When peace comes

See Quezon Beach, Patikul. Via Sulu History.

Book of the Week

“Call of the Mall: The Geography of Shopping by the Author of Why We Buy” (Paco Underhill)

Victory of the New Society

In today’s Inquirer editorial, the paper thinks the government’s trying to politicize the price of gas; this reflects the attitude of people like Norwegian Would who think we’ve moved forward since the days of subsidized oil:

It is now close to a decade since we finally smashed the old illusion that oil price subsidies were pro-poor, perpetuated for a long time by the middle and upper class leaders of so-called ‘people’s organizations.’ Note that at that time nominal prices were below 20 dollars per barrel. Now the high is about five times. But we don’t hear of any outrageous manifestos that the increase is caused by the local ruling class in conspiracy with foreign capitalists, do we?

Despite its moderate optimism, the Inquirer’s Sunday editorial proved prophetic, in a sense, as it warned of the consequences if politicking intruded into the Batasan bombing investigation too early. The news reported Ermita clears Salapuddin on Batasan blast which led to backpedaling on his part, today: Palace executive says he did not clear Salapuddin. But the damage has been done: as Senator Genaro Magsaysay famously said, “less talk, less mistake.” The dangers of higher-ups saying something were obvious to begin with.

Last Thursday I had a chance to run into Rep. Roilo Golez whose observations, however, made sense to me. He said that if assassination was the aim, then the opportunity presents itself in two places: where the target lives, and where the target works (incidentally, on Wahab Akbar, see Torn and Frayed and Sidetrip with Howie Severino).

Add to this, he said, the fact that we don’t have a suicide bomber culture, and that includes killers intent on killing themselves, too. So an assassin would make saving his own hide a high priority. This limits the opportunities, Golez said. Between home and work, the target’s convoy would make assassination difficult. You’d expect home to be well secured. But work -well, in the case of Akbar, the opportunity was there, particularly as he seemed to have suffered from a false sense of security while at the House, leaving by the same entrance like clockwork. An assassin, Golez observed, would run the risk of being gunned down after shooting his target, unless he was capable of making the 300 meter dash to the main entrance before anyone noticed what had happened. This means, if a getaway is important to the assassin, a bomb would be best. The other possibility, that the bombing was undertaken by a rogue element within the military, is a possibility Golez’s very uncomfortable with. No such inhibitions from Inner Sanctum.

Still, Amando Doronila says Blaming Abus was convenient for probers while Uniffors remains puzzled by the use of a bomb to do something small arms fire could have accomplished.

Scriptorium says the bombing raises three questions (read the whole entry, particularly his belief our society isn’t about to fall apart, just yet):

First, how could they think to do it?  For while the legislators are not deemed epitomes of integrity–and in recent years, in fact, the Lower House has seemed lower still, a very expensive rubber stamp fit for a Queen–, they are legislators nonetheless, anointed with the ill-used but still real dignity of representing the nation in its districts and sectors; and an attack on them remains, by constitutional fiction, an attack on us.  The bombing was therefore not only an attempt at mass murder–or perhaps at simple murder with multiple collateral casualties–but a national lese majeste, an brazen act of political sacrilege that makes us shudder for its confidence and contempt.

This takes us to the 2nd concern: Who then is safe?  If our legislators with their security force and phalanxes of bodyguards can be attacked at the very center of their power, then what of us–who, when we ride the trains and enter the malls, have only private guards to keep us unharmed, searching our bags for bombs they would hardly recognize, shielding us more from comfort than from danger?  The Glorietta “gas explosion” was bad enough; and even as we continue our daily routines, we know that we’ve gone back to the second lowest step of Maslow’s hierarchy (if, that is, we ever left it, or ever ascended from the first).  One can hardly blame the tourists and investors for staying away, for they have a choice.  We have none, and must go as before, though perhaps adding a prayer for safety to our morning rituals. 

The 3rd concern proceeds from the foregoing: What next?  Was this but the first ledge of a descending cascade of violence, unleashed by maybe Maoists, Islamists, Arroyoists, or random thugs?  Will our government seize on it as an excuse to formally impose martial law, which it has proven all-too-willing to do for the most intangible reasons?  In this light, though the intentions behind the attack are still uncertain, and its economic and social results remain to be seen, the needed policy response is already clear: For the sake of the nation and its people, the violence must be halted now, and its real perpetrators must be identified  and prosecuted as soon as possible–but the means used must not, through excess, threaten to destroy the very ideals they seek to protect.  More anon, perhaps, when more facts come to light.

More questions are raised by Postcard Headlines. But Mon Casiple asks the real question on everyone’s mind: are they Coincidences or real political moves? He’s a bit ambiguous on this score:

At the moment, the political situation points to the imperative on the president to make a decisive decision soon on which path she will take to ensure her own survival beyond 2010. The name of the game right now is called “transition management.”

She does not have much time left for her to decide (and make this public) since all the options require long and difficult preparations. All the interested political actors–within and outside her ruling coalition, local as well as foreign–know this. All are exerting pressure to push their own agenda and–the jackpot–to be the one to manage the transition.

Of course, GMA may not really leave the scene–witness her pronouncements on a charter change initiative. There are some in her coalition who wants to use the charter change to extend her term in power (and their own) and they are moving heaven and civil society to make this happen.

However, the chances for this are slim, unless her administration scatters the opposition and unleashes white terror on civil society. The desperate temptation to declare martial law or a state of emergency stem from the reality of a people’s resistance to charter change under GMA’s tutelage.

It is a coincidence that dramatic events such as the Batasan bombing, the Dalaig assassination, or the Glorietta incident occur one after the other in this moment of political conjuncture. Still-unfolding events will show whether these are real coincidences or planned moves in a game of political strategy.

Meanwhile, bureaucratic intramurals: Battle looms over control of Justice.

Overseas, see Malaysia Demos: Sound and Fury, Signifying Little in Asia Sentinel.

My column for today is The future’s bright (and thanks to the San Jose-Recoletos student publications editor-in-chief, who blogs at ~~peAceOuS viCioUs~~ for her kind words). On a Visayas-related note, see Boljoon Dig part 1 and Boljoon Dig part 2, in CAFFiend, on some remarkable archeological diggings there. Interesting entries, on provincial history, in Kanlaon and A Nagueño in the Blogosphere. Interesting notes, too, in The Magnificent Atty. Perez, referring to the Iloilo-Cebu connection.

Elsewhere in the blogosphere, I failed to read Blackshama’s Blog’s reaction to my columns on Marcos. But now that I have, you know, I’m working on a theory. Marcos established a New Society as the dominant discourse: it justified the scrapping of the liberal-democratic order created in 1935; and it was,actually, the justification for Edsa 1 and even Edsa Dos -and explains the refusal of what was once Marcos’ strongest constituency, the middle and upper classes frightened by Communism, to be politically engaged since 2005. Neither Edsa created a New Society, so why bother?

Think of it. Sift through all the reasons people give for not being politically active since 2005 (never mind examples of extreme social alienation, as shown in , or of guilt, as expressed by Hello Tiger Kitty), sift through the things people enumerate as everything wrong with this country (oligarchy, etc.) and then sift through what they want -basically, a Year Zero- and  where it might be headed (a swing to the Right, suggests Ren’s Public Notebook) what do you have?

Ang Bagong Lipunan!

Another idea to explore is described in History Unfolding’s entry on Politics and Fourth Turnings:

William Strauss and Neil Howe, who wrote Generations and The Fourth Turning, divided American history into periods of approximately 80 years, called saeculums (Latin for a long human life.) In turn they divided each such period into four “turnings,” a High, an Awakening, an Unraveling and a Crisis. After the civil war crisis, the High lasted approximately from 1867 to 1885, the Awakening from about 1885 to 1905, the Unraveling until 1929 or so, and the crisis through 1945. In our own time the High ran from 1945 to 1965, the Awakening from then until the mid-1980s, the Unraveling from about 1985 until. . .sometime in the last 8 years.

This is a concept that resonates with me, because I approached recent events along similar (though not as intricate) lines in.

The Marocharim Experiment on the sociology of dance moves. It’s sad to note Patsada Karajaw has vanished from the blogosphere.

Technorati Tags: Blogging, books, constitution, economy, Edsa, history, House of Representatives, Marcos, media, military, mindanao, philippines, politics, society

Presidents at play

Presidents at play, by Filemon Tutay, July 9, 1949.

Book of the Week

Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. How traditional politicians think and work.

Computer madness

Downfall (Der Untergang in German) is a terrific film, but who knew people would have fun turning chilling scenes into computer-related pariodies courtesy of fake subtitles?

In terms of hilarity and obscenity, this one is the funniest:

Which has a continuation:

Although this one comes close, and adheres closer to the German dialogue noises:

And this one takes more liberties with the scenes:

And this just gets too gamey:

And this, too!

And for non-gamers, this one about a missing car:

India and the Philippines redux

This was the original e-mail inquiry, I received on September 24, from the Department of Foreign Affairs:

I am writing because someone suggested that i inquire from you, apparently because in one of your articles, you mentioned about social, cultural ties between the Philippines and India long before the establishment of our diplomatic relations in 1949.

Now, I’d like to ask if indeed you have the materials on the subject and if i can procure copies from you. We only want to show that the Philippines already had relations with India before the formal establishment of diplomatic relations.

We badly need it, in preparation for the President’s visit to India this coming first week of October.

Thank you so much for your cooperation.

[name of official]

South Asia DIvision

Office of Asian and Pacific Affairs

My response on September 30 was, as follows, making reference to Explainer Episode 56: The India Model:

Thank you for your inquiry. May I refer you to the script of my TV show, which tackled the points you raised.

The Philippine and Indian independence movements were aware of each other. The Nacionalista Party dominated the peaceful efforts to secure independence from the USA, in the same manner that the Congress Party did, in India.

A Russian Scholar quoted Gandhi’s praise for the Philippines achieving Commonwealth status and Gandhi said, he would have accepted a similar means to independence if it had been available to his people.

We achieved independence in ‘46, India in ‘47, we are contemporaries as among the first colonized peoples to recover our freedoms without the need to wage war.

In the 1950s under Nehru and here at home, we both followed the path of an inward-looking economy. The Philippines and India have both been seeking means to break out of the limits of what the Indians call the “License Raj.”

Note Octavio Paz’s comments on historical links, mangoes, chiles, between India and the Philippines, mention the Sepoys who settled in Cainta, mention Ninoy Aquino’s admiration for Gandhi, mention how GMA’s father, DM, opened the windows of Philippine diplomacy and governance to the lessons of the Indians and their democracy.

I hope this will be of help in an important endeavor for our country’s diplomacy and economic activities.

I followed this up with a second message five minutes later:

You may wish to add that even under the limits of colonial rule, in the meetings of Asian diplomats and officials taking place in Washington during WW2, future Philippine diplomats including Joaquin Elizalde, first Phil amb. To the USA and later SECFORAF, met with Indian counterparts and this included frank and open discussions on the challenges of future independence. These meetings took place in 1943 and were the basis of a confidential report written by Arturo Rotor, the noted writer, then acting as Executive Secretary for the Phil. Commonwealth [government-in-exile].

When Gandhi and Nehru were imprisoned during World War 2, President Quezon attempted to send an appeal for their release through the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, but Halifax said any attempt by Filipino officials to communicate with Indian leaders would not be permitted (this is documented in the diaries of Francis Burton Harrison).

The two incidents mentioned above predates both Phil. and Indian independence and our formal diplomatic relations by several years.

Quezon and Gandhi also said nearly identical things which should strike an emotional chord.

As it turned out, the President decided to focus on something else, entirely, which is described in SEAArch – The Southeast Asian Archaeology Newsblog as,

It’s not so much and archaeological story as it is a political one. The Philippine president attempts to revive ancient “ties” with India by citing Indian cultural influence by way of Srivijaya and Majapahit. I find it quite funny that the basis for reviving ties is not so much because of any historic ties with India per se (whatever “India” was in the past), but by the fact that Indian “culture” was transmitted to the Philippines. Which doesn’t really say anything, does it?

But then again I’ve long argued that President Macapagal inflicted amnesia by trying to steal the thunder of the Left, and reclaim the Philippine Revolution for propaganda purposes; by so doing, he made the narrative of Philippine history senseless as the peaceful campaign for independence was ignored. But that is our actual link with India as it exists, today. Though no link in such things is ever as precise or as satisfactory as one would want.

As the Conclusion of what I’ve selected as Book of the Week puts it (giving an insight into the more prominent differences in opinion between Gandhi and Jinnah, or Jinnah and Nehru), taking the example of an Indian political leader,

The ways in which the institutional context worked to delimit potential expression is particularly well illustrated in the rather strange career of M. K. Dixit, the city’s leading political figure during the 1920s. Between 1919 and 1923 Dixit had been an extremely important noncooperator, committed to a Gandhian agenda. He rallied the population to boycott the legislative elections, he helped to sabotage local self-government in the city by insisting on the program of national education, he contributed to undermining the municipality’s scheme of universal and compulsory primary education, and he backed a pan-Islamic movement for the sake of securing Hindu-Muslim unity. By the late 1920s, however, he had become a member of the provincial legislature, a staunch advocate of urban reform on the municipal council, a man with close ties to the collector of the district, and a person partially identified with Surat’s most significant communal organization—the Hindu Mahasabha. A cynical perspective, of course, might see Dixit as a chameleon who had simply shown different colors at the time of noncooperation. No doubt, he, like most political figures, had opportunist tendencies; he was certainly aware of the audiences he would need to cultivate to maintain his political influence. But he was also consistently committed to fighting for the Indian nation and to representing his city. Pursuing these ends led him into the politics of local self-governing institutions. Once he attained a leading position in these structures, he faced increasing pressures to adhere to communal and liberal rhetorical and ritual paradigms. A close reading of his politics suggests that rather than making constant calculations in order to secure his immediate material advantage, Dixit had undergone a resocialization in which his conceptions of the political world had changed; otherwise he might have been easily able to return to a Gandhian idiom when the civil disobedience movement erupted in 1930. The range of possible ways that he felt he could present himself and his causes had seriously narrowed. In advocating and defending his roles as municipal president, provincial legislator, and spokesman for the people during the 1920s, Dixit came to redefine his values, even his self-identity.

As the author, Douglas E. Haynes, observes,

The tale of Dixit is a familiar one to Indian historians (and indeed to observers of the contemporary Indian scene), who are accustomed to seeing once-radical politicians seem to abandon their social commitments and tame their political rhetoric once inside municipal councils, parliamentary halls, and government ministries, and in positions of national leadership.[3] This systematic pattern in late colonial politics suggests that something more than a series of unconnected personal sellouts was taking place. Rather it testifies to the potent conditioning influence of the institutions and discourse of liberal imperialism tied almost inextricably to these institutions. In retrospect, it is now possible to recognize that the most successful colonialisms—the ones that exerted the most complete hegemony over the colonized elite, the ones that left their colonies voluntarily after peaceful negotiations rather than disruptive revolutions—were often those that had most completely established structures of political representation and self-government. For in these colonialisms elite figures often opted to bargain with and resist their rulers on a political and discursive terrain set by the colonizers’ institutions and culture. Independence for these societies often took a form that mid-twentieth century imperialists, whose views themselves reflected the impact of this bargaining with their subjects, would regard as safe, rational, and even legitimate.[4]

At which point, the comparison, not necessarily flattering, with the Philippine experience:

India thus ends up bearing some similarity to the Philippines, where imperialists with an even more extreme commitment to inculcating liberal democracy among their subjects assumed positions as colonial rulers at the turn of the twentieth century. In their Southeast Asian colony the Americans set up representative institutions at the local and provincial levels almost from the onset of colonial rule in the effort to coopt the ilustrado, the conservative landed and business elite. By 1907, a national legislature had been established. Thus emerged what Peter Stanley has termed the “Fil-American Empire,” an imperialism in which the ilustrado became virtual junior partners. Within this unusual colonial relationship, the elite made frequent recourse to the same American ideology of “benevolent assimilation” that had sanctioned imperial rule as it struggled to achieve its political interests, greater representative powers, and, eventually, independence. Liberal democracy achieved ascendancy in the islands’ central arenas of politics, isolating other potential philosophies and languages on the periphery.[5] The accommodation of the Filipino elite to the discourse of American imperialism sometimes took an exceptionally exaggerated, almost sycophantic, form that most Indian nationalists would surely have found pathetic and contemptible. For instance, at an event in 1938 commemorating the conquest of the islands, Manuel Quezon, the chief architect of Filipino independence and the first president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, said of the first time he had seen the American flag raised over the Manila Harbor four decades earlier: “Little did I realize then that I was witnessing what in ultimate result may prove to be the greatest event of modern civilization in the Orient. Little did I know in my immaturity that I was beholding the birth of a new ideology in Asia—an ideology based upon what was then a strange, new conception in this part of the world—a conception that government is, ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’—a conception based upon the magic words—liberty and freedom.”[6] But the language of liberal representative democracy became the chief ground of contending colonial policies as well as a means of expressing supplication. So successful was the colonial effort of “political education” that, for several decades after independence, Americans would point proudly to the Philippines as a “showcase for democracy,” hinting that their imperial venture (in contrast to those of the Europeans) may not have been such a bad idea after all.

In contrast to the Indian and Philippine experience, stands that of Vietnam:

Vietnam provides a striking counterexample to the Philippines and India. There the French gave only limited play to representative institutions, creating a colonial council and a handful of municipalities that gave voice only to a few among the emerging Vietnamese elite. Those who adhered to the Constitutionalist party—the most important organization espousing constitutional tactics—were never more than a tiny coterie of friends and associates. There was always a much larger number of the elite who perceived that they were excluded from council politics, that the political gains of the Constitutionalists were negligible, and that those whose voices were too loud would be subject to direct repression, no matter what language they were speaking. These figures turned increasingly to radical alternatives, most importantly, Marxism. Marxism provided a language of resistance against the French myth of mission civilisatrice; it insisted that European colonialism was a selfish, barbaric institution that had as its inevitable objective the plundering of the colonized.[7] But Marxism was also transformed in the process of becoming Vietnamese. Free from the discursive constraints of working within colonial structures. Ho Chi Minh and his comrades fashioned a syncretic rhetoric that evoked sentiment deeply rooted in Vietnamese culture. The use of family metaphors in referring to the relationship of revolutionaries to the people, the conscious evocation of the rich Vietnamese tradition of resistance to foreign oppression, the value placed on folk songs and peasant culture, and the shaping of a revolutionary moral code grounded in a Confucian value system all offered a possibility for creating strong bonds with the peasantry.[8] Marxist revolutionary rhetoric seems to have achieved in Vietnam a success that Gandhism never accomplished, in part because the liberal alternative was so thoroughly discredited by its obvious inapplicability to French colonial rule. Radicals inspired by this indigenous form of Marxism led the Vietnamese peasantry in a violent revolution that compelled the French to leave after the decisive defeat at Dienbienphu, and ultimately produced a communist state closely aligned with the Soviet Union.-

The author then suggests this might provide the stimulus for further research:

Such a brief comparative sketch can hardly capture the full range of factors that contributed to the development of political culture within these three societies. It sets aside such complex issues as the relationship between material interest and cultural production, the role of resistance from below, and patterns of individual variation among the elite, all issues that have figured in this study of Surat. Most important, in its sketchiness, it obscures the everyday processes of struggle and negotiation by which men and women among the colonized gave shape to their cultures. But it does suggest a broad hypothesis that might prove worth testing in other studies. To return to the typology developed in the first chapter of this book, liberal imperialism encouraged cultural accommodations to colonialism that were within hegemonic limits, it discouraged the production and spread of fully counterhegemonic languages that could inspire confrontation with colonial power, and often it successfully left its mark on postcolonial society in the form of representative institutions and an elite committed to constitutionalism and evolutionary progress. By contrast, in colonies that had experienced more repressive imperial regimes, where elite figures felt that their political mobility and access to power were blocked, the psychic and institutional legacies of imperialism were often more easily challenged and dismantled.[9]

As I pointed out on my show, there’s something remarkable about gigantic India facing off with the Philippines as one of its main rivals in the call center industry; but even a superficial look-see at India’s and the Philippines’ paths to independence and their democracies, suggests to anyone, I think, the potential not only for greater mutual understanding but for problem-solving, too. As Re-constructing Colonial Philippines: 1900-1910 by Patricio Abinales points out,

The U.S. Congress approved the colonization of the Philippines but refused to provide sustained financial support for the undertaking. In fact, the Congress allotted only $3 million for the Philippines in the entire period from 1903 to the formation of the Philippine Commonwealth. One economist called it colonial administration “accomplished ‘on the cheap.’” Financial constraints were also complicated by the difficulty of attracting Americans to govern the colony. The solution to these problems was found in generating revenues from the colony’s own resources, particularly the existing crops that the colony was exporting abroad later years of Spanish rule. Enhancing this export economy, however, was not easy. American legislators, especially those coming from the agricultural regions of the U.S., vigorously opposed proposals that Philippine products enter the country tariff-free. As a consequence, the so-called “free trade” that introduced under American rule was not so free. The U.S. was very selective in the choice of Philippine products that could be exported to the American mainland. Only sugar, hemp and coconut were allowed open access to the U.S. market; and even these products would later be taxed in American ports. Selective entry of these goods however was enough to resurrect the export economy, and by the end of the decade much of it was re-energized because of the American market.

The second issue—putting people into the administrative and political structure—proved more successful because the Americans early on opened up the structure to Filipino participation. It is general knowledge that even as the war against Aguinaldo was raging, the Americans were already able to recruit prominent Filipinos to their side. These collaborators became the backbone of the Federalista Party, a party committed to full American control as well as the medium for introducing the party system to the Philippines. The Federalistas were also supposed to become the dominant Filipino party in the soon-to-be formed Philippine Assembly and American backing initially helped them to mobilize Filipino support.

And as he then adds,

By the end of the first decade, “regular provinces” comprised half of the Philippines. These provinces had elected and appointive Filipino officials, many of whom owed their positions to Quezon, Osmeña and the Nacionalistas. Combining their local political experiences learned from the last years of Spanish rule, with the “political education” they were getting from the Americans, the Filipinos proved within a short period of time that they had the ability to be equally adept at governing the colony. In its first year at work, the Philippine Assembly had already shown a marked adeptness in introducing additional provisions or new amendments to existing colonial laws, and in negotiating with the Philippine Commission and the Governor General over matters of policy formulation, funding and government personnel changes. Quezon and Osmeña were at the top of all these processes. They were fast becoming astute leaders of the political party they helped build, of the Assembly that they presided over, and of the colonial regime they co-governed with the Americans. If Rizal was credited for having conceived of the “Filipino,” and if Bonifacio and Aguinaldo were the leaders who gave this imagination a reality with the Revolution, to Quezon and Osmeña must be given the distinction of helping construct the political and administrative structure that would be associated with the term “Filipino.” The Americans may have created the colonial state, but it was these two leaders who gave flesh to it and putting the foundations that the future Republic would stand on.

But this also resulted in a problem that would continue, post-independence, though unacknowledged in terms of its origins:

A major reason for the American success was the cooperation extended by Muslim and Cordilleran leaders to the Americans. They regarded colonial rule as a means of protecting themselves against Christians and “lowlanders.” American military officials reciprocated this cooperation by resisting the efforts of Filipinos to extend their power to the “special provinces.” A working relationship eventually developed between these community leaders and the Americans whereby the former were given minor posts in the provincial government (“tribal wards” in the case of the Muslims) in exchange for agreeing to recognize American sovereignty. U.S. army officers who administered these areas also became their protectors against Filipino leaders, doing everything they can to limit the presence of Manila and the Nacionalista party in the Cordilleras and “Moro Mindanao.”

The only major resistance came from the Muslims at the hills of Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak, when the army declared a ban on weapons and raised head taxes. American military superiority prevailed and over a hundred Muslim men, women and children were killed. Politically, however, these actions eroded the army’s standing and opened up an opportunity for Quezon to attack military rule in Mindanao. After the massacres, the army was forced slowly to concede authority to Manila and the Filipinos. The army’s powers were also clipped once the U.S. Congress authorized its partial demobilization, and once the American president ordered its withdrawal from the special provinces and its replacement by Philippine Constabulary units. Many American officers also preferred to continue their military careers in the U.S. mainland, seeing very little prospects in just limiting themselves to the Philippines. All these problems emboldened the Filipinos to assert their political presence in these special provinces. This was something that a weakened military government could not repulse anymore. In 1913, the army conceded its power to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, a body controlled from Manila and by Filipinos. The Cordilleras’ status as a special province was also terminated and the Nacionalista Party began recruiting its first “Cordillerans” to join the organization.

Two major features therefore characterized the first decade of colonial rule. First was the full and effective unification of Las Islas Filipinas under American rule, and second was the division of colony into two major zones of administration reflecting the histories of their respective populations. These two zones were eventually unified under the Filipinization policy, but the distinctiveness upon which they were based continued to affect overall colonial development. Muslims and Cordillerans remained staunchly pro-American and anti-Filipino, while Christian “lowlanders” continued to mistrust and maintain a low regard for these “wild tribes.”

The result were rebellions in Mindanao and the Cordilleras in the 1970s and 1980s onwards.

And on an entirely unrelated note, this is clever and amusing:

Autumn of the Patriarch

According to the police, PNP: Akbar was target: Basilan politics eyed in bombing.

My column for today is House in the line of fire.

This piece, The March of the Caudillos, makes for interesting reading, combined with Venezuela scrambles for food despite oil boom and  Putin: I have a moral right to continue wielding influence.

A Surigao story I recently saw in a mailing list I subscribe to:

One of the more original Surigaonons is the Ecleo family. The old man Ecleo passed away one week before the elections and he was running for Congressman. The family immediately asked the Comelec to make the wife his replacement and news about the death of the old man Ecleo was quashed.

It was hard, though, to hide news like the death of a political bigwig, so the family came up with a heck of an idea. Since most of his constituents lived in islands close to the mainland, however, they made announcements that Ecleo would be visiting the  islands to shoot down the “rumors” about his death being exaggerated.  So they put him in a banca on a chair and with fishing line and disguised straps, actually went around the islands, his arms waving up and down.  His head turned over by an alalay to the side of the island being visited. They kept the poor guy pumped with enough formalin to last at least two weeks, but only need[ed] ten days, actually. His poll watchers were at each precinct to tell the voters to write  the family name or his wife’s name when they got to the polls. Astoundingly, he won.

And, well, just because I can, here’s a link to an entry by Dissenting Opinion who doesn’t believe in criminalizing necrophilia.

And in remembrance of Commonwealth Day, Bacolod preserves Tindalo tree planted by Quezon.

Technorati Tags: law, philippines, politics

Escalation

Before we get to the blast at the Batasan Pambansa, let’s set the scene, as it was, yesterday, prior to the explosion.

The way Amando Doronila sees it, Political scandals undermining the economy, and foreign observers, too, see it the same way, as shown by this snippet:

Frederic Neumann wrote in a commentary: “We view the recent political scandals as severely undermining the President’s ability to persuade the Congress to pass new policy initiatives to advance structural reforms … The scandals will make it harder for the President to advance a new wave of policy reforms, especially relating to improving the underlying public finance sector finances.”

Neumann noted that the government had made a commitment to wipe out its budget deficits and was closing in on its full-year deficit target of P63 billlion, with the help of privatization proceeds, but its fiscal performance was “less impressive,” suggesting that more reforms were needed.

Doronila seems to have a view that’s very different from the triumphalist tones of the President herself, who seems to be crowing that her economic work is done. In Arroyo shifts focus from economic to political reforms, she is quoted as having said,

Now that we have straightened out the economy, it is time to push for political reforms. Let us reduce conflict, fight corruption, and put the welfare of the ordinary Filipino first,” Arroyo said.

But there’s something ironic in a political animal bellowing about being a beast (though a very well-educated ones with academic credentials) if it was funny-ha-ha to have the Speaker thundering on about a “moral revolution,” isn’t it funny-hee-hee, now that Arroyo blames politics for causing suicide, murder:

Arroyo called on her critics anew to focus on promoting development, this time blaming politics for the deaths of Marianette Amper, the 12-year-old girl who committed suicide in Davao due to poverty, and Alioden Dalaig, the poll official gunned down last Saturday.

“Many Filipinos are experiencing poverty since some of the country’s leaders are preoccupied with their self-interests rather than the welfare of the nation.

“On the other hand, there are politicians and groups who have no heart and conscience and are ready to use violence to attain their ambitions,” she said in a speech at the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) meeting yesterday in Malacañang.

“The preoccupation with politics, past and present, does not promote the stability, policy continuity, security and peace and order that we will need to continue to move our country forward.”

But then of course she knows whereof she speaks, so there’s nothing funny about it, at all. Point is, the President was going on the political offensive, on the premise that (unlike the view of the foreign observers mentioned by Doronila) everything economics-wise, was shipshape. While Marvin A. Tort delves into the merits and demerits of the appreciating peso, the President, long a fetishist of the “strong peso equals a Strong Republic” sort, has no choice but to ponder relief to stave off the worst effects of the appreciating peso (the majority of the two articles above, describe the relief efforts the President’s decreed as a kind of series of emergency measures, which will help the poor but leaves exporters vulnerable still).

The best defense being a good offense, the President knew full well that the opposition had left her self-innoculation devoid of oomph. As the Inquirer editorial today puts it, the President’s reliance on a tactical, and not ethical, approach to questions as to her legitimacy or fitness for office, has reached the end of the road:

This has led to the adoption by the administration of a tactical, instead of ethical, approach to the impeachment process. Yet the kind of people involved — politicians — then and now aren’t very different. Quirino faced vicious infighting within his Liberal Party reminiscent of the intramurals between Kampi and Lakas today, with a relatively small opposition hounding both Presidents.

Indeed the only difference we see is that Quirino genuinely believed in his innocence and trusted the process. Quirino knew, as one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution, what impeachment is: a means by which a nation being governed badly can gain relief. As chief executive he asserted that relief was unnecessary; as a lawyer, he knew his salvation lay in confronting his accusers and opening access to information, and presenting evidence.

In contrast, President Macapagal-Arroyo mistrusts the process and the people in it. Her allies and critics in the House have conspired to approve rules that deny impeachable officials proper vindication not only before the House, but in the court of public opinion. And the Supreme Court, too, has handed down decisions that have mutated impeachment into a race to file weak complaints to stave off genuine ones.

In other words, all three branches of government are stuck in a trap, with each blaming the other for tying its hand, resulting in what we have today. Yet among these institutions, it is the House that still has in its hands the means to pass new rules in keeping with those of 1949. But it won’t, because it prefers the Palace cash buffet. Its members worship at the altar of Mammon instead of the altar of public duty.

Everything else, House-wise, on the part of the majority is bravado on the part of those left holding the bag: House majority rebuffs minority boycott of impeach hearings.

And also, because the best defense is a good offense, this took place: Panlilio, 8 more charged with bribery over Palace handouts. This was something people saw coming: Ateneo official rallies support for embattled Panlilio.

And also, because the best defense is a good offense, just as whistle blowers get the book thrown at them, anyone showing any kind of independence within the ruling coalition gets the Palace pit bills unleashed on them. Manuel Buencamino pens an open letter not for the faint of heart  to Juan Ponce Enrile, senior Palace pit bull.

And so, having set the scene, let’s move on to the Batasan blast. I’d just emerged from a dinner conversation with a foreign businessman who was quite worried over the effect the appreciating peso was having on ordinary people and, of course, on the bigger Filipino exporters and other businessmen with whom he did business, and who now had to put plans for expanding or upgrading their equipment on hold (for my part, I traded notes on the true extent of smuggling which is also devastating legitimate businesses). The businessman was particularly puzzled by how the appreciating peso was resulting in an increase in the cost of basic commodities, which then led to a discussion on rice and sugar smuggling, etc.

Ironically, the businessman began our conversation by telling me how he’d first arrived in the Philippines on August 21, 1983, and the pandemonium that had ensued at the Manila International Airport as he arrived shortly before Ninoy Aquino’s flight. Anyway, as I left the meeting, I received a text asking for confirmation of the blast, and so contacted colleagues in the Inquirer who confirmed it; and so it went until midnight, when the President made a brief statement. What struck me most was the quavery voice of Rep. Darlene Custodio.

The initial responses on the blogosphere run the gamut of points of view, and helps provide an insight into the public’s reaction to the news. Whether its Shasha says or Andre’s Journal! a common reaction, on one part, is to be stupefied-and-angry (or relieved to be headed abroad, like Badfish) or simply astounded, like spiderye, or being held hostage by a creeping feeling that there’s an unfolding plot, and of God-knows-what to come, as blue law by anna writes:

Holy shit. They are NOT stopping. People kasi were criticizing them before, eh why the common tao your targeting, during the Glorietta bombing, so now I guess they’re trying to prove a point, that even law-makers, wala, nothing fazes or scares us, we WILL get our point across. What point ba???!!! What do they want? My god, when the Glorietta bombing went off, I felt really bad and angry, but I didn’t feel scared pa rin. I mean, I wasn’t afraid to go malling still or go around public places. But with this Batasan bombing, I’m like, oh my god, I got a really really bad feeling in my stomach, like, of things to come, this is probably not the end of it. Punyeta silang lahat. Nakaraos na yung bayan from our history of violence and unrest tapos ngayon binabalik balik nila.

Or simply being ticked off, as OLSEN 3 was, of people immediately cracking jokes. Outside Manila, in Antique, Antikenyo says people shrugged it off.

Inner Sanctum runs through all the conspiracy theories, and correctly points out,

While there’s nothing new about politicians getting murdered, it’s the audacity of the attack that sends jitters to most people, including myself. I don’t recall lawmakers’ domains (in this case, the Batasang Pambansa) ever getting bombed. If I’m not mistaken, this is the first time that an attack happened right inside the compound that houses congress.

Piercing Pens tackles other possibilities. Though New Philippine Revolution, a few days back, insisted a pattern of resistance is emerging, I’m still skeptical -coordination has not been a characteristic of the groups opposed to the administration, who more often than not, can barely manage to talk civilly to each other.

As it stands, the initial details are fully covered by the papers, see Bomb rocks Congress; solon among 3 killed and Police recover mobile phone at Congress blast site. And Arroyo creates task force vs political violence.

Even as Akbar dies, Teves in critical condition, and media attention therefore focuses on ‘Akbar, wives controlled Basilan’ (going back even further, see Ellen Tordesillas’ Akbar and the ghost of the Lamitan siege and this profile in the San Francisco Chronicle) that old reliable had to shoot his mouth off yet again: Gonzales: ‘We got the warning two weeks ago’.

You know, Gonzales didn’t help matters during the Glorietta blast, and he isn’t helping matters now. Just as one question -who was the target?- is only beginning to be resolved, Gonzales helps raise even more questions -if the target was Akbar, and government knew, why then, did the assassination (if that’s what it was) take place? The government will announce its suspects soon enough, but that, too, will raise more questions, I’m sure.

Anyway, if Akbar was the target, then it’s no different from the assassinations of other congressmen in Metro Manila right before the May elections. It shows that congressmen aren’t beyond vendetta killings formerly restricted to their home provinces -and a general deterioration in the ability of the authorities to maintain law and order.

The collateral damage, if that’s all it was, right at the House of Representatives, also sends a message that I suspect was the cause of Darlene Custodio’s quavery voice, as she described the scene at the time. They are all in it together, and in the end, enemies of the representatives aren’t interested in separating the sheep from the goats.

for me, what is significant is that it’s unclear who, precisely, dismissed the House security detail in the wake of the bombing. If it was the Speaker, then that’s fine; if it was the Secretary of the Interior, that’s an infringement on the independence of the House. This is no trivial matter, even if justified by the authorities as a question of security. If the Palace, in charge of the police power, cocoons representatives and senators in security, the legislators shouldn’t forget that it was an imposition. So far, that hasn’t happened; the Secretary of the Interior has merely offered additional security to legislators if and when they request it, which is the absolutely right way to approach security concerns.

More on Rep. Akbar in reason is the reason:

The lowdown the wife and I got from Dr. J, who was working at the FEU Hospital near the Batasang Pambansa Complex, was that the bomb had been intended for Congressman Wahab Akbar, the Distinguished Gentleman from Basilan.

An interview I heard on the radio later confirmed that the blast had likely come from a remote-controlled IED, detonated by someone within visual range of Akbar.

Akbar had unfortunately developed a routine that his enemies were quick to use to their advantage – he would have his driver pick him up at the same exit, so conveniently close to the motorcycle parking area where a bomb could easily be transported and hidden.

A quick Google search seems to indicate that Akbar had had it coming. He was alleged to have been in cahoots with the Abu Sayyaf commanders holed up in the Lamitan siege: “a group of army officers, ASG members and local governor Wahab Akbar split ransom money that they received for the ‘escape’ of three hostages in the early stages of the episode.”

In a controversial privilege speech, Akbar also claimed that 80% of Filipino Muslims were sympathetic to the Abu Sayyaf. In the same speech, Akbar made the bold claim “I am Basilan” – which wouldn’t be far from the truth, considering that two of his wives have won the top elective positions in the island province.

There’s a moral to be found here, where a man can claim to personify a violent, backward province one day – and end up riddled with shrapnel the next.

That, indeed, may be all there is to it. Live by the sword, die by the sword. If this is what happened, then the question is, just how firmly the government can clamp down if the suspects prove to be from the military, whether in the service, or AWOL.

As Ricky Carandang points out, it’s business as usual:

What happens next is anyone’s guess, but the House leadership has said that the incident will not prevent them from fulfilling their duty of killing the latest impeachment complaint against President Arroyo.

And indeed, mission accomplished: House committee rejects new impeach rap vs Arroyo.

Technorati Tags: Blogging, economy, history, House of Representatives, impeachment, media, military, mindanao, philippines, politics, society

Farcical procedures

A business paper reports, Net effect of peso rise negative: Majority say well-being unchanged, but more report being ’better off before.’ The column of Cielito Habito, On fearless forecasts, is instructive. First, he points out that,

When economic analysts made their 2007 projections about Philippine economic performance late last year or early this year, three things were not quite anticipated enough in formulating their projections or forecasts.

One, most had assumed that the foreign exchange rate would average near P50 to the dollar. The government had assumed it to be in the range P51-53 in drawing up the 2007 budget that was approved by Congress. Two, crude oil prices had been expected to be softer, following earlier episodes of above $70-a-barrel prices that had provoked near-double digit inflation in 2005. The government’s assumption was around $63-67 a barrel. And three, world economic growth–especially in the US, the world’s biggest economy and a dominant trading partner to most countries–was expected to moderate somewhat, but not differ substantially from the 2006 performance.

And then he tries to explain what’s happened since:

What happened? In the case of the exchange rate, the dollar turned out to slide more steeply than had earlier been anticipated. For the most part, it has lately been influenced by the US subprime housing loans crisis that hardly anybody anticipated (although there were some isolated voices warning of the problem even early on, and who are now able to say “I told you so”). Major central banks are also turning away from the dollar as a reserve asset, and unloading large amounts of it (China has reportedly done so recently). For us, it is also because the surge in OFW remittances continues to surprise, especially in the face of the apparent slowdown in the numbers of workers actually deployed overseas.

Surging crude oil prices are attributed to declining US petroleum product inventories, anticipated supply disruptions due to recent bombings in oil-rich Afghanistan and an oil pipeline in Yemen, continuously surging demands from rapidly growing Asian economies, and the continued weakening of the dollar. Meanwhile, the impacts of the subprime crisis on the real US economy are just unfolding, and most authoritative analyses as exemplified by that of Bernanke point to a short-term outlook that does not look good.

Now of course there is always something good and something bad in whatever’s going on, and the weak dollar means the peso helps absorb what could otherwise be a nasty oil shock; but it does mean adjustments are required all around and the citizenry isn’t seeing any adjusting among those in official circles. The result is a cranky population and a government (both administration and opposition) unable to appeal to the public to pull together for -what? The administration seems more stumped, since after all, it has the resources and the opposition does not, and it has the numbers in the cabinet and the congress which the opposition does not, so obviously, the burden of proof is on the administration.

And since it’s preached from day one that everything is a numbers game, then it ought to be given plenty of rope to hang itself with.

Hence my column for today, which was Don’t engage or dignify it. You can read the documents I mentioned over at my entry for today in Inquirer Current.

It was good to hear that the attitude towards the ruling coalition was the one adopted by the opposition. Read (UPDATE 6) Pulido complaint sufficient in form–House panel:

The committee’s approval of the motion came a little past 3:00 p.m. or before opposition members walked out after Arroyo’s allies rejected the supplemental complaint filed by lawyer and United Opposition spokesman Adel Tamano to strengthen the Pulido case.

Deputy Minority Floor Leader Roilo Golez said the opposition would not participate until the committee accepted the supplemental complaint as an “integral part” of the one filed by Pulido.

“It would be very awkward on the part of the member of the Minority to be part of the proceeding because precisely we don’t feel that this is an honest-to-goodness impeachment complaint,” Golez said.

“We don’t wish to do disrespect the committee but we’ve already made our position very clear Mr. Chairman — we don’t think it will be meaningful, it would be useful for this committee to deliberate upon what we feel is a sham complaint whose objective is to frustrate an honest-to-goodness impeachment complaint within one year,” he said.

“And therefore, Mr. Chairman we’d like to state that members of
the Minority don’t wish to participate in this proceeding for as long as the addendum and the supplemental submitted by Attorney Tamano is not part of it,” Golez said.

But Golez asked the committee to allow a member of the opposition to observe the proceedings.

Bravo! Additional details here: House justice panel rejects supplemental complaint.

I only wish TV would then cover the further deliberations of the administration coalition as it takes its own Punch and Judy Show to its absurd and inevitable conclusion -leaving the House ruling coalition being the sole source of the political noise the President herself provoked. And really, the main source of the noise is the President’s camp, not that of her critics.

Something tells me the President herself is getting confused. When she says (see Arroyo to Chinese-Filipino traders: Help me with detractors), I wonder how effective she think it’ll be. She wasn’t making a speech to a business organization known for opposing any president, ever, at any time, over anything serious. And at the same time, I don’t think Filipino-Chinese businessmen are different from any other kind, in that they’ve learned how to say “no” to politicians, including making themselves scarce during campaign season -the ability of governments to put the squeeze on businessmen has diminished, though not entirely disappeared, and in many ways it only makes sense for businessmen to assist local, and not national, politicians, except for those in industries (say power generation, or the operating of ports) that are highly susceptible to presidential and congressional intervention in, say, franchise renewals.

The President’s problem is that her own allies are getting greedy (see: Danding lays down terms for JDV ouster: Tells GMA he wants Fuentebella as Speaker), cranky, and demanding (see: Enrile turns up word war with De Venecia: Senator threatens more exposés against Speaker), and disobedient.

And so, the result is self-created scandals that no opposition worth its salt can ignore, much as I do believe that the political class would much rather let sleeping dogs lie and plan ahead for 2010. A kind of truce had resulted in May this year, when the body politic was relieved by the pressure valve known as elections, and where the public derived satisfaction by voting an opposition senate but kept the pork flowing through an administration-dominated House; the President would be kept on her toes until 2010 but otherwise, everyone could start planning for life after GMA. This explains, quite adequately, I think, Amando Doronila’s observation (which I think is true) that Resign-snap poll bid has no critical mass.

But no. Look at every controversy since, and it’s been a case of the administration shooting itself in the foot. Over and over.

Read this recent entry in the blog of Jove Francisco, for an insight into the continuing tensions within the administration coalition:

Ermita denied that Mrs Arroyo has any knowledge of what Villarosa revelead.

Which is quite interesting because the lady solon is a known and consistent companion of the President in her trips abroad. (I always see her joining the entourage whenever hinahatid namin si PGMA sa airport and kapag sumasama kami sa biyahe ng Pangulo).

Puno… supposedly one of the “RING LEADERS” of KAMPI distanced himself from the cash gifts revelation saying pa nga that he’s very hurt with what his party mates did, especially because HE WAS THE LAST TO KNOW.

And because Villarosa’s revelation made it clear that the cash gifts came from KAMPI and not from LAKAS as PUNO claimed weeks ago, he apologized to House Speaker Jose De Venecia’s for all the things he said.

Shades of PGMA’s “I AM SORRY!”

And then read this reflection, by Randy David, from last Saturday:

It may well be that the only thing that distinguishes the Arroyo presidency from any other is the manner in which cash-giving has become so much a part of the standard operating procedure of her office. No other administration has been known to resort to buying political favors so literally, as brazenly, and as routinely as Ms Arroyo’s. If this is what it takes to awaken us to the glaring discrepancy between the laws we profess and the dirty practices by which we conduct our national life, then surely we have her to thank.

In our quest for reform, we tend to ignore the realities that constrain our politicians and our electorate to behave in particular ways. We are engrossed in the easy moralism that permits us to express our disgust for the failings of our leaders in government. We cling to the belief that if only we can rid the nation of the present bunch of politicians, the country will surely be better. I think we forget that our leaders, like many of our voters, are no more than actors in a political stage governed by the hidden scripts of social inequality and dominance. We expect great things when we replace old actors with new ones, unaware that without a fundamental revision of the script, the performance will not be very different.

That script, the one that animates what we call traditional politics, provides not for the roles of government and opposition, as in the modern stage, but only for a set of patron and client roles. Under its terms, political power in our society is to be contested not by alternating majorities and minorities, but by a very small ruling class. Unchallenged in its dominance, this class creates the illusion of plurality and choice through the constantly changing composition of its factions.

What does all this tell us? It tells us that the modern institutions by which we are supposed to conduct the governance of our nation will never function properly so long as the masses are trapped in poverty. It tells us that the choices offered by our present political parties, including those that purport to represent the poor, are false. It tells us that political parties that are not themselves financed by their members are a sham. It tells us that public officials who buy their way into public office are no more than merchants or agents; they are not the leaders. It tells us that voters who are hungry and needy cannot be political subjects in a democracy.

This political culture is bound to change, albeit slowly, as more and more of our people get out of poverty, largely by finding work abroad. The change is becoming visible in our growing intolerance for money politics and in the impatience with which we scan the horizon for new leaders.

But even as that talks place, and even with Doronila’s observations in mind, what to make of New Philippine Revolution who argues,

The people don’t want snap elections. It is costly a solution for the people to even consider. What most of the people want, based on a survey which I conducted during the past 3 weeks is for the military to break out from the totalitarian grip of Arroyo and stage a coup. I say again–the people are ready for a coup. They are sick and tired of Arroyo and De Castro and they have realized that it is futile to give these two officials more time in Malacanan.

Will a coup solve these problems?

It will because it assures the people of the downfall of Arroyo and De Castro. Look, what we need today is for government to regain the trust and confidence of the people. Obviously, the people don’t trust the civilian politicians. It’s clear that the people HATE or even LOATHE their present set of leaders and what this country needs right now is a fresh infusion of new blood, of new idealists that would fight the grafters and buckle down to work afterwards. If the idealistic soldiers don’t realize this, that they have now the chance, the opportunity to succeed in their mission of ousting Arroyo, then, they must stop whatever they are doing right now and just, remain masochists.

As for myself, I think February 2006 showed how the public mistrusts any military adventurism, while it sympathizes with the emotions that drives soldiers to mutiny; I recall observing at the time that there seemed a general consensus, crossing the political divide among politicized officers, that they viewed themselves as inappropriate for actually governing the country.

This is part of a process dating back to the fatal day when a group of Gringo Honasan’s troops attempting a coup mowed down ordinary citizens who heckled and jeered them, back in the 1980s. Since then, even military rebels have adopted more of a peaceful, People Power orientation to their adventurism, than say, the Thais. In 2001, it was the military top brass joining the protesters; in Oakwood, it was an armed sit-down strike; and the ringleaders submitted to trial and incarceration. In 2006, frustrated Marines were going to march to join rallyists, but with their weapons pointed downwards and by informing their superiors they wanted to protest, first.

Such as it is, a certain amount of chivalry has been demonstrated, but those who’ve submitted to the legal process are getting short shrift. Read Ellen Tordesillas to see why -and how the soldiers have reacted:

The exchanges in the morning session, just like in the past three hearings, centered on the unsigned pre-trial advice which is supposedly one of the basis of the charges against the 28 officers. The prosecution headed by Trial Judge Advocate Col. Feliciano Loy pushed for the resumption of the peremptory challenges and called on Capt. Isagani Criste, one of the six officers who have not exercised their right for peremptory challenge.

(When a member of a panel is challenged peremptorily by the accused, he is automatically ejected from the court.)

Criste’s lawyer, Alex Avisado, objected and moved that the proceedings be suspended until the PTA is signed by AFP Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon. The PTA, submitted by Col. Pedro Davila, staff judge advocate, to Esperon recommended the disapproval of the of the Pre-trial Investigation report (PTIR) prepared by the team headed by Col. Al Perreras, which recommended the dismissal of mutiny charges against all the 37 accused officers and the filing of the lesser charge of conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman against some of the officers.

Just like in the past hearings, the defense lawyers argued that the PTA constitutes the information sheet and unless it is signed, it’s merely a scrap of paper. As Frank Chavez, Miranda’s lawyer said, “I shudder at the thought that in a civilian court, a man is charged with murder based on an unsigned information sheet.”

The court instructed the trial Judge Advocate to write the Chief of Staff and get a written comment on the matter. At past 12 noon, the court went into a lunch break.

When the court resumed at 1:30 p.m., it ruled that it was denying the motion for suspension of proceedings until Esperon signs the PTA.

The court said Esperon’s Nov. 17, 2006 memo referring to both the PTIR and the PTA in creating the special general court martial to try the officers, suffices as basis for the trial.The panel’s president, Maj. Gen. Jorgy Fojas ordered the resumption of the challenges.

Chavez stood up and declared: “I cannot take part in these sham proceedings. Sham because the accused are not legally charged. I have advised my client that he has the right not to participate in these sham proceedings. “ Then he walked out.

One after another the other lawyers followed with their own stand not to participate in the proceedings until they are given a copy of a signed PTA. I remember Attorneys Rolando Cipriano, Vicente Verdadero, Rodrigo Artuz, Alex Avisado, Nole Panganiban, Jose Miguel Palarca, Ronald Ubaña, Ma. Cristina Garcia, Johnmuel Mendoza, Dante Xenon Atienza, Ian Pangalangan. They all walked out.

Outside the courtroom, I saw troops with red armbands and shields arriving and scurrying to secure the place.

Attorneys Gilbert Gallos, counsel for Col. Orlando de Leon, and Trixie Angeles, counsel for Capt. Ruben Guinolbay initially stayed and moved for a reconsideration of the panel on their motion to suspend the proceedings until a signed PTA is produced. “The career and life of my client are at stake,” Angeles pleaded.

The court denied their motion. Col. Loy moved to appoint the two as counsels for the accused. At this point, Angeles stood up and said, “As a member of the legal profession, I fear of lending my presence to the validation of this illegal proceedings. I asked to be excused.” Then she walked out. Gallos made the same manifestation and also walked out.

The only one left was Maj. Pooten, the military lawyer. The court appointed him counsel for the accused. He told the court that the accused officers have a right to counsel of their choice. He said, “I am an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and at the same time a lawyer. I will not allow myself to trample upon the rights of the accused gentlemen officers and be a party to the denial of their Constitutional rights. And by these, your Honors, I ask to be excused from these proceedings.”

Pooten was ordered to stay in the court room. The court ordered the resumption of the peremptory challenge. Loy called one by one the officers that have not exercised their right of peremptory challenge. First was Capt. Criste, who underscored three points: “I am not availing of the services of the military counsel. I am not waiving my right to peremptory challenge. I will only exercise it in the presence of counsel of my choice and when I’m given a copy of the signed PTA.”

Next to be called was Capt. Allan Aurino who made the same manifestation as Criste. Same thing with Capt. Frederick Sales, 1Lt. Ervin Divinagracia, and 1Lt. Jacon Cordero.

I saw 1Lt. Homer Estolas raising his hand as the court was giving its decision saying that the six have been deemed to have waived their right to peremptory challenge. They didn’t know that there is still one who have nor done so. The TJA and the panel ignored Estolas, who has not exercised his right to peremptory challenge.

At this point, Col. Ariel Querubin stood up. Then all the officers stood up and followed Gen. Miranda to the door. Col.Arnulfo Marcos, the commanding officer of the custodial management unit, tried to stop the officers: “Huwag kayong lumabas. Balik kayo sa upuan. Cool lang.” (Don’t leave. Back to your seats. Stay cool.).

Maj. Jason Aquino told him, “Nakita mo nang binababoy kami. Manindigan ka naman” (You see that our rights are being trampled. Make a stand.)

Miranda ordered: “Padaanin nyo kami, kaso namin ito (Get out of our way. This is our case).” Marcos had to give way.

Unaware that they have not called Lt. Estolas to exercise his right to peremptory challenge, members of the court went on with their oathtaking. Afterwards, Lt. Col. Marian Aliedo told reporters, “The court is now duly-constituted.”

The manual for court martial, however, states that the court becomes fully constituted once the peremptory challenges shall have all been exercised by the accused.

Outside the court, Col. Segumalian saluted Maj. Pooten: “Basil, I’m higher in rank than you but I salute you for standing up for your principles.You know of course that what you did won’t please the military leadership.”

Pooten replied,”I just did what I believe is right. What ever happens, I would still be lawyer.”

The one thing an officer expects, I think, is to be treated honorably by fellow officers. But when that stops happening… When a court martial begins to behave like the House of Representatives, and when military judges start resembling the majority members of the Committee on Justice, the ability of the system, to define what is permissible political behavior and what is not, breaks down.

Now I don’t think a coup is imminent, and I won’t support one; neither do I think civil war is about to break out; it seems more logical, to me, that we will all simply stagger along until 2010 at which point the country will really see if the President decides to stay or go. But this belief of mine rests on nothing unusual taking place -because, if something unusual took place, say a War in the Middle East, I really don’t know if our society will be capable of surviving the repercussions without serious, and class-based, civil unrest.

Technorati Tags: constitution, elections, House of Representatives, journalism, law, media, military, philippines, politics, president, society

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