On official allowances (updated)
October 31, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Daily Dose
A quick political update as we go into the long weekend. The Inquirer editorial looks at the implications of the baranggay election. In his blog, Jove Francisco covers the (unexpected) return of Sec. Ermita:
Ermita denied he’s battling it out with Puno or that may samaan sila ng luob….but he gave a very meaningful line during his presscon today about the payola issue.
PDI’s Mike Ubac asked Ermita’s reaction about the admission of a local government group that they were the ones who distributed the cash gifts inside the palace and then followed it up by asking if he will allow such a thing to happen, kung siya ang tatanungin.
Ermita said “By golly, definitely not!†and then added “Alam ninyo naman na ako ay nasa loob lamang ng opisina ko nuong pumutok iyan!â€
And during the ambush interview portion of the presser, Ermita even said “Basta hindi lang ako maging intrigero…(laughed again)â€â€¦. some observers say, malinaw na parinig ito sa kung sino mang “kaaway niyaâ€.
Another factor that bolstered suspicions that there is friction between these two cabinet officials is the fact that Ermita and Puno released opposing statements today about the possible presidential appointees in the vacant posts at the COMELEC.
Puno supposedly confirmed that the shortlist of names came from the Executive Secretary’s office and that it was released 2 weeks ago.
Ermita denied this saying that based on the process they follow “it is impossible!â€.
Amidst the difference of pronouncements, both of them also declared that they are not fighting and are actually long time pals.
But the reported rift, though already denied by all parties concerned, is revealing a much bigger picture.
The bigger picture that the “on going†tension between the two largest member parties of the coalition (LAKAS and KAMPI) is still very much “happeningâ€â€¦a power play that has been happening since the start of the 2007 elections (Remember this? Just go back to past blog posts).
Puno, who is from KAMPI, is said to be the main man behind efforts to solidify the alliance of Erap and PGMA.
Ermita, on the other hand is a known LAKAS stalwart who traces his ascent to power from his links with FVR and JDV.
Thing is, both FVR and JDV have been at odds with the President after the following political developments, including the ZTE broadband deal, the Payola issue and the Erap pardon.
(So hindi lang ang opposition ang nagkakagulo as a result of the pardon, even the administration is problematic… coalition wise, for many other reasons. This aside from “the CHAVIT SINGSON problem†that palace sources say is also making the heads of many administration officials ache, kakaisip paano ito malulunasan o “mapipigilanâ€.)
BUT, despite all these, Ermita was quick to herald that everything’s a-okay within the coalition.
He even made a prediction that FVR will not forge an alliance with the opposition, because FVR “hates destabâ€.
And another interesting thing that happened today was…Ermita’s move to defend PGMA’s decision to pardon Erap.
A move that may well be different from that of his former boss— FVR…. but, as some observers say, is quite logical for officials who have “been in politics for a long time.
Ermita’s parting words today:
“Huwag kayo niniwala masyado sa rumor, hindi tutoo yan, I am still around, hahahaha…â€You have to see the report and hear the way he laughed after declaring he’s still around, masasabi ninyong “napaka lutong†ng kaniyang halakhak.
Manuel Buencamino looks at the ability of the president’s supporters to rationalize their continued support.
On to the long weekend’s readings.
One of my favorite political autobiographies is Jose E. Romero’s Not So Long Ago: A Chronicle Of My Life, Times, & Contemporaries published in 1977 by Alemar-Phoenix. To my mind, it’s about as honest as any politician’s account of his life can be expected to be. Romero, who was a congressman, assemblyman, majority floor leader, Constitutional Convention delegate, and then Secretary of Education and sugar lobbyist, covered political events in which he played a part from 1925-1946 (it seems he died before he could complete his memoirs).
His memoirs helps explain how government officials went from living within their means to trying to supplement salaries that failed to keep up with inflation or the requirements of their jobs:
I entered Congress just when the great economic depression of the thirties began to be felt, and the first thing we did was to reduce salaries and expenditures by 10%. Congressmen’s salaries then were fixed at P600 a month, P7,200 per annum, and in our time there were no extras or allowances whatsoever. The reduction in our salaries of 10% amounted to P60 per month, and this was applied to all government employees, so that teachers who were getting P50 a month got a cut of P5 a month. It pleases me now to recall in what good spirit this sacrifice was made by all. Because we did not resort to deficit spending, the prices of everything, especially rice and other foodstuffs, remained low, so that no hardships were felt, especially by the poor. There was no complaint or discontent because everybody sacrificed equally. At that time the national budget was only about 100 million pesos. It is a mere pittance compared to the budget these days, but of course our population has increased tremendously and then the peso today is worth far less than it was then. The national debt was also around 100 million dollars, again a mere pittance compared to our present national debt. Our reserves in gold bullion and dollar deposits were more than 100% of the currency in circulation, and the peso was sound. In fact, when about that time the dollar was devalued, the American government had to pay us the difference between the value of our deposits and the devalued dollar.
This account by Romero brings up one (harmful) change over the years, which is that government salaries for officials that hold a great deal of responsibility, have shrunk while the salaries of the rank-and-file, on the other hand, remain all right. The gap between a congressman’s salary and that of a government director is almost negligible, while the gap in responsibilities remains vast. To compensate, all sorts of allowances have to be created which supplements the take home pay, but does not address the need to offer salaries commensurate with what’s expected of an official.
In this blog, a reader kindly calculated, more precisely, modern-day approximations of the value of various prewar official salaries (based on official figures I provided) to an extent that exceeded my own attempt at a computation of the value of the President’s salary over time.
Of course if you were to add up the various allowances members of Congress are entitled to, their salaries are fairly generous but the problem is that it involves quite a bit of accounting sleight-of-hand, which corrodes accountability. Romero’s memoirs points out the precise point when congressmen decided they have to find ways to boost their salaries. In his book, he wrote of the situation the last Congress of the Commonwealth faced, in 1945:
The members of Congress, like most other citizens, had lost most of what they had. When President Osmena came from the U.S., the best gifts that he could give to members of Congress was a khaki shirt, a pair of khaki trousers, and a pair of shoes. Most of the members of Congress attended sessions in this attire, and it almost looked as if this was the uniform of the lawmakers. To compound the problems of the members of Congress and everybody else, inflation was rampant. Even sugar was lacking and was selling at five times the usual price.
We had to commute between the House of Representatives and the houses where we were living in cargo trucks hastily converted for the use of passengers and we had to pay a very high fare. In order to alleviate the situation of the members of Congress who were getting no more than the six hundred pesos per month provided for in the Constitution, President Osmena, in the use of his emergency powers, authorized the Auditor-General’s Office to make advances to the members of Congress to enable them to meet the cost of living in Manila during the sessions. This was the principal reason afterward for the approval of the much criticized Back Pay Law.
At the end of the sessions, the Auditor-General was pressing for payment of the advances made under the authority given by President Osmena. Their term of office was expiring. The solution was found in the payment of Back Pay to the members of Congress for salaries due them during the war. This move was bitterly criticized by the public, and the question became an issue in the succeeding elections and caused the defeat of many members of Congress in their bid for reelection.
Taking an objective view of the situation, however, this form of relief for the lawmakers was almost a necessity. The amount involved was only a little, over P20,000 for every member of Congress, and the payment made was only once. Of this amount each legislator had already received some P8,000 in advances. It was simply impossible for the lawmakers to live in Manila at six hundred pesos a month with the inflation then rampant. Had the lawmakers at that time less respect for the Constitution, and had they then discovered the magic formula of the allowances, they could have solved their problem by making payments to themselves, not in the relatively small amount of P20,000 but ten times as much, as succeeding legislators were to get -and not only once, but every year.
Many of the members of Congress were defeated in the election that followed on this issue of back pay, but later members of Congress were to be reelected again and again after paying themselves much more in the form of allowances than the legislators of 1945 paid themselves in the form of back pay. This may mean either that our electorate have already become cynical and callous or that the greater fund available for election expenses is more effective to win votes than as an issue against the beneficiaries of these objectionable payments. Had the lawmakers in 1945 voted themselves two hundred thousand pesos yearly instead of twenty thousand pesos once, perhaps not so many of them would have been defeated. But then the temper of the people at the time was not propitious for such disregard of the proprieties, and there might have been violent demonstrations. Cynicism crept in slowly but steadily and, later, the voters ceased to mind anymore what in 1945 not only would have been fatal issues but might also have triggered violent reactions.
So the moral of the tale is things haven’t always been the way they are, but that things can change pretty swiftly and then gain their own momentum.
Incidentally, I had a meaty exchange with a reader about the prewar gold reserves of the Philippines. The reader emailed me this query, which I reproduce in full:
Dear Manolo,
I’ll go direct to the point. Please help me unravel a mystery that has not only aroused my curiosity but baffled me as well. With your considerable reputation as a historical sleuth, I’m confident you can solve or otherwise clear this up. Whatever will be the outcome will make for a good thriller. Of that I’m sure.
The mystery concerns what I call our national treasure consisting of some 20 tons of gold bars. This represents our country’s entire gold reserve at the time and quite possibly the total output of all the gold mines operating in the Philippines. The fabled Yamashita treasure, which in all likelihood is just a figment of the imagination, seems like loose change compared to the enormous value of this real-life treasure which may exceed 20 billion U.S. dollars using the current price of gold per kilo.
When Bataan, Corrigedor, Manila and the rest of the Philippines were about to fall to the Japanese in 1942, all the gold bars were removed from the Central bank located then at the port area in Manila and ferried by a navy vessel to Corrigedor. The precious cargo was loaded onboard the U.S. submarine U.S.S. Trout. On February 22, 1942, it left Corrigedor for Guam. Also aboard were President Manuel L. Quezon, his family and a few, select members of his wartime cabinet. President Quezon and his party, however, landed at Cagayan de Oro and then motored to the highlands of Bukidnon where they were flown to Australia. From there, they went to America where President Quezon lived in exile until his death at Lake Saranac in New York in 1944. So much has been written about the harrowing and exciting escapes of Pres. Quezon and General Douglas MacArthur from the “Rock†fortress, the latter by PT boat. Both were highly-secret naval operations to save the two from eventual capture by the enemy. But little, if none at all, is known about the enormous cargo of gold which President Quezon obviously brought with him. It seems this was the bigger secret, and it is not far-fetched to think that the Japanese were also after it.
The gold bars reached Guam and were transferred to the heavy Cruiser USS Michigan which sailed on to San Francisco where they were finally off-loaded at the wharf there. This is where my story ends, and the mystery begins.
Where did the shipment go from San Francisco? Were the 20 tons of gold all brought to Fort Knox where gold bullions such as these are generally known to be stored for safe-keeping or somewhere else in the United States? Assuming that they were indeed kept at Fort Knox, what happened to them after the war? Were they ever returned to the Philippines? If so, when and by what means?
There should be a paper trail in this secret odyssey of our national treasure. The Central Bank should or ought to know the whole story. The time has come to tell this in its entirety. Whether by design or plain oversight, we’ve been kept in the dark for close to 63 years.
History abhors a mystery. So do I and, of course, you. I will be vastly relieved if this story has a happy ending; that our national treasure is intact afterall and has not been lost or stolen.
Kindly take over where I left off at the wharf in San Francisco and finish the whole drama to its conclusive ending whatever that may be: either good or one more national disgrace.
Very truly yours,
FERNANDO A. ALMEDA, JR.
President
Surigaonon Heritage Center
Parola Boulevard, Surigao City
My response was as follows:
Thank you for your letter.
The disposition of the Philippine Treasury (its transfer from Manila to Corregidor, and the transfer of a large portion of it to the United States) was accomplished by a committee presided over by Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice and Finance in the War Cabinet) and included Manuel Roxas. Treasury certificates and paper currency were burned after being itemized and notarized in a list. Coinage was dumped in the sea (where some of it was salvaged by the japanese, the majority of the coinage, however, being salvaged by the US Navy after the war).
President Quezon did not leave on the same submarine on which the Philippine bullion reserves was transported. The submarine you mentioned, the USS Trout, was not the submarine he traveled on, the USS Swordfish. Neither did Philippine officials leave on the same date as the shipment of Philippine gold reserves to the USA.
You will find desciptions of this process in the published biography of Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos by Justice Ramon Aquino:
Part of Abad Santos’s work on Corregidor as secretary of finance was the custody and disbursement of government funds. With [Vice President] Sergio Osmena, [Philippine Army Chief of Staff] Basilio Valdes, Jr., [Colonel] Manuel Nieto, and members of the American High Commissioner’s staff, he checked the gold bullions and silver coins deposited in Corregidor. He supervised the shipment of these by submarine to the United States. He superintended the burning of about forty million pesos in paper bills.
Justice Aquino’s sources are the Philippines Free Press February 17, 1951 and Carlos P. Romulo’s I saw the Philippines fall.
Indeed in most histories of this period the transfer of government funds from Manila to Corregidor and then to the USA is mentioned, and the care with which this was done, noted. As early as 1942, in the book Serpent of the Seas, by Commander Harley Cope, USN, you will find this (pp.222-225):
Another of our asiatic submarines had a unique assignment. Lieutenant Commander Frank W. “Mike” Fenno was given the job of evacuating the precious metal belonging to the Treasury of the Philippines and the banks from the Islands before the Japanese got their hands on it. This tall, sloping shouldered ex-captain of a champion Naval Academy baseball team -and who pitched our Asiatic Submarine baseball team to a Fleet victory when I was out there in the s-40- had been currently bringing in ammunition for the anti-aircraft guns on Corregidor. The shells were als worth their weight in gold.
The Japanese knew of course that there was a large amount of gold stored on Corregidor and in the bank vaults of Manila. Needless to say they were most desirous to obtain it. Efforts to prevent the Japanese from getting the gold were under way immediately after the war begun. American and Filipino stevedores worked day and night collecting metals, currency and securities belonging to the Philippine Commonwealth, to banks and mines and individuals.
On the night of February 4th, Captain Ferino brought his submarine into the harbor on the south hook of Corregidor, unloaded his precious cargo of much-needed anti-aircraft ammunition and took on gold and silver. Before the morning’s early light could expose the submarine to the eyes of Japanese patrolling planes it had slid out of the harbor and remained submerged during the day. After nightfall it was again alongside the dock and ton after ton of gold and silver was loaded aboard. This task was completed about 4 a.m. -too late to carry out the next assignment. The next night the submarine kept a rendesvous with an auxiliary vessel carrying the securities that were to be evacuated.
Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, former financial adviser to Mr. Francis B. Sayre, Philippine [High] Commissioner, to whom the Navy gave much credit for collecting the wealth of the Philippines, was on the auxiliary vessel and described the submarine’s appearance in the dark.
‘When nightfall came,’ related Mr. Willoughby, ‘the auxiliary vessel sailed from Corregidor to the rendezvous with her load of securities. The submarine did not make her appearance immediately. But, after a while, the dark hulk of the submarine pushed through the surface.
‘It took about 20 minutes to transfer the securities. Then Commander Fenno made a remark I’ll never forget. His crew had gone below and he was standing by the conning tower preparatory to giving the order to submerge. ‘Any passengers?’ hr asked cheerfully. Any of us would have been glad to get aboard that submarine but it was not for us to leave. We had to tell him no.’
During the long trip from Manila to Pearl Harbor several Japanese ships came within range of the American submarine and Captain Fenno lost no time in sending them to the bottom. The mere presence of tons of gold aboard could not keep my good friend ‘Mike’ out of a fight.
On March 20 Commander Fenno was awared the Distinguished [Navy] Cross for his entire crew of six officers and sixty-four men received Silver Stars for the feat of spiriting out a vast treasure of gold and silver from Corregidor right under the nose of the Japanese forces, and then sinking three of their ships.
Incidentally you will note that the Swordfish was commanded by Capt. Chester Smith, and that it left Corregidor Feb. 19, nearly two weeks after the departure of the bullion.
The circumstances surrounding the transfer of the Treasury are documented in The Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commission to the Philippine Island to the President and Congress of the United States, Covering the Fiscal Year July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 Washington D.C., October 20, 1942 (pp. 48 to 58 chronicles this in extreme detail; the relevant portion as per your inquiry follows):
(pp.57-58)
“BULLION AND CURRENCY HELD BY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT ON CORREGIDOR
“In addition to the valuables taken to Corregidor by the Office of the High Commissioner, a large amount of gold, silver, and paper currency was held there by the Commonwealth Government and was never turned over to the Office of the High Commissioner for safekeeping. Ther gold and sliver, which served as currency reserves, were on Corregidor, in the Philippine Treasury Reservations on that Island, before the war started. The gold comrpised 269 bars with an indicated weight of 1,343,493.95 grams and was derived from the melting of $805,410 face value of United States gold coins held by the Commonwealth Government at the time of the devaluation of the dollar in 1933. The silver was in the form of 1-peso coins an aggregate face value of P16,422.000. There were several small pieces of gold and silver in addition to the above. All of the gold and a large amount of 1-peso coins were loaded under the supervision of Commonwealth officials, headed by Vice President Osmena, and ere sent to the United States as ballast on the same submarine which carried the gold held by the High Commissioner.
“It Is believed that the Philippine paper money in the Treasury reservation was brought to Corregidor by the Commonwealth officials who accompanied President Quezon when he was evacuated from Manila. It appears from the records supplied by the Commowealth government that there was, early in Jaunary 1942, P78,261,825 in Philippine paper currency of various denominations held by the Commonwealth in its vaults on the Treasury reservation. This was subsequently increased by P19,900,000 clearing house funds, as noted above, making a total of P98,161,825.
“Twenty million pesos, all in Philippine Treasury certificates of P500 denomination, are reported to have been burned on January 19 and 20, 1942, on Corregidor by a committee designated by the President of the Philippines [footnote 17: The committee consisted of Messrs. Sergio Osmena, Vice President of the Philippines, Jose Abad Santos, Acting Secretary of Finance; E.D. Hester, Economic Adviser of the High Commissioner; and Col. H.F. Smith, United States Army). On January 21, 1942, it is reported that P500,000 were withdrawn from the Treasury Reservation and placed at the disposal of Mr. S.D. Canceran, special disbursing officer, Office of the President of the Philippines, to be disbursed by him for the purpose of paying of salaries and wages of officers, employees, and laborers of the Government, and for such other purposes as might legally be authorized. A message received from Corregidor in April [1942] indicates that prior to the capitulation of the fortress P50,097,925 in Philippine paper currency which was in the Treasury vaults was destroyed as well as P1,000,000 which was in a safe of the former Office of the President of the Philippines at Fort Mills, Corregidor.”
On pp. 118-119 the same report gives a full accounting of Philippine government funds in the United States; the gold is listed on a table on p. 118, in US dollars, at $1,360,621.08 and on p. 119:
“Currency Reserves in the United States. -When the Philippines are reoccupied it will almost certainly be necessary to adopt a new currency system. The Commonwealth government will be fortunate in having at its disposal for this purpose ample reserves now held in the United States. There were on deposit on June 30, 1942, in the United States Treasury $133,813,902.59, representing reserves of the Philippine currency. In addition, there was a small amount ($355,831.44) of currency reserves onm deposit with a private bank in the United States and the United States Treasury is holding for the Commonwealth gold bullion valued at $1,360,621.08 [footnote 40: This gold was brought to the United States by submarine after the war with Japan started as described in the section of the report entitled"Program for the safekeeping of currency, gold, securities, and other valuables." Its value has been computed at $35 an ounce. See pp. 46-57 of this report]. The total of these items is well in excess of the largest circulation of currency that there ever was in the Philippines. As has been noted earlier in this report, ther greatest circulation of which we have record was P200,445,432, equivalent to $100,222,716, on September 30, 1941.
“The Commonwealth Government also has in storage in the United States a large number of silver 1 peso coins which were brought to the United States by submarine after the war started (see p. 57 above) After reoccupation of the Philippines it will be possible either to reissue these coins or melt and remint them.”
As for the disposition of government funds from 1942-45, the relevant executive issuances are in Executive Orders of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Manila, Bureau of Printing 1945
I hope this answers your quiery to your satisfaction. There was no mystery surrounding the transfer of treasury funds as they were the currency reserves of the country. It was against the value of this gold that emergency wartime currency was issued by the guerrillas.
In response to the above, I was highly gratified to receive the following response:
Thank you likewise for your very kind, comprehensive and scholarly reply to my query. I’m completely satisfied that we have a happy ending here. Obviously, those were the times (perhaps just a golden memory) when public servants can be trusted with million of pesos of the people’s money.
You’re absolutely right. President Quezon and party did not leave onboard the submarine USS Trout but the USS Swordfish. I assumed that he did so because the date of his departure was Feb. 22, 1942, about the same as the ETD of USS Trout. That’s what I got for dealing with scanty and segmented data. Sorry.
There’s no mystery about the great wartime of our national treasure NOW. That’s because you’ve cleared that. How many students of history know what you’ve just narrated? I’m not sure if this event was discussed at all in our history classes with the length and clarity you just did which has amply justified my description of you as a historical sleuth. And what about the technical documents and process by which the gold reserve and other funds were removed from the Central Bank and our country. That certainly is something we didn’t know before.
Now we know better. Thanks to you. The lesson here seems to be: We should study our history more thoroughly and seriously. We can’t simply rely on you and a few other scholars to do so for us.
Your narrative was gripping, accurate and thrilling – and worth the reading. I said that earlier. I’m not disappointed that the whole episode had a happy ending. And I’m relieved.
Highest esteem.
Fernando A. Almeda Jr.
As was I, as I didn’t know the answer in full until Atty. Almeda made me look into it. On a final note, the compensation given to the Philippines due to the devaluation of the US dollar, which Romero mentioned in the first extract in this entry, was officially quantified in the High Commissioner’s report quoted in turn, above.
Unfortunately, in my response I failed to attach an interesting extract from the War Diary of Gen. Basilio Valdes, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army and member of the War Cabinet. Here’s his entry for February 3, 1942:
February 3, 1942 – Tuesday
Nothing unusual during the day. At 10 p.m. I was already in bed when the phone rang. It was the Chief Justice telling me to get dressed as we had to go to the vault, to perform a secret and delicate mission. I dressed hurriedly met them at the entrance of the Malinta tunnel and we proceeded by car for the vault. The guards were surprised at our unannounced visit. A few minutes after we arrived, Commander Parker U.S Navy and some men with two station wagons arrived followed closely to the Staff of the U.S. High Commissioner. We worked incessantly all night. The work was performed with military proficiency, no noise, no conversations. We finished our mission at 4:30 a.m. What a relief! I returned home very tired and exhausted. I forgot to mention that at 7 p.m. Colonel Roxas, Colonel Nieto, Colonel Marron, Major Romulo, General Drake and myself went to the SS Legaspi for dinner – and what a dinner. We ate like wolves.
I was happy to receive a letter from Tito and one from Colonel Quimbo. Tito sent me 5 boxes of good tonic.
Additional documents I’ve encountered, concerning the disposition of currency notes, can be gleaned from the papers of Andres Soriano, Acting Treasurer of the Philippines and then Secretary of Finance in the War Cabinet. They trace the story of Soriano’s appointment, and accounting done on the run, literally.
First, a letter of appointment.
Malacanan Palace
ManilaCorregidor
February 19, 1942Sir:
By virtue of the authority vested in me under the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, Treasurer of the Philippines.
(sgd.) Manuel L. Quezon
Mr. Andres Soriano
Corregidor
Next, a mission order:
Malacanan Palace
ManilaMarch 2, 1942
My dear Major Soriano:
You are hereby appointed Member of my War Cabinet without portfolio.
You will please proceed to Cebu where you will meet with the other members of my cabinet to take part in the deliberations of public matters that might come before it and to carry out other missions that I have entrusted to you. After you have completed your work in Cebu you will please proceed to Mindanao where you will be my Special Representative before General Sharpe. In matters affecting Civil Government in all the provinces of Mindanao except Surigao, I am designating you as my Special Delegate to act for me if and when prompt action may be absolutely necessary.
You will please discuss the civil matters with Mr. Guingona whom I have designated as the representative of the Department of the Interior to exercise the old functions of said department over provincial and municipal governments. However, during your stay in Mindanao, Commissioner Guingona shall discuss with you matters policy to be adopted in the Mindanao provinces, excepting the province of Surigao, and whenever there is a perfect agreement between you two and General Sharpe offers no objection thereto, such policies as may have thus been agreed upon, will be carried out as if they have received the specific approval of the President.
I hereby also authorize you to receive from the Manager of the Philippine National Bank and/or the Currency Committee in Cebu, all the funds that be required by the USAFFE in Mindanao as well as the provinces therein with the exception of Surigao.
You are also authorized to require the engraving of the necessary plates for the currency to be printed in Mindanao.
Sincerely yours,
(sgd.) Manuel L. Quezon
Next, a letter of introduction, to accomplish the mission order:
Malacanan Palace
ManilaMarch 1, 1942
My dear General Sharp:
Major Sorianowho was on the front has been appointed by me, with the knowledge and consent of General MacArthur, Treasurer of the Philippines, and I have made him member of my War Cabinet. I am sending him to Mindanao as my special delegate and representative to discuss with you and Mr. Guingona, and the other provincial authorities of Mindanao, the problems that exist there. Major Soriano has been given authority to act in my behalf. He will carry with him the funds that the USAFFE may need as well as the provincial and municipal governments in amounts that Cebu has already been able to print.
In order to avoid the need of sending for funds from Cebu, Major Soriano is going to see if he can have some plates made in Cebu for Mindanao so that emergency currency may be printed in some place in Mindanao. I do not consider wise to have Mindanao, or in fact any part of the Philippines, depend upon any other province which might be occupied at any moment.
Sincerely yours,
(sgd.) Manuel L. Quezon
P.S. I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy of the letter which General Jones wrote to General Sutherland regarding Major Soriano’s services in the filed, one copy og which letter having been given to me by General Sutherland himself.
MLQ
Additional authorizations:
Malacanan Palace
ManilaMarch 8, 1942
My dear Major Soriano:
I hereby authorize you to appoint the men that will constitute the Currency Committee for the provinces of Mindanao. If it should become necessary for military reasons to have this committee sit in Lanao, you are also authorized to issue the necessary order to this effect including the power to make transfer from one province to another of the officials that you may choose and appoint as chairman and members of this committee.
Sincerely yours,
(sgd.) Manuel L. Quezon
Major Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines
And a receipt from the source:
Received from the Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, two (2) galvanized iron lock boxes said to contain TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as follows:
Box. No. 4
Denomination    Amount    Total
P20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â P750,000
P1Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 25,000Â Â P775,000Box No. 5
Denomination    Amount   Total
P20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â P1,250,000
P5Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 175,000Â P1,425,000Total ———————————-P2,200,000
This represents the proceeds of my draft of this date for the same amount drawn on the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Cebu City, March 10, 1942
Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines
A treasurer’s report::
The Commonwealth of the Philippines
Province of Misamis Oriental
Office of the Treasurer
Cagayan, Phil.
March 15, 1942Major Andres Soriano,
Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
Cagayan (now at), Misamis Oriental.Dear Sir:-
I compliance with your verbal request, I have the honor to inform you of the following approximate distribution of the currency notes which I have received to-day from you, viz:
Province of Misamis Oriental —————————-P200,000.00
“Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ” Bukidnon—————————————P300,000.00
“Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ” Lanao——————————————-P300,000.00
“Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ” Occidental Misamis————————-P300,000.00
“Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ” Surigao—————————————-P300,000.00
“Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â “Cotobato—————————————P300,000.00
Koronandal Valley, Gen. Santos———————-PÂ 50,000.00
Gen. Vachon’s Division———————————-P300,000.00
General Fort’s Division———————————-P160,000.00Very respectfully,
(sgd.) Ubaldo D. Laya
Provincial Treasurer
Use of delegated authority:
DANSALAN, LANAO
BY THE SPECIAL DELEGATE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1Appointing the Currency Committee for the Provinces of Mindanao
By virtue of the authority granted me by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, on March 8, 1942, I hereby appoint the following to constitute the Currency Committee for the Provinces of Mindanao: Honorable Teopisto Guingona, Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu, Chairman; Mr. Ubaldo D. Laya, Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental, Member; and Mr. F. Atagaban, Provincial Auditor of Lanao, Member.
This Committee shall sit in Dansalan, Lanao, but is authorized to transfer its offices to any other place as may be agreed upon by them.
For this purpose, Treasurer Laya is hereby directed to reside in Dansalan, retaining, however, his status as Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental. He shall accordingly make arrangements for his Assistant to discharge the duties of Provincial Treasurer of that province.
Done in the Municipality of Dansalan, this sixteenth day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred forty-two, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the seventh.
(sgd.) Andres Soriano
Special Delegate of His Excellency,
the President, and Treasurer of the Philippines
Then, additional supporting documentation:
Counterpart No. 1
I hereby acknowledge to have this 24th day of March, 1942, received from Major Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, the sum of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THREE AND 30/100 (P28,663.30) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to be used by me as Special Disbursing Officer of the Office of His Excellency, The President of the Philippines.
(sgd) Serapio D. Canceran
Special Disb. Office
Office of the President.Note-
This recepit consists of five counterparts, each of which serves as original.
Followed by:
Counterpart No. 2
Del Monte, Bukidnon,
March 24, 1942I hereby acknowledge to have this 24th day of March, 1942, received from Major Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to be used by me as Disbursing Officer for His Excellency, The President of the Philippines.
(sgd.) Manuel Nieto
Lieutenant-ColonelNote-
This receipt consists of five (5) counterparts, each of which serves as original.
More supporting documents:
Counterpart No. 2
I hereby certify to have this 24th day of March, 1942, received from Mr. Serapio D. Canceran, Special Disbursing Officer, Office of the President, the sum of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THREE AND NO/100 (P528,663.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
(sgd.) Major Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the PhilippinesNote-
The above receipt consists of five (5) counterparts, each of which serves as original.
More documentation:
Counterpart No. 3
I hereby certify to have this 24th day of March, 1942, received from Col. Nieto the sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 (P1,100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, which was the same sum received by said Col. Nieto from The Honorable, The Acting Secretary of Finance, Hon. Jose Abad Santos.
(sgd.) Major Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the PhilippinesNote-
The above sum has been included with the funds contained in Box No. AA-1 (now footlocker with padlock) deposited for safekeeping temporarily in Del Monte, Bukidnon, in care of Lt. Col Paul S. Beard to be finally deposited in the new vault being constructed now at Dansalan, Lanao, care of Commissioner Teopisto Guingona.
(sgd.) Andres Soriano
This recepit consists of six counterparts, each of which serves as original.
An acknowledgment receipt:
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Headquarters, Mindanao Force
Bukidnon, PhilippinesMarch 24, 1942Counterpart No. 4.
I hereby acknowledge that I have received from Major Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, the following:
1. A box (foot-locker with padlock) bearing black sencil numbers B-41 on the sides and B-41 on the top:
Denomination         Total Number      Value
P50.00Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 40,000Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â P2,000,000.002. A box (foot-locker with padlock) bearing black stencil numbers B-52 on the sides and B-56 on the top:
Denomination         Total Number      Value
P50.00Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 40,000Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â P2,000,000.003. A box (foot-locker with padlock) marked AA-1 on top and sides:
Denomination         Total Number      Value
(as per list enclosed in box)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â P1,500,000.004. A box bearing black stencil numbers B-56 on the sides and B-64 on the top:
Denomination         Total Number      Value
P50.00Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 40,000Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â P2,000,000.00Contents of above four boxes were not checked or counted at time of storage, the control and accountability remaining with the Commonwealth Government, and not in any manner passing to the credit of the United States Government or any of it’s officers, and being held only for safekeeping until such time as the vault now under construction at Dansalan, Lanao, will be ready, at which time, the funds and responsibility will be transferred to Commissioner Teopisto Guingona, who is authorized to accept responsibility as custodian of the Commonwealth Government, thereby terminating entirely all responsibility of Col. Paul S. Beard, F.D., U.S.A. At no time will the contents of said boxes be used by anyone except by express authority of His Excellency, The President, Manuel L. Quezon, or Colonel Manuel Roxas, or Major Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, or their successors in office. The keys of the temporary depository will be held by Colonel Beard and Commissioner Guingona and are to be turned over to their successors should either be transferred to other posts, which will terminate their responsibility entirely.
This receipt consists of six counterparts, each of which serves as original.
Dated at Del Monte, Bukidnon, this 24th Day of March, 1942.
(sgd.) Paul S. Beard
Lt.-Col., F.D.,
U.S.A.The above agreement accepted for the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, dated at Del Monte, Bukidnon, this 24th Day of March, 1942.
(sgd.) Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines(handwritten notation & signature) Approved, Manuel L. Quezon
Additional records of transfers:
(vertical inscription: Per letter of President Quezon to Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, dated March 1, 1942)
Counterpart No. 5
THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Exchange for P1,000,000.00 Del Monte, Bukidnon
March 26, 1942——At sight—— of this First of Exchange (Second Unpaid) pay to the order of PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK CEBU BRANCH—–the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION ONLY—-
Value received and charge the same account of
To THE TREASURER OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Manila(sgd.) Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines
And more:
(vertical inscription: Per letter of President Quezon to Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, dated March 1, 1942)
Counterpart No. 6
THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Exchange for P1,000,000.00 Del Monte, Bukidnon
March 26, 1942——At sight—— of this Second Exchange (First Unpaid) pay to the order of PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK CEBU BRANCH—–the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION ONLY—-
Value received and charge the same account of
To THE TREASURER OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Manila(sgd.) Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines
And yet more:
(vertical inscription: Per letter of President Quezon to Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, dated March 1, 1942)
Counterpart No. 7
THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Exchange for P2,000,000.00 Del Monte, Bukidnon
March 26, 1942——At sight—— of this First of Exchange (Second Unpaid) pay to the order of PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK CEBU BRANCH—–the sum of PESOS TWO MILLION ONLY—-
Value received and charge the same account of
To THE TREASURER OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Manila(sgd.) Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines
And another:
(vertical inscription: Per letter of President Quezon to Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, dated March 1, 1942)
Counterpart No. 8
THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Exchange for P2,000,000.00 Del Monte, Bukidnon
March 26, 1942——At sight—— of this Second of Exchange (First Unpaid) pay to the order of PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK CEBU BRANCH—–the sum of PESOS TWO MILLION ONLY—-
Value received and charge the same account of
To THE TREASURER OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Manila(sgd.) Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines
Additional instructions:
Commonwealth Government of the Philippine Islands
Office of the Treasurer
In the Field
Del Monte, Bukidnon, P.I.
March 24, 1942.This is to certify that, in the event the military situation indicates that the Commonwealth Government funds, deposited for safekeeping with Colonel Paul S. Beard, F.D., U.S.A., and Commissioner of Mindanao, Teopisto Guingona, are in danger of being captured by the enemy, the Commanding General. Mindanao Force, may order destruction, by a Committee of Three who will certify that the funds have been destroyed by them personally.
(sgd.) Major Andres Soriano
Treasurer of the Philippines1 Copy for Major Soriano
1 Copy for Colonel Beard
1 Copy for Commanding General, Mindanao Force(handwritten notation and signature) Approved, Manuel L. Quezon
A promotion:
March 26, 1942
Sir: You are hereby appointed Secretary of Finance, ad interim, and member of my War Cabinet. You may turn over all the records of the National Treasury to Colonel Manuel Roxas, Secretary to the President, who has been instructed by me to take the necessary steps for the proper administration of the affairs of that office.
Respectfully,
(sgd.) Manuel L. Quezon
Major Andres Soriano
Del Monte, Bukidnon
Then, submission of documents to the auditing office:
Commonwealth of the Philippines
General Auditing Office
ManilaJaime Hernandez
Auditor General1617 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., May 21, 1942Hon. Andres Soriano,
Secretary of Finance,
Washington, D.C.Sir:
This will acknowledge receipt from you of copies of the following official documents:
1. Counterpart No. 5 of receipt dated March 24, 1942, at Del Monte, Bukidnon, signed by Paul S. Beard, Lt. Col., F.D., U.S.A., from Maj. Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, for four boxes containing P7,500,000.00. Approved by Pres. Quezon.
2. Certificate dated March 24, 1942, at Del Monte, Bukidnon, signed by Maj. Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, and approved by Pres. Quezon, authorizing destruction by a Committee of three, government funds deposited for safekeeping with Col. Paul S. Beard, F.D., U.S.A., and Commissioner of Mindanao, Teopisto Guingona.
3. Counterparts Nos. 5 and 6, dated March 26, 1942, at Del Monte, Bukidnon, signed by Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, Exchange for P2,000,000.00 to Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Manila, thru the Philippine National Bank.
4. Counterparts No. 7 and 8, dated March 26, 1942, at Del Monte, Bukidnon, signed by Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, Exchange for P1,000,000.00 to Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Manila, thru the Philippine National Bank.
5. Counterpart No. 4 of receipt dated March 24, 1942, signed by Maj. Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, for the amount of P1,100,000.00 from Col. Nieto.
6. Counterpart No. 3 of receipt dated March 24, 1942, signed by Maj. Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines, for the amount of P528,663.00 from Serapio D. Canceran, Special Disbursing Officer, Office of the President.
7. Counterpart No. 2 of receipt dated March 24, 1942, signed by Serapio D. Canceran, Special Disbursing Officer, Office of the President, for P28,662.30, from Maj. Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines.
8. Counterpart No. 2 of receipt dated March 24, 1942, signed by Lt. Col. Manuel Nieto, Disbursing Officer, Office of the President, for P100,000.00, from Maj. Andres Soriano, Treasurer of the Philippines.
9. Memorandum Report of S.G. Miranda, Acting Manager, Philippine National Bank, Cebu, dated at Cebu City om February 28, 1942.
10. Letter of Andres Soriano, Secretary of Finance, to the Manager, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Melbourne, dated April 2, 1942, re transfer of $500,000.00 from the Chase National Bank to the National City Bank of New York.
11. Letter of Andres Soriano, Secretary of Finance, to the Manager, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Melbourne, dated April 6, 1942, re transfer of $400,000.00 from the National City Bank of New York to the Chase National Bank.
12. Letter of Andres Soriano, Secretary of Finance, to the Manager, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Melbourne, dated April 16, 1942, re amount of $15,000.00 to be operated by Maj. Joseph McMicking.
Respectfully
(sgd.) Jaime Hernandez
Auditor General
Technorati Tags: constitution, history, House of Representatives, philippines, politics, president, Senate, society
Limits on the use of the Presidential Seal
October 31, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Medals & Heraldry
Read Executive Order 310, s. 2004, and the limits on public use of the Presidential Seal.
The machinery’s in place
October 30, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Daily Dose
Back in 1997-1998, President Ramos ordered the presidential palace, rather run down and ramshackle after a decade of being uninhabited, repaired so that, as he put it, his successor would have a place fit to live in. At the time, it seemed Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo would be a contender for the presidency, and I recall telling some friends (who were shocked) that if she won, you could be sure she would never step down. If she climbed the stairs of the Palace in an act of symbol repossession, I said, the only way she’d ever leave would be on a stretcher.
They asked me why I said that, and I remember correctly, I explained that she’d shown power was more important than anything else. She’d been elected to the Senate not as a Liberal, but as something else, despite her father having been one of the few absolutely loyal party men the country’s produced (DM got many people to switch parties but from the time he entered politics to the day he died, he was always a Liberal, and proud of it).
This told me, I said (engaging in some amateur psychology) that we should consider that the one, enduring lesson she’d learned from her father’s rise and fall, is that Nice Guys Finish Last. Every presidential family’s fall from power is traumatic to the members of that family, but the fall of Macapagal was followed by the longest period of political obscurity any presidential family’s had to endure: Macapagal was more often than not, used as a figure of fun by the Marcoses and so the psychological wounds would have been particularly great. The daughter had already done better than the father (DM had failed in his senate bid in the 50s), and she could look forward to not only posthumously vindicating her father by becoming president (a dream that had eluded Serging Osmena, Gerry Roxas and Doy Laurel), but also, to relishing the role of being the top dog after decades of having her family treated like dogs, relatively speaking. Like her mother, she has a long memory and nurses grudges.
What changed my mind was her biding her time, and her going for the vice-presidency: she’s capable of holding her ambition in check, I thought. And more or less I felt I’d unfairly estimated her as she proved overall, a good boss and as President, she seemed inclined to be generous to the memory of her predecessors and more inclined to institution-building. The high point of this was her announcement not to run for the presidency in 2004. I remember being quite touched and telling anyone who would listen, how proud I was to be working for such a president. This was a thing of personal importance to me, because in my article on Corazon Aquino as the Person of the Century, I’d argued that what our country has had all too little of, are leaders who willingly, and serenely, relinquish power (which is why I continue to admire Cory Aquino). And I recall my irritation when other people in the Palace (belonging to the camp of the President’s husband) were either non-committal or openly disappointed with the President’s decision.
But I began to return to my original impression of the President when she announced, a year later, that she would, after all, seek election to the presidency. Whether I should continue serving her or not was, in a sense, decided for me when the Inquirer offered me a job on condition that I relinquish any official appointment; I could return to focusing on my profession while supporting her but no longer as as part of her administration. And still, I tried to soldier on in support of her until 2005 proved that she would stop at nothing, thereby proving that, indeed, her guiding principle was, Nice Guys Finish Last. My decision to stop supporting the President has been chronicled in this blog, and there’s no need to revisit it.
An economist I recently met told me he’d had the President as his professor, and that he felt she’d been a lousy teacher. Why, I asked. She conducted classes, he said, like a bully. She gloried in bombarding her students with questions, saying it was how law students toughened up. The economist said that’s not the way questions are approached in economics, as a discipline, and that furthermore she derived too much enjoyment from demonstrating her authority every which way she could. She tried to pander to female students, he said, but the female students, oddly enough, resented it.
I do believe the President thinks she is doing the country a favor and that as she survives crisis after crisis, this belief has been buttressed by an absolute certainty on her part that she will do the country good even if the country thinks otherwise. Hers is the essentially self-defeating attitude of a weak person who becomes a bully, and thinks that it’s a virtue to hold on to power by appealing to the mercenary instincts of those who surround her. This is self-defeating because there always comes a point where someone can not be bought, and will no longer be for sale; while leaders who appeal to the higher instincts of their followers can often ask them to make superhuman sacrifices for a cause the leader’s been able to identify as a shared goal both leader and follower possess.
All this is a lengthy prelude to what we observe today. Two articles put the the recently concluded baranggay elections in perspective: Village polls become prep work for 2010 race and Arroyo seeks allies in villages, doles out more power, perks. In most healthy democracies, public opinion is what leaders aim to cultivate; in the case of the President, it is the machinery that she lovingly oils, and which hums its gratitude, in turn. This is what I called The “vision thing”, in 2005.
Yet the absence of an inspiring vision matters less than a thorough, even if contemptuous, mastery of the levers of power. A mastery that trumps everyone trying to seize those levers.
Here’s s very interesting observation in The Blog:
This entire drama is being played out between the ruling classes, and there doesn’t appear to be any space presenting itself for a legitimate democratic revolution – who would lead one anyway, with the Left bitterly divided between the powerful Communists and the less radical but more responsible center leftists?
There is one interesting possibility that should be noted. Though no space has arisen yet, there is an opportunity for some opportunistic elite politician to finally decide to take the first shot and engage with the Left (who have all but completely sat this current fight out). A leader like that, from outside the left, might be able to unite the factions and lead a legitimate democratic revolution.
In another interesting development, that I haven’t seen anyone writing about or discussing, there is a gathering storm slowly approaching Manila. Though mostly out of the headlines in the capital, the MAPALAD farmers are gathering support from communities across the Philippines in their march from Mindanao to the capitol. Their 1998 hunger strike became a tremendous media event, earned them a later-broken promise from then-candidate Estrada, and probably was the single biggest factor in the extension of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Today, CARP is up for extension again. With the political situation as it is, if, as we suggested above, an opportunistic trapo were to bring in the Left, the arrival of MAPALAD circa Dec. 10th would present a unique opportunity to gain mass support of many in rural communities and their allies. The Communists aren’t in favor of extending CARP (they oppose reform, and seek rather to overthrow the complete system and seize the land from the current landowners), but the NPA itself expressed support for MAPALAD in 1998. The symbolic value of MAPALAD could be the catalyst and rallying point for a real democratic uheaval in this country. The space isn’t there yet, but opportunity to make it is.
The blogger, incidentally, doesn’t think the Speaker will fall (see his article in Newsbreak, Ethics Complaint vs JDV Doomed; see, also, similar views in Philippine Politics 04), but considers what will happen if he does. This involves the baranggay elections which represent a political consolidation, and an investment in the future, by the President:
With barangay elections out of the way it’s full steam ahead into the legislative session as the House comes back from recess. If JDV falls, proving me wrong and possibly ending my journalism career before it ever begins, Arroyo will likely get an ally of hers in the House. This would set the stage for another fight over ChaCha (charter change), through which Gloria hopes to reorganize Philippine government under a parliamentary system, paving the way for her to stay in power through 2010, the end of her current constitutionally mandated term.
In his column, Tony Abaya thinks he has it all figured out (and I happen to think he pretty much does):
Readers may also recall that in the latter half of 2006, there were concerted efforts to shift to the parliamentary system.
One through a people’s initiative led by the Sigaw ng Bangaw, the other through a Senate-less constituent assembly shamelessly maneuvered by Speaker Jose de Venecia (who wanted to become interim prime minister, before the whip-wielding dominatrix takes over in July 2010.
That both maneuvers failed, thanks to an outraged public opinion and an uncooperative Supreme Court, does not mean the efforts toward parliamentary have been abandoned. Less than 14 days ago, President Arroyo, out of the blue and without anyone asking her, called for a shift to a federal form of government “by the year 2012.â€
This means that agitation for federalism will begin before her presidential term ends in 2010. This would be a signal for the Sigaw ng Bangaw to launch another people’s initiative towards a simultaneous shift to parliamentary.
Proof? The baranggay investment strategy, the trial balloon involving names for possible Comelec appointments (keep your friends close, and you enemies even closer), and the rallying of support of the congressmen in cassocks known as the Catholic hierarchy. A thorough analysis of the dynamics within the Catholic hierarchy is in Conservatives Now Control CBCP; Bishops Won’t Join Resign-GMA Calls:
Although Lagdameo got a fresh mandate for another two years, the bishops—in a surprise move—replaced CBCB vice president Archbishop Antonio Ledesma of Cagayan de Oro.
In CBCP history, members of the permanent council usually enjoy two terms in office, with the vice president normally succeeding the president when his term expires. Ledesma, described as a progressive bishop and a Lagdameo follower, was supposed to succeed Lagdameo at the end of the latter’s term in 2010.
But breaking tradition, the conservative bishops ousted Ledesma and replaced him with Bishop Nereo Odchimar of Tandag, considered a conservative.
A CBCP officer privy to the June election disclosed that Lagdameo in fact barely won the presidency. He had to undergo three secret balloting before he was able to garner the required majority for his reelection.
The replacement of Ledesma, as well as Lagdameo’s tough reelection, showed that most of the bishops are already uncomfortable with the CBCP’s active involvement in political affairs.
In her column, Ellen Tordesillas gives us an insight into the dynamics of the Arroyo-Estrada AgrementL
Sources privy to the negotiations of the pardon said Estrada was dictating the terms. What Arroyo wanted from Estrada is for him stop funding the protests against Arroyo and for the ousted president to rally his loyalists to support the one who engineered his ouster.
Estrada complied in his statement early afternoon Friday when the delivery of the pardon was being delayed. In a statement read by his lawyer, Ed Serapio, outside the gate of his Tanay estate, Estrada addressed Arroyo “President” and thanked her for granting him “full, free and absolute pardon midway through her term.” The sentence recognized Gloria’s Arroyo’s term stolen from his dear friend, Fernando Poe Jr.
This was the clincher that finally made Puno chopper through cloudy skies to deliver the pardon: “I believe I can best continue to repay to our people the blessings that God has so graciously given me by supporting from hereon the programs of Mrs. Arroyo that are intended to attack generational poverty and hunger.”
Arroyo must indeed be desperate to hang on to this assurance by Estrada. If she thinks Estrada’s loyalists will love her because of the pardon, she is hallucinating. The adoration of Estrada’s fans of their idol is not transferable. In fact, they see the pardon as something that she owes their idol. No thanks to her.
Estrada’s funding of rallies has long been a non-factor among the “protest community”. If he was not able to gather an impressive crowd last September during the Sandiganbayan promulgation, he is not expected to subsidize the gathering of warm bodies for any protest activity. Besides, Edsa One and Two type of protest is already a thing of the past, rally organizers concede.
Ellen points out that the President’s much-diminished core group of supporters have to be troubled by the President’s efforts to cozy up to Estrada. Not least because the apparent easing out of Executive Secretary Ermita in a showdown over strategy with Sec. Ronnie Puno, puts the President’s political prospects in the hands of someone widely assumed of being the epitome of the mercenary.
As John Nery says, in his column,
Another traditional politician is in charge of the President’s own fortunes. Ronaldo Puno is not only the secretary of the interior and local government (and thus head of the country’s police forces), he is also the presidential adviser on political affairs. He chairs President Arroyo’s own political party, Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi)…
There is no question, however, that Puno is a political animal — in Aristotle’s original sense, of a species whose nature it is to live for the State.
But his many years in government service or political work (he also served as Joseph Estrada’s interior secretary) have given Puno a reputation associated with another philosopher: Machiavelli.
I am certain he will dispute the following characterization, but his political work can be said to display a signature style. He is fond of the feint; he is a whiz at the use of funds; his trail is followed by accusations of fraud.
He is adept at diversionary tactics (his crucial role in Estrada’s pardon, effected at a time of political scandal, has been both recognized and condemned). Political operators say he knows how to use special funds strategically (his own secretary-general in Kampi, Francis Ver, was involved in the attempted bribery of opposition congressmen; his own undersecretary at the DILG just happened to be in Malacañang during the alleged distribution of cash gifts in paper bags). And fraud continues to dog his name (he has been accused of masterminding the so-called Sulu Hotel operations, which reputedly gave Ramos the margin of victory)…
The point of all this: Is Puno the right man to guide President Arroyo in the endgame?
Granted, he can win elections; indeed, his signature working style (marked by those three F-words) works best, and was perhaps first perfected, in election campaigns. But it is a mistake to treat the President’s last days in office as though it were only the continuation of electoral warfare by other means.
John could also have observed, that every President who’s relied on Puno has had their ambitions foiled: Marcos fell; Ramos had his desire for a term extension thwarted; Estrada fell. And the President?
An an altogether unrelated note, this entry in Bayang Magiliw is just an enjoyable read.
Technorati Tags: Blogging, Charter Change, constitution, Edsa, elections, federalism, history, ideas, philippines, politics, president, society
A new majority
October 29, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Daily Dose

The last few weeks have been like a time warp. i remember when I visited Lucena in August, Atty. Sonny Pulgar described to me how even local politics had changed, reflecting national attitudes that have been obvious for some time. He said that the old era of the stump speech and the miting de avance, on a provincial level, was gone. Why would families want to sit through boring speeches, when they could watch teleseryes on TV? The era of the miting de avance predated the concept of TV prime time, and so, even in provincial elections, people preferred to decide on candidates according to their ads, while candidates looking for support had to go house to house, retail on the most minute scale.
But it seems the last bastion of traditional politics is the baranggay. I had’t encountered marching bands and the whole panoply of traditional campaigns in 2004 or 2007 (May), but the last couple of weeks had the old trappings on display. Bands banging away, processions, posters, streamers… Over the weekend, as the photo above shows in my baranggay, processions became quite elaborate: the tricycle procession I snapped above was followed by a procession of Mercedes-Benzes and vans, all sporting blue balloons.
Saturday, too, featured a round-the-clock battle of the bands, with drums and xlyophones, literally on the hour, every hour, from morning till evening. As I said, I saw similar bands in all sorts of baranggays, rich and poor, in the metropolis.
I don’t know if I agree with Blog@AWBHoldings who thinks the problem is keeping baranggay elections nonpartisan. The problem, it seems to me, is that everyone knows the baranggay is the bedrock of party politics, and you might as well remove the bogus effort to keep it nonpartisan and make it partisan within effective limits.
The effect of today’s baranggay election will be to entrench the ruling coalition.
Anyway, on to the national scene.
Estrada is now to the opposition what FVR is to the ruling coalition -a decoration, a receding symbol of past mistakes but not a key to a better future or an obstacle to more meaningful change.
Meanwhile, as yesterday’s Inquirer editorial put it, we are an even more deeply divided nation, and that the pardon was an act of political suicide, as today’s Inquirer editorial puts it. While Amando Doronila thinks pretty much the same thing:
The President’s strategists had thought that by removing Estrada from the picture, the pardon would allow her to rebuild her defenses that were crumbling under the pressures of corruption scandals over the broadband contract with the Chinese telecommunication company, ZTE Corp., and the cash payoff to congressmen and governors to bribe them into killing new impeachment complaints against her.
The ZTE deal has opened a dangerous rift between Ms Arroyo and Speaker Jose de Venecia, whose son, Jose de Venecia III, has denounced the President’s husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo, for intervening in the deal by telling him to back off from pressing his bid to review the contract.
This rift has opened cracks on the façade of the Lakas-led coalition in the House of Representatives. De Venecia can no longer be depended upon to rally the numbers to kill new impeachment moves. There are also plots to unseat him as Speaker…
The opposition members in the House, including Rep. Ronaldo Zamora of San Juan, are treating new impeachment complaints on the strength of the evidence backing these. They are not taking cues from Estrada and, Zamora has said, his fellow opposition would not be influenced by the pardon. The impeachment threat remains.
There are no tectonic shifts in alliances in the House as a result of the pardon. It cannot save the President from a crumbling coalition. She gained nothing but more scorn.
(in light of the above, see JDV seen as on brink of ouster: Showdown expected next week)
My column today, The price of power, is almost entirely based on an earlier entry on this blog, except for this updated part:
What happens next? A free man, Estrada is now just another ex-president. He can begin investing, quite heavily, in the political futures of his sons. However, his starring role is at an end. His allies among the political leaders must now attend to their own futures, because Estrada now belongs to the past. Jejomar Binay is now the true leader of the traditional political opposition.
And as for the President, it’s back to the War Room because so many other fights still need to be fought, and any relief she obtains always proves increasingly temporary.
To those who were at Edsa Dos, but who wouldn’t budge in 2005 and 2006, and who are suddenly filled with outrage over Ms Arroyo pardoning Estrada, what did you expect? You made this not only possible, but inevitable. Edsa Dos was not betrayed by this pardon, it was betrayed when the President tried to steal the 2004 election, when she refused to be held accountable by means of the impeachment process, and when she very nearly imposed martial law in 2006 but was foiled by Nonong Cruz. I am glad you now see what others saw—years ago.
To be sure, these thoughts aren’t unique, as discussed by the razor-sharp Placeholder:
True, because of Civil Society groups’ protest activities, just like the human body, our Society may run a fever, but it would be foolish to mistake the fever itself as the problem and lash out and make fun of these groups as Geo and like-minded members of the Philippine Middle Class have done. Now it’s their turn to wake up and smell the coffee. They (and we) are now reaping the rewards of such expediency. We have now arrived at a point where the State, which is supposed to protect our way of life, can no longer be excluded from the list of prime suspects*.
Or as observed by Ricky Carandang:
After all, Estrada was the only president since 1965 whose election to the presidency was not marred by accusations of electoral cheating. And despite his ouster in the 2001 coup de etat that history calls EDSA 2, he remains generally popular…more popular in fact than the woman who ousted him from office and took his place.
But there were few protests when the Sandiganbayan convicted him. I believe this is because despite the affection that people felt for him, they generally believed that the verdict was fair.
This is also the reason why I believe so many people are angry over the pardon. Lawyers who helped prosecute Estrada say that the six years of effort showed that despite all the shortcomings of the justice system, in this one instance, the system actually worked. The pardon undermined that message. The elites and middle classes who showed up for EDSA 2 to help oust Estrada and stood behind Arroyo despite Hello Garci, ZTE, extrajudicial killings, cash in paper bags being handed out to politicians, charter change, EVAT, and all her other sins, could always fall on Estrada’s guilt as a rationalization for their apathy.  The pardon has removed that excuse and now those that will continue to stand by her after this have to find a new reason to continue supporting her. Someone told me that allowing Estrada to be convicted was the only good thing Arroyo ever did for this country and now she undid it.
The prospects opening up, however, are expressed best of all by Ang Tambayan ni Paeng, who pens an open letter to the President:
Thank you, Madam President, for taking the ghost of Joseph Estrada off our shoulders. For so long, we in the anti-GMA camp had to suffer the blanket label of being pro-Erap in our actions. Now, we can oppose your unconstitutional actions without being accused of being “mga bayaran ni Wristband.” Now, we can call for your resignation without being asked “Bakit, gusto mong ibalik uli sa kapangyarihan si Erap?”
Thank you, Madam President, for giving us the opportunity to clean the ranks of the opposition. Finally, we will get to see who is really fighting the principled fight and who is fighting for the control over the sharing of the spoils. Finally, we can purge from our ranks the corrupt people who’d like to impeach you for your rape of the government coffers, the martial law agents who’d like to impeach you for your human rights violations, and the vote-buyers who’d like to impeach you for saying hello to Garci.
Thank you, Madam President, for vindicating our fight against the 2004 movement to vote for the lesser evil. You have shown that there’s no point in toppling an administration ran by a corrupt gambler if we’re just going to just replace it by an administration ran by a lying and cheating thief. The fight against the forces of evil can only be won by fighting with the forces of good. To think otherwise is sheer idiocy.
Thank you, Madam President, for slapping the faces of the middle force who supported you for the sake of “moving on” despite your numerous crimes to the country. What a tragic irony it is to see their favorite whipping boy Erap now freely partying in Polk Street upon command of their anointed savior. What a tragic irony it is that by chanting the mantra of moving on, the country took a step back in the fight against plunder, corruption and bad governance.
Thank you, Madam President, for uniting behind your administration the Estradas, the Marcoses, your various kaKAMPIs and cronies, and the other forces fighting for the preservation of the corrupt status quo. Now, the battle lines are clearly drawn. And it is time for the true opposition who believes in the fight for genuine societal change to unite and take the fight to your door. Tama na, sobra na, palitan na…KAYONG LAHAT!
As The Philippine Experience further explains, critics of Edsa Dos miss the point:
The elite, they call us. Me, rich? I am another member of the working class who tries his best to feed his family. No, I don’t own a newspaper like Niñez does, I’m a lowly blogger who does not even have his own domain.
The people I went to EDSA with back in 2001 were ordinary folks. I saw countless individuals who obviously were not well-off. Sure there were the rich group but I could tell that they are a very small group. I did not see dole-outs but I did see people just like me who shared the little food we brought along. There were no catering trucks that handed out mineral water and food in Styrofoam containers. Even the old balut vendor I stood beside “gave” away his balut for free.
I went to EDSA not to install Gloria but to show my disgust at how the numbers game was played in Erap’s impeachment. I too am appalled by the same situation in GMA’s last two impeachments were the majority relied on their numbers to dump the impeachment complaint. Aside from being one with those who denounced his way of running the country, there was a personal side to why I joined EDSA 2. I had to teach my kids that we all have to make a stand sometime in our lives. If the people who joined EDSA were rich, they wouldn’t be working during the day and then going to EDSA after work. Maybe the Tribune did not notice how thin the crowds were during the day only to swell in the afternoon and into the night.
I laugh at how the Tribune’s editorial pointed to different groups and lumping them into one box. Calling EDSA 3 the revolt of the masses is quite incorrect. EDSA 3 showed us how the poor can be easily manipulated by the rich. It showed us how the elite can exploit the suffering of the poor to their advantage. The Tribune should look at itself and those who see Erap as an aggrieved party and examine themselves closely.
Erap’s undoing was his own. The private prosecutors found evidence to link him to the crime for which he was charged. He was acquitted of those he obviously did not commit. I too defended him against the obvious injustices this administration handed him. Maybe the Tribune has to understand what morality and justice is. The editorial was quite reckless in its opinion. I am not a member of the Black and White movement. I must agree though that certain personalities were accommodated by the UNO but that is to put some credibility to their slate. UNO cannot claim that these personalities were forced upon them. If UNO stuck to their favored candidates, I doubt if those would match up to who GMA had.

In Hungry Enough to Devour a President, Sylvia Mayuga ties the threads of the past with the unraveling ties that bind the administration to power:
Point is: the Republic of the Philippines is not starting from scratch. It won a victory for people empowerment at a very high price after 20 long years under Marcos, the way Manuel L. Quezon and the independence movement won back our sovereignty in 1946, the way the Katipunan decided to take the plunge for revolution in 1896…
…A panorama of recent history – for that is all it is in the life of a mystical race with all its faults – emerges now in major landmarks of a reigning Kapampangan queen’s dismal failure to become a President of all Filipinos. If Inday, our bookworm OFW domestic, called these landmarks “major blocks to Filipino evolution erected by a pushy, super-competitive Filipina without sufficient self-knowledge, and for her own regressive psycho-historical reasons,†I would agree.
As A Jaspitz’s World puts it,
GMA mentioned in her speech, when she announced the pardon, that part of her legacy agenda is healing the wounds of EDSA 1, 2 and 3. If she could only be honest for once, she should have admitted that the pardon was intended to preempt an EDSA 4. She knew that all the previous EDSAs were simply a numbers game. By buying the Erap crowd with the highly-praised executive pardon, GMA was effectively betting that she could already afford to play Russian roulette with House Speaker Jose de Venecia III (JDV) and the still silent middle-class.
Torn & Frayed thinks Estrada lost out:
Erap was guilty of criminal acts, but that’s not why he ended up in the dock. He was deposed, tried, and convicted as much for his criminal stupidity as for his plunder.
As Erap’s supporters have said repeatedly over the last seven years “why just Erap?†I think that is a reasonable question. Erap’s crimes were probably no worse than those committed under the present administration, but he lost out in a political power play. The fact that he had been so careless, decadent, and profligate was a convenient way of justifying his ouster but I don’t think it was the main reason he went.
If Erap had spent less time boozing and more time building his coalition, he would have sailed through to 2004 without any bother. As it was, being a typical mummy’s boy and surrounded by sycophants in the palace, almost to the end he was convinced everyone loved him. He paid for that complacency for the next seven years.
As Machievelli observed, it is better to be feared than loved.
smoke thinks Estrada has made a net gain:
It’s a chess game. Well, sort of. Maybe a Greek drama or something. Anyway, Gloria was threatening checkmate with the conviction.
Estrada – the black king – moves into a more vulnerable position which, while it increases the possibility of a checkmate, also brings to bear a threat from an intrepid black knight and a coterie of pawns – the Erap rabble and its leaders.
Gloria is flustered and withdraws the threat from the black king in order to shore up her weak side against the black knight and pawns. All without realizing that the newly liberated black king – by diverting the buck-toothed queen’s attention – has managed to bring up his other troops on the other side. An enfilade in the offing. Mate in three or less – years.
the bystander is more cautious:
By asking for pardon, Erap in effect has recognized the legitimacy of the Arroyo presidency. Not only that, his role as the de facto leader of the opposition is now highly suspect. I doubt if he or even his sons Jinggoy and JV will still have the nerve to criticize Mrs. Arroyo the way they used to.
And because of the perception that Erap has struck a deal with the administration, this will ultimately lead to the break-up of the loose coalition of anti-Arroyo forces composed of former pro-Gloria civil society, religious and militant groups on the one hand and the pro-Erap group on the other. If that happens, then Gloria will definitely have the last laugh.
As always, let me point to Mon Casiple as a sure-footed guide to these contending ideas:
GMA wants to have a political hold on Estrada even after the grant of a pardon, thereby preempting possible revenge in the post-GMA period. The GMA camp wants a conditional pardon restricting Estrada from running in 2010. The nightmare here is an Estrada presidency avenging itself on its former vice-president, EDSA 2 nemesis, accuser, arrestor, jailor, and political judge.
What broke the impasse? Two things happened almost at the same time that, I think, opened the door to a hasty request for a presidential pardon and an equally hasty granting of it.
Estrada saw a failed motion for reconsideration and a Supreme Court sitting on his appeal, continued incarceration amid a political transition, and possible irrelevancy in the nation’s favorite game of politics. GMA, for her part, saw the first signs of a ruling coalition self-destructing, the specter of a successful impeachment, and the inexorable march towards a lameduck presidency.
GMA has only three options facing her in the waning days of her power: to reconcile with the opposition and agree on the rules for the post-GMA period (particularly on guarantees for her survival), to gamble and exact the same guarantees from presidentiable(s), or to maneuver to extend her term.
She tried the first option on her terms–it failed. She tried to play off the presidentiables against each other–they unified against her. She tried redoing the Cha-cha caper–she is failing. The political battlefield is littered with her various bungled initiatives. The strategy that saved her so far was the creation of diversionary issues marked by a cynical use of the short attention span of the mass media.
However, the clock ticks, and having ticked, moves on. Today, she stands in the endgame, with threats of a checkmate from within and outside her defenses. Her trusted people–one by one–had already left or are ravaged by time and the political war. The window of opportunity for a favorable outcome to her crisis–or even a merely survivable one–is fast closing.
The Estrada pardon is a decisive political stroke but its effectiveness is diminished by it being a forced move. It is also an ambiguous signal, indicating either a reinforcement of depleted political ranks or a genuine gesture of reconciliation. GMA has to do more to extricate from a closing attack and clearly signal her intentions–by undertaking specific actions for political reforms that can unite the body politic for the post-GMA period. Or embark on a perilous gambit that only a Marcos dared use before.
New Philippine Revolution takes a reading of the public pulse:
I believe at this time, the accounting of forces have already been made and both camps know their true strength. The question is–will we see a change of government this November?
Observation on the online petition
Based on a reading of the People’s Pulse, this online petition will amount to nothing. The people does’nt want a snap elections. Its a waste of time and money. What they support though, is a caretaker government. The concept of a caretaker government seems to resonate loudly among the people and I believe that should this happen, it will be supported by the people.
The caretaker government should rule this country until 2010. By that time, everything would have calmed down and a new constitution would have been in place. That’s the way to go. The only question is–are these forces really determined to go all out against Arroyo? We will see in the coming weeks.
Interesting entries, too, in theraveneffect, in My Point… Exactly! and Mad Musings of a Matabang Mama from Muntinlupa.
Relevant readings, from the West and the East: The Rockefellers and the Angry Commoners discusses how the millionaires of America’s Gilded Age staved off class warfare.
Blogger History Unfolding expresses dismay over how American politics seems incapable of heading off disaster:
Last fall’s election certainly seemed to show that the country had turned against the Bush Administration and most of its works, but the Republicans have bizarrely managed to remain on the offensive and the Democrats seem to cower more every week. The Mukasey confirmation hearings present the latest and perhaps most dramatic challenge to the Democracy (as it used to be called): the Senate is now called upon to confirm a new Attorney General who claims absolute executive power in time of war, and if they do so–as it seems they surely will–it will amount to an admission that Presidents may in fact establish a modified dictatorship if it suits them. The drumbeat for war against Iran continues, and the President’s CHIP veto has been sustained. Even more alarming, however, is the tenor of the debates among the two sets of Presidential candidates.
How so? Well, our Constitution has in effect been suspended, we may face an impending economic catastrophe, and we have destroyed the postwar world order that our parents spent half a century building up, all under President Bush. Yet the Republican candidates are projecting more self-confidence and self-assuredness than the Democrats! One hears no more talk of them distancing themselves from the President–they are falling all over each other (and this includes Rudy Giuliani) promising that they will out-Bush Bush. They are ready to attack Iran and foresake the UN, to make Bush’s tax cuts permanent, appoint yet more extreme right wing judges and make all the Bush tax cuts permanent. So vehement are they that I will be genuinely surprised if the eventual nominee makes a real move towards the center in the general election. Meanwhile, on the other side of the fence, the Democrats are once again failing to articulate any broadly different foreign policy (even though Obama has made a few tentative steps in that direction), and the front runner, Senator Clinton, seems eager to pursue the confrontation with Iran, if her vote on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is any indication. Perhaps the electorate still wants the most muscular foreign policy possible and an abridgment of civil liberties to fight terror because it sense how detested we have become around the world–a sad commentary, if true, on the Republican capacity for turning policy failure into political success.
Another article, Resign, Retire, Renounce, ponders what the American military should do, if Bush embarks on a lunatic war with Iran; King Duck Goes to His Taiwanese Reward shows how Taiwan’s Kuomintang is weaning itself away from its mafia connections (see Hong Kong’s market collapse of 20 years ago is worth recalling during the present turmoil for an insight into how governments bail out businesses).
Technorati Tags: Blogging, constitution, Edsa, elections, history, ideas, impeachment, law, media, military, people power, philippines, politics, president, society
Book of the Week
October 29, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Books & Music
“The Third Philippine Republic, 1946-1972″ (Lewis E. Gleeck)
MLQ and crooks
October 28, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Quezoniana
See How Quezon handled government crooks, August 19, 1961, Crooked judges get the boot, May 27, 1939 and Quezon and the judiciary, 1959.
Return of the native
October 26, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Daily Dose
After Edsa Dos, I expressed the opinion, mainly in private, that having stepped down, and having avoided bloodshed, Joseph Estrada should be left alone in Greenhills and left to wallow in his riches. Ouster, under the circumstances, was enough. When Edsa Dos forces insisted he should be thrown in jail, again, I expressed reservations on the basis of the country remaining deeply divided, and on the principle that you do not kick a man when he is down. When the pressure to charge him and try him proved irresistible, I cautioned that pending the trial, he should still be allowed to stay in Greenhills, as humiliating him would not serve the interest of justice.
What happened of course was that he was clumsily arrested, and treated in such a manner as to provoke the Edsa Tres revolt. A revolt the forces salivating over his humiliation proved powerless to prevent or even counter. The reformist instincts of the President were swiftly abandoned at that point, when it proved her Civil Society allies couldn’t protect her; instead, the military and the operators shielded her and the inevitable slide to 2003 (her decision to run again), 2004 (the manner in which the campaign was conducted), 2005 (the divorce between the President and what remained of the reformists within her government) and 2006 began.
After having gone against her instincts and ordering the arrest of Estrada, the President always proved ambiguous about the trial and a conviction: from day one, she’d preferred exile as a solution. If that proved impossible, she would be persistent in offering a pardon. Meanwhile, she expressed no dissatisfaction with the trial being dragged out, since a quick resolution of the case wouldn’t do her any good (in the absence of a willingness, on Estrada’s part, to recognize her legitimacy by accepting a pardon from her), and while a drawn-out trial also served Estrada’s purposes (either postponing an inevitable conviction or keeping him in the limelight as some sort of self-styled prisoner of conscience), neither side seemed capable of figuring out what a possible compromise could be.
And so, earlier this year I proposed that Estrada cut the Gordian knot and run for office. It offered up a possibility for the public to resolve something the court was proving unable to do. Estrada preferred to continue posturing from his Tanay rest house. After the election, when it became clear Estrada’s endorsement was not as powerful as people had expected, and when the President for her part, saw the public mood (nationally-speaking) was completely against her, the trial began to move toward a resolution. On the day the verdict was handed down, both Estrada and Arroyo loyalists discovered they stood larger in their own minds than in the eyes of a public that shrugged off Estrada’s conviction. Both saw themselves in the mirror, and didn’t like what they saw: they saw themselves as sliding, inexorably, too, into the has-been column of the political divide.
With neither side having shown themselves as particularly devoted to the law, I felt that the whole thing should be done with, and Estrada pardoned. I did end up qualifying that opinion with a further opinion that a pardon shouldn’t include his taking home the loot. The opinion of Prof. Popoy de Vera struck me, which was, that the Filipino concept of justice is restitution and not retribution -as he later told me, besides that was the public view that Estrada shouldn’t keep his loot, and having been disgraced, he should bow out of politics.
The pardon, as it’s emerged, involves exactly that, and suggests at whom the pardon is aimed, in p.r. terms: the Estrada constituency among the masses. The pardon contains a pledge (whether meaningless or not) that Estrada will not seek elective office, and that he forfeits the properties and monies ordered confiscated by the court.
Estrada, for his part, had angled for nothing less than a full, sweeping pardon. the President, on the other hand, anxious as she was to grant that pardon, had to be able to throw some sort of bone to her constituents and so, made a counter-proposal: Estrada should accept a conditional pardon, the only condition being his being unable to keep the loot (which Estrada, after all, had unblinkingly claimed was never his). What seems to have finally clinched the deal was something personal and not political -the widely-held assumption that Estrada’s mother doesn’t have very much longer left to live.
Add to that the unappetizing prospects, for the Estrada, of continued detention (however pleasant it is, but from his perspective still an intolerable situation), his being unsure of whether he would secure the overturning of the verdict on appeal, and the chance that a future government might not be anxious to pander to him the way the President has, and you can well imagine why Estrada would want to settle things now, and forget any chance to achieve a proper vindication. Add to this, finally, the pending transfer of Estrada to New Bilibid prisons: being fingerprinted in an orange jumpsuit, shaved of his Elvis-style pompadour, having to endure a jail cell.
You can imagine, too, that the President, beset on all sides by problems of her own making, and who never wanted things to reach this point, anyway, would want to settle matters, too, and her willingness to take one more gamble by saying she’d allow his being sent to Bilibid.
And so, they sealed the deal.
I am not surprised by the pardon, and I’m generally inclined to look at it the way Torn & Frayed does (he opposed amnesty, though I think amnesty would have been more politically acceptable all around), but I think it does leave a little room for further interpretation.
It tells us that the President has more to gain in terms of good will from the Estrada constituency than she has to lose from Edsa Dos forces who will be angry, upset, and shocked, but who in the end lack what matters most to the President: numbers, in terms of votes, and a willingness to make those numbers count, whether in terms of public protests or going to the polls.That political math has been clear since May, 2001: and the losers here are the Edsa Dos veterans who are shocked and appalled, only now, not least because the folly of their support for the President has been exposed, not to the President but to themselves. As far as Estrada’s supporters are concerned he made the best out of a raw deal.
But it also tells us that Estrada is permanently incapable of saving anything beyond his own hide. In the end he had to kneel and beg for mercy from a President he’d never recognized as legitimate; he would not risk vindicating himself in the courts, the ultimate demonstration of his disbelieving his own rhetoric. He can always say what does it profit a man, if he is unable to bury his mother as a free man? As far as that goes, he’s right; but he would have been allowed to bury her anyway, but he could not allow himself to endure the prospects of the Supreme Court upholding his conviction, or worse, his being hauled off to Muntinlupa to endure the kind of imprisonment regularly endured by his constituents.
In the strange, because almost mystical, way our society manages to see rays of sunshine, public opinion had finally welcomed Estrada’s conviction as closure to the great divisions of 2001. His supporters could proclaim him a willing martyr; his critics could view it as vindication. Estrada and Arroyo both managed to deny that closure to both, and that’s the reason there’s public dissatisfaction. at least withing Edsa Dos and some Edsa Tres circles, with the deal.
One comment I heard, from some Edsa Dos veterans, was, “and he didn’t even spend a single day in jail.” I understand some Estrada supporters were upset, too, because their idol caved in and left them twisting in the wind, proclaiming the illegitimacy of an administration from which Estrada himself decided to seek a pardon only a legitimate president can grant.
What this has achieved is that it has simply reshuffled the deck chairs on the Titanic. The President removed the chains keeping steerage from joining the First Class passengers on the deck of the sinking ship. Those astute enough to realize the ship’s doomed long ago fired the distress rockets and clambered into lifeboats.
In a nation where symbolism trumps substance, Estrada never had to suffer for his rhetoric, the President never gave the legal process to reach its final conclusion; there wasn’t even a token effort at proving justice could be tempered with mercy; instead, mercenary calculations were passed off as executive mercy. But, as Amang Rodriguez so famously said, “in the long of time, we shall success.”
Much as everyone saw the pardon coming, what I don’t think anyone outside of official circles expected was for it to be used so crudely, so patently politically: a historic verdict required a historic demonstration of presidential statesmanship; instead, it was a tool used to blunt the effects of embarrassing headlines resulting from the Senate hearing; and it was a brusque dismissal of those who, all these eventful years, stubbornly insisted on giving the President the benefit of the doubt because she had to be, somehow, better than her predecessor.
What happens next? It remains to be seen whether Estrada will be grateful to Arroyo, and whether a new Arroyo-Estrada alliance is in the making. I can only hope so. It relieves the opposition of the burden of having to maintain an uneasy peace with the Estrada forces, and finally offers up the prospects for the veterans of Edsa 1 and 2 to reunite.
Then again, it may also give Estrada a new lease on political life. But the damage has been done; a free man, Estrada is free to return to engaging in his vices in full public view, and to prove himself ungrateful and incapable of doing anything for those who loyally stood by his side since his fall from power.
If Estrada were to run for the presidency again, he would lose. But he can begin investing, quite heavily, in the political futures of his sons. What that future is, remains to be seen. now he is just another ex-president. He has achieved his aims, and how minimal they turned out to be. There is nothing left for him to do, not least because who, now, will follow him after his kneeling before the President?
And as for the President, it’s back to the War Room because so many other fights still need to be fought, and any relief she obtains always proves increasingly temporary. Tuesday and Wednesday night, apparently, neophyte congressmen were brought to the Palace for their egos to be stroked. Last night, a larger meeting of all non-opposition congressmen was held at the Palace, ostensibly to survey the political situation, but possibly to consider the party line concerning the President’s cash gifts, since the governors already came up with their own excuse.
Jove Francisco chronicles how reporters found out about the pardon, which wasn’t expected to be announced until Friday. Reporters apparently take their cue from how the President color-codes her dresses: if she’s in blue, you know she’s in crisis mode. Also, Jove mentions a gathering of the Cabalens in the Palace, which made for a surreal scene:
I heard some people who witnessed the event comment that the event was a bad idea. That it won’t help their cabalen-PGMA any bit. Imagine, here’s a President who has been distancing herself from the payola issue, and then here are Mayors saying stuff like “they need the controversial cash gifts†… inside the palace mismo. In bad taste, at sino man daw nag isip, – malamang di nag iisip. Ill advised, ika nga.
As for the goings on in the Palace bunker, word is that Sec. Bunye’s assumption of the role of Acting Executive Secretary is in preparation for his assuming the role in a more permanent capacity, which is why two deputy presidential spokesmen have been appointed; Sec. Ermita, according to scuttlebutt has been given a one-way ticket to America, and before he left, he told his people to start packing their things.
The reason the announcement of the pardon was moved to Thursday, instead of Friday, when the Palace prefers to make big announcements so it has the weekend to survey the scene and gage public reaction, is chronicled in turn by Uniffors. It’s a great read. And explains why the Palace dispensed with its only make breaking news as the weekend starts rule of thumb.
For a roundup of blogger’s reactions to the pardon, see tonyocruz.com.
Technorati Tags: Edsa, philippines, politics, president
The gathering storm
October 25, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Daily Dose
Yesterday afternoon I addressed a gathering under the auspices of NIPS on the current political situation. I briefly outlined what’s in my column today, Political leprosy (which makes reference to my March 13, 2006 column, Managing expectations), as well as some points raised the paper of Economist Dr. Michael Alba (which I posted, yesterday, at Inquirer Current) and the argument put forward by yesterday’s Inquirer editorial on the repercussions of the Estrada pardon (widely expected to be formalized on Friday).
My column speaks for itself, but here’s two relevant extracts from the pieces I mentioned. First, from Dr. Alba’s paper:
Is there hope for the future? Recall that, from the inference made by Jones (1997 and 2002) on the very long-run evolution of the world distribution of living standards, the Philippines is right on the demarcation line of countries headed for different futures. If it gets its act together—and this is a big if—the country may yet join the high performers that are tending toward high steady-state levels of output per worker. But to do so, it must exhibit a high growth rate (faster than that of the technological frontier) over a long period of time (as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have done), by persistently pushing out the steady-state level of output per worker to which it is headed, not so much by achieving a higher saving rate, a lower population growth rate, and a higher quality workforce, although these will help because of synergistic effects, but by significantly improving its total factor productivity. Growth and modern development economics tell us, however, that this is not so easily done, because it involves improving the quality of the country’s social infrastructure by taking on the vestiges of our history and culture that are growth-constraining, such as flawed leadership that values loyalty more than competence, an entrenched political and business oligarchy that unashamedly promotes and jealously protects its narrow self-interests, and an incentive structure that is nepotistic rather than meritocratic and that rewards thievery and corruption more than honest, hard work. In particular, three absolutely essential and indispensable elements for social transformation are: an effective, efficient, and high-quality education system, a vigilant civil society that demands high accountability from the government, and a competent, corruption-intolerant government administration of firm purpose committed to reform and transformation.
And next, from yesterday’s Inquirer editorial:
The lesson Filipinos have learned is that both leaders have more in common with each other and both have more that sets them apart from a public that is as angry at Arroyo’s cash bar as it was over Estrada’s karaoke governance. In other words, after two years of agonizing over who is the lesser evil, the public can breathe easy, seeing how both are two sides of the same debased coin. It is People of the Philippines now versus Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Returning to Dr. Alba’s economics paper, he pointed out a dilemma facing our OFW remittance-dependent economy. First, as more people work abroad, and send money home, the more foreign currency they send home, the less it’s worth. The result is OFW income is actually declining.
Add to this another problem: the more Filipinos leave home to work abroad, the less they stand to earn, and thus, the less they can send home, and the less what they send home is worth. This is the root cause behind proposals like the proposed November 1 and 2 Remittance boycott. Besides OFW’s, Filipino exporters have also, by all accounts, been ravaged by the depreciation of the dollar.
Add to this a third factor economists like Alba have noticed: the more Filipinos work abroad, the more their remaining dependents at home are likely to give up looking for work, and the more dependent they end up on those abroad. Short-term, this benefits the government, which can (and has, if you refer to Cielito Habito’s presentation a couple of months ago) then write off Filipinos who have given up looking for work, thereby formally (but not really) reducing those officially classified as unemployed.
Put in another factor, which is unreported in the media but common currency among entrepreneurs and other businessmen: the rampant smuggling of goods, which is also hurting Filipino manufacturers and traders. Simply talk to people with businesses that depend on importation or manufacturing, and you will know the concerns are serious, and resentment has begun to run deep. And you will also know who businessmen consider the godfathers and beneficiaries of smuggling.
Add another factor, which is that the upper and middle class in particular, was willing to tolerate many things about the administration, so long as it maintained the appearance of being marginally more virtuous than the Estrada administration. The handing out of cash to congressmen and governors, however, exceeded any doling-out of patronage in the Estrada years and was even more brazen than in the Marcos years. And the President’s attention to detail and workaholic style seems to have been spent more on manipulating the bureaucracy to approve the ZTE and other deals, than on anything particularly productive.
Add to this the growing realization on the part of military officers that they have to consider their career prospects in a future administration (a reason, I’ve heard it pointed out, that with the retirement of the previous service commanders, current and next-in-line commanders have quietly but effectively put a stop to tolerating extrajudicial killings and abductions, which seem to have subsided), and the realization among the politicians that the President’s solution to party problems -throwing money at people causing problems- has made politics so expensive and so utterly transactional, that they will have to bear the price of this in campaigns to come -and it makes politics a pretty much losing proposition, financially (even with Political Viagra by way of IRAs).
Put together the infighting in the President’s ruling coalition, with the sustained efforts of the various groups opposed to the administration, with the growing dissatisfaction with the President on the part of sectors formerly content to either turn a blind eye to her shortcomings, or who preferred her government to the prospects of a new one before 2010, and you have an administration running out of wiggle room. Not least because the President can no longer trot out her claim (very Nixon-like) that she represents a “silent majority.” If you noticed, her “silent majroty” has been consistently vocal, until now. Since ZTE began, the top 500 Women of Civil Society, the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and so forth have been very, very quiet while the usefulness of organizations such as ULAP has been severely curtailed, because of the payola scandal and clumsy handling by provincial officials (every family dealing with the depreciation of the dollar now has to consider what each congressman’s and governor’s dole out from the President could have done for them, instead, for example). The public hostility to the President over her handling of the Glorietta explosion and the handling by her pet officials hasn’t bolstered the President’s claim to public support, either.
In the same forum, Mon Casiple said that there are several confrontations that will determine whether the President recovers her strength or further dissipates it:
1. Today’s hearing at the Senate, and whether it brings to the fore new revelations (see ZTE inquiry resumes; Cabinet men not going and Joey: FG was coach; Abalos ‘captain ball ). I don’t know if I’d be as sanguine as New Philippine Revolution who suggests,
1. After tomorrow’s Senate probe, expect a revival of street protests and rallies. These protests will escalate to heights never before seen in both EDSA 1 and 2. The situation, based on objective analysis of existing conditions, is tantamount to the 1986 scenario. People are raring to protests now and it is just a matter of time. Groups should serve as the trigger.
People are saying that the military should move for the kill first before the people support them. I think this is feasible under present circumstances. A repeat of EDSA 1 is in order. I concur with this observation.
2. The resumption of Congress on November 5, widely expected to be a showdown between the President and the Speaker. Tuesday and Wednesday night, apparently, had meetings of neophyte congressmen at the Palace, which suggests the administration is trying to regain the initiative.
3. The fallout from the Estrada pardon and whether, in the weeks and months to come, a quid pro quo between Arroyo and Estrada becomes obvious as a result, which means a burden for the opposition will now shift to the administration (see the letter of Estrada’s lawyers to the President).
4. The serious resumption of Charter Change will make it clear the President does not intend to step down in 2010.
5. The ability of government to convince the public that it’s solved the cause of the Glorietta explosion.
And, I’d add, the ramifications of a far less cheery citizenry going into the Christmas season, as The Unlawyer points out:
It goes without saying that Philippine retailers were the most adversely affected business sector in the wake of the blast. For example, my company suffered an 11 percent drop in business for this Friday to Sunday weekend period – prime shopping days at that – compared to revenues from previous weekends, although I must say that customer traffic rebounded somewhat on Sunday.
What about in the medium term? The explosion happened during the runup to the 2007 Christmas shopping season, which traditionally starts soon after the All Saints’ Day holidays. Indeed, at least two major Metro Manila malls started their respective pre-Christmas sales promotions on the day of the blast. Philippine consumers will definitely stay away from the malls in the next few days, and if the authorities don’t quickly restore confidence to an apprehensive populace, they may just decide to refrain from shopping for quite a while longer.
Philippine retailers are depending on Christmas season sales for a substantial portion of their 2007 revenues, and it is certainly not an appealing prospect for many of them – of us, I should say – to see our customers frightened so.
Imagine how the retailers will feel as their suddenly-slender margins are further eroded by smuggling.
Blogger Scriptorium, unlike Mon Casiple, thinks the odds are still in the President’s favor in terms of staying in power. The blogger starts off with an interesting analysis of the political scene:
The Philippine political system is best understood if we see its major players as estates divided into blocs composed of factions. An estate, following Weber’s usage, is a group distinguished by its specific social functions and conventions (rather than by mere economic standing, as in the case of a class); blocs are subgroups made cohesive by a common ideology, orientation, or interest, and which are the best Philippine equivalents of political parties; and factions are groups usually united by personal antipathy or allegiance. In the Philippines, the estates would be the Thinkers or “lords spiritual†(its Blocs being the Church, the Left, and the urban intelligentsia); the Warriors (i.e., the regular military, the armed Left, and the criminal and private armies); the Commons (the urban middle class, and the rural electorates); and the Magnates or “lords temporal†(i.e., the political elite, big business, and organized crime). There are other estates and other blocs, but they are not as politically significant.
Based on the above, the blogger breaks things down into three main groups:
(1) Since 1986, the successful removal of a sitting President through peaceful mass action has required a coalition composed of at least one bloc from each estate. Hence, the 1986 EDSA revolt was carried out by an alliance of the Church, the non-aligned intelligentsia, the urban middle class, the military, and the Opposition factions of big business and the political elite; and the 2001 EDSA revolt required the same broad alliance, with the addition of the intellectual Left, which directly participated in the protests.
(2) Of these blocs/factions, the most important have been the military, the Church, the urban middle class (as the popular base of the protests), and the opposition faction of the political elite (which provides the leadership). The absence of any one of these blocs/factions, especially the last, renders removal of a President through peaceful mass action unlikely.
(3) A successful removal through peaceful mass action requires a correlation of forces that favors removal; that is, in leadership, will, and political strength, the pro-ouster coalition must have the advantage over the administration. Thus, the 1986 coalition was marshaled against a regime weakened by economic crisis, the President’s wasting illness, and the attacks of the intellectual and armed Left; and the 2001 coalition confronted a President whose main political base was the isolated and untested urban poor, and who had neither the skill nor the machinery to counter-mobilize.
The blogger points out that the Catholic Church lacks a Cardinal Sin, and the political class either a Ninoy Aquino willing to embrace martyrdom, or a Doy Laurel willing to subordinate his ambitions; and because of these, the military is, in a sense, incapable of moving (for the same reason, the German military proved incapable of challenging Hitler; it’s interesting to me that the blogger compares the current AFP mentality to the old Prussian military mentality that equated professionalism with blind subordination to the state). Anyway, the blogger then concludes,
At present, however, the preconditions for successful removal of the President through peaceful mass action simply do not exist, as was amply demonstrated in the almost-successful ouster attempt of 2005.
To begin with, the main social blocs have been isolated, neutralized, or weakened. For one, the urban middle class, especially the all-important 18-35 age range, is sheltered from economic pressure (like that faced by the urban poor) by the existence of outsourcing and emigrant (OFW) employment, which also siphons off discontented urban intellectuals; and it is diverted from politics by the expansion of the emigrant- and outsourcing-driven consumer market. (Some writers, in fact, have noticed the discrepancy between the youth that fueled the First Quarter Storm and the young adults of contemporary Philippines: once, they say, the paradigmatic activity of college and young professionals was public protest against oppression and injustice; but today, one finds the youth in Starbucks and the ever-ubiquitous malls.)
Even if it were politically active, the urban middle class has declined in relative strength with the politicization of the rural electorate, which tends to be less pro-Opposition than the urban sectors. The presence of this new countervailing force allowed GMA to fight the 2005 ouster-movement by counter-mobilizing the provinces, somewhat as the 14th-century Valois mobilized rural France against the Jacquerie; and with the dominance of patrimonial politics in rural Philippines, which, as I explained in another essay, is under Presidential control, she can well use the provinces again to resist urban protest. Another additional factor has been the rise of urban poor as a potential force. Being less inclined to liberal-democratic ideology and oriented to bread-and-butter issues, the urban poor’s very existence as a mobilizable force serves to weaken the claim of the urban middle class to represent the public will. In a word, we are seeing in the Philippines the beginnings of the process that, in Europe, led to the displacement of middle-class Liberal power with the Conservative, Catholic and Socialist movements.
I can’t wait for Part 2 of the blogger’s essay!
See the PNP Presentation 1 and the PNP Presentation 2 on the Glorietta blast. See also the observations of Tongue In, Anew and The Journal of the Jester-in-Exile and Manuel Buencamino in his column and Inner Sanctum in his blog and Jessica Zafra in hers. Some news: PNP probes army official who found plastic bag with RDX and Ayala Land says PNP theory of methane gas blast unlikely. Whatever the case, the Inquirer editorial urges authorities not to rush it.
A very poignant reflection by Luz Rimban on journalists and their having to pry into the sorrows of individuals in times of crisis or disaster. See Rabid Pirate Tanuki on the reactions of an office mate, a survivor of the blast; I feel blest publishes a letter by a bereaved husband (her harrowing account of the husband and his ordeal is in this entry). helen’s site has harrowing rescue photos, and Life No. 2 reflects on how people coped with the tragedy.
Technorati Tags: Blogging, constitution, economy, House of Representatives, impeachment, media, military, philippines, politics, president, Senate, society
Book of the week
October 22, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Books & Music
“The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940″ (William L. Shirer)
Evidence (updated)
October 22, 2007 by mlq3
Filed under Daily Dose
“Concentrate on what cannot lie. The evidence.”
- Gil Grissom to Warrick Brown, CSI
“It’s a scientist’s right to re-examine his theory with each new piece of evidence, Nick.”
- Gil Grissom, CSI
So what do we non-scientists do? Essentially, pursue the paths scientists would take, anyway. This morning, I gave a talk to high school and college students from the various La Salle schools, and one student asked my opinion on the Glorietta blast. And so, I quoted from CSI.
I told the students that as students, they should try to make sense of what happened, by starting with the realization that there is a lot more we don’t know, than we actually know at this point. the little that we know can be gleaned from three main sources. First, eyewitness accounts. Second, photos and videos showing the damage. Third, what our officials tell us.
At the end of the day, whatever official explanations emerge will have to be convincing to the many eyewitnesses, and match what they’ve related and what the pictures show (an interesting entry, with pictures, is in sane psycho, who’s mother is apparently the architect of Luk Yuen;Â Hueco Mundo says the owner had a close call indeed). Our job as citizens, I told them, is to be unafraid to insist that any explanation given makes sense. I told them that people will of course have preconceived notions or assumptions about what took place, but a sober and thorough investigation -and explanation- should hopefully end up convincing your average, reasonable, person.
And if it doesn’t, ask, ask, ask, until you’re satisfied it all makes sense. The opinions, even instincts, of people who were there, will matter. As will the views of ordinary citizens who try to make sense of the tragedy by comparing official explanations (or theories) with their own personal experience. See delai’s realm, for example, who, when the LPG explosion theory was first proposed, wrote,
they said it was just a gas tank leak. what the hell? when i saw it on tv, i had to say “wtf?” i’ve witnessed a house burn down because of lpg leakage. but it was nothing like it. there was a loud blast and then the house was eventually engulfed in flames. glorietta however was nothing like it. no fire at all. a blasted area of glorietta facing park square 2 flashed on tv. and when the inside of the mall was shown, there was no doubt that it was bombed.
See Turning Points, who has photos and refuses to believe it was a gas leak, either. See Clumsy Limbs who sadly noted that after Sunday’s brief fire, she has had to cancel future events in the mall.
In the end if they can be convinced, all of us should be convinced by whatever official explanation emerges. The trauma and confusion those who were there are going through (and their loved ones, who have just begun to count their blessings,)Â will naturally affect their attitudes and behavior.
Blogger Cindy.cIndy.ciNdy.cinDy.cindY who was fairly close to the blast, describes the process many others are going through too, I’m sure:
As soon as I arrived home last Friday, my father uttered the words “Military may pakana niyan. Sila lang ang may C4.†How can my father say that? I was disgusted to hear that the government might be behind the incident. And I was scared at the same time because the government can do that to their constituents. Then the news outlined several bombing instances in Metro Manila and all of them showed that the bomb used were home-made bombs. They believe that the ‘terrorists’ are the one behind the previous bombings. Anyway, we have to wait for the result of the investigation before we make accusations, right? So I watched the news and red the newspapers. It has been 3 days since the incident happened but still they don’t have a concrete idea what kind of explosive was used. Some were saying that it was indeed C4 since some chemical components of C4 can be found in the area. But the police investigators alleged that these components are available in the drug stores, therefore, speculations about the military and government being behind the incident should be disregarded. Ganon na ba kadali gumawa ng bomba?!
And the questions that are emerging in their minds:
And guess what, there are no security guards who died that day. Come to think of it, 2 passengers from a taxi died and the taxi driver was thrown off his own taxi because of the explosion but the guard on duty managed to stay alive. Another thing with the security guards in the mall is that they just stand there and tell the people don’t panic. The hell!!! Why don’t you just show the people where’s the safest way to go so that they won’t panic?! So much for the guards…
She also then tackles, next, the kind of talk going around and where officials could do some good by stepping in to squelch such talk, if it’s unfounded:
Yesterday the father of my brother’s friend, which is a Colonel in the military, warned us to stay away from malls because according to him there are 3 more bombs. They do not know yet where the other bombs are located. And according to him, the bomb used in Glorietta is indeed a C4. He also added that the C4 used in Glorietta was less than 2kgs and the purpose was just to scare the people. Then last night I received a text message from my friend saying, “This came from my brother Henry from the army. Wag kayo pumunta sa Global City Market Market and Makro Bicutan… All Ayala Corps subject for bombings. Ocean liners hindi pumutok kanina. Intel info yan, high alert kami…â€
I don’t know whom to believe because the news hasn’t disclosed this information yet or they haven’t received the information. And the military hasn’t given any statement regarding this information. But it seems that the info is quite correct in saying that there are still 3 bombs scattered in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, I wrote this to warn other people to be vigilant.
This is the problem: much as the stories being passed around bothers people (see Oodles of Goodles and love-andy and Willie Galang.COM for examples of those who feel bothered) in the absences of official reassurances to the contrary, passing around information may be the only way the citizenry has to cope with the possible implications of the blast. Put it this way, even if the blast wasn’t due to terrorism, it raises troubling questions, as Mara Finds points out:
[B]ut what is being stored there and why it wasn’t being audited and regulated by Ayala Center is a little bit questionable because, allegedly, there is a big gasoline tank sitting right under the mall and empty fuel cylinders being stored there.
What, they can’t find alternative storage solutions that they have to choose storing explosion hazards in the basement of a very busy mall?! While the investigators have not released a definite cause of the blast, whether it’s an accident or work of terrorist groups, it’s idiotic to give anybody or anything undue access to a large cache of volatile fuel.
There are others firmly convinced any official responsibility is improbable, even unthinkable, see Postcard Headlines.
My column today, Defeatism, is a far cry from the beautiful piece written by Patricia Evangelista in Things fall apart last Sunday:
When the soldiers were beheaded by the Abu Sayyaf, we were disgusted, violated, but we could push past it and say it’s the risk a soldier takes. It is the same for the activists and journalists, the leaders and politicians. They’re only names, mourned now, replaced by someone else’s story tomorrow. But what’s different about the Glorietta blast, in the reactions and confessions and the dozens of entries in blogs all over the Internet, is the uniform mix of fear and relief. There is no forgetting this one. The words that are repeated, in murmurs and whispers down the alleyways of cyberspace are the same. It could have been my brother. It could have been my boyfriend. It could have been my mother. It could have been me.
It could have been the girl and her father who had lunch in Luk Yuen. It could have been the boy who was planning to go to Toby’s to look at sports equipment. It could have been any of the thousands who pour out of the Ayala MRT station and flood the crossing into Glorietta. There’s no longer any sense of safety—it happened in a mall, that safe haven of the 21st century. It is the same mall where young couples hold hands while walking, the same mall so many of us who were raised in Manila have wandered into dozens of times without a thought. And in Glorietta 2, where the bomb struck, there were play areas, and toys, and children’s books, and stores for mommies-to-be. Safe? We don’t know what that means anymore.
But in my own space I had to point out one troubling aspect of the whole tragedy is that it shows no one is capable of rallying the country even in times of disaster, when the normal (and healthy) instinct of a population should be to rally around the flag. I’ve learned that readers only react to columns when they disagree, and so I wasn’t surprised when some readers took exception with my generally praising the police: but it is really too soon, to my mind, to come to any conclusions about how they’ve handled things.
As things stand, last Sunday’s Inquirer editorial asked readers to brace themselves, and pointed out something blogger Pwede Na, who has a must-read blog entry which begins with a meditation on our mall culture,
There is a direct relationship between the noise levels in a mall, the frigidity of the aircon, and the income levels of the shoppers – the poorer the clientele, the colder and louder the mall. Poor folk come to a mall to cool down, and to be entertained. They want their money’s worth!
SM North Mall leaves one half deaf after an hour, and you had better bring a sweater if you’re planning to take in a movie. The Rockwell Mall, which you can’t even get to on public transportation, goes for the very upscale shopper and is nearly silent. So, if you want powerful aircon, well, you can get that at home.
A few weeks after the new TRINOMA mall opened I realized it was not going for the same demographic as the Ayala’s Glorietta Mall in the City of Makati’s financial district. TRINOMA now leaves me almost as hearing impaired as SM North. Adjacent to a new cross-country bus terminal, TRINOMA advertises itself as a “regional mall†capturing shoppers from the provinces a few hours north of Metro Manila. You can see the probinsyanos wandering the mall, wide eyed, and hanging on to each other. ATM machines every 50 meters insure that they won’t come up short on cash before they head back to the bus terminal and the return trip to Bulacan, Tarlac, or Pampanga.
And why the public has reacted the way it has:
What is interesting is how quickly we absorb the shock, those of us who did not lose a loved one and who were not injured. On Sunday, two days after the event, we were in the SM North Mall to get some gardening supplies. The mall had about half the number of people one might normally expect for a Sunday. Barring any new bombings, I suspect the crowd will be back to normal by next Sunday.
The October 21, 2007 editorial in the Philippine Daily Inquirer notes the sadness of our country, the fact that there are so many suspects in this bombing. The real tragedy, however, is that for a great many Filipinos and other residents, including this one, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and her government are among the suspects. This is not the assessment of wild-eyed conspiracy theorists, but of average work-a-day people.
Similar thoughts were echoed in today’s Inquirer editorial, too.
A day prior to this story, Investigators not discounting accident in Glorietta blast, word was already going around that the police were rethinking the accident angle. As well they should, since all possibilities have to be looked into. But a hypersensitive public will tend to pore over every official comment to see what it may mean when police officials say US experts unable to detect C-4 component from blast site, when perhaps all the cops are doing is trying to be more nuanced:
However, Razon said the test results could have varied because Philippine and American authorities swabbed different areas.
“The [US] tests are negative because when the US experts arrived at the blast site, they swabbed the exterior portions or the portions that were not directly at the center, or at the seat, of the explosion. That’s why it tested negative,” Razon said in Filipino.
Razon added that, “But when the PNP Crime Laboratory personnel conducted their swabs, it was in the general vicinity of the seat of the explosion.”
“That is the explanation why the swabbing of US experts showed negative results for RDX,” he said.
As it is, even as the latest is, PNP: Accident in Glorietta becoming more and more likely: No bomb components found, they better be doing their homework and dotting every i and crossing every t (and here’s how things can get misconstrued: some would ask, why doesn’t the FBI say something, then; others will say, that’s protocol, they’re guests so only Philippine officials will talk; how to resolve it? Officials should say if protocol’s at work or what to expect by way of an official statement from foreign observers).
Inner Sanctum explores the accident theory, which he says “geek friends” proposed even when official statements started focusing on that possibility:
Over the weekend, several geek friends of mine have put forward deflagration as the probable cause of the Glorietta blast, especially after The Inquirer published a composite image of the blast site inside the Glorietta 2 lobby.
According to them, deflagration is just like a gigantic fart, wherein tremendous gas pressure is released similar to a gas-powered canon–meaning, in one direction–as opposed to the ripple effect of a bomb.
Philippine Commentary who seemed morally convinced the blast was terrorist-related, goes to greater lengths and points to GexCon, a gas explosion consultancy, whose handbook does make interesting reading. but not everyone is quick to embrace this possibility.
However, Chemical experts doubt new blast theory:
Ernesto dela Cruz and Wilfredo Jose, both professors in chemical engineering, faculty members and students said it was unlikely that a leak from the tank containing thousands of liters of diesel at the mall’s basement caused the blast.
The engineers said diesel is not a volatile substance and will not explode as a liquid at any rate. They said it has to be in a gaseous state and has to vaporize before it can explode.
They said that for diesel to vaporize, it has to be heated to up to more than 200 degrees Celsius inside a diesel engine.
Dela Cruz, Jose and the others also said that it would also be impossible that methane gas that allegedly leaked from the mall’s septic tank caused the blast.
The experts, however, said that methane explodes only if ignited. They said a mixture of five to 15 percent methane and 85 percent oxygen may explode when lit.
They added that the mixture should contain a substantial amount of chemical components to reach a blast magnitude similar to the one at the mall on Friday afternoon.
The professors said they doubt that there was enough methane inside the Glorietta 2 sewer to fuel the explosion that reached up to the building’s roof three stories from the basement.
They also said that the rate of reaction would have to be quick to attain an explosion with impact. There should also have been a bad odor, much like that of rotten eggs, if the cause of the blast was indeed methane gas.
More convincing is Tongue In, Anew:
If the diesel tank, which by the way is almost always filled especially in applications such as malls and other establishments frequented by many people, did cause the huge explosion, it should have been blown beyond recognition. Generators used for critical applications such as Glorietta’s are typically run with and without load weekly both automatically then manually for about fifteen minutes just to make sure the Genset (engine + alternator/dynamo w/ Auto-start/Auto-shutdown circuits) and the electrical controls (Automatic Transfer Switch, Paralleling Switchgear, etc.) will work in the event a real power interruption (brownout) does occur. It also ensures that the batteries are recharged regularly. Without batteries, generators are worthless. This regular process, called Plant Exercise, makes it imperative that the fuel tank/s are always filled to its upper limits. Meaning very little space for compression and combustion in the tank’s upper chamber.
What did the pictures show? A fuel tank standing perfectly by itself, except for a small hole and with a portion of the top cover appearing to me as intentionally pried open. The tank did not appear to have “bloated” or puffed out as it should be if it had exploded from inside. The small hole? It looks to me like it was there all the time. Maybe a vent punched out by maintenance for pressure release. This is necessary especially if the fuel delivery pipes to the engine operate by gravity (think pressurized water tanks vs. gravity tanks).
Or it could have been used as inspection hole to check fuel level either visually or by using a dipstick. Some tanks usually have level indicators using a transparent plastic tubing stretched vertically outside with both ends connected to metal tubes welded at the top and bottom of the tank’s side. The level outside is the same inside since liquids seek their own level. But since this type of indication is neither rigid nor durable, at some time maintenance people disable this and use the more reliable dipstick method.
Again, the metal plate that this hole was created in did not look dented in nor puffed out that would have indicated any explosion either coming directly from the top or from the inside, respectively.
I now also remember talking to military officers from the Electronics group called AFPCES some years back who wanted me to design and build diesel tanks thick enough to repel bullets. I was told the NPAs use AFPCES’ tanks for target practice (including soldiers climbing their antenna masts) but when I asked how many have died in the explosions, I was told the bullets just punctured the tanks and at worst, it would deprive them of a week’s supply of diesel but no explosions. Either I was watching too many cowboy movies at the time or totally ignorant to have asked that.
Who also explores the sewage tank angle:
From what little I know about sewage treatment plants (I designed and installed electrical controls including semi-automation modules for, what do you know? A high-rise 5-star Hotel and a mall complex!), the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)- if your establishment spills a huge volume of effluent towards the Laguna Lake or any of its tributary rivers, or the DENR – if your sewers lead to floodways or esteros flowing to any of the seas in Luzon, sewage treatment plants (STPs) ARE required by either gov’t offices before Environmental and Sanitation Permits are issued, thus construction permits are withheld in their absence. A mall the size of Glorietta, or the whole Makati Commercial Complex or Ayala Center as it is now called, IS required to operate a Sewage Treatment Plant.
Two possibilities, therefore. Either Glorietta has its own or it pumps its sewage into a central STP operated by Ayala Center. If not, then either LLDA or DENR did not do its job here. Or were bribed. In the late nineties, 2 or 3 malls/condos in the Ortigas-Shaw corridor were issued Cease and Desist Orders by LLDA because they were found pumping sewage straight to the city lines. They were heavily fined and closed temporarily until they constructed their own STPs. At least, that’s what the papers said.
What does an STP do?
To simplify, it first screens solids out of the influent waste from the mall, breaks down into “digestible” size large sediments like a giant blender with many agitator blades at the bottom of the tank; then pumps all of it into an aeration tank where air produced by big fan blowers is pumped from under the sludge, making aerobic bacteria digest organic waste. The next tanks would separate liquid from the remaining sludge. Liquid undergoes chlorination before the effluent is released to the city sewers while the remaining sludge repeats the process. This is where methane gas is produced. In large quantities, it may be dangerous as 14% methane mixed with oxygen explodes when ignited. Some large STPs use the gas to heat and dissolve the sludge but in this size (Glorietta’s) there is not enough methane produced to install a collector-burner stage. Abroad, it is common in city-size STPs but of the 3 private-owned medium-sized STPs I’ve worked on in the past, I have not seen one with a methane collector-burner stage, much less one that exploded.
It would be stupid likewise that Glorietta, or Ayala for that matter, would maintain a large septic vault holding raw sewage under one of its public buildings. They employ the finest architectural firms in the world to design their projects, any firm of that caliber would definitely not skip the basic requirements in their designs. So will sanitation and safety engineers, too. Even our houses’ pozo negros have vent pipes with which to “breathe” out the gas. Further, Methane does not stay stable for long. It breaks down into Hydrogen Sulfide which is a very toxic gas. We haven’t heard anyone die of gas poisoning in Glorietta prior to the incident, have we? Instead, what many witnesses and victims smelled was a gunpowder-like odor. Or in one victim’s words, “amoy-paputok”, which is characteristic of a C4 blast. A explosion caused by methane could be preceded or followed by flames and we haven’t heard of any such thing in Glorietta. Let’s take a look at the simplified chemical equation of burning methane in ordinary air:
CH4 + 2(O2 + 3.76N2) = 2H2O + CO2 + 2(3.76N2 + energy
where energy may be all or combination of Sound/Heat/Light/Shockwave
It is standard that explosion relief vents are constructed in STPs, more so one under a Generator room. The Generator Room itself, depending on the size and quantity of gensets, may have several exhaust fans to evacuate the hot air around the engines, the cooling system’s radiators (or water pipes to the external cooling towers for large installations), and the exhaust mufflers. I will not accept any excuse that the generator room is a totally contained/enclosed one, meaning a sealed vault where the operators can die from fumes inhalation either from the fuel or the engine exhaust. It is therefore safe to conclude that the generator room was well ventilated. Blast waves and shock waves cannot be produced like that as in Glorietta (blasting through the flooring up to the 4th floor) if it was not a sealed container.
Now, a room that has many vents and openings, doors, windows, vents, etc. should have allowed the smell at least of the foul-odored sewage, or methane gas, or hydrogen sulfide (when methane breaks down) and it would have been detected earlier by Ayala personnel or reported by shoppers. Any reports? Nothing I’m sure.
That being the case, and all the foregoing arguments here from my raw experience and stock knowledge, all debunks either the methane or diesel theory or the combination of both.
And from the layman’s point of view, Uniffors points out, however,
Remember a few years ago, there was a methane gas explosion from an underground sewage pipe in the street fronting the DFA office in Roxas Blvd. The blast was so powerful it tore up the pavement and sent a car a few feet airborne, but there was [no] fire.
Journal of the Jester-in-Exile tries to tie all the information together (read the whole thing):
Back to wrapping up a few things. In the next episode of CSI: Makati, I’ll be talking about my hypothesis on the why, as a follow-up to the how, the Glorietta blast occurred. Let’s face it — it takes a lot to ignite diesel and methane vapor, even in a confined environment, and the confined environment itself has factors that militate against the ignition of the flammable vapor (e.g., the velocity of the aircon exhaust roiling and disturbing the air inside the confined environment, the absence of any pressurization in the diesel tank or septic tank that would cause flammable vapor to accumulate much too rapidly for the vapor to be dispersed into outside air). Thus, it seems to me that it’s fairly unlikely that this was a simple case of an industrial accident.
Okay, it MAY BE an industrial accident, but it was probably STAGED.
American blogger Left Flank says American troops here on exercises might be playing it too cool (while prudently keeping safe) but also says,
The most ridiculous commentary on Filipino politics, though might be this: “An alternative theory in the investigation into the Makati bombing is that it was accidentally set off by incendiary material inside the building.â€
Make that clumsy employee president!
One news item shows how intense emotions have gotten: Kin of Glorietta victims ask Arroyo for justice, not cash. And Twilight Zone news stories just adds to the unease: Calls to Rajah Solaiman diverted to Rep. Biazon’s cell phone.
In the end, I have to say ahnnabanana makes a good point:
A lot of friends overseas are writing about how glad they are that they left because they heard about the recent Glorietta bombing. How the Filipinos have grown apathetic and indifferent to such tragedies. That they’re so safe in America blah blah blah. I don’t think we’re apathetic. We feel bad about it, yes. But realistically, what is there to do about it? Protest with signs that say “STOP THE BOMBINGS”? Stay in our houses and not go to malls forever? Cry to show that we’re affected? Hold prayer rallies? Of course people will still go to work. Of course life will go on. When it happened I was doing a show in Greenbelt, the mall right beside Glorietta. Yesterday I had one, today I had two shows. Something like this can happen anywhere. A bomb can be assembled inside a mall with materials bought inside a mall. And where did the Columbine and Virginia tech shooting happen again? America, right? I’m not trying to go on this self-righteous, nationalistic high horse. My point is NO PLACE IS SAFE, not even first-world countries. It pisses me off when people are proud to be Filipino when something good happens like Pacquiao winning some boxing match then disown the country when something bad happens.
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