Primer on the Neri Case (updated)

The President’s cheerleaders did their pom-pom dance, PCCI supports Supreme Court decision on executive privilege, as expected.

And if anyone has doubts, to borrow a phrase of Bautista the Hutt, that this decision has provided “comfort to Malacanang,” one only has to scan the headlines. Cabinet to skip Senate inquiries, while old problems now have a chance to be buried: Malacañang ‘open’ to Jocjoc extradition.

After all, if he comes home, where can he be made to talk? Not before the Senate, because Bolante can now invoke executive privilege. In court? He will live a long and untroubled life, then.
Meanwhile, RG Cruz has scuttlebutt on the latest rearranging of deck chairs on the Titanic:

Anyway, seems like a cabinet reshuffle will be in the offing in a few months. Esperon is said to be poised be new defense secretary, as gilbert teodoro moves to the justice department to replace a supposedly ailing raul gonzales. Puno is making the leap from DILG to Executive Secretary as Ermita flies off to Washington DC as the new Permanent envoy to that seat. Or so the grapevine says.

(some of these grapes are getting so long at the tooth, they’re the singing raisins of scuttebuttdom!)

But Edilberto C. De Jesus examines why the majority decision has the attributes of a Pyrrhic victory for the administration:

If the President did not ask Neri to follow up the NBN-ZTE project, did not ask him to favor it, and did not ask him to approve the deal, would she not have encouraged, indeed demanded, that Neri testify to these points, under oath, at the Senate hearing and all other available public fora? What we do know, however, is that the President, despite Neri’s report of the Abalos bribe attempt, did not immediately stop the implementation of the NBN-ZTE contract.

The President’s presence at the contract-signing in China actually rendered the three questions irrelevant. Whether Neri approved the project or not was immaterial. The President is the ultimate decision-maker in Neda; the buck stops where she sits. But a clear admission from Neri of presidential intervention in favor of NBN-ZTE would have allowed the senators to press forward with other questions.

For Neri to invoke executive privilege thus appears analogous to invoking the 5th Amendment to protect against self-incrimination. But the person in danger of being incriminated was the President, on whose behalf Neri claimed executive privilege. The move was defensive in nature; Neri avoided placing on the public record testimony that may be damaging to the President in any court of impeachment proceedings.

The Senate hearing could have served as the stage for Neri to declare clearly and categorically that the President did not intervene in any of the three ways indicated by the questions. Neri could thus have dramatized the President’s iron resolve to root out corruption.

Instead, it has demonstrated her iron resolve to implicate as many people and institutions as possible in her version of governance. Read an interview of PLDT’s Manuel Pangilinan, as reproduced in New Philippine Revolution, to get an idea as to why an administration victory in the Supreme Court can be hailed by the PCCI and underwhelm others. While others, still, are beyond being underwhelmed, they’re overwhelmed by what all the scandals imply. See Absolutely Beautiful’s views.

Yesterday, former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, under whose watch Senate v. Ermita was decided, had this to say about the Supreme Court’s decision in Neri v. Senate. In his column, Arroyo Supreme Court? , he suggests the choice confronting the sitting Justices is a stark one: to be a puppet court, or not:

With due respect, I believe that the majority decision failed to check presidential abuse; worse, it imprudently expanded executive privilege to cover wrongdoings.

First, to justify Secretary Romulo Neri’s refusal to answer the three questions linking President Arroyo to the ZTE-NBN mess, the majority considered “conversations that take place in the President’s performance of (her) official duties… presumptively privileged.” It deemed the bare, proof-less claim of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita that Neri’s disclosures “might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations” with China. It faulted the Senate with rank failure to explain a “critical or compelling need for the answers.”

By shifting the burden of proof to the Senate, the nine-member majority reversed the much-acclaimed “Senate vs Ermita,” issued just two years ago, that unanimously placed the duty of proving the need for secrecy on the president. Disclosure is the rule because the Constitution expressly mandates transparency and accountability for all officials.

Second, by giving the “presidential communications privilege” presumptive confidentiality, the majority inexplicably expanded kingly prerogatives. It unreasonably suppressed the truth.

Third, executive privilege is not expressly provided in the Constitution. There is no sentence or clause mentioning the privilege directly. The Supreme Court merely implied it from other presidential powers. In contrast, the power to investigate in aid of legislation is expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. In a clash between these two prerogatives, the choice is clearly in favor of the express grant.

Fourth, the majority agreed with the Senate that executive privilege should not be used to hide a crime or wrongdoing. Well and good. Yet, it still ruled against disclosure on the convoluted argument that “US vs Nixon” involved a “pending criminal action,” while the Neri petition related to a “legislative inquiry.” As I see it, this American case is simply inapplicable. The majority should have relied on the constitutional mandate requiring transparency and accountability of officials.

In his column today, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. calls the majority opinion A dangerously crippling decision. Crippling of what? Institutions and institutional efforts, including recourse to the Writs of Habeas Corpus, or Habeas Data; and anti-corruption efforts, says Bernas:

The Court could have decided that Romulo Neri should answer the three questions pregnant with cloudy foreboding: (a) Whether the President followed up the NBN project; (b) Whether the President directed him to prioritize the ZTE; (c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe.

But the Court placed all three questions under executive privilege, and nothing derogatory to the woman, if there was any, as many thought, could come out…

The type of executive privilege claimed here is “presidential communication privilege.” Presidential communication is presumptively privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoever challenges it must show good and valid reasons related to the public welfare.

What reason did the Senate have? Recall that this was in the course of a legislative investigation occasioned by, among others, pending bills about foreign loans. The topic of foreign loans is special. It is not the sole domain of the President. Under our Constitution foreign loans may be incurred by the President but only with the prior consent of the Monetary Board and in accordance with laws passed by Congress. Hence the Senate had very good reason for finding out how the ZTE-NBN loans were handled and how the very unique experience under it which had attracted national interest could contribute to legislation.

When the claim of privilege is disputed by Congress, how and by whom is the dispute to be resolved? US decisions, strewn all over Justice Leonardo-De Castro’s ponencia, say that it is the Court that decides whether the claim of privilege has foundation.

That was the reason why the Court called for the oral argument on the subject. The Court wanted to find out, without compelling Neri to reveal legitimate secrets, how Neri’s answer might affect diplomatic relations and national security. As Chief Justice Puno observed, “The Court cannot engage in guesswork in resolving this important issue.”

Neri was not at the oral argument to explain. When his lawyer was asked to explain, Neri’s lawyer was clueless. His answer, repeated like a mantra, was “I cannot fathom.”

One might also add that, if there was any possible cause for impairment of diplomatic relations with China, one such possible cause would have been the cancellation of the contract. But no diplomatic problem arose from the cancellation.

The Court could have asked for an in camera session for Neri to explain his claim within the hearing of the Court alone. Such a procedure, followed by American practice, could have enabled the Court to sift what was privileged and what was not and then to allow the revelation of what was not privileged. But the Court did not use the procedure, probably because it was already obvious from the oral argument that the claim of privilege could not be sustained. It was, to paraphrase Neri’s lawyer, unfathomable.

But, lo and behold, the ponencia ruled that the matter was covered by executive privilege. Was it fathomed by guesswork, as Puno suggested? That is the way it looks to me.

The implication of this ponencia that shows no effort to look into the underlying substance of the claimed privilege is that once the claim of “presidential communication privilege” is claimed, no evidence is needed to support it even if there are legitimate reasons calling for disclosure. This would revolutionize the doctrine on executive privilege in a manner that can affect all other investigations. This can, for instance, hamper effective use of the recently promulgated writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. It can also cripple efforts to battle official corruption, which is a world-recognized specialty of the Philippines…

The case clearly calls for a reconsideration to give the Court a chance to clarify what doctrine of executive privilege it really wishes to establish.

Another Justice of the Supreme Court, Antonio Carpio, discusses The limits of executive privilege in his dissenting opinion; yet in Notes toward a circumspect ruling on executive privilege, Rep. Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., as is his wont, takes contrarian view:

26. There is jurisprudence, and it is scant, that executive privilege may yield to the demands of criminal justice because of the superior stakes of real lives, liberties and properties but not to a generalized interest in whatever the Senate deems the truth of any matter that strikes its fancy. “The leading case prior to US v. Nixon was US v. Burr. There, Chief Justice Marshall, on circuit duty, had issued a subpoena duces tecum demanding of President Jefferson a letter thought by defense counsel to be relevant to the treason trial of Aaron Burr. Chief Justice Marshall declared: “The propriety of introducing any paper into a case, as testimony, must depend on the character of the paper, not on the character of the person who holds it.” [Tribe] Which is to say that in requesting for presidential privileged communications, the request must be framed on a more or less explicit description of the paper and its relevance to the proceeding where it is to be introduced. The proceedings in our case is a Senate investigation in aid of legislation and the relevance to be demonstrated is in relation to prospective legislation, which, of course, does not and cannot extend to a prosecution under that law which would smack of ex post facto. Jefferson sent the papers but, he stressed, of his own free will and not because of judicial compulsion.

27. Yet with the search for truth, except in the most generalized way, and the attainment of justice except in a rhetorical fashion, Congress can have nothing to do. By its partisan nature Congress cannot be objective nor impartial to the interests of its constituents and its own members—even in the stronger case when the House sits in impeachment as The Grand Inquest. In a political contest between the executive and the legislative branches, a judicial determination had best await the political outcome.

And he says the battle, right now, is not between the Senate as a whole and the Executive, but rather, parts of the whole versus the Executive; and that the burden of proof is on the Senate or its parts to justify not allowing a claim of executive privilege to hold; and he then argues why in his opinion the courts remain a superior venue to determining wrongdoing. All the Senate’s doing, he says, is engaging in a fishing expedition; and however laudable the aims, fishing expeditions are disallowed: if anyone is going to go fishing, it should be the House.
And he argues, further, that it is the House that is properly tasked with putting together a “Grand Inquest” versus the Chief Executive as the Senate’s charged with being the judge; but perhaps he overlooks the particular historical development of our Senate as a foil to the Chief Executive’s aggrandizing instincts. In essence he was asserting the prerogatives of the House to which he belongs, and a reasoned defense of the Executive, which he once served, in contrast to the Senate, with which he has traded barbs, and pointing out a possible, prudent resolution of the case on the part of the Supreme Court, by which he has often been exasperated. But his brief, it seems, was ignored; and what would really be interesting is what his opinion of the actual decision might be.
Anyway, Locsin does raise an interesting point in that he believes there are grounds for a case which would challenge the present rules of the House concerning impeachment, which results in “sham” impeachment complaints:

“The political efficacy of presidential assertions of executive privilege is perhaps most limited in the context of congressional impeachment proceedings. It would be a ‘mockery’ indeed, to quote John Quincy Adams, ‘to say that the House should have the power of impeachment extending even to the President…himself, and yet to say that the House had not the power to obtain the evidence and proofs on which their impeachment was based.’ The same could of course be said of the Senate’s power to try impeachments. Indeed, assertions of executive (or other) privilege that unjustifiably thwart impeachment investigations and trials can themselves quite properly become the basis for an article of impeachment.” [Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 3rd Ed, 787.]

3. Which, by the way, shows that the House rules on impeachment disallowing continuing amendments of impeachment complaints are mentally dishonest and constitutionally infirm so that the Supreme Court should throw out what the former Speaker of the House himself disdained as “a sham complaint” filed for purposes of inoculating the President from the genuine article.

Meanwhile, even as More solons back access-to-information bill, the PCIJ publishes a report on its data-gathering (during the preparation of a three-part report on Overseas Development Assistance: see ODA surge sparks scandals for Arroyo, debt woes for RP, followed by Bids sans caps, tied loans favor foreign contractors and then finally, 7 in 10 ODA projects fail to deliver touted benefits ) and how it fared when trying to ferret out information from government agencies. As its introductory note says,

For about six months, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) sought to uncover and scrutinize documents on projects funded with official development assistance (ODA). Our experience highlights the government’s snail-paced progress toward transparency, and full compliance with the Constitution’s provision on access to information.

The three-part series written for the PCIJ by Roel Landingin, senior correspondent of The Financial Times of London, reflects the reluctance by many government agencies to allow public access to documents that involve use of taxpayers’ money. The report published in February 2008 established that 7 in 10 ODA projects reviewed have failed to deliver their touted promise of economic benefits.

To support Landingin’s report, the PCIJ filed 23 written requests for documents with various government agencies. Only 15 were granted, for a 65 percent response rate, even as many of the agencies failed to provide all the data that PCIJ had asked for. The agencies who turned down the requests similarly invoked either the so-called confidential nature of the documents requested, or the seemingly catch-all excuse called “executive privilege.”

Go ahead and read Gov’t curbs access to information amid Senate scrutiny of projects.

Of course, this is all very inconvenient for those who’d rather focus on The fantasy of the 7.3-percent GDP growth, as Amando Doronila puts it.

What follows is a primer on Neri v. Senate and what it implies, prepared by Atty. Carlos Medina. The Watch, Pray and Act Movement and the Busina network will lead a mobilization to accompany legal counsels Chochoy Medina, Mel Sta. Maria, et. al. in the filing of a motion for reconsideration on April 8 at the Supreme Court. They will assemble at Adamson University on San Marcelino St. at 8 am and then proceed to the SC.

Primer on the Supreme Court Decision in Neri vs. Senate Committee and its Implications

In General:

What is the case of Neri vs. Senate Committee?

This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project. During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his conversations with President Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim of executive privilege.

What is “executive privilege”?

It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts and the public. It is a privilege of confidentiality which applies to certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to disclose. Executive privilege is based on the constitution because it relates to the President’s effective discharge of executive powers. Its ultimate end is to promote public interest and no other.

Is executive privilege absolute?

No. Any claim of executive privilege must be weighed against other interests recognized by the constitution, like the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure evidence in deciding cases.

Did the revocation by the President of E.O. 464 on March 6, 2008 diminish the concept of executive privilege?

No. Executive privilege may still be invoked despite the President’s revocation of E.O. 464 because it is based on the constitution.

On the Contents of the Supreme Court Decision:

What events led to the filing of the case before the Supreme Court?

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), a corporation owned by the People’s Republic of China, executed a “Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Services for the National Broadband Network Project” (NBN-ZTE Contract) worth US$329,481,290.00 (around PhP 16B). The project sought to provide landline, cellular and internet services in government offices nationwide and was to be financed through a loan by China to the Philippines. President Arroyo witnessed the contract signing in China.

After its signing, reports of anomalies concerning the project (e.g., bribery, “overpricing” by US$ 130M, “kickback commissions” involving top government officials, and loss of the contract) prompted the Senate, through the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security, to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation. The inquiry was based on a number of Senate resolutions and in connection with pending bills concerning funding in the procurement of government projects, contracting of loans as development assistance, and Senate concurrence to executive agreements.

In one of the hearings held on Sept. 26, 2007, former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified that President Arroyo initially gave instructions for the project to be undertaken on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement so the government would not spend money for it, but eventually the project was awarded to ZTE with a government-to-government loan from China. He also said that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, the alleged broker in the project, offered him PhP 200M in exchange for NEDA’s approval of the project. Neri testified that when he told President Arroyo of the bribe offer, she told him not to accept it. But Neri refused to answer questions about what he and the President discussed after that, invoking executive privilege since they concerned his conversations with the President. The Senate required him to appear again and testify on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita wrote the Senate Committees and asked that Neri’s testimony on November 20, 2007 be dispensed with because he was invoking executive privilege “by Order of the President” specifically on the following questions:

a. Whether the President followed up on the NBN project?

b. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?

c. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?

When Neri failed to appear on November 20, 2007, the Senate required him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt. Neri explained that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege and that should there be new matters to be taken up, he asked that he be informed in advance of what else he needs to clarify so he could prepare himself.

On Dec. 7, 2007, Neri questioned the validity of the Senate’s show cause order before the Supreme Court. On January 30, 2008, the Senate cited Neri in contempt and ordered his arrest for his failure to appear in the Senate hearings. On February 1, 2008, Neri asked the Supreme Court to stop the Senate from implementing its contempt order, which the Court granted on Feb. 5, 2008. The Supreme Court also required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the contempt order.

What reasons were given for the claim of executive privilege?

Executive Secretary Ermita said that “the context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Neri further added that his “conversations with the President dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.”

What issues were considered by the Supreme Court in resolving the case?

The Supreme Court said there were two crucial questions at the core of the controversy:

a. Are the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions covered by executive privilege?

b. Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest?

How did the Supreme Court resolve these issues?

The Supreme Court first recognized the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court said that the power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.

On the first question, the Supreme Court said that the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive privilege. Hence, the Senate cannot compel Neri to answer the three questions.

On the second question, the Supreme Court said that the Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt. Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest was not valid.

What are the types of executive privilege?

a. state secrets (regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters)

b. identity of government informers

c. information related to pending investigations

d. presidential communications

e. deliberative process

In what cases is the claim of executive privilege highly recognized?

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the constitution to the President, such as the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers of the President. Information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

What specifically are the executive privileges relating to deliberations or communications of the President and other government officials?

These are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege.

How are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege distinguished?

The presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential”.

The deliberative process privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials. It includes “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.”

Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.

Moreover, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

What is the type of executive privilege claimed in this case?

The type of executive privilege claimed in this case is the presidential communications privilege.

Is there a presumption in favor of presidential communications?

Yes. Presidential communications are “presumptively privileged”. The presumption is based on the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.

The presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to presidential communications.

Who are covered by the presidential communications privilege?

Aside from the President, the presidential communications privilege covers senior presidential advisors or Malacanang staff who have “operational proximity” to direct presidential decision-making.

What are the elements of the presidential communications privilege?

The following are the elements of the presidential communications privilege:

a. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power”.

b. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

c. The privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate or compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and that the information sought is unavailable elsewhere by an appropriate investigating agency.

What are examples of “quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers” which are covered by the presidential communications privilege?

The privilege covers only those functions which form the core of presidential authority. These are functions which involve “quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers” such as the powers of the president as commander-in-chief (i.e., to call out the armed forces to suppress violence, to declare martial law, or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), the power to appoint officials and remove them, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the power to receive ambassadors, and the power to negotiate treaties and to enter into execute agreements.

Are the elements of the presidential communications privilege present in this case?

Yes. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege because:

a. First, the communications relate to the power of the President to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.

b. Second, the communications are received by Neri, who as a Cabinet member can be considered a close advisor of the President.

c. Third, the Senate Committees have not adequately shown a compelling need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of a law and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Does the grant of the claim of executive privilege violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern?

No, for the following reasons:

a. Neri appeared before the Senate on Sept. 26, 2007 and was questioned for 11 hours. He also expressed his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, except the three questions.

b. The right to information is subject to limitation, such as executive privilege.

c. The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to information. Congress cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.

Was the claim of executive privilege properly invoked by the President in this case?

Yes. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim by the President stating the “precise and certain reason” for preserving confidentiality. The grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita are specific enough, since what is required is only that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified, and the following statement of grounds by Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement: “The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”

What reasons were given by the Supreme Court in holding that it was wrong for the Senate to cite Neri in contempt and order his arrest?

a. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege.

b. The Senate’s invitations to Neri did not include the possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the subject of inquiry, and the questions to be asked.

c. The contempt order lacked the required number of votes.

d. The Senate’s rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of legislation were not duly published.

e. The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege and instead dismissed Neri’s explanation as unsatisfactory.

Implications of the Supreme Court Decision:

Who has the burden of showing whether or not a claim of executive privilege is valid?

Executive privilege is in derogation of the search for truth. However, the decision recognized Presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Hence, the party seeking disclosure of the information has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the confidentiality of Presidential communications.

This presumption is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier statement in Senate vs. Ermita (April 20, 2006) that “the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure”. It is also inconsistent with constitutional provisions on transparency in governance and accountability of public officers, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Does the decision expand the coverage of executive privilege?

Yes, the decision expands the coverage of executive privilege in at least two ways:

a. The decision explained that the presidential communications privilege covers communications authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. This means that the privilege applies not only to communications that directly involve the President, but also to communications involving the President’s close advisors, i.e., those in “operational proximity” with the President. There is no definition of “operational proximity”, so it is not clear how far down the chain of command the privilege extends. This expansion of the coverage of the privilege means that information in many areas of the executive branch will become “sequestered” from public view.

b. The decision also stated that the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. This means that the privilege protects not only the deliberative or advice portions of documents, i.e., communications made in the process of arriving at presidential decisions, but also factual material or information concerning decisions already reached by the President.

How will the decision affect other investigations?

The decision makes it easy for the President to invoke executive privilege, since what is required is only that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” This in effect will enable the use of executive privilege to hide misconduct or crime. According to Fr. Bernas, S.J., the implication of the ruling is that once the “presidential communications privilege” is invoked, no evidence is needed to support it even if there are valid reasons for disclosing the information sought. “This would revolutionize the doctrine in a manner that can affect all other investigations. This can, for instance, hamper effective use of the … writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. It can also cripple efforts to battle official corruption ….”

In particular, what is the effect of the decision on the Senate’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?

The decision severely limits the Senate’s power of legislative inquiry and its ability to investigate government anomalies in aid of legislation. The decision encroaches upon matters internal to the Senate as an institution separate from and co-equal to other branches of government.

The decision, for instance, requires the Senate to give its questions in advance of its hearings. But this is a requirement applicable only to the question hour and not to inquiries in aid of legislation. Moreover, it is impractical, since follow-up questions of Senators will be difficult to anticipate.

The decision also requires the Senate to publish its rules of procedure on legislative inquiries every three years. But the Senate traditionally considered as a continuing body. Senate committees continue to work even during senatorial elections. By tradition and practice, the Senate does not re-publish its rules. To require publication of its rules every three years is unnecessary and inconsistent with its tradition and practice.

Did the Supreme Court ruling establish a doctrine on executive privilege?

No. Although the vote is 9 – 6 in favor of upholding the claim of executive privilege, two of the nine Justices concurred merely in the result, while one Justice argued not on the basis of executive privilege. Hence, only six out of the nine Justices explained their votes in favor of the claim of executive privilege. Six out of a total of 15 Justices do not establish a doctrine.

Can the Senate continue with its investigations despite the Supreme Court ruling?

The decision does not stop the Senate from continuing with its investigations and from undertaking other inquiries, although the government has already declared that officials will not appear unless the Senate rules are first published. Should Neri (and other officials) appear, the Senate can ask him questions other than the three questions. But Neri may again invoke executive privilege on other questions, which could result in another case before the Supreme Court, and the cycle may be repeated again and again. Such a situation, particularly where there appears to be a pattern of concealment in government activities, will ultimately be harmful to public interest.

Prepared by:

Atty. Carlos P. Medina, Jr.

March 30, 2008

Book of the Week

“The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico” (Kevin J. Middlebrook)

Supremes’ Folly

Let’s begin with a quote from the Vice-President, not usually considered an authority on anything, but who knows his public pulse. In the news article Inquiries barred by SC ruling?, which focuses on the Palace’s emerging effort to limit public criticism by bringing up the possibility of the Supreme Court citing people by contempt (a dangerous road, considering even lawyers are incensed: can you imagine hundreds or even thousands all being jailed for contempt of court?), the Veep was quoted as saying:

Vice President Noli de Castro urged those who disagree with the Supreme Court to respect and accept the ruling.

“Kapag hindi pa natin ginalang ang decision ng Supreme Court, sino ang igagalang ninyo after the Supreme Court?” he said in an ambush interview at the Philippine National Police Academy graduation rites in Silang, Cavite.

And really, this is the crux of the problem. Because, indeed, if the Supremes have disgraced themselves then the unthinkable has to be confronted, and that is, going back to the drawing board. But that point hasn’t been reached, at least, not just yet: at the very least it would have to wait until the Supremes have received a motion for reconsideration and then denied it with finality; or possibly, even further down the line when the 9-6 majority continues to hold even in cases, say, like another People’s Initiative scheme. Then the country would no longer be able to ignore the reality of a Puppet Court.

Unless of course, without waiting for a Puppet Court to hand down one decision after another, the justices in the minority, led by their chief, decide to simply resign if the court upholds Neri v. Senate. That would be unprecedented; but would it be wise? It would only give the President a free hand to appoint not just six, but seven Justices in one fell swoop. But then again it would have been an act of self-preservation for the resigned Justices.

Would we then be faced with a situation more similar to the Japanese Occupation than even, say, Martial Law? Though at the heart of the New Society were ideas first explored during the Japanese Occupation.

Even when the Supreme Court disgraced itself (while saving the jobs of its members) by adorning the New Society with “a color of constitutionality,” the critics of Marcos still went to the Supremes to argue their cases, even though they weren’t particularly confident of a fair hearing. It was just that court remained one of the few venues where people could exercise a semblance of free speech. There was still a residual respect for the high court, but I have to wonder if it was an institutional respect or respect for its membership; just as during the Japanese Occupation the Supreme Court tried to do as little work as possible, knowing it was viewed as just another illegitimate institution of a government viewed as illegitimate by the people.

But then the public didn’t scoff at Jose Yulo, who assumed the position of Chief Justice after the legitimate Chief Justice, Jose Abad Santos, was executed by the Japanese, the way the public scoffed Chief Justice Enrique Fernando during the Marcos years. But in the end when the entire Marcosian apparatus came crashing down the Supreme Court he’d appointed went with him. The Japanese Occupation and Martial Law still remain national traumas within living memory: and with continuing ill-effects as Alfonso Aluit once pointed out.

But then, what do you do, Puppet Court or no? For example, De Venecia son seeks SC help over wiretapping. And while Manuel Buencamino, in his column Play them loud, can properly distinguish between the Garci tapes and those Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile has in his pocket -and which has led JDV3 to run to the Supremes with a Habeas Data petition- the long and short of it is that the reason people have to run to the Supremes is they’re the court of last resort -but what happens when resorting to that court can only hasten not justice, but the closing of a government trap?

Which brings us back to the Vice-President. Who -or what- would be left to respect, once respect for the high court is gone? Which explains why disappointment in certain quarters -and I am specifically referring not to critics of the President, but those who believed that the President’s sins of omission or commission, as alleged by her critics, could be amply attended to by institutional means, whether Congress or the courts- is running so deep, and why the response, as invoked by Fr. Bernas (see link below) is basically this: storm the high court at Padre Faura with prayers, of the legal and spiritual kind.

And why great pains are being taken to dissect the high court’s ruling, to point out the Supremes’ folly, and to remind them that once respect for them is lost -what, indeed, will be left?

Let’s move on to a portion of the decision, before tackling what some lawyers told me yesterday. Here is the portion from the main decision as written by the ponente, Justice Teresita Leonardo de Castro:

The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.

United States. v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held:

[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon vs. Sirica, where it was held that presidential communications privilege are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government “in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.” Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.

Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v. Nixon[48] that “demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial” outweighs the President’s “generalized interest in confidentiality.” However, the present case’s distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to “limit the scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information.” Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.

At yesterday’s Mass for Cory Aquino at the Ateneo Rockwell, I asked lawyer Carlos Medina (who was part of the Senate’s legal team and was part of One Voice’s legal team) his views and to the best of my understanding, he believed the portion above was the most objectionable part of the entire decision.

In the past, executive privilege applied to the President and individuals consulted by the President. When invoking executive privilege, the burden of proof was on the one invoking the privilege, and not on those making inquiries resulting in the invoking of privilege; the decision reverses things and now puts the burden of proof on those making inquiries, therefore turning what was once something that could only be rarely invoked and with difficulty, at that, into a shroud of secrecy almost impossible to pierce.

Before the decision, it would have been, “I invoke executive privilege, because what you want me to tell you, deserves to be superdupertopsecret because of reason A, B, C…” with reasons A, B, and C subject to strict limits on their appropriateness.

After the decision, it becomes “Tell me why I should answer you when everything is presumed to be covered by executive privilege so tell me your reasons A, B, and C and I’ll see if I think your reasons justify my giving you an answer.”

It turns the assumptions that executive privilege is exactly that, a privilege, and one that’s strictly circumscribed, on its head.

Besides that, the privilege once applied to two people: the President and whoever talked directly to the President, about confidential matters; the decision expands coverage to include those with “proximity” to the President -including when those enjoying that proximity consult each other, in turn, on matters involving the President.

Before the decision, it would have been, “I invoke executive privilege, because what the President and I talked about on the phone is superdupertopsecret.” After the decision, it becomes, “I invoke executive privilege because what Sec. A and myself, Sec. B, talked about had something to do with the President, although neither of us were talking to the President at the time, nonetheless, since it was about her, it’s superdupertopsecret.”

smoke, in her blog, noticed this, too:

All this conclusion does is bolster the fact that Neri can claim privilege. But that was never at issue. The issue is whether the claim is justified. Again, the justifiability of the claim seems to have been taken for granted.

The third conclusion is the linchpin, and it is based on the fact that

“The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.”

In other words, the claim actually need not be justified. In cases where the Senate thinks the claim is unjustified, it can take the case to the SC. But that remedy is, in fact, illusory since, when it receives the case, all the SC will look for is whether the allegation was properly made – it won’t even look into the reasonableness of the claim. For instance, Midas Marquez – the Court’s spokesman – is now emphasizing that the reason the Court ruled for Neri is actually because the Senate was unable to show any compelling need for the information. This line of reasoning implies that if a need was shown, the privilege would have been denied. BUT that implication is contradictory to what the Court itself said when it declared that a mere allegation of privilege, properly made, is all that is needed. How can any enumeration of “compelling need” be validated without measuring those claims against the justifications for keeping the privilege intact? How can you say that the justifications for disclosure are more ‘compelling’ than the justifications for secrecy when the secrecy need not even be justified?

That all looks kinda circular to me.

A perfect trap!

The decision also closes off executive agreements from public scrutiny, because they become essentially immune to legislative inquiry.

And the decision essentially defines the ability of Congress to inquire so narrowly as to make oversight over the executive impossible; and that includes finding probable cause for prosecuting executive officials (or even the President) in the courts. For the Supreme Court says that while indeed, a limit on executive privilege is that it can’t be invoked to cover up a crime, it says the the only place that invocation won’t work is before the courts -which ignores how things can even get to court, if nothing fishy can be uncovered in the first place.

The whole thing makes a news story like this, otherwise heartening, disheartening: House body OKs bill facilitating access to state information.

Yesterday and today’s Inquirer editorials focus on the Supreme Court and its decision in Neri v. Senate Committee. Yesterday’s editorial, Divided court, began by pointing out,

We join the many who find the majority decision to be gravely disappointing. In striking a balance between the competing interests of two coordinate branches of government, the high court in Neri v Senate Committee et al seems to have decided to enable an Executive department with an inglorious record of evading accountability. That record includes the remains of Executive Order 464, the “ashes” of which, Justice Conchita Carpio Morales wryly noted in her dissenting opinion, “have since fertilized the legal landscape on presidential secrecy.”

The editorial went on to focus, first, on the dissenting opinions and what they argued were not at stake:

In his exhaustive and magisterial dissent, Chief Justice Reynato Puno devoted several pages to prove that the three questions are pertinent to the legislative inquiry the three Senate committees are conducting and to actual bills pending in the Senate. “The three assailed questions seek information on how and why the NBN-ZTE contract–an international agreement embodying a foreign loan for the undertaking of the NBN Project–was consummated,” he reasoned. Declaring the three questions as covered by executive privilege, therefore, is to effectively undermine the work of legislation.

Justice Antonio Carpio, in his separate opinion, also makes short work of the three questions: These, “if answered by petitioner, will not disclose confidential Presidential communications. Neither will answering the questions disclose diplomatic secrets. Counsel for petitioner admitted this during the oral arguments …”

We find it of no small import that, in a landmark case (a case of first impression, as Puno noted) where alleged diplomatic reasons are used to justify the exercise of the so-called presidential communications privilege, Neri signally failed to support his argument that the fate of our diplomatic relations with China was in fact at stake.

The editorial was referring to Bautista the Hutt’s inability to explain any diplomatic wrinkles that might arise from pursing the line of questioning intended by the Senate. The editorial then proceeded to focus on the main decision and its flaws (referring to the passage from the decision I reproduced above, in the context of another lawyer’s views on the decision):

Strip the ponencia written by Justice Teresita Leonardo de Castro down to its basics, and we find that it can be used to justify wrongdoing.

The three Senate committees, the majority decision notes, “argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this.” But the decision then draws what seems to us to be an unnecessary but most consequential contrast between the Neri petition and the landmark US v Nixon case. “Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry.”

What do our honorable justices mean? That when information about an alleged crime is elicited in a legislative inquiry, the claim of executive privilege can be used to make the information irrelevant? This strikes us as absurd. What are our lawmakers to do, if evidence of criminal activity surfaces during an inquiry in aid of legislation? Look the other way? Unfairly as it may seem, the ruling in Neri v Senate Committee et al will be summed up by many of our most law-abiding citizens as suggesting exactly that.

The majority decision makes much of the assertion that the “petitioner is not an unwilling witness.” That seems to us to privilege Neri’s one day of testimony, as against the numerous other instances when he failed to honor the Senate’s invitation. Again, context tells us that this did not occur by happenstance; the Arroyo administration, by the admission of its own officials, has helped potential witnesses to avoid the Senate hearings on the NBN deal.

And yet today’s editorial, Not absolute, says hope springs eternal and while slim, there’s always a chance the Supreme Court, upon a motion for reconsideration, may indeed reconsider (as Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. pointed out). On what basis? The editorial says,

Allow us to hazard a guess. In his lengthy dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Reynato Puno summed up the doctrine of executive privilege as the “tension between disclosure and secrecy in a democracy.” If we accept this phrasing of the problem, then our prayer is that enough justices in the majority may be moved, on reconsideration, to favor disclosure over secrecy.

That, it seems to us, is what this landmark case on the limits of executive privilege amounts to: A decision, by the justices of the high court, about which is more important, which is more in keeping with the public interest, at this particular juncture in our history.

There is no question that the Executive enjoys what is called the presidential communications privilege. In her dissent, Justice Conchita Carpio Morales disposed of the matter succinctly. “Underlying the presidential communications privilege is the public interest in enhancing the quality of presidential decision-making. As the Court held in the same case of Senate vs Ermita, ‘A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.’” (It bears noting that Carpio Morales wrote the 14-0 ruling in Senate vs Ermita.)

This privilege, however, is not absolute.

There is also no question that the Executive enjoys what is called the diplomatic, military or state secrets privilege. In his dissent, Puno noted that these content-based categories of executive privilege are subject to judicial determination, “without forcing a disclosure [he quotes from the jurisprudence] of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” But again, this privilege is not absolute.

(It bears noting that Romulo Neri’s inclusion of “impairment of economic relations” was dismissed by Justice Antonio Carpio, in his separate opinion, as “not even a recognized ground” for the claim of executive privilege, and that Neri’s inclusion of “military matters” was derided by Carpio Morales as a mere afterthought, and therefore “need not be seriously entertained.”)

The editorial then tackles the proposal made by the Chief Justice at the time of the oral arguments on the case, and says that while it tried to head off a constitutional crisis, the decision, unless reconsidered, makes one inevitable:

The proposed compromise made a virtue of necessity.

Unfortunately, the majority position that ended up deciding the case may have only rendered the very constitutional crisis the justices sought to avert inevitable. Why? In favoring the Executive’s claim of secrecy, the Supreme Court pushed the Senate into an untenable position. Essentially, the ruling in Neri vs Senate Committee asks the Senate not to probe evidence of criminal activity that surfaces in a legislative inquiry if the Executive may be implicated. How can the Senate possibly acquiesce?

In the end, the majority decision in Neri vs Senate Committee strikes us as being based on a fundamental mistake: It takes the Executive at its word… Today, when the choice is between disclosure and secrecy, can we still afford to give this Executive the benefit of the doubt?

See the Malaya editorial, Promoting concealment of wrongdoing, too.

Lawyer Jose C. Sison, in his Philippine Star column “External and internal justice” (useless linking to it, because the paper’s site doesn’t have permanent links), helpfully put in bold the important parts of his column and that’s what I’m reproducing below:

In other words Neri won because the justices perceived that his position is the lesser of two evils…

…But at least some facts have already been established by the SC in this case that brought us nearer the truth.

Thus the SC found that on April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of US $329,481,290 (approximately P16 billion) to be financed by the People’s Republic of China; that on September 26, 2007, Neri testified for 11 hours and disclosed: that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN project; that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe; that originally the project was under a Build Operate Transfer (BOT) or any similar scheme, but when the contract was signed it was already by means of a loan from China although he was not privy to the changes anymore; that he had further discussions with the President regarding the bribery scandal involving high Government officials but could not divulge them anymore on the ground that they are covered by executive privilege.

If these facts are woven into the publicly known and openly admitted events… then the conclusion is quite clear and indubitable that some “katiwalian” amounting to a crime or violation of the Anti-Graft Law has been committed by the named officials and other brokers still to be positively identified.

And this is the vulnerable aspect of the decision… It still recognizes executive privilege when the Congress has already acquired substantial evidence that the information requested concerns criminal wrongdoing by public officials and other influential persons…

…“Law” here refers to “man-made rules and methods by which society compels or restrains actions of its members; the general rule of external human action enforced by a sovereign political authority”. Conformity of our actions to this law serves the ends of what we call external justice only.

…a broader all embracing law that treats of what is right and wrong or distinguishes between good and evil. If our will and actions conform to this law we have what is known as internal justice.

…internal justice is the object of morality while external justice is the object of jurisprudence or the science of giving a wise interpretation to man made laws and making a just application of them in all cases as they arise. Obviously internal justice is more important in the search for truth because our duty here is dictated by conscience unlike external justice where the duty is dictated by imperfect human laws. A combination of both internal and external justice is of course the best…

Another lawyer, Florin T. Hilbay, 1999 Bar Topnotcher and a professor of law, in When law is politics says:

…the Supreme Court’s decision in Neri v Senate… I believe is deeply flawed for a host of reasons: by default, President Macapagal-Arroyo (or her alter ego) has minimal proprietary rights over information generated in the exercise of her public functions; the questions the Senate asked can barely be said to have an impact on the President as a private person and on national security or foreign affairs; and the need of the public to elicit concrete information on allegations of office-related crimes involving high public officials surely trumps any speculative defense.

The 1987 Constitution may be insanely verbose, but its effusiveness is narrowly focused on the need to have a vibrant speech environment and on preventing misuse of public office. By now we ought to realize that behind claims to privileged information, done in the name of the public, is usually a crook who wouldn’t show his (or her) dirty hands. Citizens have the right to raise their eyebrows at every invocation of “national interest” or “official privilege” because rights claimed in the name of the public have almost always been exercised at its expense.

The Neri v Senate decision is all the more unfortunate considering that it effectively suppresses information crucial to opinion-formation essential to citizen feedback, at a time when it is most needed. What the Court has done is to discount from the public sphere knowledge that may be used by citizens in deciding whether they should use the force of public opinion to force Romulo Neri and/or GMA to resign, or to impeach her, or to prosecute Benjamin Abalos and Jose Miguel Arroyo; or in concluding that Jun Lozada is a fraud and his statements are hogwash. The wisdom of the masses doesn’t come cheap; it is a social capital available only when the marketplace of ideas is free. Today the Court engages in reverse expropriation, taking what is otherwise public property and preventing citizens from treading a path that might lead to enlightened public opinion.

Among bloggers, blog@AWBHoldings.com says lawyers should weigh in but laymen should, too; a lawyer, Red’s Herring, does weigh in, pointing out the Supremes have already neutered impeachment:

In an earlier entry, I have submitted that the Supreme Court in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives has practically crippled the impeachment process by adopting the Bernasian reading of “initiate” under Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution in lieu of the interpretation of the House of Representatives, and taking up what it supposed as its “activist” role, declared such interpretation of a coordinate branch, contained in the House Impeachment Rules, unconstitutional. Under the impeachment gun then was Hilario Davide, Jr. and so the robed gang huddled together and quite expectedly hailed their Chief – at the expense of the Constitution. Francisco, I concluded, is therefore the father of Lozano and Pulido.

Now, Senate v. Ermita can also say, “Here, have a cigar, we have sired a son … in Neri v. Senate Committee.”

Because the father had misspoken, the son lost its way, and unabashedly acknowledged being befuddled.

…Very clearly, executive privilege can only be invoked by way of exception. So when the executive officials fail to show that the privilege is “of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest,” as Senate v. Ermita ruling describes it, in the disclosure of the supposedly privileged information, congressional oversight, as a general rule, will trump an appeal to the supposed privilege. In that event, contumacious defiance and refusal to disclose the information sought or needed by Congress for legislative purposes renders the withholding official liable to its contempt process and the attendant punitive measures. Indeed, Congress, acting through its committees, need not rely upon the all-too-measured judicial pace to exercise the ultimate power of oversight and thereupon employ the necessary enforcement tools.

Non-lawyers Strawberry Fields Forever and Scarlet Sky and Ricelander’s Blog are aghast. The Marocharim Experiment calls for resistance. Dean Jorge Bocobo over at Philippine Commentary is very excited over the fact that Justice Corona (of the spouse who signed that manifesto in support of the President fame) is still taking his doctorate in law while already serving on the bench.

Speaking of Cory Aquino, a beautiful passage in Scriptorium:

With her persevering courage, born of prayer and piety, she helped lead us of the Marcos kleptocracy amid coups and crises and the infighting within her coalition; and considering that Aquino for a time (1986-1987) had revolutionary powers exceeding even those of Marcos himself and yet did not abuse them, her example of self-control and liceity makes her a steadfast pillar of Philippine reformism.

Admittedly, the Aquino administration had its share of serious problems, but her achievements are too strongly buttressed by the facts of history to collapse from administrative or other imperfections. Even if she erred in Edsa Dos–as I think she did not (for there is nothing illicit in removing a corrupt leader who abused the Constitution, and the evil of the next one can be blamed on herself alone)–it was through sincere desire for reform and no other. This is indeed well-known to the Autocracy, hence its illegal effort to block Aquino from joining the protest of the ill-fated marines in Fort Bonifacio; for nothing else would have stopped her.

Therefore the news of her illness comes as a terrible shock. Corazon Aquino is a woman of faith and valor, a Philippine ashet chayil in the line of Deborah, Matilda and Dorothy Day who even now leads the cause of reform; she has earned not only our gratitude but our enduring love; and so the nation owes her all the prayer and support we can muster.

My column yesterday was Testimonial of a matriarch.

A perfect trap

Whoever expected them to cash in so soon? See Palace: Many items in ZTE deal confidential. But then, cash in, they must, since Puno ‘disappointed’ with SC majority decision.

I myself am surprised the Chief Justice has gone beyond his dissenting opinion and made the rounds of the media outlets. But then again, with nine of his colleagues retiring next year, he is in the unenviable position of having his name attached to what might end up being called a puppet supreme court.

See SC ruling on Neri shows a Palace-controlled court: sources:

It was a case where Malacañang worked overtime lobbying with justices who could provide the swing vote, abs-cbnNEws.com/Newsbreak gathered from court insiders and observers who requested no attribution for fear of reprisal or jeopardizing their pending cases in the Tribunal.

We learned that just before the oral argument last March 4, the justices were evenly divided on the issue, a situation that did not favor Neri since he had to get an absolute majority for his petition to be granted.

It was in the two-week gap that followed that the Palace applied pressure on some justices. One justice reportedly was promised something in exchange for voting for Neri, while the loyalty check was applied on the others.

A justice known to be close to Arroyo was reportedly instrumental in the appointment of newly-named associate justice Arturo Brion, a move that assured the President that Brion would vote for Neri.

Brion, who was appointed only last week, participated in the voting.

One of the sources said the Palace learned its lesson from the Feb. 12 “Hello Garci” decision where a majority of nine justices, against six, ruled that the warning of the National Telecommunications Commission and the Department of Justice against the playing of the controversial tape is illegal.

In that case, the Palace apparently did not exert pressure on its appointees in the SC.

One of the sources said Puno was aware that the initial stalemate would not hold, and that the numbers will tilt in favor of Neri. This was why he proposed the compromise solution that would have allowed Neri to testify in the Senate but without being confronted with the three contentious questions where he invoked executive privilege.

The Senate, however, rejected the compromise solution, took the risk, but paid a heavy price.

Simply put, the Neri ruling implies that “the SC is under the control of the President and that Puno does not seem to have the majority of the justices,” the sources said. “9-6 will be the configuration for the rest of the year.”

It is one clear sign, they said, that the SC will be Malacanang’s rubber-stamp in the last two-and-a-half-years of her term. Arroyo is supposed to step down in June 2010.

One source, who has intensive background in the SC, said that from a short-term standpoint, Malacanang may control the Tribunal, but her hold could loosen in the long-term.

The justices, who are her appointees, might see the need to finally exert independence as the end of Arroyo’ term nears. “There will be a change of feelings shortly before she steps down.”

And so, if he is to be the lone warrior left in the high court, perhaps the Chief Justice wants the public to know that he won’t be tied down.

Chief Justice Puno penned a dissenting opinion with history, with posterity, in mind. It’s a dissenting opinion with future generations of lawyers, perhaps, in mind, and to this end, I find the comments of soliloquyboy, a law student, interesting:

On TV, Biazon was wondering whether or not the case would be applicable for all members of the Cabinet, or only for Romulo Neri. Sadly, that’s not exactly something that can be answered on its face. As part of our country’s jurisprudence, the case has become technically, a part of our legal system, thanks to Article 8 of the Civil Code. As my ObliCon professor Sir JJ Disini would say, time will tell whether the case is good law or not.

Think of it this way: this case, to me, is a case of Ermita-Malate Hotel vs Manila Prince Hotel. It’ll either be Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila , where it can become one of the most oft-quoted cases in Philippine history, especially since it’s the first or one of the few where you have two branches of government really duking it out, on the basis of executive privilege (Senate vs Ermita doesn’t count). Or it can become Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS , where it’s a legal punchline, according to my Legal Method professor.

Back to the Chief Justice. Read his dissenting opinion, the whole thing. But for now, some extracts from what he wrote, and which gives the gist of what he was trying to argue:

The doctrine of executive privilege is tension between disclosure and secrecy in a democracy. Its doctrinal recognition in the Philippines finds its origin in the U.S. political and legal system and literature. At the outset, it is worth noting that the provisions of the U.S. Constitution say little about government secrecy or public access. In contrast, the 1987 Philippine Constitution is replete with provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. This is a reaction to our years under martial rule when the workings of government were veiled in secrecy…

…A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. …U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases … as well as subsequent cases, all recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case, quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

The statement in Senate v. Ermita that the “extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure” must therefore be read to mean that there is a general disfavor of government privileges …especially considering the bias of the 1987 Philippine Constitution towards full public disclosure and transparency in government. In fine, Senate v. Ermita recognized the Presidential communications privilege in U.S. v. Nixon and the qualified presumptive status that the U.S. High Court gave that privilege…

Throughout its history — beginning with its use in 1792 by U.S. President George Washington to withhold information from a committee of Congress investigating a military expedition headed by General Arthur St. Clair against Native Americans — executive privilege has never justified the concealment of a wrongdoing… the first U.S. President, Washington, well understood the crucial role he would play in setting precedents, and so he said that he “devoutly wished on my part that these precedents may be fixed in true principles.” (emphasis supplied) President Washington established that he had the right to withhold information if disclosure would injure the public, but he did not believe that it was appropriate to withhold embarrassing or politically damaging information.

Two centuries thence, the principle that executive privilege cannot hide a wrongdoing remains unchanged.

…Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides for the power of the legislature to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. It explicitly provides respect for the constitutional rights of persons appearing in such inquiries. Officials appearing in legislative inquiries in representation of coequal branches of government carry with them not only the protective cover of their individual rights, but also the shield of their prerogatives – including executive privilege — flowing from the power of the branch they represent. These powers of the branches of government are independent, but they have been fashioned to work interdependently. When there is abuse of power by any of the branches, there is no victor, for a distortion of power works to the detriment of the whole government, which is constitutionally designed to function as an organic whole.

It will take some time for legal scholars to digest the Supreme Court’s decision but some views have begun to emerge from lawyers and non-lawyers alike (see Brown SEO, and The Philippine Experience and Dissenting Opinion). Not being a lawyer, I’m having to read and reread the decisions. But I do find Philippine Commentary’s argument convincing: The Fallacious Heart of Neri v. Senate is a False Distinction About the Powers of Legislation and Oversight.

But then, as I’ve said before, I subscribe to Woodrow Wilson’s view that Congress’ oversight power is actually more important than its law-making functions.

Read, too, what smoke has to say.

As for lawyers, I asked Atty. Edwin Lacierda, who teaches constitutional law, what his initial thoughts were and this is what he said:

It’s a really bad decision. It pays lip service to the doctrines laid down in Ermita and expands executive privilege to the detriment of legislative inquiry and right to public information.

What is awful with the decision is that the majority took as gospel truth the claim to executive privilege. This ran counter to the actual oral arguments where Atty. Bautista could not even specify how diplomatic relations with China would be damaged. Parang hindi nakikinig… sa oral arguments. The explanation of Bote was pathetic… If you go to the transcripts of the oral arguments, you will find Bote wanting and was demolished by the questions and arguments of Carpio, Puno et al.

In his blog, The Warrior Lawyer opines,

Of course, CJ Puno did not have the numbers.

This will allow Secretary Neri, and Malacanang, to sleep better at night as, unless the Court reverses itself upon motion by the losing respondents (an extremely remote possibility),Neri and members of the President’s official family now have the full weight of the Supreme Court behind their refusal to testify at future Senate hearings. Even if they appear, they will not provide the answers the Senate and the people are looking for and simply hide behind the skirts of executive privilege. Neri was a big fish that got away, leaving Jun Lozada and party high and dry.

Unless the Senate has another “surprise witness” in the wings, its investigation into the ZTE scandal is bound to run out of steam.

In his blog, A Simple Life, using a chess analogy, suggests everyone should pack it up and go home:

Three weeks ago, the essential pieces for the end game – the black rooks (senators) were busy playing arrogant by rejecting the SC compromise, and the white rooks (Supreme Court justices) were simply choosing not to get into play right away by deferring their decision on Neri’s petition.

Yesterday, the white rooks made a decisive move that caught the black rooks by surprise, a blitzkrieg move that crippled the black rooks and rendered them irrelevant towards the end game.

Since the white rooks have now effectively flanked the white king (Arroyo administration), and since the white knights (military and police) are still strategically positioned at the center of the board, ably supporting the white queen (Pres. Arroyo), the game now appears to be winnable for the white pieces.

However, since the black pawns (Lozada, et al.) and the other black pieces (anti-Arroyo groups) are still in a relentless, but ineffective checking mode (coup attempts, calls for resignations, interfaith rallies, Masses “for truth”, Senate inquiries “in aid of grandstanding”, media offensives, etc.), the game could still end in a draw – due to perpetual checking.

The black pieces should now concede to the futility of a perpetual check. It could go on forever, but it could lead to nowhere. We all should accept a mandated draw. Nobody won. We all lost somehow. The ZTE-NBN game is over.

So here we have two perspectives essentially in agreement on one thing: that the Senate hearings have been so seriously undercut as to be useless, though Warrior Lawyer thinks another witness could give the hearings a second wind while A Simple Life thinks it’s game over, folks.

But could it be that all it is, is yet another stalemate: too soon to tell if the stalemate is permanent, because no new fronts can open up? Not that all previous fronts haven’t resulted in a stalemate. They have.

Last August, Randy David, in Hello Garci and Philippine democracy , observed:

Both the generals and the Comelec officials have dared their accusers to bring them to court. They know, and everyone knows, that you need solid evidence for this — the kind of evidence that precisely only an authorized and empowered investigative body can put together. But whom should we turn to for this? The National Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice headed by Secretary Raul Gonzalez? The Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government headed by Secretary Ronaldo Puno?

No one trusts the independence of these government agencies, particularly when it involves Ms Arroyo. Together, Secretary Gonzalez and Secretary Puno have done more than any of their predecessors to undermine the autonomy and efficiency of the investigative and prosecutorial offices under them. This is the crux of our present institutional crisis. The imperatives of regime survival have assumed a higher priority over the integrity of our institutional system. The outcome of this has been the corruption of institutions. In turn, the weakening of our legal and administrative institutions has encouraged the politicization of almost all issues. This is what eventually turns the public against politics itself, paving the way for a government devoid of politics — a dictatorship.

What accounts for the Palace being able to hold the line?

The public insistence on constitutionality, when confronted by an unconstitutionally-inclined regime, requires those who oppose it to be in the situation of being in a boxing ring but fighting with one hand tied behind one’s back.

All the while duking it out with an opponent who is not only fighting with both hands, but who’s concealed horseshoes in both gloves. I explored this to some extent in A limited and limiting consensus last December.

I am continuously astounded by those who insist there’s no need to worry, because the present isn’t an exact duplicate of the past. Since Marcos isn’t being aped, the orangutangs in power must neither be Marcosian or up to Marcos’s tricks.

It is like saying, Marcos mugged democracy. Today, no one is bruised and bleeding, no one’s being mugged; everyone is walking around (within limits, but each limit is perfectly legal even if unprecedented!); therefore, there must be no mugging of democracy and if there’s no actual mugging, there’s no criminal, either. It ignores the changing nature of crime -and criminals. Why engage in mugging if you’ve perfected white collar crime?

It’s a perfect trap: if it doesn’t exactly act like Marcos, it can’t be a danger on par with that Marcos presented in the past; but even so: what is the alternative? The ultimate trump card. It justified the original sin -stealing the election in 2004 was excused as par for the course because it was preferable, anyway, to risking the defeat of the incumbent- and excuses every continuing crime on the basis of “I will wait ’till 2010!” And if, as I personally believe, 2010 finds her still in the saddle?

Well, that old trump card yet again: “Yes, but… who will replace her anyway?”

From my computer’s handy-dandy dictionary, comes what this perfect trap resembles:

Möbius strip |ˈmōbēəs|

noun

a surface with one continuous side formed by joining the ends of a rectangular strip after twisting one end through 180°.

Oh well.

Mon Casiple says the Supreme Court passed the buck -to the people:

The Supreme court decision further burdened the people with the responsibility of exercising sovereign direct democratic action in settling the political crisis. All the other power institutions have failed or are failing in enforcing the majority people’s will expressed time and again in surveys, street actions, and other fora of direct democracy.

People power is on the march but it will have to spread and broaden among the people even as it develops its leaders and constituency. It will not be a simple rally in EDSA or Makati but more of the same mobilization process reminiscent of the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship.

Given the required time for mobilization of the people, we are facing the real possibility of an extended political crisis in the coming months and years. The 2010 elections–far from a benign and normal democratic exercise–may be held within the context of tumultuous constitutional or extra-constitutional challenges. This may include attempts to force a constitutional change process designed to extend the power of the President, electoral machinations to have a pro-GMA presidential successor, desperate opposition moves to unseat the president, and a general political polarization.

It really depends, I suppose, on how serious one thinks the threat is, and whether the threat can be forestalled by playing for time, or playing to win. The Palace wants everyone to think that the country wins by playing for time; I think that the country loses if it plays for time, because the Palace is playing to win -and win big. But I also believe that most people want to think that the Palace wouldn’t -or won’t, or can’t- extend the game past the time limit.

Some people I talk to think that the minimum goal has already been met: that the President can’t stay in office past 2010. My response is if you believe that, well and good -then pack it up, right now, and hold your peace henceforth. the thing is, I can’t pack it up, because I’m personally convinced that the moment there’s a lull in the fighting, the trumpets will sound in the Palace and they will go on the offensive.

And part of me has the sinking feeling that those who claim they would be first in line the moment the President shows any inclination to stay on, won’t be hastening to the front.

Instead, they will shrug, and say…

“Well, she has a point. Who will replace her, anyway?”

A perfect trap. And a color of constitutionality is preserved throughout!

But then the color of constitutionality might be the only alternative for those unwilling to look down into the abyss.

A satirical look at the decision, courtesy of Uniffors.

Or, as Ricelander’s Blog puts it, satirically, too, it was a win-win:

Two souls are at stake, his and his President’s. He tells the truth, he damns his boss. He tells a lie, he damns his own. He can’t be too selfish taking care only of himself. His boss is such a nice woman.

How do you solve this dilemma, economist-style?

Well, throw the problem to an institution. An institution has no problem about souls. The Supreme Court is an institution; it has no soul… I mean, like that supposedly humans have. Perfect shield. He answers no question, he tells no lie, he tells no truth. Two souls saved— at no cost.

Speaking of souls, and so that I might as well close this on a more optimistic note, here is, first of all, a letter of endorsement from the Jesuit Provincial, Fr. Huang:Letter endorsing Guidelines, 3-25-08, final version.pdf

The letter serves as an introduction to the following, which makes for instructive reading:SJSA Commission Guidelines for Communal Discernment and Action.pdf I can say that it is an objective document that is worthy of widespread disseminationand consideration. Consider, for example, the following:

“How does one address the GMA problem?”

d. Call on GMA to resign. There are individuals and groups who have been calling for President Arroyo’s resignation since 2005 and continue to hold that position as a matter of principle. At that time, the CBCP itself recognized the call for the President’s resignation, as well as for a “Truth Commission” and impeachment, as legitimate options under the guiding principles of accountability, constitutionality, non-violence and effective governance. While the bishops did not call on President Arroyo to step down, they asked her to discern “to what extent she might have contributed to the erosion of effective governance and whether the erosion is so severe as to be irreversible.” Therefore, those who in conscience have made a decision that the President should not remain in office deserve respect. Their call for her to resign voluntarily is one of the options provided for in the Constitution. However, it also needs to be pointed out that while this position is one of principled moral conviction, it ceases to be a real political option if GMA remains resolute that she will not resign voluntarily.

e. Cabinet declaration of incapacity of the President. The Constitution provides that a majority of Cabinet members can declare in writing to the Senate President and the House Speaker that “the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his [her] office” (Article VII, Section 11). This is a constitutional way of removing a President who is seen to be physically or mentally incapacitated, but the meaning of this provision may be interpreted more broadly. This is one scenario for an “internal or Palace coup” within the GMA regime. But such decisions on regime change tend to be elitist, as they are dependent on so few people. This declaration can be challenged, however, by the President, in which case Congress may confirm the Cabinet decision by a two-thirds vote of the two houses of Congress voting separately. Note that this requirement is even more stringent than the one-third percentage required for the House of Representatives to send an impeachment complaint to the Senate for trial.

f. Oust GMA. When faced with the President’s refusal to resign voluntarily, those who are willing to push the demand for her to step down to the point of employing even extra-constitutional means must be reminded that democratic institutions may be harmed in the long-term, especially if a political vacuum is created for groups with an anti-democratic, adventurist or power-grabbing agenda to try to seize power and hold on to it indefinitely.

g. People Power. People power is a precious legacy from the struggle against the dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in the Philippines. EDSA I was the culmination of a long process of political education, organization and mobilization throughout the martial law years and especially during the nearly three years after the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino. Active nonviolence was a defining characteristic of EDSA People Power. It is enshrined in the Constitution, which values initiatives from below as a way of harnessing the direct participation of the people in politics and governance. In its current usage, however, it is problematic because it is often equated with popular insurrection and takeover as a method of regime change. This creates a dynamic where crisis situations continue to be resolved through extra-constitutional means which are not predictable, weaken democratic institutions and install leaders with questionable mandates. Thus an endless series of EDSA’s spells serious instability.

h. Snap elections. Any call for “snap elections” would be extra-constitutional, since there is no such provision in the present charter. What the Constitution provides for is the holding of “special elections,” should vacancies arise in the offices of both the President and the Vice President. Therefore, those who are advocating this option presume that both the President and Vice President will step down or will be made to do so. Moreover, special elections before 2010 without meaningful preparation and electoral reforms will only lead to a contest between those already entrenched in power and thus will not produce genuine change.

i. Military intervention. Some have called for an interventionist role of the military to effect regime change. While recognizing that there are reformminded members of the military who have a genuine concern for the good of the country, military intervention in whatever form must be eschewed, especially in the present context of a weak Philippine democracy. Allowing the military to become the arbiter to resolve political conflicts and stalemates undermines civilian supremacy, long-term democratization and political stability.

j. An Independent Counsel. Some have called for an independent institution with the credibility and capacity for investigating and prosecuting government corruption at the highest levels. This proposal has been made because some see the Senate investigations as partisan, while the Ombudsman is overloaded with corruption cases and is perceived as partial to the government in power, given its recent track record. For this option to prosper, however, three difficult issues need to be addressed: (i) creating such a body through a law approved by Congress, (ii) defining the scope of its power and responsibilities, especially in relation to the Ombudsman, and (iii) giving it real autonomy, particularly from the President, who would be the appointing official.

k. Impeachment. This mechanism is provided for by the Constitution to exact accountability from the President. It is also a way by which allegations can be verified, thus giving the President a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend herself. However, impeachment will only work if people are willing to participate actively in pushing for and making sure that this process is effective (e.g. sustained lobbying, pressuring their representatives in Congress to prioritize the search for truth and accountability). Thus, it can provide excellent opportunities for active political participation, especially for citizens outside Metro Manila.

And its nine-point action agenda (along with the whole document), merits our attention, too:

Action Points

7. It is precisely during times of great upheavals and crises that the call to hope becomes more urgent. Desperation and cynicism cannot be allowed to eat up people’s inner resources. To move forward from this crisis means identifying and pursuing specific forms of action, such as: (a) joining circles of ongoing reflection and discernment, and efforts at political education and organization, including training in anti-corruption advocacy (Ehem) and active nonviolence; (b) supporting institutional efforts to get to the truth and creating a broader climate of truth-telling which encourages and protects whistleblowers; (c) joining activities that promote accountability; (d) articulating long-term ideals and policies for national political reform; and (e) establishing sectoral and multi-sectoral organizations and networks to promote dialogue and concerted action.

Concretely, eight action areas fall within the range of options which are consistent with the principles identified above, especially the need to build strong democratic institutions and promote engaged citizenship for socio-political reform:

a. Support for the ongoing Senate investigation of the ZTE-NBN case not only to bring out the whole truth on matters of public interest but also to strengthen the institutional system of checks and balances that seek to prevent the abuse of power.

b. Creation of a credible Independent Counsel, in order to ferret out the veracity of various allegations and promote accountability within the judicial system, in which unfortunately many of the official institutions are seen as severely compromised politically. Thus there is a need for an institutional venue and mechanism that will be viewed as autonomous of the government currently in power and free of the antics of traditional politicians.

c. Initiation of a genuine impeachment process, particularly by pressuring Representatives in the House to hold the President accountable for serious violations of public trust if there are sufficient bases for doing so.

d. Pursuit of reforms towards government transparency in all its transactions, especially in processes like procurement, decisions on loans, development projects, social reforms, and on issues such as mining, energy and land use that have a profound impact on poor communities and the environment. There is a need to ensure rigorous implementation of laws and policies, the institutionalization of a culture of social accountability, free access to information, and the enhanced participation of civil society in governance decisions at all levels.

e. Promotion of electoral reforms to ensure the conduct of clean, honest, and credible elections in 2010, including the revamp of the Comelec, beginning with the appointment and confirmation of commissioners of unquestioned integrity and competence; the modernization of the electoral system; the eradication of warlordism; the monitoring of campaign finance and expenditure; and the continuing political education of voters.

f. Search for worthy candidates and potential leaders, parties/coalitions and platforms for 2010, through positive preparations, planning and strategizing. This would mean clarifying political values and development priorities, candidate selection and recruitment, resource mobilization, and political organizing.

g. Organization of and support for basic sectors, to enable them to have a real say in democratic processes and to address the urgent needs of economic development and social justice.

h. Engagement of the youth in current issues, through political education, organization and mobilization for democratic institution-building, lobbying for transparency and accountability, policy reform, and involvement in electoral politics.

8. These specific and concrete calls for action are not isolated and discrete but are precisely interconnected in a framework that seeks to promote truth, accountability and reform. They address gross injustices in the country through active citizen participation that will support and be supported by efforts at political education, organization, mobilization and network-building in order to strengthen and transform democratic political institutions under the Constitution.

Responding to the Call for Communal Discernment, Conversion and Action

9. We offer these guidelines as a response to the call of our bishops for “circles of discernment” to “pray together, reason together, decide together, act together.” We trust that these reflections help clarify the context, principles and options for people – especially the youth – who seek to respond in action to the current crisis rather than succumb to the temptations of despair. For as Pope Benedict XVI has said, “All serious and upright human conduct is hope in action” (Spe Salvi 35).

Read it and weep

ABS-CBNNews Online (with SC rules Arroyo-Neri talks on NBN are secret ) and GMANews.tv (with It’s 9 vs 6: SC favors Neri’s plea vs ZTE probe – sources ) out scooped Inquirer.net on the Supreme Court’s decision on the Neri case. The GMANews.tv report boils down the case as follows:

Neri, who filed the suit in his capacity as former director of the National Economic Development Authority, claimed that the three questions posed to him during his first and only Senate appearance last year were privileged communications covered by the principle of executive privilege and which can only be divulged during an executive session.

The three questions are whether the President followed up the NBN-ZTE project with Neri; whether he was told by the President to prioritize the NBN-ZTE project; and whether the President told him to go ahead with the project after learning of the massive bribe offer.

Neri’s invocation of executive privilege on these questions had prompted senators to cite him for contempt. The Senate also issued an arrest warrant against Neri after he refused to attend the inquiry into the NBN-ZTE deal.

Inquirer.net’s report, SC: Neri can invoke executive privilege, summarizes the decision as follows:

Commission on Higher Education chairman Romulo Neri can invoke executive privilege and cannot be compelled to answer three questions the Senate feels is crucial to getting to the bottom of the scandal-tainted national broadband network (NBN) deal, the Supreme Court has ruled.

Voting 6-9, the justices also ruled that the Senate cannot cite Neri or anyone in contempt because the rules of procedure of the 14th Congress had not been published, Supreme Court spokesman Jose Midas Marquez said.

The breakdown (according ABS-CBNNews’s report), the ponente and the voting was as follows:

The majority ruling was penned by SC Associate Justice Teresita de Castro.

She was supported in her decision by Associate Justices Renato Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Presbitero Velasco, Antonio Nachura, Dante Tinga, Arturo Brion, Leonardo Quisumbing, and Ruben Reyes.

The six who dissented were: Chief Justice Reynato Puno; Associate Justices Antonio Carpio, Adolfo Azcuna, Conchita Carpio-Morales, Alicia Martinez, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.

Associate Justice Ynares-Santiago was actually on leave during today’s deliberations, but she left her dissenting vote.

It’s interesting to note that the the ponente wasn’t Justice Velasco, as originally reported; and that the freshly-appointed Justice, Brion, voted -and in favor of the government. In his blog, lawyer Teddy Te, Vincula, has something to say about the voting:

There is an unsurprising lack of shame in Brion voting on a petition where he did not participate and where popular sentiment held that his appointment was precisely to forestall the effects of a Velasco inhibition. There is also an uncharacteristic lack of delicadeza in De Castro writing for the majority, where her appointment was clearly seen as a reward for convicting Estrada.

This vote, coming on the heels of the 10-4 vote in the Chavez decision, shows just how much headway the Gloria appointees are making in controlling the court. If she lasts until 2010, Gloria Arroyo would have appointed all but one of the Justices (Puno is the exception; but since she appointed Puno Chief Justice, technically she could be considered to have appointed all the Justices).

How’s that for separation of powers? Checks and balances, anyone?

Both parts of the decision, are possibly highly controversial. The reasons why can be gleaned from the March 10 column Fr. Joaquin Bernas wrote, Anatomy of a rejected compromise,

But from the way the Puno Court has been waging a campaign for the protection of rights through the writ of habeas corpus, the writ of amparo and the writ of habeas data, I should not see the Court as being willing to be an instrument for the enfeeblement of democratic institutions.

What then do I hope to see?

I hope to see witnesses coming forward when summoned as witnesses and answering questions asked and, where proper, claiming that the President has instructed them to claim executive privilege.

I hope to see such witnesses being required to elucidate on what privilege they are claiming and submitting such claim for judgment by the Court, if need be, in chambers.

I am confident that the Court will be able to examine the claims presented before it and sift what is truly privileged and what is an attempt to hide wrongdoing.

Among the roles of the judiciary is the exercise of the power of judicial review. The power is a two-edged sword. It can either legitimize or exorcise. Thus in the current controversy the Court will either legitimize the power of the Senate to compel a witness who refuses to heed a subpoena and in the process rebuff Neri and his superior’s resistance to the Senate; or it will legitimize Neri’s refusal to testify and in the process clip the power of the Senate to compel defiant witnesses.

The Senate had occasion in 1950 to detain an uncooperative witness in Arnault v. Nazareno. But in that case Arnault was already before the Senate.

The Neri case now is different. The Senate already had him the first time, but they let him go, and Neri now is saying “Catch me, if you can.” Will the Court help the Senate?

Apparently not. In his blog, Philippine Commentary was predicting a decision in favor of Neri, but doesn’t mince words as to the implications of such a decision:

I cannot imagine a more compleat and disastrous demolition of the Separtion of Powers and a curtailment of the Public’s Very Right to Know what their government is doing than this 9-6 decision of the Supreme Court. We are now under an effective Dictatorship of Judicial and Executive Privilege in which the principle of Checks and Balances is no more.

Philippine Commentary supports new legislation patterned after American whistleblower laws, for the following reasons as he explained iin a previous entry.

The decision hasn’t been published on line, yet, so it remains to be seen whether it will go down as one of those decisions that maintain “a color of constitutionality” but which ends up placing the high court in disrepute. For now, The Mount Balatucan Monitor may be premature but not necessarily wrong.

It all hinges on whether the Supremes have enabled executive privilege to help cover up crimes, something that past jurisprudence was held to forbid (see my columns, A color of constitutionality and It’s how you play the game). Up to today, it was a given that the ultimate veto on executive privilege was that in matters involving crimes, executive privilege couldn’t be invoked.

It will be interesting to see what the Supreme Court’s arguments in its decision will be. I understand that the decision is over 100 pages! Anyway, Phoenix Eyrie, Reloaded finds it interesting.

Here is the decision and the dissenting opinions: Index of G.R. No. 180643, Romulo L. Neri Vs. Senate Committee, et al.

Meanwhile, an indication of where public opinion lies, is Arroyo trust, approval ratings down while Opposition senators top latest Pulse Asia survey.

Steam jet boat for the Philippines

Intriguing story in Ahead of her time: Woman, 94, remembers earlier life as a fireman on Lake Michigan boat.

The interdiction of a witness

Even as Cardinal says Lozada’s forgiven , my column for today is The interdiction of a witness, which took its cue from yesterday’s Inquirer editorial, A nation of lost sheep. For additional background, see the Sun Star Cebu article, Cardinal explains ’secret meeting’. What’s the worth of a Mass, anyway? I Believe 101 offers up a reflection. Meanwhile, Philippine Commentary reacts to my column and says it’s an exercise in futility. On a related note, see Red’s Herring and smoke.

Today’s Inquirer editorial, Easter settlement, praises the Sumilao farmers and San Miguel Corporation for what it hopes will be a successful settlement of the farmers’ case; and along the way praises Gaudencio Cardinal Rosales for brokering the deal.

The Malaya editorial, Abuse of executive privilege is the issue, alerts the public to the expected handing down, tomorrow, of a decision on the Neri executive privilege case, by the Supreme Court. I’ve written about this case in A color of constitutionality and It’s how you play the game; the scuttlebutt, for a time, was that the Palace was confident it would get its way, and so the President was prepared to hold off appointing a new justice; but then she made the appointment anyway, which was taken by some to be an indication she wanted to improve her administration’s odds. As it is, New SC justice’s first test of independence: Neri case.

There’s an interesting article in the Philippine Star, Palace has yet to submit Melo appointment papers, on how Congress claims it shouldn’t be criticized for not confirming Justice Melo as Comelec Chairman, when the President hasn’t submitted his appointment for confirmation. What’s noteworthy (and praiseworthy) is that Melo’s refused to occupy the position until he is confirmed.

Even as Pacquiao saddened by doubts on WBC win , I’d like to point out an interesting comparison made by John Neri between the President and PacMan. See Manny Pacquiao’s lesson in legitimacy :

Can Philippine politics learn anything from Pacquiao’s legitimacy issue?

…I thought each fighter won six rounds, with Pacquiao edging Marquez only because of the additional point from the third-round knockdown. In other words, it could have gone either way, but by the rules of the game it went in Pacquiao’s direction. No, it wasn’t a convincing win. It certainly did not put paid to the two boxers’ “unfinished business.” And it did nothing to improve Pacquiao’s pound-for-pound rankings. But do all these make his victory illegitimate? Our answers tell us more about ourselves, and about what we think of the fighters, than about the fight.

As for Pacquiao’s political patron: The President’s continuing crisis of legitimacy stemmed from her felt need to post a convincing victory in 2004. Her troubles started when she became unwilling to risk a close decision.

And then, there’s this analysis of the damned if you do and damned if you don’t nature of corruption case prosecution, courtesy of Steven Rood, in In the Philippines: Just Another Week of Anti-Corruption (hat tip, The Daily PCIJ):

The Sandiganbayan has penalized almost 1,200 public officials for administrative and disciplinary offenses from 2004 to 2006, she added.

Other measurements of corruption have indeed shown progress throughout the years. The price of textbooks in the Department of Education has been reduced, as has the price of medicines procured by cities where The Asia Foundation works to improve governance in cooperation with the city governments themselves, as well as local chambers of commerce and NGOs. Other data come from regular Social Weather Stations surveys of businessmen, which had the percentage of businessmen reporting the payment of bribes for local government permits declining from 55% in 2000 to 40% in 2007. Similarly, the percentage who reported having to pay bribes in the payment of income taxes declined from 52% in 2000 to 33% in 2007. We can say that those percentages (40% for local permits, 33% for paying taxes) is still too high, but we cannot deny that progress has been made.

And yet the PERC, based on a survey of expatriates thoughout Asia in early 2008, arrived at its gloomy judgment. This leads us beyond the realm of technical progress into that of political controversy, which can drive perceptions.

The PERC report summarizes:

“The Philippines is a sad case when it comes to corruption. The actual magnitude of the problem is bad, but it is probably no worse than in places like Indonesia and Thailand. However, it has been politicized as an issue more than in either of these countries, used by political rivals to undercut each other.”

And, this is all well-publicized since “… the media, even more than the courts, is the forum in which all sides try to wage their battles of defamation.”

All the statistics about progress against bureaucratic corruption – no matter how beneficial that progress is for the citizens of the Philippines – tend not to be perceived in the middle of political turmoil, which is beginning to seem (at least in the media) to be a permanent feature of the Philippines (the WBI’s “political stability” index has plunged precipitously in recent years).

This politicization of anti-corruption activities in the Philippines has long been a problem. More than a decade ago, PCAGC (Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption) Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo stated that every corruption complaint forwarded to his office was politically motivated. When such charges are used as part of the struggle for political advantage, the public can become cynical, believing that all officials are alike and nothing will change.

To fight this cynicism, people want to see the conviction of a “big fish” to demonstrate progress against corruption. While we might have hoped that the “plunder” conviction of President Estrada would count as such an achievement, the fact that he was pardoned and has since vigorously protested that he is innocent means that this goal was not really achieved. Anti-corruption civil society organizations often have a list of particular cases in which they are interested and for which they track the progress. They focus on those cases as a means of demonstrating that prosecution reinforces other tactics – preventing corruption and promoting a graft-intolerant culture – so that a holistic approach against corruption can be effective. Frustratingly for the Ombudsman, the fact that charges have been filed against Undersecretaries, Deputy Commissioners, or provincial governors does not seem to count as “catching big fish” in the public eye.

And, when the Ombudsman’s office did move on the most publicized recent case, the so-called ZTE-NBN scandal about allegations of an overpriced computer network subject to bribes that involved (again, allegedly) the Chair of the Commission on Elections and the President’s husband, the effort was attacked as “grandstanding” or as part of a cover-up.

In the atmosphere of a vigorous media in which charges of corruption are always highlighted, anti-corruption agencies are in a very difficult position. If agencies like the Ombudsman are not in the media, are not visibly taking action, they can be accused of doing nothing. On the other hand, if they do take action and publicly move forward on a particular case, they are immediately attacked as part of the “battles of defamation.” This is a classic case of “damned if you do and damned if you don’t.”

So, the glass is definitely half full – the Philippines is at the 57th percentile of comparator nations. International agencies issue conflicting assessments of the state of corruption in the Philippines. The Ombudsman and others point to measurable progress against corruption as they undertake efforts to ensure the glass doesn’t become any emptier. Absent “big fish” sitting in jail, opposition reactions range from disappointment to skepticism to outright disbelief.

Overseas, historian David Kaiser in his blog History Unfolding, looks at Barak Obama’s recent speech on race, and says it marks a turning point in American political history:

When I read, and then watched, his speech last Tuesday, I thought it was the most effective speech of the last 45 years or so, an extraordinarily honest attempt both to define the racial crisis (in large part, a crisis of beliefs and opinions, as I have tried to show) in the United States, and to try to move beyond it. When Obama referred to the bigoted remarks of his white grandmother, I also smiled to myself because of the kinship that I (as the product of a religiously mixed marriage) felt with him. We half-breeds, I said to myself, can’t be trusted—we have no allegiance to anything but principles and we’ll rat out anybody. (Our existence, too, is a living rebuke to bigotry. Take it from me, no one can hate bigotry more than those of us who know that if everyone were a bigot, we would never have been born.) But I admit that when I actually watched Reverend Wright’s now-notorious clips yesterday, I was shaken, both with respect to Obama’s judgment and with respect to my own ability to be consistent. Would I, I asked myself, be willing to accept as reasonable the candidacy of a Republican who for many years had attended a church whose pastor railed against godless feminists and homosexuals?

I would be most unlikely to vote for such a person, of course, simply because he or she was a Republican—but eventually something else occurred to me. If that candidate (let’s call him John Smith) were to make a speech repudiating those views, specifically likening them to extreme views on the other side of the political fence, and arguing that the United States has to reject such views to move forward as a nation, I would certainly respect him. And as I write those views another thought occurs to me. Such a candidate could never be nominated by the Republican Party in 2008. That was why Mitt Romney could not simply claim a right to be a Mormon, but had to add the standard Republican nonsense about the eternal place of religion in the American public square. The Democratic Party remains the more tolerant party, and Obama simply extended its tolerance to the expression of views like Reverend Wright’s, which, as he said himself, are unfortunately common among blacks. Obama genuinely offered a way out of the box we have been living in for forty years. His opponents have not.

The Asia Sentinel looks at the two Chinas in Taiwan’s Kuomintang Return to Power and The Tibet Riots: Hu Jintao is the Biggest Loser. An article in Foreign Affairs, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, says the West can come to terms with a resurgent China; and note to self, this book looks intriguing: The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistable Shift of Global Power to the East.

In economics-related news, another article, Life Gets Tough for Asia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds , makes for interesting reading. On a related note, Slate provides Recession Literature, a reading list. On a domestic note, Is RP doing well? Jury is still out, says think tank.

The Long View: The interdiction of a witness

The Long View
The interdiction of a witness 

 

By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 01:01:00 03/24/2008

 

MANILA, Philippines – When Ricardo Cardinal Vidal was recently taken to task for showing partiality to the President, his critics were taken to task in turn. The whole thing has taken a regrettable emotional toll on the Cardinal and his defenders.

Due deference is owed the good Cardinal as the spiritual father of the Cebuanos. But whether president, prince of the church, or pauper, in matters that involve the public good, a democratic citizenry must put the lowest premium on respecting hierarchy. Respect the office, yes; respect the principles the office ought to represent most of all.

What must be paramount is for our spiritual shepherds to realize how they have been co-opted by political wolves.

The present administration handles the hierarchy in the same manner it handles congressmen. For this reason, anyone who objects to calling prelates “congressmen in cassocks” should lodge a complaint, not with those who say it, but with the Palace that made the comparison possible.

No other administration ever contemplated or needed a Religious Affairs Office; no other president needed a Dodi Limcaoco, a Nena Valdes, or those with a roving commission like Medy Poblador or Mike Defensor, to name just a few, to coordinate with the hierarchy the way the PLLO coordinates with congressmen. No previous president needed to dispense state funds to Catholic dioceses and charities by handing out envelopes or placing ads on Radio Veritas or involving the PCSO and other agencies in such a politically systematic fashion through the bishops.

Our prelates know their moral theology; they know how to receive patronage without sinning. In these poisonous times, these are acts, though, that serve to place the Church in disrepute.

When Cardinal Vidal met the President in Wack Wack Golf Course and discussed jobs, when he allowed Cerge Remonde to address his gathered clergy in a retreat, when he forbade the clergy from signing petitions, and when he and other prelates met officials in Malacañang, everyone needs to understand that from the point of view of the prelates concerned, what they did was licit.

But the hierarchy needs to understand how the public can view it as an illicit effort, at the very least, on the part of government, for such illicit behavior benefits the government politically. A political act of generosity always has a price, and it is a fine line that separates the naïve from the saints. If you will deal with the devil, you had better have the strength of an archangel. And this is why the generosity of the President, and her politically-shrewd operators, serves to divide and confuses the public, Catholic and non-Catholic alike.

It also sends the wrong signal to overzealous subordinates.

When Cardinal Vidal was criticized for supposedly issuing instructions to the clergy to deny the Mass to Jun Lozada, the Cardinal denied ever issuing such instructions. I believe him.

Undoubtedly no memorandum was ever signed—but then again no one ever said the instructions had been given in written form. He didn’t need to issue any instructions, because his past actions are as unambiguous as any human act can be. For when he allowed Remonde to address the assembled priests of the archdiocese, approved the handing out of a government-prepared primer on NBN-ZTE, forbade petitions and interceded for schoolteachers with the President, the clergy knew right there and then on which side their archbishop stood—and assumed they’d be expected to act accordingly.

No need for instructions, no need for prohibitions; once Cardinal Vidal showed partiality his priests took the cue: and as subordinates tend to do, probably with greater zeal than the Cardinal ever imagined. It wouldn’t surprise me if perhaps a priest or two, to salve his own conscience, maligned his Cardinal by whispering to angry nuns that they would not say Mass because the Cardinal said so—when he only implied and was never explicit about denying anyone the Mass. This is how our culture works: the boss winks, and everyone beneath him does the nudging.

Whether implied or explicit, the consequences of the Cardinal’s behavior were grave. For the display of archiepiscopal partiality essentially placed an Interdict (“a sentence barring a person, or esp. a place, from ecclesiastical functions and privilege”) on Lozada, a sanction of the Church almost at the level of an Excommunication.

And here lies the question at the heart of the criticisms against Cardinal Vidal: not even Marcos faced such ecclesiastical sanctions.

For this reason, it is fair to appeal to the Cardinal to confront the questions that have been raised, and not by means of an appeal to his authority. If no one can question the desire of the clergy to uphold the Mass as a sacrament, what needs to be questioned is whether there’s Christian justice in denying the Mass to anyone, knowing that denial represents the highest and most fearsome sanction in the power of the episcopacy. What is his discernment? Does he remain neutral? If not, why not?

Let the shepherd speak. Politicians allied with the President are not the Cebuano people. The clergy of Cebu is not the Catholic Church in Cebu. There were Cebuanos who wanted to hear Jun Lozada for themselves, to judge him, for good or ill. That some of Lozada’s supporters treated a heckler violently and discourteously is what should have provoked holy anger from the Cebuano clergy, united with their Cardinal-archbishop.

Cardinal Vidal knows full well that the CBCP has already declared NBN-ZTE, and everything else, to be a national concern. The people of Cebu deserve more than an insistence on the feudal belief that presidential sins of omission and commission are acceptable so long as patronage for the province keeps rolling in.

Book of the Week

“A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic: The First Years, 1946-1961″ (Milton Walter Meyer)

Holy Week reflection: The civic imperative

Whether in A complex achievement, in Elections are like water, and Circle to circle or most recently, in The perpetual avoidance of opportunity,a great concern of mine has been not only to come to grips with the present crisis, but by discovering its origins, to propose a framework that will enable concerned citizens to arrive at a consensus for solutions.

My column yesterday was The civic imperative: a reflection. For some time now, I’ve been returning, again and again, to Titus Livy’s summation of the exhaustion of Rome:

Here are the questions to which I should like every reader to give his close attention: what life and morals were like; through what men and what policies, in peace and in war, empire was established and enlarged. Then let him note how, with the gradual relaxation of discipline, morals first subsided, as it were, then sank lower and lower, and finally began the downward plunge which has brought us to our present time, when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure.

Of course there are morals and there are morals; there is sectarian morality and what should be preferable, a civic sense.

For over a year now, one of the many projects that are simmering away on the backburner because of so many reasons, is a compilation of reflections on the various civic-consciousness raising projects of the past. As it stands, roughly, the book would look like this: the text of a civic code, and a reflection on it. So, Rizal’s Constitution of La Liga Filipina, with an essay by Dean Jorge Bocobo; the Kartilya of the Katipunan, with an essay by Conrado de Quiros; Mabini’s True Decalogue, with an essay by Randy David; Quezon’s Code of Citizenship and Ethics (thinking of an essay by F. Sionil Jose, but haven’t asked); Laurel’s Citizen’s Code of Rights and Obligations (no idea yet, who to ask); the Magsaysay Credo, with an essay by Eggie Apostol; and Alex Lacson’s Twelve Little Things Every Filipino Can Do To Help Our Country, with an essay by Willy Prilles.

The genesis of the project was an experiment I conducted with college students from different Catholic schools to whom I presented copies of these codes, and who I then asked to reflect on them. First of all, they were unfamiliar with all of them; second, the concepts of citizen’s rights and obligations incorporated in most of the codes was an alien concept to them; as were the pretty basic principles of good citizenship and so on that the codes espoused. We then had a vigorous discussion on the relevance of the codes, and from time to time, I’ve tried repeating the experiment with other student groups I’ve encountered.

This was further underscored when, during the campaign against the Palace-proposed constitutional amendments, I found myself having to conduct a 3-hour discussion on the basics of our constitutional set-up instead of doing what I was supposed to do, which was pitch the case for One Voice. And afterwards, I overheard one priest tell another, “you know, maybe we should teach the students about the constitution.”

You think!? I wanted to scream at him. But I didn’t but instead, encouraged him to take it up with his faculty. The point being, never has the citizenry been so ignorant not only of its obligations, but its rights; and never has the workings of government, even in the ideal sense, been so obscure and mysterious to the public.

And all the more the need to inform, when, it (change, improvement, discussion, debate, consensus, whatever) always begins with a few but the few blaze a trail for the many: see Letter From Vietnam.

For, as Mon Casiple says, the country faces hard choices:

What we see is a presidency in the midst of fighting for its very survival. The pressure won’t let up–the awakening of the middle class will not permit it. The timidity and the self-interest of power institutions may prolong its life but certainly things will not go back to normal governance anymore. The next two years of the GMA presidency–if it reached that far–will be a constant crisis presidency.
The lines have been drawn on the streets of Makati and elsewhere. This situation leads inexorably to a political polarization. Either GMA gives way or she has to assert the power. Every democratic institution will become a battleground or will have to give way. At the end, she is confronted with the constitutional end to her term.
Will she abide by it? There is a great doubt about it. Since holding on to the power has become the sine qua non of her survival, the logical path for her is to continue beyond 2010.
Only a constitutional change process can give even a modicum of legitimacy to this decision. Thus, even if the obstacles are almost insurmountable, she may opt for it in desperation. From this perspective, the 2006 failed charter change initiatives are lessons towards another try, not lessons to stop.
Of course, this time she had more obstacles–an awakened and hostile citizenry and the political forces gearing up for the 2010 elections. Only a martial law regime–as in the case of Marcos–will have the remote chance of carrying it off.
GMA may still opt to negotiate her way out of the crisis. Those who want to manage the transition from her regime are avidly waiting and working for it. For them, the popular movement is useful as an instrument of pressure but not as the decisive instrument for her ouster. She will, of course, as a minimum condition ask for immunity or protection from the suits that are certain to be filed against her once she is out of power.
The presidentiables are also a target in this negotiation scenario. However, they run the risk of being identified with an unpopular president and thus the probability of losing in the presidential race. On the other hand, it is no secret that the presidential access to government resources and the prospect of a ready-made campaign machinery in the ruling coalition are tempting to these presidentiables.
The option to resign is now basically only a function of the popular pressure to oust her. It has been a logical–if unspoken–end to the search for truth being pursued by many in the church sector and others in the middle class. However, the actuations of Malacañang do not support the scenario of a voluntary resignation.

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