, in Denmark 0.2 percent of the population succumbed to the flu. In the United States, that figure is 0.3 percent (based on data from 24 states). In the Philippines, the mortality rate was 2.8 percent, in the Bombay region of India, 6.2 percent, and in central India, 7.8 percent, which was the highest rate of the countries and regions analyzed. According to this data then, from Denmark to central India, death rates from the 1918-1920 flu pandemic varied more than 39-fold.

The researchers then took the relationship observed in 1918 between per capita income and mortality and extrapolated it to 2004 population data. After adjusting for global income and population changes, as well as changes in age structures within different populations, the research team estimated that if a similarly virulent strain of flu virus were to strike today, about 62 million people worldwide would die.

The article above was meant to herald the publication of Estimation of potential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of vital registry data from the 1918 – 20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis, which is freely available, in full, online.

The fascinating book Colonial Pathologies by Warwick Anderson mentions the 1918 flu pandemic. First, though, this extract concerning the at times heavy-handed efforts of the Americans in their campaigns against rinderpest, malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, and cholera. He reproduces some extracts from an outraged letter by Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera (himself a physician, and a member of the Philippine Commission) to Governor-General William Howard Taft:

…the people fear the Board of Heath a great deal more than they fear the epidemic. The sanitary inspectors, white, brown, black, civil and military have committed and still commit all kinds of abuses… [there are complaints] against the barbarities of the health agents… [In Pasig, the provincial treasurer] set fire to a house where a victim of the cholera had died and the flames extended to two neighboring houses…. [while the provincial inspector] went about with a gun on his shoulder in order to intimidate the people in order to make them obey sanitary laws…

Anderson writes that American public health officials were often mistrustful of Filipinos and skeptical of the capacity of Filipinos to undertake public health, with every possible shortcoming being used as proof of the incapacity of Filipinos to govern themselves:

[Public health director] Hesier and most of his compatriots continued to find in the failures to enforce smallpox vaccination, the recurrence of cholera, and a rising death rate in the archipelago evidence of the unreadiness for office of the Filipinos they had trained. American papers unsympathetic to the Democratic administration declared that “the full harvest of the ‘new era’ is now in the reaping in the Philippines.” “The Filipinization wind,” warned the New York Herald, had caused the incidence of plague to “jump” in the islands. Even the increasingly Filipinized health service conceded that in Manila the mortality rate for each one thousand inhabitants -42.28 in 1903, at the end of the war, but as low as 24.48 in 1913- had risen in 1918 to 46.33, and in 1919 was 27.55. To Heiser this was a clear indictment of Filipino management. But Dr. Vicente de Jesus, the acting director of public health, had another explanation: the influenza pandemic of 1918 had exacted a heavy toll in lives and caused “a weakened organic resistance” to other diseases among the population.

Returning, briefly, to Crosby’s book, he says that the worst-affected populations in the world were those in the aboriginal populations of the small Pacific islands. See 1918 pandemic in Polynesia and Fiji in the blog Grassroots Science; and also, The 1918 flu pandemic in New Zealand History online; and finally, Our nearly forgotten pandemic by Emmy Fitri and Arie Rukmantara, which details Indonesia’s 1918 flu pandemic experience:

Around 1.5 million people died in Dutch East Indies, which was then home to just some 30 million people.

The first case was reported on the east coast of Sumatra. By July 1918, it had spread to Java and Kalimantan before reaching Bali and Sulawesi. It then reached the eastern part of the archipelago in Maluku and Timor.

It seemed to die down for several weeks, but soon reemerged.

The second wave came in October 1918 and was more widespread. Like the pandemic in the US and Europe, the second wave brought the most deaths. These deaths were recorded in the Dutch Kolonial Verslaag (Colonial Journal).

Some of Brown’s reports show the horror of the pandemic situation. In Southeast Sulawesi, a Catholic missionary was quoted as saying that “deaths are everywhere”. According to the report, in one Sulawesi village, 177 of its 900 people died in a period of just three weeks.

In Tana Toraja, 10 percent of the population reportedly died from the flu. Meanwhile, according to the Dutch regional administration, 36,000 people in Lombok, or 5.9 percent of the island’s population, died.

Statistics are scarce and it is hard to gain a sense of what truly happened. Brown’s research shows that most fatalities occurred in people aged between their mid-teens and mid-fifties, the same age bracket that has been most affected by the bird flu in Indonesia.

Now a brief word on the “vessel” in which the spooky combination of human, swine, and bird flus seem to have mixed: the pig. Also in the same year (2006), as the Harvard study, a marvelous article appeared in Harper’s Magazine titled Swine of the times: The making of the modern pig by Nathanael Johnson. It tells the story of modern breeding and farming methods for commercial pork in the United States, and the dangers that have arisen from these practices: briefly, unhappy, unhealthy pigs too susceptible to disease because too genetically uniform and raised by means of bombardments with antibiotics.

This isn’t the first time humans have been concerned over the spread of swine flu (see March 24, 1976: Ford Orders Swine-Flu Shots for All) and for information, visit the Center for Disease Control of the USA.

The Long View: The elimination of public opinion

The Long View
The elimination of public opinion

By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 05:45:00 04/27/2009

What, exactly, is going on in the House of Representatives? Every representative willing to venture an opinion seems to have one different from everyone else’s. When their opinions do end up having certain things in common, they tend to be what’s normally referred to as a belief in “conventional wisdom.” This is nothing more than generalities politicians and their observers adopt, since politics is the kind of activity that hates hard and fast rules, and which thrives best in an atmosphere of generalities and not specifics.

The conventional wisdom is: once the present second Regular Session of the 14th Congress ends in June, when it resumes sessions in July for its third and final Regular Session, the political class would have gone from fussing over the political interests of the administration, to an every-politico-for-himself scramble to be “under the kulambo” of whoever they think will be the next president.

The present dispensation, for whatever reason, can look forward to being in office for the second-longest duration in our history come October, but without achieving the kind of one-party dominance the hitherto-longest-serving presidents achieved during their time. The present Lakas-Kampi alliance is nowhere as large, or as united, as the prewar Nacionalistas or the New Society KBL.

Worse, neither party has a particularly viable presidential candidate, which would condemn Lakas leaders to being under the thumb of yet another outsider, as it’s been since 2001, while Kampi, deprived of the incumbent’s power of patronage, might wither and die. Neither party has particularly strong senatorial candidates, either, which would limit their options under any new dispensation, regardless of whether or not they retain or even expand control of the House and local governments.

To be sure, any future president would need them, but their ambition is to be more than mere piglets dependent for sustenance on the Palace trough; the House has a long-standing grudge against the Senate, and any hope of changing the equation depends on both a cooperative president and eliminating constitutional obstacles to amendments: and the present situation is, perhaps, the best for doing that.

Much as administration supporters in and out of office insist they’re reasonable people, who only want an open debate, and who therefore accuse their opponents of being fanatically opposed to change, the reality is otherwise. The only change the administration wants is a unicameral, parliamentary system, possibly with a kind of fake federalism – in a region where even neighboring parliaments are bicameral, and where no unitary state is contemplating a shift to federalism.

An insight into the actual problem confronting the House today (and the motivations behind their present moves) is provided by a speech made by Raul Manglapus in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, endorsing the “Ban Marcos” resolution.

According to Manglapus, politicians began to consider abolishing the four-year term (with one possible re-election for another term) in 1949, because of the controversial elections of that year. By the 1960s, legislators were also keenly interested in two other Constitution-related proposals: first, that the membership of the House should be increased; and second, for elections to be synchronized to save time and money.

In 1967, fulfilling the provisions of the 1935 Constitution, Congress began sitting in joint session to consider these proposals, but no consensus could be reached on restoring a single six-year presidential term and on synchronized elections; there was agreement, though, to increase the number of representatives.

At which point, according to Manglapus, “someone said, ‘Since we cannot agree and we cannot keep on meeting in joint sessions because the public will demand that we cease this futile exercise, let us call a Convention.’”

But, Manglapus added, “the intention of course was that the Congressmen and the Senators were to control the Convention. And therefore when somebody said, ‘Let us call a Convention, anyway we can all be members of that Convention and we can control it,’ some other members of the House said ‘We cannot because we are inhibited by the present Constitution.’”

Clever colleagues proposed a solution: “All we have to do is amend the present Constitution at the same time that we pass the increase of seats in the House. We will say ‘However, a senator or congressman may be a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.’”

The problem was that any amendment had to be submitted to the people; Manglapus related that public opinion was disgusted with such a self-serving proposal, the result being “84 percent of them said ‘no.’ And the next morning the Senators and Congressmen woke up to find they had created a frankenstein monster. They had called a Constitutional Convention and they were not going to control it. And so they began to make noises that there was no need for the Convention, that it would be expensive ;  and cheaper and more convenient for the Senators and Congressmen to resume their work as a constituent assembly.”

Public opinion forced Congress to pass a Constitutional Convention Act, according to Manglapus, and deprived the political professionals of the fruits of victory twice over. Is it any wonder then, that when President Marcos offered a means – “constitutional authoritarianism” – to veto public opinion, that the political class, on the whole, decided it could live with martial law?

That option seems fairly remote today. The President is reported to be meeting with House members practically every other day: will it, can it, finally gamble on throwing caution to the wind and brazening it out? The only way it can is if Lito Lapid runs to the Supreme Court, or Oliver Lozano does, to provoke a manufactured constitutional crisis – with the payoff not necessary in the lifetime of the present Congress, but say, in the 15th, under the leadership of by-then Representative Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Pampanga.

The Long View: Majorities and minorities

The Long View

Majorities and minorities

By Manuel L. Quezon III

Philippine Daily Inquirer

First Posted 03:56:00 04/23/2009

There’s a temporary truce in the Senate while the senators try to figure out how to handle the case of former Senate President Manuel Villar Jr. The former Senate president considers the Senate Committee on Ethics a “kangaroo court” composed of his rivals for the country’ presidency.

His critics reply that – as Sen. Jamby Madrigal put it, relating how former Senate President Aquilino Pimentel Jr. (not knowing that the complaint referred to his fellow former Senate president) reacted when he was shown the general facts concerning the complaint against Villar: “Whoever did this should be removed. Wow! This is big.” – that the case, in and of itself, is serious enough to warrant serious consideration. But Pimentel himself has publicly questioned the manner in which the ethics committee is going about its business.

I listened to Senator Villar defend himself, and it’s important, I think, to point out that he did not refuse to face an investigation; instead, he is questioning whether the ethics committee is the right venue for such an investigation. My impression was that he would not oppose the Senate constituting itself into a Committee of the Whole to tackle his case. Then the proceedings of the ethics committee would be subject to the Senate as a whole and its findings, whether rigged or not, would be recommendatory.

The danger is that the majority might use its numbers to ignore every argument of Villar’s on the pretext that he’s just stonewalling because he knows that even an initial – and negative – ethics committee report will hurt him, politically. This is a very great risk: both for Villar, if he doesn’t get his way; and even for the majority (including his rivals for the presidency) if they get their way, for it would also turn Villar into a victim of their ambitions.

At stake is something larger than the individual political career of Villar. In refusing to submit to the ethics committee, is Villar actually questioning the Senate’s committee system, and with it, the Senate as a representative body composed of minority and majority members with corresponding rights and privileges? On one hand, every majority is granted the privilege of selecting the leadership of the body and its committees; but on the other hand, the minority has rights which also apply to each and every senator.

This is why Villar and his supporters have been able to challenge the investigation, including the complaint itself and the proceedings. But that is also why Sen. Panfilo “Ping” Lacson can insist that his committee has proper jurisdiction over the case. And perhaps, it isn’t entirely accurate to accuse Lacson and the others – their obvious lack of affection for Villar aside – of being a hanging jury. The real jury is the Senate as a whole, and the worst Lacson can be compared to is a fiscal who shoots from the hip, legally speaking.

Demeter’s three justifications for parliamentary procedure are that they are a necessity: first for “orderly procedure” to prevent “utter confusion, chaos and disorder”; second, for “the protection and liberty of the minority”; and finally, for “the expression of the will of the majority,” because it is “axiomatic that an assembly functions best when the majority rules.” Demeter adds that “democratic self-government implies that the minority, however convinced of its own wisdom, consents to be ruled by the majority, until in orderly process it can make itself the majority.”

Our current constitutional rules were put in place as a reaction to past majorities that were viewed as unduly unresponsive to either public opinion or basic concepts of fair play. However, things that were surely beyond even the wildest imagination of the framers of our present Charter have happened since then. And Villar has to ask himself how much he contributed to a system that now has him politically pinned against the wall.

In November 2000, when then-Speaker Manuel Villar Jr. transmitted the articles of impeachment to the Senate, he did so by means of a trick. Immediately after giving the opening prayer, he segued into the transmittal, taking the defenders of then President Joseph Estrada by surprise. The gallery cheered him on. But by doing so, he ignored a basic doctrine of representative bodies: to accord all sides the opportunity to debate the actions of the chamber. Having trampled on this right of his own majority – and the minority – all that the House could do was to oust Villar from the speakership.

The Senate itself, in organizing itself to try the impeachment charges, ignored an American precedent that placed the conduct of a president’s trial under the direct supervision of the Chief Justice. The senators, normally accorded the role of jurors, for example, hand in any questions they have, in writing, to the Chief Justice for him to ask on their behalf. Instead of adopting this more sensible American system when the Senate constituted itself as an impeachment court to try Estrada, the senators insisted on being “senator-judges.”

And then-Senate President Aquilino Pimentel was elevated to presiding judge in tandem with then-Chief Justice Hilario Davide, while senators took turns directly asking questions of the prosecution, the defense and witnesses. It made for dramatic television, but unduly tedious and confused proceedings.

And there have been other innovations that have blurred what should be the firm lines between majority and minority rights.

Impeachment itself, meant to arm House minorities with the power to hold even our chief executives accountable, has mutated out of all recognition by the “impeach me” tricks of the current dispensation, and the enduring reality that a large majority can easily gobble up enough oppositionists to make even the minority impeachment provision impossible to achieve.

The House throws down the gauntlet

Clipping from PDI 4/22/09

The past few days have certainly been full of surprises. Early yesterday afternoon, word started to circulate that the Supreme Court had issued a ruling immediately permitting 32 new party-list representatives to take their seats in the House. To my mind, the clearest summary of the Supreme Court’s decision can be found in The Business Mirror:

The decision, in effect, paved the way for the representation of 19 more party-list groups by 32 additional House representatives from the present 17 party-list groups with 23 representatives…

On the other hand, the SC affirmed its previous ruling in Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec disallowing major political parties from participating in party-list elections.

Under RA 7941 and the deliberations of the constitutional commission, major political parties may coalesce with certain sectors to be able to join in party-list elections.

“However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia,” the Court said.

In its ruling, the SC maintained that the party-list election has four unbreakable parameters as clearly stated in the Veterans decision.

These include the 20-percent allocation in the membership of the House of Representatives; the 2-percent threshold; three-seat limit, and proportional representation.

However, the Court said the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term “proportional representation,” which compelled it to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941, the Court said following procedure shall be observed:

- The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

- The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

- Those garnering sufficient number of votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

- Each party, organization or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats.

The Court noted that in computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every 2-percenter.

Here is the Majority Decision in  G.R. No. 179271 , and here is Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s G.R. No. 179271 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Among the newly-authorized party-list representatives is Mong Palatino, who just very well might be the first Filipino blogger to make it the House, and a national position.

In fact, he may have overtaken Jeff Ooi, the Malaysian blogger turned Member of Parliament, who sits in the assembly for the State of Penang (incidentally, you may want to read Ooi’s tale of woe concerning his economic difficulties as an MP, with a Philippine Peso equivalent of 79,762 monthly salary and 93,000 in allowances! and how the Malaysian tax authorities scrutinize officials and also, grant tax writeoffs for the purchase of books and computers by any citizen!), as the highest-ranking blogger-turned legislator. Palatino’s fellow National Democrats may also be celebrating his representing the fourth generation of their movement to assume national prominence and position.

What was interesting about the Supreme Court’s decision (besides junking the Panganiban formula), was that it was widely interpreted as representing a complication for the administration’s ongoing amendments efforts.

An interesting analysis of the alliances (pro and con) in the House, as well as an exploration of whether amendments can still be accomplished before the 2010 elections, is provided in Chacha is Dead? by Joel Rocamora:

Retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban says he has information that they only have 178 votes for the Villafuerte resolution. He doubts that they can get the remaining 18 signatures. Of the 238 incumbent congressmen, 89 belong to the Lakas, 52 to Kampi, 30 to the Nationalist People’s Coalition, 20 to the Liberal Party, 10 to the Nacionalista Party and the rest are distributed among the LDP, PMP, PDSP, PDP-Laban and Uno, and party list members.

Even if we assume that all 52 Kampi members will vote for the Villafuerte resolution, the official position of the leadership of Lakas, NPC, the LP, and the NP is against a “House only ConAss”. The NPC, LP and NP are deep into preparations for the 2010 elections for which they’ve already spent several hundred million pesos. We cannot assume that the members of these parties can all be bought by Malacanang. Any combination of congress persons from these parties plus some of the more progressive party list representatives totaling 42 will frustrate Villafuerte.

The April 21 decision of the Supreme Court adding thirty five new party list representatives does not make it any easier. Most of the new party list reps are local trapo and rabid anti-Left people like Jun Alcover of Anad and Jovito Palparan of Bantay Party. Even if GMA people manage to get three fourths of the new party list reps to sign on, however, they still can’t make up for the missing signatories that six months of solicitation have failed to produce. They can’t make up for the obvious hesitation of the largest fraction in the House and the party of the Speaker.

The Speaker, interesting enough, pleaded lack of physical space and budget, and raised a constitutional question, when informed of the Supreme Court’s decision. He certainly didn’t immediately issue a summons for the affected party-list representatives to materialize in his office so that they could be sworn in forthwith.
lebanon_ac

Then, today, news began to circulate in the late afternoon that an interesting resolution has been filed in the House. Here it is:
House Resolution No. 1109

Yesterday, Dean Jorge Bocobo had some choice things to say about the line of reasoning of the Villafuerte Resolution, but for my purposes let me just reproduce his summary of Villafuerte’s line of reasoning and ostensible motive for creating a “justiciable issue”:

Speaking to Pia Hontiveros (Strictly Politics, ANC) Rep. Luis Villafuerte, President of the Kampi Party of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, said he wants to trigger “a justiciable controversy” to get the Supreme Court to rule definitively on the meaning of Article 17 Sec. (1). For this purpose he has drafted a resolution on which he says he only needs 198 signatures to trigger that justiciable controversy. But Rep. Villafuerte informs the audience that his resolution does not contain any specific amendment or revision of the Constitution as such, but only “establishes the mode” by which Congress is to exercise its “constituent power” to propose such changes for ratification at plebiscite.

The leitmotif of the Villafuerte mode of exercising constituent power is the concept of a “Constituent Assembly (Con-Ass).” Notice that in the 1935 provision, Congress “in joint session assembled” proposes amendments with House and Senate Members voting separately and obeying the three fourths majority rule. The Villafuerte Resolution however contemplates an entirely different entity altogether than that found in the 1935 Constitution. He envisions a Constituent Assembly whose Members are all the Members of Congress with no distinction as to whether they are Senators or House Members.

The Resolution above, filed this morning, adds a “pledge” by its signatories, that should the Supreme Court rule favorably, they will not extend their own, or the President’s, terms, or create any sort of mischief, including canceling the 2010 elections. Scout’s honor, your honors.

Anyway, Rep. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel was able to get the resolution stricken from today’s order of business in the House. But the gauntlet has been thrown down by the leadership. The Senate, perhaps, can refrain from legitimizing the ploy by refusing to be drawn in by running to the Supreme Court; however, this does not prevent someone else (paging Atty. Oliver Lozano!) from going to the Supreme Court, creating the “justiciable issue” the resolution proclaims as its reason for being.
Besides that, the filing of the resolution sets aside the question of the new party-list representatives and therefore, leaves intact the original administration coalition computation of the votes required to propose amendments -regardless of whether or not the Senate agrees or disagrees.

Note to readers: in moving servers, some comments seem to have disappeared. My apologies. If you find your comment missing, kindly re-post it.

The Long View: Head hunting

The Long View
Head hunting

By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 03:56:00 04/20/2009


It is Adolf Hitler’s birth anniversary on Monday. Coincidentally (let’s hope) Carmen Pedrosa announced in her column that on Monday, Representatives Ortega, Romualdo, Garcia and Domogan will jointly file the Speaker’s Resolution No. 737 proposing the amendment of the Constitution’s ownership of land provisions. The past week found the House repeatedly failing to muster a quorum to do business, and a hearing in the House Committee on Constitutional Amendments was remarkable for the non-appearance of members.

Last week, Rep. Luis Villafuerte reportedly tried to kick off discussions in plenary on amendments – but was foiled by the absence of a quorum. Speaker Prospero Nograles and Villafuerte have been playing good cop and bad cop with their respective flavors of proposed amendments, though their rivalry for the President’s political affections has also unduly complicated matters, with neither one wholeheartedly supporting the other.

Former Chief Justice Panganiban, in this paper, wrote on Sunday that as of April 14, the competing Villafuerte resolution has 178 signatures, 18 short of the targeted 197 endorsements (it proposes to bypass the Senate by invoking the interpretation that a three-fourths majority of all of Congress’ members, regardless of which chamber they’re from, can directly propose an amendment for plebiscite).

The unnecessarily complicated – because intrigue-ridden – nature of the amendment campaign arises from the Frankenstein-like nature of the ruling coalition, which until last week had two heads: there’s the Speaker, and there’s Luis Villafuerte. Now both heads claim they’ve been replaced by another one: the President, who has apparently decided that two heads aren’t better than one. And so perhaps the logistical difficulties of the administration’s amendment campaign have been ironed out.

Another bill, proposed by an administration congressman, will probably be ignored despite its merits. Last week, Rep. Raul T. Gonzalez Jr. filed a bill (No. 6181 but unavailable on the House website) which proposes a “surgical amendment” of the Constitution. If no candidate obtains 50 percent of the vote for president, a run-off election between the top two contenders would automatically follow three weeks later, ensuring we’d have a chief executive elected by a genuine majority of the electorate.

The problem with the Gonzalez proposal is that he isn’t exactly a heavyweight in the House, and so his bill lacks the impact it might otherwise have, had it been proposed by, say, Victor Ortega or even Pablo Garcia, who know their stuff. Just because Gonzalez belongs to the majority doesn’t mean either the Lakas or Kampi factions of the ruling coalition will support it; it could even present an inconvenience to the administration.

Since voter registration is expected to end in October instead of December, and since the filing of candidacies for national positions has been moved to Bonifacio Day instead of next February, a solid advantage, under the camouflage of electoral automation, is being handed over to the administration.

Who has money aplenty, and based on the Comelec’s schedule, a time advantage? The administration.

In the first place, the much-ballyhooed Youth Vote will prove even more of a dud, since the summer vacation will pass with few, if any, students registering to vote. As it is, Sen. Francis Pangilinan has asked some embarrassing questions concerning the limited quotas, in some places, for voter registration, supposedly due to a shortage of materials. Not every potential voter who lined up the first time, only to be told to come back because equipment needs replenishing, will return. The advantage therefore passes to political groups already organized, with a reliable network of registered voters at their command.

Second of all, moving up the filing of candidacies means that the time available to various groups to form coalitions, whether for the presidency, the Senate or even the House, will be shorter than usual. Existing coalitions will be strengthened, and the biggest coalition of all happens to be the administration’s. Whether it decides to openly endorse a candidate for president, and let him take the flak, while secretly supporting another, or brazening it out, doesn’t matter: what matters is that if pressed for time, their rivals and enemies will have a harder time of putting together a viable candidacy.

The result is a kind of Ramos-like win-win situation for the Frankenstein coalition. It can test the waters with the Nograles resolution, while working in the background to attempt the Villafuerte scheme. Win or lose, everyone will have to enter the fray and at the very least, this will use up everybody’s time – and resources – until the end of the present Second Session of the 14th Congress.

Still, anything is possible. There is always the chance the Gonzalez resolution might benefit from a switcheroo in the House, substituting for the Nograles and Villafuerte schemes, just to keep things interesting. While I’ve personally long supported the idea of run-off elections for the presidency (and others have, too; for example, Ducky Paredes and Tony Abaya have independently endorsed the idea), it seems to me run-off elections are dangerous for the administration. Unless it has both leading contenders in its pocket, a run-off could finally achieve unity of sorts among oppositionists going into the final round.

That would make 2010 a real showdown between the Frankenstein coalition and its many enemies, with the politicians forced to follow the lead of public opinion, which might very well embrace the idea. The risks of railroading amendments, and using administration machinery to win a constitutional plebiscite, seem much more manageable in comparison.

Yet another blunder worse than a crime

That seems to be the way the pendulum of public opinion has swung, concerning Ted Failon and the death of his wife. Two things, after the initial flurry of details (some of them wildly off the mark) concerning the whole thing.

The first is put forward by Rina Jimenez-David in her column, Celebrities have rights, too:

[On]the morning of April 15… Ted Failon, then doing a solo turn, took note of how, in Quezon City, “not one, not two, not three, but four” cases of carjacking had taken place not just “over four days, three days, or two days” but overnight!

…Failon proceeded to skewer the newly-appointed OIC of the Central Police District who was hard put to explain this boomlet in crime. Then, as most everyone knows by now, Failon cut short his program to rush home and there, as he says, found his wife with a bullet wound in the head.

The QCPD would, of course, subsequently take a lead in the handling of the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Failon’s wife.

And there is Patricia Evangelista’s marvelous column (read the whole thing), The Failon incident:

When the men behind the badge dragged Trina Etong’s sister Pamela screaming out of the New Era General Hospital, a short while before Trina breathed her last, they made Failon the victim.

This is what Kaye Etong, Failon’s daughter said while sitting in the ABS-CBN newsroom last Thursday to the police: My mother killed herself. She ended her life and died alone. My aunt and uncle were hauled off to jail. My father is being accused, and is attempting to bring our jailed helpers and relatives together to be with my mother.

The police are hounding us. I am here, on national television, announcing that I believe my mother chose to leave us and die. Now, is there anything else you want to put us through?

Understand that this is what that admission means: that one girl has been pushed to a corner to a point that she is announcing to the public that this woman, the mother who gave birth to her, who was supposed to love her and cherish her and stand by her, has chosen instead to die, knowing the consequences to the two daughters left motherless and guilt-stricken.

The consensus then is that, setting aside what might have actually transpired -or not- in the death of his wife, the police handling of Failon and family has turned public opinion squarely against the police. In general, our culture expects a wide latitude to be given even to one’s foes in times of family celebrations (baptisms, weddings) or tragedy (illness, funerals), and for a predominantly Christian (indeed, Catholic) country, suicide in particular is something treated with kid gloves because of the stigma that remains attached to that act. And whatever official scrutiny takes place concerning the prominent, we expect some consideration for their underlings. Whether tangling with the doctors over a proposed Paraffin test, dragging household help to jail, and then depriving a distraught sister of the cultural imperative of nursing her dying sister -well, how many cultural norms could the police have possible defied in a single week, concerning a single case?

It only reinforces the notion that the police are less interested less in law and order than in publicity and getting even.

After the grisly murder of Iglesia Filipina Independiente bishop (and former Obispo Maximo) Antonio Ramento, I remember his son describing to me, during the wake, how the police bungled the investigation into the murder of his father. One detail in particular stands out: the policemen brought their coffee and snacks to the murder scene and subsequently added the remainder of their merienda to the scene of the crime. Of course to this day, no one has been apprehended in the case of the bishop’s murder, the police considering a robbery gone awry.

The problem -for the police, anyway- is that once cases hit the headlines, police conduct is subjected to intense public scrutiny, regardless of whether that scrutiny is informed or not. There is, perhaps, an instinctive desire for the public to play amateur sleuth, a desire emboldened by all the detective shows people feast on in movies and on television. A few months ago, I picked up a marvelously entertaining book. “Beating the Devil’s Game: A History of Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation” (Katherine Ramsland) which gives a brisk rundown on the development of Forensic Science and criminal investigation procedure since the Middle Ages. The testing of a suspect’s hands for gunshot residue, according to Ramsland, first took place in 1932, and was done by a certain Thomas Gonzales.

I bring this up, because of one particular aspect that looms over anything the police do or don’t do, concerning their investigating the circumstances surrounding the death of Ted Failon’s wife: the politicization of the police, and with it, the prioritization of the political aspects of crimes, to the detriment -even abandonment- of scrupulous police procedures. The police are perceived to be neither professional, nor fair; put another way, the capacity of the police to engage in neutral investigations is hobbled and inevitably compromised, by political considerations that affect, in particular, high-profile cases: either things can be hushed-up if the case involves someone with access to the authorities, or taken in all sorts of unhelpful directions if the case involves people not in good odor with the present dispensation.

This not to say that the State had no right to get involved; or that charges shouldn’t be filed. In Ramsland’s book, she puts the involvement of the authorities in suicide (or alleged suicide) cases in context:

They were… the keepers of the king’s pleas. Those who held the office, soon to be called coroners, collected taxes, but they also summoned inquest juries for people who were seriously wounded or who had died from “misadventure.” Since these officials were there to protect the king’s interests, they could confiscate animals or objects implicated in accidental deaths and take over goods found in accidents or wrecks, although they could not themselves render verdicts.

…One’s manner of death had implications for taxes, because in certain types of deaths the king confiscated the property.

A suicide is no longer an outlaw, except in the religious sense (for Catholics, hence the lingering social stigma in our society involving suicides; though the Church more often than not, tempers this by giving wide latitude to the assumption that a suicide might involve temporary insanity, mitigating the circumstances in the eyes of Church authority). However the State requires all deaths to be certified and registered; and death by suicide is the kind of thing that requires ruling out other possibilities, such as foul play. All these certifications and necessary inquiries, too, necessarily involves taking notice of the financial implications (and motivations) of alleged suicides.

But this brings up the possibility that what violates the law may not be worth the persecution involved. Consider the established fact that the site of the suicide was cleaned up; and that, since it is reasonable for the State to inquire into the circumstances, cleaning up the scene obviously makes a determination one way or another more difficult. Therefore, an obstruction of justice. But there is also the possibility that if the cleaning up can be considered a sign of foul play, it might also have been a very human response to the grisly nature of the event: what normal person wants a reminder of the event to remain? If the former is determined, then if done alone or in cooperation with others, the cleaning up was certainly a crime; if the latter, it does not seem either reasonable or beneficial to the public to insist on a persecution leading to conviction.

The police could have come out smelling like roses out of this one, precisely because the QCPD had been criticized by Failon. Instead, they did practically everything possible to alienate public opinion and render a dispassionate, professional finding after a scrupulous investigation.

In this, the only counterpart of the police in terms of unprofessional behavior was large segments of the media. The airwaves were cluttered, from the start, with misleading or patently false information in some cases. There were pious requests for privacy to be respected, followed by a showbiz-style extravaganza that passed itself off as news coverage: network muscle was wielded to monopolize the news in favor of ABS-CBN’s coverage, which may or may not have been motivated by the manner in which the rival network tried to peddle its own scoops, including the broadcasting of the alleged suicide note.

Baratillo@Cubao pointed out in a recent conversation that what seems to have been overlooked, in the mania for amateur sleuthing that accompanied the event, was the element of justice. For Failon’s wife and the real circumstances, whatever they might be, surrounding her death; and for her family. The public’s interest is, of course, to ensure that if foul play resulted in her death, that it be punished -and conversely, for the family and friends of the victim to be cleared of any potential, unwarranted, stigma attached to that death.

The police blunders means whatever they determine will be clouded by public skepticism; and for Failon and his network, that ratings and protecting one of their own trumped all other considerations.

aside from masticating quotes CSI: “a… family burdened with tragedy that put you under a microscope. That close, nobody can look good.” Indeed. Some reactions giving a sampling of public opinion can be found in Smoke, in Purpose Driven Paul, and Now What, Cat? in pakshet 101 and Touched by an Angel.

The Long View: The Thais and us (2)

The Long View
The Thais and us (2)

By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 04:21:00 04/16/2009


A question often raised is whether the goings-on in Thailand are a kind of neighborhood mirror of our own contemporary political experience.

Thailand may have a parliamentary system and the Philippines a presidential one, but it seems both nations have a political class that is in a state of siege. Because of that siege, politically, both nations seem to be adrift, as the institutions of the state prove incapable of honoring the mandates given to governments opposed by the political class, big business, and the middle and professional classes. What determines whether governments endure or fall is not institutional legitimacy in terms of electoral mandates and constitutional procedures, but whether the kind of legitimacy the ancient Chinese understood as the “Mandate of Heaven” is accorded or taken away by paternal, non-elected figures.

This used to work, in a crude sense, because these figures were powerful even among the educated and wealthy, in a sense transcending for most classes of people differences that precisely fostered the sort of political divisions that kept wrecking the functioning of the rule of law. But those capable of bestowing or taking away the Mandate of Heaven have succumbed to their own mortality. Thailand’s King is ailing and apparently incapable of intervening. There was also the very real risk that had he intervened at the height of the recent Thai protests, the unthinkable might have happened: outright defiance from the Red Shirts.

Here at home, with no politician capable of mustering the prestige required to be an elder statesman, it fell on prelates to decree whether presidents lost the Mandate of Heaven or not. Specifically, that authority was wielded by Jaime Cardinal Sin through sheer force of personality and the logistical muscle of his archdiocese. But Sin is dead, his archdiocese stripped of territory, and no one can shepherd the Catholic hierarchy anymore. The result has been to blunt the armed forces as a remover of administrations, and they have, institutionally at least, swung back to being the defender of incumbencies. Though of course there are other dynamics at work, broadly speaking, as with the Thai military, the natural inclination of the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been to uphold the status quo.

The result in Bangkok has been as predictable as every effort since 2001 to muster People Power: it all ends with a massive military crackdown whenever the urban or rural poor take the streets. Each time that happens, People Power becomes even more clearly a limited instrument, as it becomes seen as an essentially middle-class phenomenon with elite characteristics.

Nothing could be further from the way in which peaceful non-violent resistance was originally intended, and believed, by its adherents than the manner in which it has ended up more as an instrument for extra-constitutional efforts that proclaim a democratic inspiration on one hand but which have resulted in the increased alienation of the poor from the formal manifestations of democracy on the other.

In a sense, the Philippine political system has more successfully integrated the allies of ousted President Joseph Estrada than the Thai system has with the followers of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Bloomberg summarized the Thai situation as follows: “Since the 2007 election, protesters have been on the streets for 213 days, courts have removed two pro-Thaksin prime ministers, the airports were seized, rival gangs have taken over streets and four emergency decrees were issued. In many ways, it’s an extension of decades of turmoil.”

Philippine courts only had to do so once to justify Estrada’s ouster. Estrada’s allies, after discovering the uncontrollable nature of the followers they unleashed on the Palace gates in May 2001, have refrained from summoning that genie again, or, having disappeared while their followers were beaten up, have lost their capacity to egg on the crowd. Perhaps the late Fernando Poe Jr. could have galvanized his followers into mounting an urban insurrection in May 2004, but both he and, later on, his widow deliberately refrained from doing so.

But the divide is there, between those who once viewed People Power as a means for democratization and those who have come to view it as achieving precisely the opposite. Order has been restored in Bangkok through force of arms, but the loyalists of Thaksin melted away vowing that those who run away live to fight another day – and the seriously disquieting specter of an underground resistance to the government has begun to rise.

Interestingly, I’ve heard quite a few people remark that the upheavals in Thailand seriously torpedoed the arguments of the proponents of parliamentary government for us. The ongoing political crisis in Malaysia, also a parliamentary system under a constitutional monarchy, also suggests that in and of itself parliamentary government is susceptible, if not conducive to, political instability. On the other hand, there isn’t much to be said in defense of the presidential system as it currently exists here at home, with presidents condemned to minority status and thus deprived of mandates that confer legitimacy.

This also suggests that the presidential system in and of itself is not superior to a parliamentary system: it is the constitutional fine print, in either case, that determines if a political system will be stable. Consider Indonesia, which has a more complicated legislative and presidential system than ours, but where, in general, people are congratulating themselves for entrenching democracy, and achieving relative political stability. And yet their recent legislative election and upcoming presidential poll haven’t been adequately studied, or even observed, by Filipinos desiring political reform here at home.

The death of Roxas

This marvelous video comes from a 1946 United Newsreel:Roxas visits Truman:

Today marks the 61st death anniversary of Manuel Roxas, who died in Clark Field, Pampanga, in 1948. I’ve been working on a political biography of the man for eight years now (more off than on), and it’s proving to be a difficult but rewarding task, not least because having died so soon, he didn’t live long enough to see many of his initiatives bear fruit. While it is said that history is written by the victors, the opposite is the case in the Philippines, or at least, that is the case when it comes to Roxas; after he passed from the scene, his critics wrote the enduring epitaph to his administration. In my draft second chapter, I proposed that instead of viewing the peaceful campaign for independence (circumscribed as it was, by the reality and consequences of military defeat for the First Republic) was actually the logical progression of the independence movement, a blueprint laid out by Apolinario Mabini at the end of his life.

1101460708_400.jpg

(Roxas was the second Philippine president to be on the cover of Time Magazine; the portrait clearly shows his hazel-colored eyes)

For most of his political career, he was portrayed as a kind of wunderkind of politics, even when he ran for the presidency and broke up the prewar monolith that was the Nacionalista Party: the existence of a two-party system was not an American legacy, they had failed (or perhaps it might be more accurate to say, were powerless to prevent) the emergence of a one-party state prior to the War; if it hadn’t occurred, more likely than not, one-party rule might have survived until well into the 1960s, much as other Asian countries that went through a similar process of achieving independence peacefully brought forth single-party rule for decades (Malaysia and India are some relevant examples, their independence parties achieving half a century or more of political dominance).

roxas-osmeña race

(The famous 1946 Free Press cover of Roxas being in a hurry; Osmena would have preferred not to break up the NP, at one point considering not even running for presidency to preserve party unity; Roxas, said by some of those close to him to be haunted by the idea he might not live long enough to succeed to the presidency in 1949, couldn’t wait; the party split and the two-party system born)

It is even possible that had Roxas lived long enough to achieve re-election in 1949, as was widely expected to happen, he might have begun working to reunite the Liberals with the Nacionalistas; Magsaysay, certain of re-election in 1957, was also said to be planning to either found a new superparty, or preside over the reunification of the NP and LP (both parties were inclined to make him their common presidential candidate, as he was considered unbeatable). Death scuttled that possibility; but Ferdinand Marcos achieved a temporary restoration of one-party rule from 1978 onwards, and the superadministration parties since 1987 -LDP for Aquino, Lakas for Ramos and Arroyo- points to one-party instincts remaining strong within the political class.

MAR_arrives

(May, 1946: after taking his oath of office in front of the ruins of the Legislative Building, Roxas ascends the main stairs of the presidential palace in the ceremonial taking of possession of the presidential residence; he’s with his wife and his mother)

There’s an entertaining profile of the man circa 1946 by Sol Gwekoh, titled Roxas the Man. Politically, what’s interesting is how Filipino writers (mostly his critics) have conflated the immediate postwar period with the Cold War, when they represent two distinct stages and reflect widely different American attitudes towards the Philippines, in the context of American priorities. A Philippine president, then, having made certain strategic decisions and embarked on the tactics required to achieve them, would have been confronted with his assumptions suddenly being invalidated; and that is exactly what happened to Roxas. Not enough has been done, to my mind, to explore how he handled this change in the global scheme of things.

The first stage of American reactions to the end of the war coincides with the presidential campaign here at home in 1946 and on to 1947, the year of the Parity Amendment. The onset of the Cold War only began in the closing months of Roxas’ life, and it was in terms of positioning himself and the country, to reflect this changing reality, that he ended up in Clark Field to deliver a speech, after which he suffered a heart attack and died.

As it was, it would have been during Roxas’ second term beginning in 1949, that the Cold War would really be felt, with the invasion of South Korea by the North, and the United Nations effort that saw Philippine troops being sent to South Korea.

Roxas gained his reputation as an economist, so here’s an interesting paper by former national treasurer Liling Briones on how Roxas handled deficits in his time (a summary can be found here).

Life Magazine’s photo archive was recently made publicly available on Google; here is, perhaps, the most famous photo of the man, taken in the Reception Hall of the Palace (it was demolished and rebuilt, without the pillars, during the Marcos 1978 renovations):

c

There’s another photo which suggests how Roxas aged in office:

c

My first chapter draft actually begins with the arrival of Roxas’ body in Manila. Only in my draft eleventh chapter do I describe the last day of Roxas, how he died, and the highly macabre refusal of his wife to accept he’d died.

In the draft twelfth chapter, I look into the twist of fate that meant that Vice-President Elpidio Quirino, widely expected to be discarded as a running mate by Roxas when he ran for re-election in 1949, ended up as President.

In the photo below, Quirino, having arrived from an ocean voyage meant to help him recuperate from heart trouble, ascends the stairs of the Palace, flanked by Senate President Avelino (of subsequent “What are we in power for?” infamy) and Speaker Eugenio Perez (natural father of Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr.).

EQ_arrives

Below, Quirino is shown signing his oath of office in the Council of State Room in the Executive Building (Carlos P. Garcia would later on also take his oath of office here, when Magsaysay died):

Quirino Succession

The wake of Roxas was only the second presidential wake and the first one held in the Palace that was open to the public: here’s a series of Life photos of the lying-in-state, which took place in the Ceremonial Hall of the Palace (the room was greatly enlarged during the Marcos renovations of 1978 and the chandelier is now in Bonifacio Hall, more familiarly known as the Guest House):

c

c

c

(Roxas’ son, Gerardo; Aurora Quezon; Roxas’ daughter, Ruby, at the wake)

The necrological service was held in the Philippine Congress, at the time still squatting in a former schoolhouse in Lepanto St., Manila:

c

And then, the state funeral.

c

Here is a Life photo of Aguinaldo together with veterans of the Revolution, awaiting the passing of the funeral procession. What follows are more Life photos, this time, in color, of the funeral procession and the internment:

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

Roxas’ tomb was remodeled in the 1990s.

Roxas: Chapter 11 (draft 11/02/01)

THE day of his twenty seventh wedding anniversary, April 14, 1948, was also the day before his death.

It began, like all his days, with visitors, and ended, like all his days, with even more visitors. He was, after all, Manuel Roxas and he was President of the Philippines.  His close friend and adviser, slim, slight, bespectacled and loyal Marcial Lichauco, would later reminisce that that as early as that morning, he had remarked to the President that he looked pale and haggard; Roxas diplomatically dodged the remark, smiling and nodding his head as if indicating that there was nothing he could do about it. After all, the afternoon of the day before, April 13th had seen him receive an honorary doctorate from his alma mater, the University of the Philippines, its main campus along Taft Avenue a bunch of Quonset huts amongst the hastily patched up ruins of once proud buildings still being reconstructed, even as its new campus was already beginning to be expanded in Quezon City.

During the event, it had rained, and the President been “slightly drenched”: yet the President, proud to be honored by his alma mater, would not leave though the ceremony capped a day that was a positively grueling one.

Marcial Lichauco was a close friend, a confidant, who had come to introduce two American friends eager to meet the famous Manuel Roxas  - because, as, Lichauco would later write, the Americans “wanted to discuss certain matters” with the President. The early morning call to discuss certain matters was just one of a series of visits, the continuous comings and goings of those who needed this and that – “certain matters,” important or not at all, but all made by people who saw in Manuel Roxas the font of all patronage, the source of all solutions, the resolver of all disputes. Even as his country remained very much in ruins, in the grip of an independence so fresh and yet already so tainted with disillusionment and disappointment, it was clear that Manuel Roxas realized that as President, his countrymen saw in him – and projected on to him- the hopes that the independence that was barely two years old would still bear the fruits of the sacrifices it had endured during the Second World War.

Never mind the fact that as Lichauco noted, the President had been looking haggard; and those close to him had been anxiously but discreetly monitoring his health for some time. He had been losing weight; he had been missing meals, though he was known to enjoy good food; his doctors, among them Dr. Antonio Sison who had once looked after Manuel L. Quezon, who, though suffering from an entirely different ailment, tuberculosis, had been as equally stubborn about ignoring his doctors until he would end up bedridden and weak. Dr. Sison had been warning Roxas about his heart; about the need for the President to take vacations: the President’s response was always: later, later, there is still too much to do.

Still, from time to time when he felt discomfort in his chest, Manuel Roxas would relent and take the strychnine tablets his doctors had prescribed – this was long before nitroglycerine was used to treat heart disease- but on he went, never giving pause, never quite taking the vacation his doctors urged him to take. This,  his last day at Malacanang, would be like all his other days – days that had passed, since he had assumed the presidency, carried out at such a dizzying pace his only son would later recall they were spent “as if each day was his last.”

THE night of April 14, 1946 even if it was red letter day in the eyes of his family and friends, celebrating as they were, the anniversary of his wedding, was a day of parting as well.

The President’s only son, Gerardo “Gerry” Roxas, bespectacled and at the time rebellious, was preparing to leave for the United States to study. Early in the evening Gerry inquired as to where his father was, and was told his father was in the reception hall. Son went to say goodbye to his father; he found his father pacing back and forth restlessly in the reception hall under the glare of the three Czechoslovak chandeliers that were the pride of the Palace, and standing beneath which his father had been photographed by LIFE magazine in a portrait commemorating the birth of the independent Republic in 1946.

The President heard his son’s footsteps padding towards him and turned to face his son. Gerry extended his hand, expecting the rather formal handshake that father and son usually exchanged; to his surprise, Manuel Roxas put his arms around his son’s shoulders and held him close: then, holding his son by the shoulders at arms’ length, and looking him straight in the eyes, said, “Gerry, take care of yourself, and above all, never do anything that will bring dishonor to our name.” He again hugged his rather astonished son, wished him God speed, and let Gerry leave in the company of his friends for the airport. The President, was, after all, expecting many guests shortly. Typically Roxas found himself mixing private celebrations with official business. Besides the wedding anniversary party earlier that evening, the President was also tendering a state reception in honor of the birthday of the second United States Ambassador, Emmet O’Neill.

The guests soon began arriving; the President his son had seen restless and deep in thought put on his best smile. Manuel Roxas had a tasteful yet not gaudily stylish sense of the clothes appropriate for his position and the occasion and this night was one in which he was dressed to the nines, in black tie; as he circulated among the guests everyone found him cheerful: a man who appreciated fine wine, though never much of a drinker, he probably quipped to the Americans and other guests who often headed for a small ante-room by the rear of the reception hall where hard drinks were served that,  ”Fellows, this drink may be mild for you but not for the President of the Philippines,” although he was known to prefer a Manhattan as his cocktail of choice, if he did, by chance, want a cocktail.

Somehow amidst the mingling he found time to send someone on a highly personal and hurried mission. A motorcycle policeman was called, the President handed him a slice of his wedding anniversary cake wrapped in tissue paper, and told the cop: “hurry to the airport and give this to my son – make sure Gerry gets to have some cake.” The policemen zoomed off and Gerry Roxas found himself surprised yet again by the sight of a motorcycle patrolman bringing him a piece of his parent’s wedding anniversary cake.

A man who enjoyed dancing, President Roxas that night danced twice or thrice; and despite the past few tiring days and the tiring day ahead, went to bed late.

He slept not as long as he should, and fitfully at that, that night.

On April 15, Manuel Roxas woke up a little earlier than 7:30 a.m., the time at which he usually began his day. The President had breakfast; put on a stylish double breasted white linen suit, with matching white hat; was driven to Tutuban to board a special train that would bring him to Clark Field. The train, pulling seven coaches filled with the usual flock of dignitaries and officials and members of the press – the pressmen getting, as always, the particular attention of the President- then proceeded to Clark Field in Pampanga, home to one of the largest American military bases and, ironically, also to the brewing Hukbalahap rebellion.

Upon his arrival at Clark, where the President was greeted by Air Force Lt. General Walter E. Eubanks, commander of the base, the American honor guard rendered the President of the Philippines full military honors, and then General Eubanks proceeded to take President Roxas on a tour, including the  viewing of an exhibition of P-47 Thunderbolt fighter aircraft doing aerial acrobatics at noon. Only after that, around 12:45 p.m., did Roxas have lunch: cold meats, potato salad, baked beans, iced tea, ice cream, cake. And after lunch at the officers’ club, there was still a scheduled speech – the speech that would be his last –  and then a military revue. It was April, it was hot, the President was tired, but the day was far from over.

The President vigorously delivered his speech to the officers and men at the U.S. Air Force Bass’s Colin Kelly Theater:  and was applauded vigorously in turn, but the packed auditorium was stifling. A relieved President was brought to Gen. Eubank’s house to refresh himself and get a bit of rest, preparatory to the parade.

At two-twenty in the afternoon, the President went to have a wash; he soon emerged from the bathroom, pale and sweating profusely, and said: “I am feeling dizzy.” He asked that Senate President Jose Avelino take his place in the scheduled military revue; and then, turning to his military aide, instructed that a doctor be called for.

An American Army doctor arrived; the President complained of chest pains. The doctors ordered a mattress brought; in and it was suggested the President lie down to be more comfortable; the President said he felt better sitting up – his extremities, he said, felt cold; the doctors knew these were  symptoms of  at least one heart attack and feared it might lead to progressive heart failure. A loudspeaker summoned health Secretary Dr. Antonio Villarama from the parade ground to hurry to the cottage where the President lay ill; a jeep full of American MP’s went to the parade ground to pick up Dr. Jose Ojeda, the President’s accompanying physician. Urgent calls were made to Manila: to the First Lady; to Dr. Antonio Sison. The U.S. Embassy plane was dispatched from Clark Field to Nielsen Field in Makati to fetch the doctors.

At four in the afternoon, Roxas had difficulty breathing; oxygen was administered. As ranking officials stayed behind, unessential members of the presidential party boarded a train at this time to return to Manila.

Half an hour later, the First Lady left Malacanang by car to be by the stricken  President’s side. At six o’clock, an hour and a half after his wife and mother had left the Palace, the President asked that his mother be informed of his condition: a few minutes later, the First Lady, accompanied by the President’s mother, the Executive Secretary, Emilio Abello, finally arrived.

By this time, the doctors sent for from Manila had also arrived and were attending to the President. The condition of the President seemed to have stabilized; the afternoon papers were already reporting in Manila that Roxas had been stricken by a heart attack, but that his doctors were confident he would be able to return the capital. Yet his extremities still felt cold. Nurses, doctors and aides took turns massaging the President’s feet in an effort to make him feel more comfortable.

Eight p.m. saw the condition of the President still apparently stable; he was drowsy; it was decided to let the President get some rest. The President told his anxious mother, “Mama, I am all right, you can go home now. I’ll be seeing you tomorrow.” Gen. Eubanks, Dr. Antonio Sison, , and the First Lady retired for dinner. An American nurse and one of the President’s military aides kept vigil over the patient.

At nine-twenty p.m., the President suddenly began gasping for breath; Drs. Sison and Ojeda rushed back into the President’s room; they found the President, mouth agape, trying to breath. At around 9:35 p.m., the First Lady was brought into the room, but the President had already passed out. Then, five minutes later, suddenly, what seemed to be hiccupping, but what was really the last agony as the walls of Manuel Roxas’s heart literally gave way; and after the hiccupping – stillness.

“The President,” said Dr. Antonio Sison, “is dead.” The time was 9:50 in the evening. Manuel Roxas was fifty six years old. He was dead of a coronary thrombosis.

At 11 p.m. the government of the United States officially informed the Republic of the Philippines of the fact. The American liaison officer sent to the office of the Press Secretary at Malacanang found only two people there. But news spread fast by word of mouth. Ambassador Miguel Perez-Rubio, former aide of the President, recalls people calling up each other in shock; they went to their neighbors; then listened to the radio as the grim news was announced; the news became official when, at 3 a.m. on the 16th, Malacanang issued a statement that the President was dead.

While preparations were made for the train that would take Roxas’ remains to the capital, Marcial Lichauco arrived at Clark at 2 in the morning of the 16th, to find the President’s mother bearing her grief with stoic dignity. “At last,” the President’s mother gently told Lichauco, “no one can add to Manoling’s problems anymore.” Meanwhile arrangements were being made to gather together the Roxas family.

THE President’s eldest child, vivacious, charming, young Ruby Roxas, at the time of her father’s death, was in Baguio, vacationing with friends. At 9 p.m. Mrs. Elvira Rufino, wife of Bataan veteran and businessman Ernesto Rufino, called up Baguio and confirmed that Ruby’s father had had a heart attack.

“I’m calling to tell you not to worry, your dad is o.k.,” Mrs. Rufino, a close friend of Ruby’s mother said, “and your mother and grandmother are with him now -he’ll probably be going home tomorrow.”

Ruby Roxas hadn’t even known her father had been stricken by a heart attack. She was told to be ready to be fetched by plane early the next morning to join her father and mother. She went to bed early.

Between two to three a.m., while Ruby Roxas was sound asleep, the telephone rang. Conchita Acuna, Ruby’s aunt, who was chaperoning Ruby and her friends, answered the phone. Ruby Roxas’s young friends – even the friend sharing Ruby’s room- had crept out of their rooms upon hearing the phone ring at such an odd hour and were gathered around when the President’s aunt was told that her nephew -Ruby’s father- was dead.

No one of Ruby’s friends went back to sleep that night; everyone sat around in shock, some in tears, some emotionally numb; at one point Ruby’s friends softly asked each other if they should wake their friend to tell her that her father had passed away; no one had the heart to do so.

When Ruby Roxas was finally awakened to have breakfast prior to boarding the plane she knew was being sent for her, she found it strange that everyone was so quiet. “Not one of my friends would look me in the eye,” she would recall many years later. “They told me General Eubank’s plane was on its way; I noticed the eyes of many of my friends were red; and my most talkative friend had nothing to say to me that morning.”

Ruby Roxas was brought to the airport where General Eubank’s personal plane was waiting on the runway. Her feelings of foreboding were prevented from getting much worse as a doctor immediately administered a sedative right before she boarded the plane.

All Ruby Roxas was told was, “your father is not feeling well.”

All she could ask was, “where is my father?” She was told they were headed for Clark Air Base.

Not too long after taking off, the American pilot came out to the passenger cabin and gently told Ruby, “we have been instructed to proceed to Manila, because the President is being brought to the Palace.”

Hoping against hope, Ruby Roxas tried to tell herself this might be good news.

But as the Douglas DC-3 plane landed at Nielsen Field, Ruby saw Geronima Pecson, head of the Social Welfare Agency, and not an official normally sent to greet the children of Presidents – dressed in a black terno: a mourning terno. Ruby also saw the presidential guards – all wearing black armbands of mourning. The finality of it all hit her at that moment; what she had dared not think about was so obviously true: her father was dead. She knew it. No one had to tell her. A car was waiting to bring her to Tutuban station.

Gerry Roxas, got the news upon his arrival in Honolulu on the morning of April 15, where he was met at the airport by Philippine Consul  Modesto Farolan; Gerry immediately noticed the rumpled suit and the black arm band of the man meeting him and was just as quickly told that his father had passed away. They lingered just long enough to await the next plane back to Manila. Gerry Roxas then arrived the next day at two a.m. to join in his family’s – and his country’s- grief. For the next week both presidential children would quietly sit, their friends describing them as polite, even gracious, to the throng of mourners, but both of them in a daze.

AS Ruby Roxas was preparing to be flown to Manila, and twenty hours before his son would get back, at six in the morning, April 16, 1948, Manuel Roxas was carried out of the two-story cottage in Clark Field on a US Air Force  stretcher. The stretcher was placed in a waiting ambulance.  The ambulance rushed to the train station at Clark Field where anxious dignitaries, led by former Speaker Jose Yulo, who had all left Manila at three in morning, awaited the man and the distraught First Lady.

In Malacanang the President was laid on his bed. Manuel Roxas had been dead since late evening the day before: the nation knew this; Ruby Roxas knew this, Gerry Roxas by this time probably knew this; but in her grief, her anguish and sorrow, Manuel Roxas’s own wife could not come to terms with the fact that her husband was dead. She clung to the believe that her husband could be revived with the same tenacity she had shown clutching his slipper as she brushed past the hushed throng at the train station. So adamant was she that he must not be dead, that she could not bear to have him put in a coffin, or be brought to the Palace in a hearse; instead, he was to be treated as patient. A man whose life could be brought back. Hence the sight of the President on a stretcher, the ambulance instead of a hearse, and now the President’s lifeless body on his bed.

Soon after the arrival of the ambulance at the Palace, former first lady Aurora A. Quezon accompanied by her eldest daughter, arrived. The silver haired former first lady was approached by anxious officials. A tired and concerned Jose Yulo told her of the depths of grief-struck denial of the First Lady. His worries were echoed by other officials who did not know what to do in the face of such an implacable refusal to come to terms with death. She asked to see the First Lady, and was ushered into the President’s bedroom.

It was a scene few saw, but which was filled with an especial poignancy for those close to Aurora Quezon and Trinidad Roxas. The wives of two Manuels;  of two presidents;  of two men suddenly dead on foreign soil – for Clark Air Base at that time was considered every bit as much American territory as Saranac Lake New York, where Quezon had died in 1944; two wives of two men dead while still in office. Now it was the  sad duty of one to tell the other as a friend, what she must now accept and endure.

Brought to the President’s bedroom, retiring, maternal Mrs. Quezon, in her quiet, deliberate way, approached Trinidad Roxas, took her hands in hers, and told her of her own experience with losing a husband so quickly.

“Trining, Manoling – the President- is dead”, Aurora Quezon told Mrs.  Roxas. “You cannot bring him back; God has taken him.”

Mrs. Roxas looked intently at her friend, and it seemed as if in the eyes of one widow the other widow saw that the abyss was indeed there, and must be faced. Mrs. Roxas’s clinging to the hope that life might be brought back gave way to questions as to what to do to fill the void, to keep the grief that must now be faced, private.

Aurora Quezon proceeded to recount to her friend what her own husband had told her, when he knew he was losing the battle against Tuberculosis in an American sanitarium so far away from home,  and that he might never reach his homeland alive. Manuel L. Quezon had called his wife into his sick room in Florida that day, and told his wife to prepare for the worst.

They spoke as husband and wife but also as President and First Lady, and what Quezon had told his wife, in 1943, his wife now repeated to the widow of Manuel Roxas in 1948: “If I should die in office, you will have to allow the government to do with my remains as it pleases, for as an ordinary citizen I belong to you and our children, but if I die in office I will belong to the country.”

“Trining,” Aurora Quezon said, “Manoling belongs to the country now”. He died in harness. Like my husband. “You must do what must be done.” Again, she repeated:  ”your husband belongs to the nation.”

A last attempt to keep her grief private came from Mrs. Roxas – “but I do not want Manoling embalmed, it is not what I would want for my husband”, Dona Trining said.

“It is neither what I nor my husband ever wanted,” Mrs. Quezon replied. “But we had to do what the government said they should do. The people will want to see their president for the last time. You must allow them to render their respect to the President they have lost. The entire country is grieving.”

Only then did the First Lady relent. Officials hurried to put into effect plans for the state wake and funeral due Manuel Roxas as the departed head of his people.

WHEN the remains of Manuel L. Quezon had been brought back to Manila from the United States less than three years prior to Roxas’s death, the newspapers had criticized the laying-in-state at the Palace being off-limits to the public. Articles chided the administration of Roxas for limiting the visitors to the high and mighty, reserving public homage for when Quezon’s remains were brought to Congress and then the chapel of the University of Santo Tomas. It was disgraceful, the papers said, that the dead president’s countrymen were kept out, while others resorted to trying to barge their way into Malacanang and still more were turned away at the gates.

This time the government made no such mistake. The gates of the Palace were flung open to the public at five that afternoon, and would remain so for more than a week while flags were lowered to half-mast and high officials designated to take turns keeping vigil.